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THE SOCIAL PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT WAR.*

An American publicist[1] recently predicted that the end of our present social order would come before 1930. He points out that many of the social tendencies of the present are strikingly like those which preceded the French Revolution. He cites the mental opacity of our ruling classes as in many respects similar to the stupidity of the old French nobility when they were faced by the necessity of social readjustment in their time. The parallel between recent social unrest and that which preceded the storm of the French Revolution would probably be assented to by nearly all students of social history. Indeed it requires no profound scientific mind to see the parallel. The blindness and ultra-conservatism of many in our privileged classes on the one hand, the fanatic radicalism and one-sidedness of many of the leaders of the non-privileged on the other, would breed trouble in any social order. Unless plasticity of mind and a sense of social obligation can be instilled into our socially fortunate classes, and broad-minded and constructive views shall dominate the leaders of our masses, Western civilization is indeed brewing for the world something worse than a French Revolution.

The problem of our civilization is, however, something more than the mere threatened overthrow of existing political and industrial institutions. This the European war makes evident. The problem before us is not how to avoid political revolution, but rather how to avoid the decay and disintegration of civilization itself. Many writers have recently told us that our civilization is on the wane, and many things might be cited in the present war to show that such a conclusion is no mere expression of temperamental pessimism. Indeed, the parallel between existing social conditions in the Western world and those which we find in the Rome of the decadence is closer even than the parallel between our social unrest and that of pre-revolutionary France. There was no need of a Ferrero to point this out.[2] All who know anything at all about the inner facts of our civilization and that of decadent

* A paper read before the Sociological Society on November 10, 1914; Viscount Bryce in the Chair.

1. Brooks Adams, *Theory of Social Revolutions* (1913).
2. See *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*; also *Ancient Rome and Modern America* (1914).

Rome know the disturbing resemblances. The decay in religious belief, in moral ideals, in political honour, the conflict of classes, the breakdown of social regulation and control, the demand for a strong man and a centralized government to enforce order—all of these phenomena of the present suggest the parallel with Rome. The very forces which undermined Roman civilization, viz., commercialism, individualism, materialistic standards of life, militarism, a low estimate of marriage and the family, agnosticism in religion and in ethics, seem to be the things which are now prominent, if not dominant, in Western civilization.

The war has come as a shock to those who have not studied intimately the foundations of nineteenth-century European culture; but in my opinion it is not an accident of any sort, in diplomacy or otherwise. Rather the war has merely exposed the rottenness of some of those foundations of Western civilization. We have supposed that we could rear a secure social structure upon the basis of an egoistic and materialistic social philosophy. We have permitted a rebarbarization of the individual's moral standards without imagining that these would actually express themselves in the life of nations. We have thought that somehow, out of a programme of self-interest, material satisfactions, and brute force followed by men and nations, a settled and harmonious order would result. Even now there are those who fail to see that the egoistic, socially-negative doctrines, which got such a hold of Western civilization in the nineteenth century, both in theory and in practice, are the sources of present disorder. They look for some more ultimate sources in biologic or economic necessities. But those who see clearly must perceive that while biologic and economic conditions may act as stimuli, the real roots of civilization are always in the mental attitudes and conscious values of individuals. They will also see that some of the mental attitudes and values approved as sound by the nineteenth century have proved unsound in practice; and that the present war of nations calls for a reconstruction of our social philosophy—a rebuilding of it—on a different basis from that approved by the nineteenth century.

This may seem but a partial view of present society, and the writer is glad so to confess. But there is beyond question in Western civilization at the present time a mighty conflict going on between social philosophies, between ideals of life, between the forces of social disorder and dissolution on the one hand, and of social reconstruction and progress on the other. All other conflicts are but parts of this grand conflict in our civilization. No one, perhaps, can at the present time foresee the outcome of this conflict; but all can, at least, be intelligently informed as to its existence and know something of the power of forces arrayed on either side.

We are not justified in thinking that the outcome will be a matter either of chance or of fatal necessity. Nations and civilizations, so far as the historian and the sociologist can discover, do not die natural deaths; their decadence and extinction seem to be rather the result of wrong choices, of misjudgments, especially on the part of the social *élite* who furnish the leaders in the fields of thought and action. If then our civilization is "at the cross roads," as a recent English writer has well said,[3] let no one suppose that the road which it will ultimately take is predetermined. That will be a matter to be decided by the amount of social intelligence and character which the individuals of the present and of the immediate future can show. In proportion, in other words, as we can get an intelligent insight into the existing social problem and an intelligent appreciation of the individual and social qualities needed to meet that problem, in that proportion we may hope to control the destiny of our civilization.

The old world of our forefathers has suddenly, within a generation, enlarged and burst its bounds. The world in which we live may justly be regarded as a new world, transformed out of the old by the working of forces yet imperfectly understood. Many new problems have suddenly come upon us, due to the increase of population, the increase of knowledge, the intermingling of races and cultures, the increasing interdependence of nations, the invention of new machines, and other new developments in industry, politics, and religion. These many problems, however, have long been seen, even by superficial students, to be interdependent. Back of our social problems, we are gradually coming to realize, there is *the* social problem; but unfortunately we are far from agreed as yet as to what that problem is. Theorist and practical reformer alike have been too prone to see it from the little corner in which they were working. The truly broad view of the problem is scarcely to be found in the social literature of the present, unless perhaps in the pages of a few writers who apparently have no appreciable influence as yet on practical social and political leaders.

The present strife between classes and nations has obscured the real nature of the social problem in many ways, but in others it has clarified the issues involved. It has shown that the social problem cannot be defined or understood from any point of view which is merely national. War has suddenly revealed the interdependence of national groups and the common life of humanity. When any one nation claims that "action in favour of collective humanity outside of the limits of the State or nationality is impossible";[4] and that its own mission is to impose its superior civilization upon as large a part of humanity as possible, the rest

3. J. N. Figgis, *Civilization at the Cross Roads.*
4. Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, p. 26.

of the civilized world stands aghast at this frank avowal of group egoism as a basis for practical living. It suddenly becomes evident that the unit of our sociological thinking must be humanity. We see that group egoism, whether of a nation, class, or race, is no lovelier than individual egoism. Again, the danger of taking some single principle, like that of the biological struggle for existence, from some single aspect of life, and conceiving the human problem preponderatingly in its terms becomes evident when we are told that "the aspiration [to abolish war] is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws which rule all life."[5] We begin to see that all the factors which shape civilized human life, whether material or immaterial, must be taken into account in any truly broad view of the social problem.

Let us specify briefly some of the particular narrow views of the social problem which are dangerously prevalent at the present time. To many whose vision has been confined largely to the economic relations of classes within the nation, the modern social problem has seemed essentially the labour problem. If it is not merely the problem of the harmonious adjustment of employer and employee, it is at most the problem of finding a social order in which work and enjoyment shall be in satisfactory relationship to each other. Hence the generally prevalent view that the social problem is essentially the problem of the satisfactory production and just distribution of wealth. To find the proper methods of producing and distributing material goods would solve the social problem, according to those thinkers.

The pacifists, however, looking beyond the bounds of national life, and emphasizing the dangers to civilization itself of international conflicts, have suggested that the pressing social problem of the present is that of international relationships. If, by treaties, international federal councils and arbitration courts could be established to discuss all questions and settle all disputes between nations; if the burdens of militarism and of increasing armaments could thus be got rid of; then, they seem to think, the inherent forces in civilization, such as increasing knowledge and increasing control over external nature, could be trusted to work out the solution of all minor questions.

But the eugenists, looking beyond the bounds of the present generation, have lately insisted that the real social problem of the present is the problem of the relation of the generations to one another, more particularly, the problem of the control of heredity. Starting out with an abstract biologic man, much like the abstract economic man of the early nineteenth century, they seem to think that the all-important matter is the breeding of man. To secure

5. *Ibid.*, p. 18

the perfect, or even the normal physical man, would be to solve, they think, the essential problem of humanity.

To the leaders of the feminist movement, again, the social problem appears to be very largely the Woman Problem, or at most the problem of the relations of the sexes to one another. When opportunity is given to woman to assert herself freely, to develop her own personality fully, and to make her full contribution to the social life of mankind, then the problems of our civilization will easily be solved.

The views of pacifists, eugenists, and feminists are all to be welcomed as tending to bring out the larger human elements in the problem. Some of us, at least, are beginning to perceive that the social problem is now, what it has been in all ages, namely, *the problem of the relations of men to one another*. It is the problem of human living together, and cannot be confined to any statement in economic, eugenic, or other one-sided terms. The social problem is neither the labour problem, nor the problem of the distribution of wealth, nor the problem of the relation of population to natural resources, nor of the control of hereditary qualities, nor of the harmonious adjustment of the relations of the sexes; but it is all of these and much more. If the social problem is the problem of human living together, then it is as broad as humanity and human nature, and no mere statement of it in terms of one set of factors will suffice. Such a statement obscures the real nature of the problem, and may lead to dangerous one-sided attempts at its solution.

A word of caution is necessary here. Because the greatest possible broadmindedness is needful to view aright the social problem—the problem of human living together—it must not be thought that it is beyond the power of the human intellect or of science. On the contrary, we may boldly claim that if we will keep to the common-sense view of the world, and not be seduced by one-sided philosophies, enough knowledge of how human groups do actually live together has already been accumulated to make it possible for any well-trained mind to see deeply and truly into the problem of human living together—whether the living together concern two or three individuals or humanity as a whole. Nor must it be thought that, because so many different factors are involved in our social life, there is no such thing as "the social problem," that it is only a name for many different problems. On the contrary, nothing is so real as the social problem, the problem of living together. Every age, nation, and individual must solve it in some way, by howsoever crude a social philosophy. But to solve it aright for humanity at large—in universal terms, so to speak—requires a scientific understanding of the forces at work in human inter-relations, and careful putting together in a right way

of all the factors concerned. In brief, it requires a scientific sociology.

Let us, therefore, consider the nature of the unity of a social group in the light of modern sociology in order to see what the nature of the social problem of the present is upon scientific analysis.[6] A social group, whatever else it may be, is a mass of interactions between the individuals who compose it; but if it is to have any sort of unity, these interactions must be regulated and controlled: that is, the activities of the individual members of the group must be adjusted to one another in some more or less definite way. Otherwise, the group cannot work together as a unit nor can its actions work out to any definite end. While analogies are dangerous in science, it may be helpful to compare our social group to a machine. Now the unity of a machine is secured by the nice adjustment of its parts to one another. If this adjustment is not mechanically perfect, there is friction and it will not work well, or perhaps not at all. So in the social group there must be this nice adjustment between the activities of its individual members, if the group is to work well as a unity, or even at all. But the parts of the social mechanism, if we may so call it, are not bits of dead inert physical matter, but are living, feeling, thinking individual units. The machinist has only to know the principles of physics in order to manipulate the parts of the machine as he will, to secure its harmonious working. But the social leader cannot so easily manipulate the individuals of his group. He must understand human nature in all its phases; that is, he must know the principles of psychology instead of physics to make the social mechanism work harmoniously. He must understand all the factors, in other words, involved in that adjustment of the activities of individuals to one another which is necessary in order that the group may work together as a unity.

Now the factors which are involved in the harmonious adjustment of the parts of our social machine are evidently very numerous. First of all, of course, are the external physical conditions. These must be such as to favour the normal development of human life in all ways, or else the social machine will work badly or not at all. But taking favourable conditions in the external environment for granted, it is evident that many internal factors will need to be considered. First among these is the biological make-up of the individuals concerned, and the impulses or instincts which this make-up gives rise to. Unless these are such as to favour the adjustment of the activities of individuals concerned, we can scarcely expect any high degree of social unity. Heredity must be right or else our social machine will not work. Beyond

6. For a more detailed and scientific analysis of social unity see the writer's *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Chapter VIII.

heredity, however, and equally important, is the matter of the acquired habits of the individuals of the group. Either these habits must be similar, or if different, must be such that they can be harmoniously co-ordinated, or else again we shall have little or no social unity. Mere habituation has much to do with maintaining social order; and therefore, external circumstances which affect habit must be strictly controlled by a group if it is to keep its unity. But if any social unity of more than a merely animal sort is to be attained, certain purely subjective elements must also be taken into account. For in all conscious human groups it is the mental attitude of the individuals toward one another that is the final decisive factor which decides whether a group shall maintain its unity or be disrupted. There are, for example, the feelings, sentiments, beliefs, ideas, and opinions of the individuals of the group. Not only must these be similar within certain limits, but the members of the group must be more or less conscious of this similarity, that is, they must develop mutual sympathy and understanding. From mutual sympathy and understanding, moreover, arise confidence and mutual trust which make possible still closer co-ordination between the members of a group.

All of these are necessary that the mechanism of human society may work harmoniously. And such facts show conclusively that the unity of human groups is essentially a psychic or spiritual matter. Destroy the psychic element in it, and we would have no society. Even if the psychic element may be only a means to perfect the adjustments of life, still it is evidently the absolutely decisive factor in the social life of civilized men. And we shall see as we proceed that the psychic or spiritual elements in social life are not wholly derived from the immediate environment, but have a life history of their own. These simple principles of social unity apply to all human groups, from the simplest to humanity if it shall even become organized.

But what makes civilization? The level of civilization in social development is not reached until, in addition to all of the instincts, habits, feelings and sentiments which unite men into groups, we have certain socially co-ordinating, unifying ideas and ideals. For essentially civilization is the discovery, diffusion, and transmission from age to age of the knowledge, beliefs, ideas and ideals by which men have found it possible to conquer nature and live together in well-ordered groups. It is, in large measure, the substitution of a "subjective environment" of ideas and ideals for the objective environment of material objects; and cultural evolution is possible only through the continuity of ideas and social values. Civilization, in other words, *is at the bottom the creation and transmission of ideal values by which men regulate their conduct.* It is, therefore, essentially a spiritual affair and cannot be measured by changes in

the material environment, prone as we may be to measure it thus. While human society was from the start psychic, it is manifest that only in its higher developments does it become so dominated by the psychic that it may well be called spiritual. Likeness in the beliefs and ideals of its members becomes finally even more important than the likeness of impulse, habit, and feeling which was the original foundation of group life.

Civilized human beings, in other words, cannot live together harmoniously without some mutually accepted scale of values by which they can measure and regulate conduct. They need not only the like-mindedness which springs from similar impulses, habits, emotions, and feelings, but also generally accepted ideas and ideals of life, if they are to achieve any social order worthy to be called civilized. A civilized social order must rest upon certain ideal values, which, at least in a democratic society, must be accepted by a large majority of the population.

Now, when we look out on Western society, we find absolute difference, if not hopeless conflict, between the fundamental beliefs and ideals of its members. If Western civilization is at present torn with conflicts, it is because just now our world of values is topsy-turvy. Faith in the old ideals by which men have lived in the past has decayed in many classes, and no new ideals have yet been found and generally accepted upon which to build a new social order. There is scarcely an institution, from the family to the State, which is not in the crucible of fiery criticism and in apparent disintegration. Take the institution of the family for illustration. Instead of the general acceptance of permanent monogamy as the ideal of the family, which it was until very recently in Western civilization, we now see this form of the family attacked on every side and classes who advocate divorce by mutual consent, free love, polygyny, and even promiscuity. The proportion of individuals who hold to these views in Western civilization is now so great that their existence can no longer be ignored, while it must be admitted that an even larger number practise these theories without being willing to admit that they hold them as their standards. Much of the present criticism of the family, in other words, is no longer constructive, but anarchistic and absolutely destructive, and is proving so in actual practice.

Again, if we take modern literature as faithfully reflecting the inner condition of our civilization, the absolute disagreement as to ideals of life becomes even more plainly visible. A very large part of modern literature repudiates not only the traditional standards of Christian ethics, but all truly humanitarian standards whatsoever. It exalts the individual as an end and as a law unto himself, and not infrequently inculcates the gratification of natural impulses and appetites as the highest good in life. It often derides the ideals of

service and of self-sacrifice for the sake of service, and even the idea of social obligation. The individual and his feelings are its supreme value. It is not simply a few minor writers who thus flout the traditional morality of Christendom in the family and in general social relations, but some of the foremost names in literature to-day. The decay of our moral ideals is evident, then, from even a cursory acquaintance with modern literature.

If we take the United States as an example of one of the most developed nations in Western civilization, we find that it illustrates the utmost confusion and conflict with respect to the higher values of life. Every American, of course, with the exception of a few belated idealists, is agreed as to the value of wealth, and of the comfort and power and position which wealth will bring. Practically every American is also agreed as to the value of individual liberty, the power to do as one pleases, with a minimum of social constraint. Most Americans are also probably in agreement as to the value of health, or at least they are rapidly coming to such agreement. Finally, the American people seem to be becoming convinced of the value of knowledge, and so of education, at least the education of information. But if there are other social values of moment, as to which the American people are in practically unanimous agreement, the writer is at a loss to mention them. They are certainly not in agreement as to the value of the family, property, government, morality, or religion. "It is useless to deny," says Professor Giddings, "that our present tendency in the United States is toward anarchy in all those fields of human interest which we have not yet brought under the iron hand of our central government"; and he might have added, especially in the field of social ideals.

Again, if we take modern Germany as an example of one of the most developed peoples in Europe, we find that in it certain tendencies of our civilization have come to a head. We find that practical ethics has become based upon a crude evolutionary naturalism, which has eventuated in the worship of power, as in Nietzsche and von Treitschke. Speaking from personal experience, I should say that a hard materialism seems to dominate the great mass of the German people from pauper to prince. This materialism expresses itself in a great many socially negative doctrines—doctrines which are not favourable to increasing human solidarity. In the ruling classes, there has been increasing worship of the army system, and tacit, if not open, acceptance of the beliefs that the might of the State is the supreme right, and that the end justifies the means. Hence for a long period a Machiavellian political philosophy has dominated in Germany, not only in practical politics, but to a large extent in academic circles also. A very large school of German historical and political writers have

endorsed such views. It is over a generation since Gustav von Rümelin, the renowned chancellor of the University of Tübingen, declared[7] that the principles of Christian morality could not possibly be applied to politics, and especially not to the relations between nations. This doctrine has been constantly re-echoed, and it is no wonder that a recent German militarist writer can declare: "This law [of love] can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties Christian morality is personal, and in its nature cannot be political." With such ignoring of humanity, it is not surprising, either, that the doctrines of Nietzsche, although individualistic rather than nationally egoistic, with their negation of all Christian, and of most social virtues, have proved popular in German society.

It would be unjust, of course, to say that all Germans accept such views of life as have just been indicated, quite as much as it would be unjust to charge them with accepting free love and polygamy because some of their writers have advocated such practices. But it is necessary to point out how far the pendulum has swung toward barbarism in a people once famed among European peoples for their social idealism and Christian piety.[8] But Germany only illustrates the reversion towards barbarism in Western civilization generally. And this reversion toward barbarism in the ideals of life must be regarded as one of the chief causes of the present fierce struggle among European nations. It would not be difficult to cite many instances of recrudescence of barbarism among other European peoples. Indeed, the most distressing thing about the present war is not the frightful destruction of life and property, but the barbarous hatred manifested by the contending nations toward each other—a hatred such as has scarcely been witnessed in recent European wars. In Germany, for example, admirals, generals, journalists, and even university professors and theologians seem to have vied with each other in the expression of the most bitter hatred toward England; while, on the side of the allies the most eminent Belgian writer of the century, M. Maeterlinck, has said that no mercy must be shown the Germans; that "they must be destroyed as we destroy a nest of wasps."[9] How world peace is to issue from the atmosphere of envenomed hate which now enshrouds the classes, nations, and races of the modern world, is difficult for even the wisest man to see. Mr. H. G. Wells's prophetic picture of the destruction of modern civilization seems within the measure of possible realization.

7. See his *Reden und Aufsätze*, Vol. I, pp. 144—191.
8. By "barbarism" I mean that state of civilization in which the chief social sanctions employed are those of brute force, and little or no control is exercised through the higher ethical values.
9. *The Daily Mail*, September 14, 1914.

Now these statements are not made as a basis for any pessimistic conclusion. They are simply given as facts. Such facts are indications, to be sure, of grave social disorder; but such disorder, may, to a certain extent, be a normal accompaniment of the profound social changes through which Western civilization is now passing. To be sure, the negative social ideas which now prevail among certain classes in Western nations cannot be considered an indication of social normality. On the contrary, they present real dangers; but our contention is that in passing from one type of social order to another we must expect a certain amount of confusion in regard to the ideas and ideals by which men govern their lives. It is impossible for societies to change their methods of living without some degree of confusion, just as it is impossible for individuals to make such changes without some confusion. And if the change which has to be made is a great one, there is liable to be opportunity for much conflict between different groups, whether classes or nations.

Moreover, so far as a sound social philosophy can discern, there is nothing necessary or inevitable about the hatred and conflicts of classes and nations which we are now witnessing. Lack of right ideals of social life and lack of sympathetic understanding will explain most of the conflict. Hence there is a good scientific basis for a melioristic attitude toward the present conflicts which seem to threaten to tear our civilization asunder. Whatever the issue of the present war, only able social leadership is needed to lead the nations to something higher and better than nineteenth century civilization, possibly even to a real solidarity of humanity. If we are in hopeless conflict, it can only be because we are in hopeless conflict regarding the ideals of life, in utter disagreement concerning the fundamental principles by which men should live. Not until we can reach some unity in social doctrine on a sound scientific basis, as Comte long ago proclaimed, can we have either stability in our civilization or unity and peace in our social life.

But if the present war is due to a lack of unity in the social philosophy underlying our civilization, if it is a contest between social systems and social ideals within that civilization, and if moreover such confusion and conflict is normal, especially in periods of transition, where is the danger? May we not adopt a completely optimistic attitude, and say that the best ideals and best social system are bound to win out in the present struggle? The reply is that in neither history nor sociology is there any assurance of continuous progressive social evolution. There is no assurance that when the institutions and values of a civilization are destroyed, they will be replaced by better ones. On the contrary, there is always the danger that there will be a reversion to a lower type of social order and of civilization. To see this, let us recall again the

nature of civilization, that it consists essentially in the propagation and conservation of ideal values. We see immediately that civilization is from its very nature a fragile affair; that it is possible for any of the great value traditions of civilized society at any moment to be destroyed, especially those which have respect to the higher institutions and relationships. And as Professor Hobhouse says: "If the tradition is broken, the race begins again where it stood before the tradition was formed."[10] It is easily possible, in other words, for civilized societies to return to barbarism, though a complete return would perhaps take centuries in the case of high civilizations, since not all civilizing traditions could be broken down at once. The decay of higher social values may, of course, go on in times of peace through the undermining of the sense of social obligation and social responsibility by materialism and individualism; and we have seen it long going on among ourselves. But in periods of international war and internal revolutions, with their bloody conflicts between peoples and classes, the process of social disintegration and of relapse towards barbarism may be infinitely accelerated. For in such conflicts the animal instincts of man are frightfully stimulated and apt to gain control, while negative social doctrines are made the impossible foundations of social order. Where such conflicts are long continued, the social loss and damage may become irreparable.

When we say that the modern social problem is fundamentally spiritual, and due to confusion and conflict with regard to the ideals of life, and that the present war is essentially a phase of this conflict, we must not be understood to deny the presence of many non-spiritual factors in the social problem or among the causes of the war. Man's social life, like individual character, develops about two poles—one the material conditions of life, and the other the psychic controls over life, which are represented by values, ideas, and ideals. No one who has investigated the social conditions of the present would deny for one instant the importance of the material conditions of life, especially of economic conditions, upon our civilization, and so upon this European war. But admitting the importance of the material conditions of life, no one has shown how these conditions can be controlled except through ideas. Unless the psychic element can exercise some control over economic conditions, *e.g.*, a melioristic attitude toward the problems of our civilization is impossible. The attack upon those problems must come in the first instance through bringing to bear upon them our ideas, ideals, and valuations. This means that our ideas, ideals, and values must be so expanded that they include, and give adequate recognition to, the material conditions of life.

10. *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 39.

The present situation in Western civilization then, we repeat, calls for no pessimism, but only alertness and intelligent appreciation of real dangers and difficulties, and a genuine largeness of mind in seeing all the factors involved, on the part of social leaders. Western civilization needs a great social and spiritual awakening. Let us hope that the present war will bring it. Our whole social atmosphere must be changed. The tradition of peace and goodwill must be established among the nations, and justice between man and man. We need a new social philosophy which will lay bare the faults in existing civilization. In any constructive programme for the future we must recognize that certain rotten stones were laid in the foundations of Western civilization; and that these must be removed if the whole superstructure is not to fall. As examples, we need only point to the materialism, individualism, and hyper-nationalism of the nineteenth century, which the twentieth century also is apparently starting out to take as its practical guides. These doctrines are socially negative; materialism, because at bottom it denies the reality of the spiritual or psychic elements which alone make civilization possible; individualism, because it denies the reality of the common life, upon recognition of which must rest the sense of social responsibility and obligation; hyper-nationalism, or national egoism, because it denies the common life of humanity and the unlimited obligation of nations to humanity. Yet we have been trying to build the delicate and complex structure of a humanitarian civilization upon these socially negative and destructive doctrines. So embedded are they in the structure of our civilization that their most prominent advocates are found among our intellectual and social *élite*. Even sociologists, who are supposed to be trying to find the solution of the social problem, are sometimes found among their supporters. To such an extent are even scientific men the puppets of their time!

With such social doctrines, it is no wonder that our civilization has evidently been breeding within itself a mass of barbarians who do not respect its higher values. These are the only enemies of which it has need to be afraid; for Western civilization is no longer threatened by external foes. If its walls are ever pulled down it will not be by the barbarians of Africa or Asia, but by the barbarians within its gates. Scarcely has civilization achieved security from attack without, when enemies within its own ranks seem about to betray and destroy it.

This, then, is the end of the whole matter, that if Western civilization is not to go down through a series of hopeless conflicts between nations and classes it must have a re-birth of humanitarian ethics, that is, "an ethics which shall teach the individual to find his self-development and his happiness in the service of others, and which will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race

from regarding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of humanity." The general acceptance of such an ethics would have prevented the present war; and whatever the issue of the struggle, only the frank acceptance of such humanitarianism by the leaders of future civilization can save the world from a series of endless conflicts between classes, nations, and races.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

WARDOM AND PEACEDOM: SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION.[1]

I CITE from a friend's letter before me: "Write your thoughts about this War. Can there be wars of progress? Is this the end of Capitalism, or, as some think, the destruction of our civilisation? What does it all mean, and whither are we drifting?"

We cannot answer such questions, it will be said; but let us at any rate go on asking them. Is it not through asking all manner of questions that we find the right questions, the questions answerable by research or by reflection? So each new science grows. Why not then a science of war—a branch of sociology of course, but still a distinctive and rational strategology; or, more exactly, a description of wars or strateography, with an interpretation of their significance—as far as may be indeed, a strategosophy. Let us at least ask a few of the questions for beginning the inquiries of such a science. What have been the main and characteristic wars of history, particularly of recent history? Can any order be observed in their recurrence; and if so, of what kind or kinds? In what regions have wars especially prevailed, and where have they been rarest? How far are they related to racial and anthropological origins; how far to predominant occupational activities, such as hunting and fishing, as compared with pastoral life and the labours of the peasant, and all these in various conditions of climate, production, etc.? Why, for instance, have the hunter and warrior Assyrian vanished, while their contemporaries, the peaceful Chinese peasants, still inhabit the earth in ever-increasing multitude?

There is a large popular literature of War, and all of great pretensions—with Bernhardi, and others too numerous to mention, for its prophets; and a pro-sociology, however inadequate, mythic, or false, cannot but be suggestive. Such writers have long made affirmations—in the name of anthropology and history, of human psychology and the rest—as to the eternal and ultimate combativeness of man; so that by sheer iteration, if not argument, a majority of the public seem to have come to believe them. Yet where, in any scientific forms, are their arguments to be found? And where the answers of the clamantly bellicose writers to such reasoned and vividly stated arguments as those, for instance, of Kropotkin or Tolstoi? But of the vast literature of war and peace our poor society has practically nothing—not from its plentiful lack of

1. A Paper read before the Civics Group of the Sociological Society, Nov. 27, 1914.

means: it has not yet sought it. But why should it not appeal to the various Peace Societies, who would surely willingly help to a bibliography, if not even to the beginning of a special library?

To these Peace Societies we might, and should, return the service of that condensed summary and that manifold classification of wars which must be the necessary scientific preliminary to any adequate interpretation of them. At first, no doubt, the problem seems insuperably difficult. It is the problem of describing a great game of life and death for multitudes, in fitful labyrinthine progress since man, and indeed his progenitors, have been upon the earth; in which the changing pieces are also players, and in which even the greatest players may be but pieces in their turn. Nevertheless, in the tangled and seeming confused chronology of history are there not observable some periodicities of recurrence, waves corresponding to generations and semi-generations, as has been once and again pointed out, and as often apparently forgotten? May not the history of wars be more orderly than it has seemed? So may not the war centres be marked out, amid more stable ones, upon the world's map of different periods, much as we map volcanic centres and earthquake areas, and work in each field of catastrophic and seeming fortuitous activity until an orderly vulcanology and seismology are attained? And besides seeking for such areas of war phenomena as may be discovered in space and in time, may we not enumerate and classify the different types of war, in terms of the social functioning and institutions of the peoples?

May we not go further, and generalize wars in terms of the essential types of human society, temporal and spiritual and their outer relations? For the "people" and "chiefs," in varying form, ever compose the temporal orders. The "intellectuals" and "emotionals" (or shall we say intuitionals and expressionals?) are no less permanently recognizable as making up the spiritual order which (as only economists can forget) is the indispensable and invariable hemisphere of any and every society—from the Regulars and Seculars of Catholicism to the specialists and popular writers or teachers, or the scientists and journalists of the larger world to-day. Some wars have been among the people, and more among the chiefs; many have been between chiefs and people—with results here aristocratic, there democratic. Amid these conflicts the Regulars, as we call them, from their antique cloisters, their modern studies or laboratories, have taken a not infrequent part (before and since their invention of gunpowder for instance); and still more the Seculars, whether as preachers or orators, writers or singers.

Such then are some of the inquiries which the sociologist cannot avoid, the more now that historians have accumulated ample materials for him, and indeed have in large measure anticipated his inquiries, especially as philosophers of history—although in a too

vaguely speculative form, in rebound from the too strictly annalist form of their historical material. It is between these two extremes that the path of sociological interpretation must lie; and may not such studies of war as those here pleaded for be one main method of advancing the science of society?

To give all this clearer definition, let us map out once more the stream of history and re-edit (as some of us have been doing for many years) upon a larger and fuller scale than ever, that "graphic chart of history" which has so long been a-making, so often compiled in parts, by historical workers, and of which the construction has been only temporarily pushed aside during that intensive criticism and study of documents which has been the main (and very necessary) task of historians in our own and recent times. Upon this chart let us mark no longer merely the successions of princes and their few most decisive battles, but, with a more vivid notation, insert the long waves and surging eddies of international and national wars. We have thus a means of comparison of wars which turns out strangely suggestive, and even yields at times general ideas; of which a single one, well worth pondering, may be offered here—that any advantages arising from war between two parties, A. and B., frequently turn out to be to some third party or parties, C. or X., by them unforeseen or altogether unknown.

Leave now this ordinary annalist's chart of universal history, with its wars and names and dates inserted to the full, and ask: Can we not next construct the same contemporary graphic for the philosophy of history—that is, of history without the characteristic names and the particular dates which identify the individual wave crests and wave marks—and map the great tides of time to which the waves belonged? In broad and simple ways we all do this: as when we speak of Græco-Roman times and their civilization, of the Middle Ages, of the Renaissance, and of the Revolution. For these then, and with such sub-divisions as we may, let us map out the main, the characteristic, social formations and types—again, that is, the people and their chiefs; the relevant (not merely surviving contemporary) intellectuals and emotionals. To give it definiteness we have to recall, first the people in their homes and workshops, their town-halls; next the chiefs in their castles or palaces; the intellectuals in their yet more strangely varying cloisters (studies, laboratories, studios) up to date; and briefly, the expressionals, from their pulpits to their pamphlets or newspaper columns, as the age may determine. Thus arises a fresh image—no longer so much of the flowing streams of national existences through time, now uniting again, or it may be separating anew, like the tributaries or branches of a river—but rather of a more organic and fourfold growth of grouped (or rather whorled) branches of a single tree of civilization. This main fourfold growth takes place upon the great

scale but rarely, only with the advent of a new order of things, as when the Middle Ages give place to the Renaissance, or the Renaissance to the Revolution. This tree of history the studious traveller may see in every city he visits; for from its changing town plan, its corresponding monuments, edifices, survivals of all kinds, he reconstructs the main aspect of its branching and fruiting, in wondrously complete detail of ramifications. All this is as yet too much overlooked by the annalist historians of library and document room, more even than by their literary predecessors, and by the observant connoisseurs of art and its museums.

Not less significant than the survivals of the ancient beauty of such historic city-trees are the dead branches left by time, the breakages and scars caused by its wars. Here in the natural and social palimpsest of the city are in fact the truest records; for history is no more a book science than are the sciences of nature—albeit themselves also each in books, and ever increasing them, yet ever (on pain of stagnation) allowing the authority of records and catalogues to usurp the place of that direct and first-hand interpretation of phenomena—that study of forms, living or fossil, which is their essential test.

In each of these various social formations, and their branches, we see the traces of wars, wars usually of all the kinds named, and in groupings and combinations of them. But beyond all alike, are there not more important war-movements, more terrific, more epic, more significant, because associated with great transitions—nodal wars, we may perhaps call them? Such for instance are the barbarian invasions through which the Roman order slowly gave place to the mediæval system. So again, may the Wars of the Reformation be called nodal or transitional, with as their provisional settlement, the Thirty Years War, though accompanied by sowings of dragon's teeth, once and again and even now springing up in armed men. So, once more, were plainly transitional the Wars of the Revolution, continuing into those of the Napoleonic Empire, with their consequences manifold. In such ways are we not moving at least to fuller questioning of what may be the origins, the nature, the significance, the possibilities, of the stupendous war in which we find ourselves engaged to-day? We come back, it may seem, to little beyond the vaguely general but suggestive questions quoted at the outset. Still it is something to have been seeing some lines of possible research: as we return upon these, further lights may develop. In what other way save by thus observing and recording, researching and pondering, do we reach scientific views of anything? And as these methods are applied, in what departments of inquiry have they failed to yield some results, and growing ones? The scientific and comparative (that is the historico-sociological) study of war may therefore be fairly

attempted; and when was there ever so vast and vivid an opportunity? If we fail now, we may well be asked (and we shall be), Of what value is your sociology after all?

If time and space permitted we should here return anew over the field, and, like M. de Bloch for his particular illustrative purpose, not be satisfied till we had prepared a veritable encyclopædia of war, together with an exhibition even more comprehensive than his War Museum at Paris in 1900, later established at Lausanne. The collection of matérials towards such an exhibition has long been one main task of the Edinburgh Outlook Tower; it already forms a substantial part of the Cities and Town-planning Exhibition; and the study of such accumulations, incomplete though they are, may fairly justify the claim, even the challenge, to the annalist and documentary historian, that the study of regions and cities is not less necessary than his own line of inquiry, nor less fruitful. Further, when, as not infrequently happens, the reading of towns and cities with the help of plans and pictures yields results and views of war and peace differing substantially from the interpretations of more official historians, there is clear need for a reconsideration of the whole subject in the light of this fresh line of inquiry as well as of that of written authority. For definite examples of such re-reading of wars in their effect upon cities and civilisation, of cities, and above all of metropolitan cities, ancient and modern in their too little realised productivity as regards wars, we can here but refer (*a*) to the Cities and Town-planning Exhibition, and the too condensed thesis of its catalogues, and (*b*) to the growing Survey of Edinburgh (a peculiarly complete and representative war-city) in the Outlook Tower, and (*c*) to the corresponding surveys now happily in progress at Oxford, Dublin, and other centres of the contemporary movement towards regional surveys, geographic and historical, contemporary and social.

Enough, however, has surely been said to express the present thesis—of possible and fruitful sociological studies and interpretations of War, upon a scale of greater completeness and care than hitherto, such as is customarily given in every rational science, even in its smallest fields.

II.

The previous inquiries may seem "too scientific," for some, and "too academic" or "too detached" for others, when now, not cities alone but the world is burning. What then of contemporary social evolution, and of this war in it? Is the conflagration making more or less of an end of the existing world-system, political, social, or both, with phœnix-like advent of a new order of things; or something, which, despite the unpredecented magnitudes of areas and numbers, is less significant qualitatively?

Who can yet say? But in the meantime, we are not merely politicians that we should only wait and see: we may be thinking out lines of inquiry without which we may see too little even when opportunity arises.

Of such lines of inquiry here, perhaps, is one. Assuming, as characteristic and dominant in contemporary evolution, the Revolution—the Revolution industrial and economic, political and social, philosophic and scientific, as its historians have described it—had it not largely developed, historically, in France, in Britain, and in Germany, into imperial systems, widely diverging in temporal and spiritual powers from the liberalism and industrialism which characterised their parentage and birth? And are not both liberalism and imperialism more and more dominated by financialism, so that in each great country the social system is a complex mixture, an unstable equilibrium? Again, are not these three (or triune) systems, with their corresponding life, thought, and belief, largely, perhaps increasingly, confined to the governing and the prosperous classes, while the working class has long and increasingly been formulating its criticism—first of liberalism in terms of radicalism, next of imperialism in terms of socialism, and even of financialism (commonly most sacred of all) in the profanest terms, even at times those of anarchism itself? Here then are conditions of instability, international and intranational alike, of the extremest kind, as well as on the greatest scale; and, in the comparative disproportion, even poverty (or shall we say arrested development?) of intellectual and expressional powers among all six parties concerned, the dangers, incentives, and opportunities of world collisions are all the greater. To wait is dangerous, to see is difficult: can we not foresee? Can we not at least survey the situation a degree more clearly?

It will not be denied that the peace of the past generation, especially since 1870–71, has been no peace, but one of latent war. So plainly, so fully, has this been the case, that there are many to whom the extreme state of war preparations has seemed, if not the very norm of human existence, at any rate its inevitable burden, destined ever to further accumulations until it crushes civilisation beneath its fall. Here at any rate is a pro-sociological theory; but may we not, from wider survey and more comparative reflection, attain a truer, not to say a less hopeless one? Grant by all means, that we in our lifetime have practically only known wars and rumours and preparations of wars—that, when not in patent war, we have lived in latent war; but do not let us go on with the absurd misnomer of giving to this period of latency, this task of governments and industries in tending the germination of dragon's teeth, the great name of Peace. Absurd! What intelligent mind of the civilised past, be he Greek or Roman, Jew or Christian, would for

a moment confuse two such distinct social states under one term? While for intelligent contemporaries of civilisations other than our own—be they Hindu, Buddhist or Chinese, among the great cultures, Africans or Melanesians among the simple ones—the current contradiction in terms of latent War with Peace is no less obvious.

Let us then, civilized Occidentals though we be, try to be clear, simple and honest (that is, scientific) with ourselves. Must we not condense our unmistakeable wars, our thin-veiled, war-preparing pseudo-peace, under some one single common category—say, of *Wardom*? And thence come more clearly to ask, What then of *Peacedom*, peace proper, free from war and war-makings alike? May we not next in turn monograph this, and with description and interpretation no less than we have sketched for war? We shall be told, of course, that no such state exists, ever has existed, or ever will exist; but a statement so grandly independent of biology, of anthropology and history, of psychology and ethics, is not for sociologists, and its would-be god-like sweep is plainly from lower origins. *Si vis pacem, para pacem*—seek peace and ensue it: that is the touchstone of vital fact as surely as its plausibly poisonous travesty, so long and widely current, is of literally mortal error. Here again, the thesis alone can be stated, not the argument in detail. Enough for the moment if the general idea and nomenclature be clear—the idea of War Kinetic, and our commonly so-called "peace" as mere war static and potential, indeed potentializing, as being but rhythmic phases of what we should call Wardom. Whether liberals, imperialists, or financiers, whether radicals, socialists, or anarchists (in whatever muddle or combinations, crossings, and blendings matters little, and however we may talk of "peace" matters perhaps even less), it is in Wardom that we live, move, and have our being. Peacedom is for us at best a logical and ethical ideal (a beautiful one some may even grant, though not all), but not for us a practicable one. Agreed, for you, while in that mind, certainly not: but for others, in a more right mind (the mind which has learned and discerned that in this universe what is true, good, and beautiful is also and thereby practicable) Peacedom is here already.

What then of its working? That Peacedom affords a truer view of life and evolution, organic and social, than does Wardom, is a hard saying for us who (few more than the present writer) have been brought up from youth upon the impressive nature-myth of Darwin—a myth dazzling to British and German minds alike. For the British it was the projection upon nature of their progress of machines through cumulative patenting, and the co-adaptive struggle of guns and armour. For the Germans it was the projection of progress by victorious war-cycles, with ever-

improving guns, artillery of ever-enlarging calibre. By the help of touching such analogies, far more than Darwin or his disciples ever realized, did he persuade a whole generation, blinded to life and its uses by their inventions of mechanisms in competition, towards at any rate some rude idea of evolution. Nemi, "the priest who slew the layer, and shall himself be slain," had his day anew, this time of nearly world-wide spiritual authority; but his laying to rest is none the less assumed. In this view of life and evolution all the sterner mythologies have practically come back disguised as science, and unrecognized as mythology because of their practical omission of the fairer and nobler elements which the ancient myths contained: as of Thor and Loki (force and fraud), but without Balder the beautiful even as slain, much less as returning to life. Atropus, the third Fate with the shears, and Siva the Destroyer have re-appeared as Natural Selection and been presented as essentially creator and preserver in one, and the creative and progressive breaths of Brahma, dimly apparent, have been explained away as mere "spontaneous and indefinite variations."[1]

III.

So important is the concept of Peacedom that to give it some fuller definiteness is a problem not to be escaped, however beyond the limits of a brief and preliminary outline may be its efficient treatment. Enough here for the moment if we define it as turning essentially on Eupsychics, instead of on the psychics and kako-psychics, of Wardom, essentially based as they are on fear and hate. Thereby we are not only evolving patriotism to a fuller public spirit, and utilising it more continuously towards finer issues, more civic and more human alike; but we are sublimating that courage and chivalry which have been its earnest in Wardom towards ever higher and more enduring forms. The aims of Peacedom lie in Etho-politics, not merely in politics: hence it is polito-genetic, re-creative of cities and their politics, not centralised, metropolitan, and megalopolitan in the main, as in the main is Wardom to-day. Where Wardom is destructive of cities in war and careless of their life and growth in what it calls peace, Peacedom is reconstructive, in both the rural and urban order, recovering the concept of industry and of economics from their patent misuse, as dominated respectively by mechanism and by money. Hence its activity is as definitely geotechnic as war is geoklastic. War, among its

1. Fuller, and therefore of course fairer, summaries of Darwin's theory will be readily found in the writer's Encyclopædia articles: *e.g.*, "Variation" and "Selection" in the *Britannica*, "Evolution" and "Darwinism" in *Chambers's* while in the volumes *The Evolution of Sex* and *Evolution and Sex*, written conjointly with Professor J. Arthur Thomson, a different reading and interpretation of the evolution of species is given; and it rests with the disbeliever in Peacedom to overturn these theories, and with them such teaching as that of Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid*.

superiorities to the peace of Wardom, is undeniably neotechnic where the latter is still little save paleotechnic;[1] but the neotechnic character of Wardom is too much concentrated upon weapons, while that of Peacedom rises into all the arts. That all these factors have existed in the past, and have never wholly disappeared even amid the long predominance of Wardom in our occidental civilisation; that they are capable of great, of incomparable, development as soon as we apply our minds to them with the vigour with which we have sought Wardom and ensued it—are theses which may safely be left to win their way through controversy. As a salient example of the development of Peacedom amidst the very age of Wardom, take the completion of the Panama Canal, with all that it means to-day to Americans, not only for war-communications, for geotechnics and health, but for the reform of industry and its organisation—as, in brief, an example of how Peacedom has triumphs exceeding those of war. Yet the war preparations of Europe, before the present War broke out at all, corresponded, it has been computed, to the outlay upon a whole Panama Canal ten times over per year! Is it then altogether so absurd to believe that, as the world awakens from Wardom, and even from putting too much faith in legalities and arbitrations and other pious restraints of age, and sets itself to finding for youth and energy more of "noble and impassioned things to do," constructive Peacedom may have its turn, and not in the transformations of material environment alone, but in the ennoblement of human life as well?

IV.

In such ways as the foregoing we may approach the internal social problems of the war from a higher standpoint than that of relief funds, or other philanthropies and palliatives of Wardom, and more fully constructive than the Fabian memorandum, although that is so far the most statesmanlike (because constructive) programme available. As a single example of the needed further advance, let me take an example from my own profession of town-planning, since it claims and seeks to organise architecture, as architecture in turn seeks to organise the visible arts with many detailed crafts and industries, and all their accessories in turn. Add then to Mr. Sidney Webb's unanswerably convincing plea for public works of many kinds, a regulation of them towards civic needs, defined upon the town plan, more orderly than can possibly be prepared without the town plan as it is at present. We have a scattered set of too much mere individual suggestions in detail, without general civic survey at all. If, in a word, the present war

1. *Cf.* The writer's *Cities in Evolution* for definition and use of these terms. (Williams & Norgate, 1915).

crisis and its needed remedial measures should lead us to an adequately comprehensive study of our towns and their possibilities, we shall emerge from the War with Peacedom clearer before us, and with economics of wealth and increments of common weal going far towards realising a new citizenship and its city beautiful together.

One other illustration for the present, distinct from yet congruent with the preceding, and capable of being followed as far further as the reader pleases. At the outset of war particularly, one of our first impulses is to economise, and how better may economy be effected than at the expense of luxuries? Yet here is the confession of that mere past "peace" which we would fain see past for ever—that its luxuries were unworthy ones: for when, as in far past Peacedom's times, the luxuries and arts were of nobler kind, it was the comforts that were more readily dispensed with. In modern London, however, perhaps of all places and times, must not this proposition seem the unlikeliest and the least practical of all in the present paper? Suppose, however, that the hasty abandonment of the artist to unemployment and its deterioration, accompanied as it is by a practical arrest of publishing, a paralysis of the drama, a neglect of music, a lowering of education, and so on, be, instead of the wave of virtuous asceticism it thinks itself, really at bottom the instinctive reaction of the paleotechnic order, of Wardom, all its divisions, liberal, imperial and financial, with their labour critics also, for self-preservation against the neotechnic forces and resources which are now being set free for mobilisation against it? If sociologists be really awaking to current problems, must they not soon consider this aspect of the war-situation—that as war needs and advances with the mechanical and chemical arts and sciences, so Peacedom yet more needs the fine arts, the organic sciences, and with all a fuller psychic and social education? In the architectural, constructive, and artistic unemployed lie the possibilities of renewing our cities, of raising their industries to finer and finer levels, of an economic endeavour far more enduring and renewing than are the attempts to "collar Germany's trade," turning mainly, it is to be noted, upon those cheaper and more sweated levels which appeal to the advertising profiteer in particular and the paleotechnic public generally. So also the organisation of the unemployed among the musical and dramatic professions, in recital and play, in worthy masque and seemly ritual and noble drama expressing the higher national aspirations, too apt in war time to be but crudely expressed, would not only cheer and support the present winter, but invigorate and inspire it to fuller productivity, to more vigorous endurance and chivalrous use of arms, and restore the Muses to their place in a civilisation worthier the name than ours has been and is.

The working world is rightly discerning that it is less desirable at this time than ever to go on hurrying what is still childhood at its school-leaving age into production. Here is for it the potential organization—from the unemployed of art and music and literature, of science and skill, of a new and accessory education service which could not but notably reinforce and aid the existing one, and, united with that service, turn out a new type of youth, ready for incorporation into neotechnic industry and civic life. As the boy scout differs from the hooligan he will soon have eliminated (through incorporating and transforming his active virtues), so would this deeper and fuller and higher education invigorate the too pallid and lawless schoolikin and streetikin of our existing output. While the social change, of art reclaimed from its predominant tasks of multiplying luxuries for the indifferent, and finding its ancient place of public service and education in one, would itself be a renewal of Peacedom well-nigh forgotten since the days of the cathedral builders. But all this, it may truly be said, is for the artists themselves to be thinking out anew. Assuredly it is: and at this very time many of them, and before the winter is over many more, will be thinking over their social and civic place, and how best to be utilizing the present crisis towards finding it. Much of the best art work of the world has been done before and in times of war and stress.

To the facile criticism of "how is all this to be paid for?" the answer is partly easy, partly difficult. Easy, because people have to be kept alive somehow, and as (even if the above argument of heightened usefulness be left aside) they had better be producing what they can than undergoing the deterioration of the unemployed. Difficult, too, no doubt, because our present paleotechnic finance, our feeble monetary economics have neither the ways nor the means of organizing the notation and the book-keeping of such tasks. For these a more civic notation may be required, adaptable to higher forms of wealth and modes of service than those for which our money routines and credit have been built up. But again, why should we not invent such a notation in principle, and work it out more fully in practice?

PATRICK GEDDES.



THE MOBILISATION OF NATIONAL CREDIT.

With Special Reference to Co-operative Enterprise.

The Conference reported below was convened to discuss some of the issues raised in Mr. Branford's paper on the Mobilisation of National Credit, published in the October number of the *Review*. It was held on December 10th, 1914, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. A. Hobson.

Mr. J. A. Hobson.

Mr. J. A. Hobson (Chairman) said that the outbreak of the present war had caused so great a shock to our economic system that it had been impelling a great many people to let their minds play more freely the conceptions of economic life than at ordinary times. The term "mobilisation of credit" was, if not used for the first time, at least popularised for the first time, as a result of the outbreak of this war and the consequent disturbance of financial arrangements. The measures taken by the Government to deal with high finance at that time not merely were novel but they had played havoc with the view-points of many people. These arrangements were primarily directed to the larger aspects of financial business. Every business man, great or small, was a financier and at times desired to realise his concrete capital in terms of credit or purchasing power. At these times they had recourse to the pawnshop or the bank, according to the nature of their resources and their condition in life. For the most profitable part of banking is virtually identical with pawn-broking *i.e.*, making advances on securities.

Now the financial history of this and other countries in the first few months of the war made some momentous revelations regarding the basis of the credit system. It immediately displayed the truth that our great joint-stock banks of private profit-making shareholders, though sound enough for ordinary times, were obviously and admittedly unequal to meeting their engagements and fulfilling their necessary business functions in grave national emergencies. The State had to come behind them with a fresh stream of public credit, which it pumped into the clogged arteries of our financial system. This discovery of the fact that the credit of the nation as a whole is greater and stronger than the merely aggregated credit of the separate financial institutions is one of prime significance for all reformers who realise the part which credit is called upon to play in the achievement of their cherished schemes of economic reform. Much has been thought and said, some little has been done, in organising small units of co-operative credit for agricultural and other reforms.

The organisers of this conference approached the credit system in one of its most important aspects *viz.*, its relations to the practical requirements of the producing claims in agriculture, fisheries and other fundamental occupations for the development of the material wealth of the country. They had brought together for this

purpose a number of competent persons, who had special knowledge of the financial defects and difficulties of co-operation in these processes, in order that they might bring their special experiences and suggestions of reform into the common stock, and assist one another to devise remedies. All realised that in the pursuance of their particular reform cheap and sufficient working capital was of prime importance, and that access to abundant and reliable credit was a first essential to success. The sources of such credit were two: first, the formation of some stable association of mutual aid among the local groups working in these productive occupations, and secondly, the support given to these local credit units by that greater national credit, which in the last resort was seen to depend upon the power of the State to mobilise in a financial form the wealth of the nation.

FINANCE AS A SOCIAL FORCE.

By John Ross.

Although it is common speech that nothing will be unchanged when this war is over, it is also inherent in current action that things will somehow revert to the old system—slowly no doubt; still in due time affairs will resume what is called their normal aspect. This so-called normal condition of things is clearly believed in as something which must necessarily re-establish itself. The phrase, however, is delusive, akin to that delightfully convenient catchword "human nature," which is made to account for so many phenomena not grappled with, and sometimes even advanced as the insuperable barrier in the path of investigation. There is, of course, no such thing as a normal condition, the condition so described being nothing more than a *status quo ante* duly hailed as permanent by the indolent mind. Under the first startling shock of the war some kind of readjustment of society was realised as vital, but as time passes and old habits tend to reassert themselves and life in many ways goes on as before, these visions fade and a reaction sets in. One is reminded of the old saying, "The devil was sick, the devil a monk would be; the devil got well, the devil a monk was he."

There is danger, therefore, that after all little will be done to reorganise or re-form our life. This attitude is especially apparent in the region of finance, where the first effects of the war were startingly evident. We are told that the wonderfully poised and extraordinarily intricate and delicate machinery of credit collapsed, as though there were something inherent in the nature of credit under these conditions which accounted for this. Undoubtedly the conditions were altogether unprecedented; but may we not ask whether or not something was lacking in the organisation of the "credit machine" when such total, immediate, and unforeseen dislocation occurred. The very phrase "credit machine," indeed, seems to reveal that the organisation of credit is not an organisation at all but, to use the word of the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, a mechanism. The problem of credit is not so much the problem of its *reconstruction*, as of its *organisation*, and on the best discoverable basis.

Looked at from outside, the capital of a country at any given moment consists of the sum of its resources in men, in services, and in environment. From the personal standpoint a man's capital (in the widest sense) is his individual share in this total, however acquired or possessed. These resources are of value in direct proportion to the ease with which they can be translated into life or energy. Capital is thus a power to productive ends and not an unchangeable entity. The conception of capital as merely a surplus of accumulations has in the past, however, led to a theory of its indestructibility, expressed or implied, and hence to the prevailing ideal conveyed in the illuminating phrase "amassing a fortune." Accumulation alone has become the objective, the ultimate good, together with the power—as power solely—which it carries with it. The object of this paper is to suggest that the time has come to recognise that sound finance can only exist where attention is focussed not on the accumulation of capital, nor even on the discovery of outlets, but on the objects and method of its employment. Not all forms of capital being transmutable at any given moment, this fact has led to the system of exchange which we know as the credit system, and credit may be defined as the loan of liquid, convertible, or usable capital in exchange for or on the security of other less readily convertible resources.

The basis of all credit is security. Security, however, is a relative term, and in the strictest interpretation of the word it must be admitted there can be no such thing, since all things change. What then is security? For everyday acceptance the term implies a form of value—of capital—which is sure, in the sense that it may be readily exchanged without loss for such other forms of value as may suit the momentary convenience, or the requirements, of the holder. The conception of capital as security must not be limited to such material things as land, or goods, or cash alone, but must be extended to include those finer and finer powers which we somewhat grudgingly include under the name of 'services,' and for which we pay wages or salaries, but without (or as yet with only partial) recognition of their potential (*i.e.*, capital) value. There is, for instance, surely as much justification for regarding the powers of a great artist, or a great musician, as part of the stock of capital, as let us say, a cargo of rubber. We are all ready enough to admit the value of art, but perhaps it is the measure of our civilisation that we are yet so far from giving this value concrete expression. Similarly, shall we not have made a further step when we accord to the workman a recognition of his value and express this otherwise than by the term of mere "wage-earner"? The value of a security, then, depends mainly for that value on the minds of those who deal with it; and, again, its valuation becomes more scientifically accurate as the scope of that valuation is extended. Its ultimate basis is character.

Indeed every experienced banker is well aware of this. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking not long ago on the recent pledging of government credit, stated very clearly the rules which should guide every banker in the granting of credit. "Bankers," he said, "have to consider not merely the security, but mainly the position and standing, of the person who applies; the character of the transac-

tion; and also in the third place the security offered." Here we have three requirements set forth, and the order of these three requirements is very noteworthy—first the personality, second the objective, and third, and lastly only, the material resources offered in security. The best life offers the best security, since by implication it will occupy itself with the best objectives and produce the best results—all three requirements being thus satisfied. In Ruskin's phrase—"The first wealth is life."

How far is this triple golden rule for the granting of credit really adhered to by our bankers and lenders? Doubtless there are many who keep before themselves and steadfastly apply the high standard, but I fear that the prevailing tendency is to reverse the order in which these requirements are considered. Security alone is first thought of and demanded, and if this conforms to the required standard, the purpose of the loan and the character of the lender take a very secondary place, if indeed they be considered at all. Safety rather than security has become the criterion. The intensity of competition has led to a race for quantity rather than quality of business, and the apparently more profitable nature of larger operations to the centralisation of cash. The local country banks have become primarily collecting branches, concerned only in a secondary degree with the fostering of local trade and industry, and with very limited local powers of granting loans. Hence the intimate, personal, and painstaking knowledge of the local banker of past days finds little to occupy it, and the decisions of the head office are necessarily and primarily based on the security rather than on personality. This dependence on security or on approved guarantors only, together with the race for quantity of business, indicates a desire to handle the maximum amount of capital, not with a view to directing its wise employment, but with a view to attaching the largest percentage of profit with the least amount of trouble and risk. This is, in fact, to aim less at the performance of a social function than at the acquisition of a profitable sinecure. In other words, modern banking is in serious danger of becoming socially parasitic, and so far ceasing to be socially useful.

I repeat that the best life offers the best security, and from this it follows that the production of the best life should be the objective of capital, which thus appears as a social implement, a tool, a means towards the releasing of energy, of life. To be of maximum service capital must constantly maintain this character of an efficient tool, not of a deity or a golden calf, performing the desired work with the minimum expenditure of life and energy—a real conservation of energy since an economy of it. Just as the problem of efficient production in manufactures is a problem of efficient handling of efficient tools (of every element which contributes to the final product), so in finance there can be no exception to the rule that efficiency and adaptability make for progress, for civilisation, for survival. Adaptability is indeed the touchstone of efficiency and survival value.

Can we say that the tools of our finance are efficient and adapted to all our needs? I do not think so, despite recent changes, but a discussion of this would require a paper to itself. For the moment

let me say merely that I believe it has become imperative for us to advance from a stage in which many of the tools of finance are cumbrous, antiquated, and only effective for the crudest operations, in which also insufficient regard is paid to their purpose, to a condition of greater efficiency and scientific precision, and still further to a stage in which the finer efficiency of function shall be consciously directed towards objectives with a social purpose. What then are these social purposes for which I claim the attention and the obligation of finance?

Man is distinguished from animals by the measure of his superior ability to co-operate with his fellows rather than by any power of fighting for his own hand alone. Such co-operation as he has achieved in forming families, groups, and nations, just so far entitles him to be regarded as civilised. A civilised state is one in which all human powers and implements (*i.e.*, capital) are devoted to co-operating primarily towards the general welfare, towards the production of the best civilised, that is, civic life—the most civilised, the best civic community. The menace of existing finance (like the menace of Germany at the present moment) lies in its tendency towards a low plane of purely selfish individualistic action—a reversion to a condition below the civilised. It is necessary therefore to have a wider conception of co-operation—not as a system merely—but as a law of life, of survival, and of upward progress. To many people the word co-operation has ceased to mean a working together, and stands only for a special kind of grocery store or trading association of a rather dull kind, perhaps not altogether without reason. But the fault is not in co-operation; it is in its hitherto too limited application to life. True organisation implies co-operation in this widest sense, in the mode appropriate to each set of conditions, and in a co-ordination of all.

Now if there is survival value for society in co-operation, the same must be true for finance and for security. Security can, in fact, be judged from this standpoint of survival value. No doubt all good security is security which survives, but I urge that this survival value depends on combined, conscious, and organic action, directed towards the requirements of the community as a whole and not on individual effort. Man with his superior civilisation should abandon such unrelated effort in the field of finance just as he has long abandoned it in his family relations. Finance must not be self-regarding (dividend-earning) solely, but also other-regarding (social) in its action. Such action clearly implies a change of standpoint, and a realisation of citizenship, a step further on the road to real civilisation. In a word, the operations of finance must be directed to activities which extend the idea of the family beyond the home to the city, the community, the state. Finance thus socialised becomes an element in Civics.

How is this civilising of finance to be accomplished—this making of finance into an instrument to be readily wielded in the service of the community?

Let us look at the present European occupation and industry which of all others is most highly organised—the preoccupation of War. Here we find the first step to all action is "mobilisation," that is the rendering each army mobile or movable; the aim of all

armies being to attain the maximum of mobility. Despite its low level of endeavour—merely destructive for selfish individual ends—we have something to learn from this, and a constructive mobilisation of our resources, of credit, is the problem to which we ought now to turn our attention; and, with half the will and forethought of our military friends, what may we not accomplish?

It will not do, however, to repeat and perpetuate the purely individualist financial exploitations of the past only on a more highly organised scale, nor even to encourage co-operation for any combined end—we have had enough of the production of armaments and other unsocial employment; let us organise henceforth for peaceful purposes, for truly social ends. To repeat: not only must our finance be more efficiently organised and directed, but regard must be paid to the objects and the aims of the activities to which this mobilisation of resources shall be directed. The two principal objectives, therefore, are:—

1. The mobilisation of credit.
2. The direction of credit particularly towards co-operation, *i.e.*, civilised or social ends.

How are these aims to be achieved? A few suggestions are as follows:—

(*a*) The further extension of the use of paper money and the organising of a central system for transfer and exchange of credit. In both of these much could be done by an enlargement of the existing postal facilities. Some endeavour might also be made to work out a scheme of social values. In regard to this I may refer to a paper by M. Emile Solvay on the subject of social valuation, or "comptabilism" as he names it, and to the extremely interesting account of the central credit system in Austria which is appended.

(*b*) A more complete, cheap, and effective system of land registration and transference. (Here the example of Germany affords experience which should be of the utmost value.)

(*c*) With the view of directing credit towards social purposes, the preparation of a "white list" of undertakings of this nature.

(*d*) The collection of statistics of the credit requirements of such undertakings.

(*e*) The issue of an invitation to investors—especially those who already look to the usefulness of their investment rather than to the rate per cent.—to place their money in white-list securities. This involves, again, some kind of centralising and distributing association—centralising as regards security, distributing as regards credit—which would issue securities and possess the distinctive character that it dealt not with the larger operations of trade, already sufficiently provided for otherwise, but with all those smaller operations which are in danger of neglect, although their functions (like those of the root fibres in a plant) are vital to the general well-being.

(*f*) The obtaining of a government guarantee on the lines of the government guarantee to the Bank of England on behalf of traders.

(*g*) An arrangement by which credit can also be obtained from the joint-stock banks on the government guarantee.

(*h*) The issue of credit certificates to the borrowing societies which would be saleable in open market; these certificates being

also under the government guarantee. (Here again the example and experience of Germany should prove useful, and I would particularly refer anyone to whom this is of interest to the valuable exhaustive report prepared for our Government on the subject by Mr. Cahill.)

In making these suggestions I urge that the time has come to put an end to the long neglect from which so many social initiatives in this country are suffering for lack of their just share of financial support. It is neither to our credit nor to our advantage that this should continue; indeed, I may go further and say that a continuance of that neglect in the present crisis may have the gravest effect on our national well-being and on our power of survival. I may perhaps make my meaning clearer in the following way.

I constantly figure society as a plant in full growth. For healthy development there are necessary appropriate conditions of climate, position, soil, and many other things. Of these conditions the plant is enabled to make the fullest use by its roots and root fibres, performing through these tiny threads the magic chemical transformation of soil and water into flowing sap. Without these roots, with their slow, laborious, minute, and secret work, there could be no sap; without the plant-stem the sap could not reach the leaves and flowers. Withdraw from these rootlets their due share of nourishment and the plant withers and dies. Does not the function of such roots aptly resemble the slow, apparently insignificant yet really vital, work of the small co-operator—supplying the sap which the stem conveys to its destination? Yet what gardener would dream of neglecting the interests and the growth of these humble workers, trusting to produce a healthy stem or a healthy plant; or still more, what gardener would tolerate the growth upon the stem of some parasitic plant appropriating to itself the life-blood of the plant and giving nothing in return? Yet, it seems to me, the simile is not wholly without its counterpart in our present social arrangements.

Is it not possible, then, to contemplate some concerted action on the part of the many social initiatives on some such lines as I have endeavoured to indicate? It would be paradoxical indeed if such co-operation should not be possible amongst the very co-operators themselves; and personally I have not the slightest doubt that they will not be found behindhand in converting the present national emergency into a national opportunity.

AGRICULTURAL CREDIT.

By J. Nugent Harris.

General Secretary of the Agricultural Organisation Society.

I have received from Mr. Victor Branford, and read with the greatest interest, a copy of his article in the *Sociological Review* for October on "The Mobilization of National Credit." I should like to take his paper as my starting-point, for it deals in a very interesting way with the subject we are met to discuss, and I under-

stand that most of those present have received a copy. The whole subject is one not of financial importance only, but of a much deeper and national significance, and Mr. Branford appears to have succeeded admirably in focussing attention on the vital features of this great question. When I read his paper my attention was especially attracted by two of the points which he makes and which, to my mind, mark the position from which the further discussion of the subject must be pursued. The first of these points, and the one which has been emphasized by the war as it has never been emphasized before, is that all credit, whether it be of the individual or of the joint-stock organization, relies ultimately on national credit. The second is that the small people organised must be linked up with the great banking system of the country, and that the state help which has been extended to the big financial organizations should be made available also for the individual organised in a small way of business.

At the present time trade in certain districts is good; in some it is booming, and in others indifferent or bad: and we must expect this condition of things to continue throughout the course of the war. It is the upsetting of the ordinary channels of trade which is the dominant factor now, and will be again at the end of the war, and it is with a view to minimize the effects of these disturbances that we should direct our thoughts. How, can we secure (in Mr. Branford's words) "that no producer, however humble, be deprived of his morsel of national credit, if he needs it and can prove to his peers that its use would raise his economic potential." As Secretary of the Agricultural Organization Society I shall be excused if I confine my attention entirely to the needs of the farming community, and if I ask you to consider with me how we can make the financial position of the agricultural community more secure, particularly the position of the small cultivator, who is numerically in a great majority. "Credit for every potential agricultural producer" is the text I should like to take for my remarks. In the short space at my disposal it is impossible to attempt to give you even in outline the position as it affects the agricultural industry. I can do no more than bring before you a few special points.

It should be made clear at once that the agricultural credit problem is by no means a new one in England and Wales. Although therefore special attention has been drawn to it at the present moment as a result of the war, it must be considered on its own merits and with a view to establishing a system of organization which will be of a permanent nature and which will hold good long after the effects of the war, one may hope, will have ceased to be felt. Mr. R. A. Yerburgh, M.P., Mr. H. W. Wolff, Mr. Branford, and other pioneers twenty years ago began to urge the farmers of England and Wales to adopt some form of co-operative organization for the purpose of obtaining credit, and since its formation the A.O.S. has never ceased to try to get credit societies established. As a result of this work some progress has been made, but it is admittedly small when contrasted with the immense strides which have been taken in continental countries and in India. The existing societies in England and Wales are formed very much on the system which

is associated with the name of Raiffeisen, whose principles represent the foundation on which has been built up the vast structure of co-operative credit on the Continent. Many of the societies which have already been established in this country are working quite successfully and have for a number of years fulfilled the objects for which they were started. The system as a whole, however, does not seem to "take on," whatever the explanation may be. There are some who still question this view, but it is impossible to overlook the fact that the credit societies which have been established do not seem to act as "centres of inoculation" or serve as models to be followed by the villages of the surrounding districts. On the other hand, in countries where the Raiffeisen credit bank has met the need the extension of these banks has been very rapid through whole districts. The comparatively small progress made in England and Wales is probably due to a number of different reasons. Mention might be made of the following:—

1. The fact that the rural districts of England and Wales are not burdened by the usurer to anything like the same extent as in many foreign countries and in Ireland.
2. The unwillingness of the average farmer and small cultivator to disclose his financial position to his neighbours when he wishes to borrow.
3. The general custom of merchants and dealers of giving long credit to agricultural customers.
4. The general preference for obtaining goods on credit rather than borrowing actual cash.
5. The want of enthusiasm on the part of those who should naturally come forward to undertake the responsibility of acting on the committees of credit societies and the scarcity of properly qualified men to act as secretary.
6. The difficulty of obtaining persons who will act as sureties for the borrower.

It is also probable that the fact of so many of the old private banks in market towns having been absorbed by the large joint-stock companies has accentuated the difficulty which many farmers now find in being able to borrow. It is certain that the system of short credit which the banks follow, though it may be well adapted to ordinary commercial and shopkeeping undertakings, is quite inadequate for the farmer, who cannot expect a return until his crops or stock has matured, and this cannot generally be looked for in the space of three or four months. There is therefore, in my opinion, an urgent need for some system by which the agricultural credit needs of this country can be met by means of a central co-ordinating agency on guarantee lines.

To the foregoing has to be added the difficulty of financing societies if formed. In a country whose credit is better than that of any other in the world the absence of such a system is a scandal of the first degree. An attempt, however, was made by Mr. Yerburgh and some others a few years ago to remedy this and a Central Bank was formed. This bank promised well, but its career was cut short by the arrangements made by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries with some of the joint-stock banks by

which the latter will, under certain conditions, consent to guarantee local credit societies.

The joint-stock banks are prepared under their arrangement with the Board of Agriculture to give favourable consideration to applications from properly registered credit societies for advances, but they require in each case to be satisfied as to the security for the loan, and although they require that the loan shall be payable on demand, the banks will, in general practice, be ready to lend for twelve months, and the loan will then be subject to repayment, renewal, or reduction. If satisfied that the joint liability of the members of the credit society under its rules and constitution are adequate security for a proposed loan, the joint-stock bank will require no further guarantee for its repayment. The rate of interest charged on approved advances to credit societies is a favourable fixed rate, subject to a year's notice of alteration. Loans are, however, only to be made in accordance with ordinary banking principles. This arrangement with the joint-stock banks is to be welcomed, if by it the facilities hoped for are obtained. I should, however, like to bring the following points to the notice of the conference:—

(a) The interpretation which the joint-stock banks will put on the proviso that loans will be granted "in accordance with ordinary banking facilities."

(b) The proposals make no provision for any system of linking up the individual societies on lines similar to those which have been attended with such conspicuous success in Germany and other continental countries and in India.

(c) The proposals include no provision which would make it possible for the savings of people in country districts to be collected and used in their own locality, and in other agricultural districts of our own country, where they could be used to the greatest advantage instead of being, as at present, collected by the joint-stock banks and used to finance city concerns or possibly undertakings in foreign countries, which are in direct competition with our own farmers.

There is undoubtedly a growing need, and the war will intensify it, amongst agriculturists generally, for some co-operative means to be devised by which cultivators can obtain loans for productive purposes, and for use in connection with their holdings, which would enable them to pay promptly for feeding stuffs and other requirements rather than to obtain these on long credit. If they are dealing with private merchants or firms they lose the discount which could generally be obtained in return for cash payments, and no doubt in order to protect their own interests the merchants are compelled to quote a higher price. If, on the other hand, the farmer is dealing through a co-operative agricultural trading society, its financial position is seriously and adversely affected by not being able to obtain ready cash. In the case of small cultivators especially, lack of ready money or means of obtaining credit often leads to produce being sold before it is ready or when the markets are not favourable, or worse still to their being driven into the clutches of the money-lender. The fact that the dealer and merchant often give a large amount of credit is an in-

ducement to members to desert their co-operative societies, although the society in the main offers the advantage from the economic standpoint. Two effects arise from this both of which involve unsound principles. The first is that the trading society, formed to buy and sell goods, is to all intents and purposes used as a loan society—that is to say, loans are advanced in the form of goods by the society, a course which was never intended. In the second place, members place their society under obligations out of all proportion to their financial stake in it, in the form of share capital. As a result there is often financial embarrassment requiring overdrafts from the bank, which in the absence of ordinary security have to be guaranteed by a few members constituting the committee, a method of procedure which is thoroughly unsatisfactory, placing as it does an unfair burden on a small proportion of the total number of the society's members.

The question of credit-giving on the part of agricultural co-operative trading societies cannot be solved unless some scheme be devised by which agriculturists may, co-operatively, receive the credit facilities which in their business is so necessary while they await the realisation of their crops. Neither will it be possible for the United Kingdom to become self-contained, or in any way approaching this, from the point of view, of agricultural production, unless and until a comprehensive scheme of organised credit facilities on national lines is devised. It is appalling, the apathy that is in the minds of our statesmen and others as to the pressing need in this direction. When will those in authority be got to realise that easy access to cheap capital is just as important as easy access to land? The land without the capital becomes a curse rather than a blessing.

The Agricultural Organization Society has for years been deeply impressed with the urgent necessity for establishing such a comprehensive scheme of credit as I indicate, and its president, Mr. Yerburgh has in season and out tried to impress upon both Liberal and Conservative Governments that this is a vital question to the nation, but without avail. It would appear, therefore, from what I have already stated that it will be necessary for us to work out a scheme for ourselves and not to depend on a system of organization merely because it has met with success in other countries, where conditions are widely different from those which obtain in England and Wales. This is also the attitude that the pioneers of the co-operative credit movement in Canada are adopting. M. Desjardins, the H. W. Wolff of Canada, says in a pamphlet, "The Co-operative Peoples Bank," which he has just published:—

> "The pioneers of the co-operative credit movement in Europe did the best they could with the elements they had to deal with, and in departing from the main principle of this system, we in Canada acted not in a spirit of criticism or self-pride, but with a sense of practical economics. We admired what had been done in Europe, but we thought that our admiration should not prevent us from improving on the old system or adopting a new one better suited to the conditions, circumstances, ideas, and prejudices, of our people."

It is in this frame of mind that we must in the United Kingdom try to tackle the great rural credit problem, and it is in this spirit that the Agricultural Organization Society is endeavouring to work on the problem as it affects England and Wales. The society is now engaged in drafting a scheme of credit banking on a county basis and on the guarantee lines. This scheme will link up the various forms of co-operative enterprise in each county into a county scheme, and as each county is organised it will be federated with other counties, and so gradually we hope to build a national federation through which the mobilization of the capital requirements of the agricultural industry of England and Wales will be arranged. In such a scheme we hope to surmount the difficulties to which I have previously referred, and to combine in it the joint-stock banks, the local authorities, and other national institutions. The word "mobilization" used by Mr. Branford is apt. We must bring up our reserve forces and place them at the disposal of those who can use them to the best advantage. We must bring money out of its hiding-places, and the money that at present comes out we must divert into channels that will fructify our own land and not that of the foreigner, and so place the tiller of the soil of the homeland in a position of sound independence.

CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT AND THE JOINT-STOCK BANK.

By VERNON A. MALCOLMSON.

MR. V. A. MALCOLMSON said he had been asked to state what he believed to be the probable attitude of the joint-stock banks towards a co-ordinated system of agricultural credit societies and in what degree they would be prepared to offer their assistance to the movement. He welcomed the opportunity afforded him as he recognised the necessity for emphasising the fact that in England the closest co-operation must be maintained between the old established banking institutions and any organised system of agricultural credit. He was assured that the banks were prepared to meet any such properly constituted organizations more than half way. They would rightly, however, wish to be satisfied that such a system was founded on sound economic principles and would look for adequate security in return for the accommodation they would be asked to provide. This adequate security, he was satisfied, could be evolved by co-operation and would emanate not only from the tangible floating assets of the agriculturist, but also from the elements of personal energy, enterprise, and efficiency which were in themselves an asset of the greatest possible value and were recognised as such in all branches of industry. It was this "personal capital" which Sir Horace Plunkett had been so successful in harnessing in Ireland and from which he had, by the magic of co-operation, evolved a potential credit that had proved to be the secret of success. In these days of highly developed industrial organisms,

it was necessary to point out that credit was after all only an alternative term for working capital, and working capital was the pressing need of the agriculturist, especially of our 'small' agriculturist; that the absorption of the country banks by mammoth institutions had necessarily strained, and in many cases snapped, the personal tie formerly existing between the farmer and his banker; that the tendency of the science of banking was to become more and more complicated as it became more and more concentrated, and its original vocation—that of financing the industries of the country, agricultural and otherwise—had been to some extent lost sight of in the wider field of cosmopolitan finance; that the very fact of so much power—the power of the purse—being wielded by a comparatively small number of corporations had necessitated the development of finance on highly scientific lines; in fact, that a Money Trust had almost unconsciously come into existence, a trust not necessarily opposed to the public interest, but equally, perhaps primarily, for the public interest; that such a trust carried with it heavy responsibilities and imposed upon those in charge of the machinery, as potent for good as for ill, a rigid adherence to scientific principles; that the joint-stock banks were not only responsible to their depositors for the safety of the money entrusted to them and to their share-holders for the provision of an adequate annual return on the capital invested in them, but also to the public and the commercial interests of the country to uphold unimpaired Great Britain's position as a powerful creditor nation; that these responsibilities brought into prominence vital questions of gold reserves, liquid assets and exchange, together with the question of the proportions to be allotted to foreign investments, permanent home securities, short-term loans and trade bills. The discussion of these subjects would occupy too much time and would probably lead him out of his depth, but he hoped he had said enough to shew that the stringency existing in agricultural credit was due rather to the evolution of finance than to any lack of interest or sympathy with the agriculturist on the part of the banking fraternity. He held that the change in the procedure of banking being an accomplished fact, the wisest course to adopt was to recognise it as such and endeavour to put the agriculturist's house in order and thus provide it with the necessary qualifications for access to the banking world. In a country such as England, where banking was so highly developed that in almost every village of any size large and powerful institutions were represented, it would be a work of supererogation to establish other and competitive banking machinery. It was infinitely better business to set to work to fulfil the requirements of the bankers in the matter of security and thus gain immediate access to the vast funds in their hands awaiting investment. It would be better business (1) on the ground of economy, for the big banks would always be the cheapest lenders against approved security; (2) on the ground of safety, for it would take years and years for a young bank to build up adequate reserves; (3) on the ground of responsibility, for this would be a serious matter were a young and inexperienced corporation to compete for deposits with the old and experiencd institutions—for, as he had endeavoured to shew, banking was a science and

could not be learnt in a day. Perhaps, however, the strongest argument in favour of working with, rather than in competition against, the banks, was the substantial advantage to be derived from the spreading of risk. A purely agricultural bank would have all its eggs in one basket and must necessarily, from the nature of its business, be deficient in liquid assets and not in a position to call in its advances in the event of an unexpected drain on its deposits. Looking at the matter from the banker's point of view, he had no doubt whatever that it would be possible to lay before them a very attractive proposition, providing a ready outlet for the employment of funds at remunerative rates of interest against approved security and for purposes of the most vital national importance, the fostering of the country's agricultural resources. Bankers, while recognising that advances to farmers could not readily be called in at short notice, appreciated the fact that those made for fixed periods were regularly and punctually repaid, while the progress and enterprise of the agriculturist were patent to all, his stock and crops always open to inspection, and his assets difficult to remove surreptitiously.

He had been closely identified for several years with the co-operative banking movement both in rural and urban areas, and claimed to speak from personal experience as to the stability of organized personal security, and he did not for a moment doubt that bankers would in time recognise the value of this security. It must, however, be presented to them in concrete form, and it was for this reason that he strongly supported the principle of knitting together all local credit societies into one central credit agency, or some half-dozen district agencies, organising credit on defined lines and introducing a system of credit certificates or authorities to borrow, which certificates would eventually become a 'recognised security' and would take their place in the open money-market as such. It might be that in its infancy such an organization would require some assistance from the government, and he considered that, being a matter of urgent national importance, government assistance might very properly be invoked.

CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT ORGANISATION.

By J. R. CAHILL.

I have been asked to contribute a short paper on continental experience in the matter of a central agency or bank for co-operative credit institutions.

I.—LOCAL CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT.

Present Position in Various Countries. Before proceeding to that particular subject, it may be helpful to cast a rapid glance at the present position of local co-operative credit organisations in various countries. In the table presented, in which is given for nineteen countries the approximate number of credit societies both

rural and urban therein existing at the beginning of 1914, it will be noticed that, while Germany, India, Russia and Austria all show 11,500 societies or more, there are yet several other countries where the intensity of co-operative effort appears greater measured by the list of the number of inhabitants per society.

LOCAL CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETIES IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES.

Country	Approximate number of Co-operative Credit Societies (rural and urban)	Number of inhabitants per Society
Germany	19,600	3,312
India	14,000	17,447
Russia	13,000	12,609
Austria	11,500	2,484
Japan	7,000	7,370
France	5,200	7,615
Hungary	4,000	5,221
Roumania	3,000	2,322
Italy	3,000	11,557
Spain	1,000	19,588
Netherlands	850	7,085
Belgium	760	9,856
Servia	700	4,159
Bulgaria	650	6,660
Finland	550	5,664
Switzerland	400	9,355
Ireland	176	24,944
Canada	140	51,463
Great Britain	70	585,412

These figures, which in several instances were probably lower than the reality, are very striking. And what is very remarkable is that, with the exception of Germany, Austria, and Italy, the growth of co-operative credit has been practically a matter of the last twenty years or less. In 1900 Russia could show perhaps one-tenth of her present number: it was only in 1904 that the present remarkable Indian movement appeared: in 1901 there were slightly over 100 societies in the Netherlands, some hundreds in France at the same date; and so on. Even Germany in 1901 had less than half of her present number.

Development not due to Dearth of Banking Facilities. In this connection it is well worth while to draw attention to the fact that the societies have not sprung up in all these countries because there was a dearth of banking facilities of the ordinary kind. Take for example only Holland, Finland, Germany or Switzerland. In all these countries commercial banking facilities are as adequate as in the United Kingdom, in some cases even superior: for a banking office abroad means an office with a full regular staff, resident in the locality and open daily. In this country it may mean an office whose staff may simply consist of a clerk who journeys thereto for the occasions when it is open, *e.g.* on fair days, or market day, or once a week for a few hours. Laymen will learn with surprise that in 1913 of the banking offices in Ireland 38 per cent. were not open daily, and in England and Wales 23 per

cent. Scotland forms a laudable exception: only two per cent. of its offices are not open daily. It may be added that the United Kingdom is not even, as commonly claimed, the best banked, (*i.e.* possessing the greatest number of offices) country in the world. It is surpassed in this respect by several countries: *e.g.*, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and others.

Functions of Local Institutions. Local credit societies, in the case of practically every country whose practice is known to the writer, aim at fulfilling the functions both of thrift and of credit institutions. Their aim is to obtain as far as possible within their area of operations all the funds necessary for their business; and by offering security and an adequate return upon deposits they endeavour to gather in, for further productive employment in their district, all the idle capital of members and of all persons within their sphere of influence. The local society is in essentials a bank, and should work on banking lines, unless it is pretended that they should be merely skeleton banks, merely groups of mutual guarantors for the purpose of securing advances from outside sources and watching over the safety of such advances. If co-operative credit societies are to develop and succeed in their business they almost inevitably follow the permanent principles of action which other undertakings of the same nature are compelled to follow. The responsibility of obtaining, utilising, and safeguarding deposits had better be left with them: otherwise there is a great danger that the organisations lose their local impulse and deteriorate into a sort of routine registries of operations determined elsewhere and perhaps for the undue profit of others.

Not in real Competition with ordinary Banks. Nor have commercial banks to fear loss by the prosperity of local credit societies. In the first place the deposits to be obtained by the latter do not usually find their way to the joint-stock banks: under this head therefore they not only suffer little or no loss, but they are actually likely to gain greatly, because fresh resources are obtained and circulated within the general organised financial scheme of the country. In the second place, commercial concerns of the great bank type can never decentralise sufficiently to meet the credit needs of persons for whom co-operative societies are mainly designed. It is not a commercial proposition for such banks, and theirs is not an organisation capable of undertaking such business with efficiency.

II.—Central Co-operative Institutions.

Their Functions. A word as to the *raison d' être* of a central credit organisation for co-operative credit institutions. The business of a local society when in working order is normally conducted upon the basis of its local receipts, whether from members or non-members, being sufficient to meet local credit demands. But if deposits happen to be abundant and demand insufficient, or *vice versa*, investment for idle funds or a source of credit is essential. A village bank, for instance, operating over a very limited area and the bulk of its members deriving the main part of their incomes from agriculture, may find that the abundance of funds and their scarcity are apt to fall at different times in the year. But

during the time of plenty its funds must not lie idle, and in that of dearth the bank must not fail to fulfil one of its principal functions. There are also the drawbacks that the management may be untrained or semi-trained, and that banking or investment facilities are not near at hand.

If these local units are to fulfil their functions in a proper manner they must have at their command financial agencies through which their legitimate requirements may be readily and substantially met. Experience tends to show that such societies, more particularly the rural societies, find it advisable to form combinations and create central banks on a more or less broad territorial basis, so that local economic inequalities may be more or less adjusted within the groups and the necessary financial assistance obtained from organisations which at once understood and took account of the peculiar structure of their affiliated societies, and were always available for furnishing expert advice to them. Such groups have usually found it advantageous to form still larger territorial organisations covering perhaps the whole State, or to attach themselves to great non-co-operative organisations whether special state banks for co-operative institutes, national banks, or great capitalistic banks.

Threefold Organisation.—The co-operative organisation tends therefore to be threefold: local units, provincial groups, and national combination of the provincial groups. The function of the selected national organisation is not only to form the centre of monetary adjustment for its constituent or affiliated provincial groups; it has also to procure and facilitate for them access to the general money market. It is the completion of the edifice based upon the principle of local mutuality, and in correspondence with its compactness and the breadth of its lines it takes its place among the institutions of the national economy for the adjustment of capital distribution among all the elements participating in the business of the nation.

Compared with Joint-Stock Bank Organisation.—Though organised and drawing their vigour from the other end, the great joint-stock banks work in effect if not formally on similar lines. The branch bank pays into and receives from a divisional centre communicating in the same way with the head office, which is the great clearing house for the supply and demand of its offices and the agency for obtaining assistance or investing surplus in the general market.

III.—Co-operative Credit Institutions in Europe.

What has then been done in other European countries with flourishing co-operative credit institutions to secure the liquidity of the local units and to bring them into harmonious relationship with the general monetary economy of their respective national entities?

France. In 1897 the Government arranged with the Bank of France that a loan of £1, 600,000 (without interest but repayable in 1920), and an annual royalty on the profit yielding circulation of the Bank, but which was never to be less than £80,000, should be

placed at its disposal for the purposes of agricultural credit. As a matter of fact the annual payment has so far exceeded the stipulated minimum that up to date about 85 million francs has been paid under this head, making a total of 125 millions or £5,000,000 placed at the disposal of agricultural credit by the action of the State. There is a special agricultural credit branch in the French Ministry of Agriculture. Under the guidance of this state intervention nearly 100 regional banks, roughly one for a department or county, have been created, and to these the local banks within their respective departments are affiliated. Regional banks are organised as commercial companies, which may not however pay more than 5 per cent. interest on capital. They lend to the local societies, discount their bills, take deposits, and have the power to issue bonds maturing at two years. The funds from which they make advances at various rates (generally from three to four per cent.) to the local societies are obtained for the most part from the State.

In BELGIUM, where the movement may be said to have begun in 1892, there are seven central institutions, of which by far the most important is that with its headquarters at Louvain. At the beginning of 1914 over 350 local societies were attached to this bank in which they must hold shares of £4 with a liability of £40 per share. Formerly funds were borrowed from the National Savings Bank, but the majority of the local societies receive ample deposits and are able to transfer their idle money to their central bank which employs it either in loan to other societies requiring accommodation or invests it otherwise. If in need of temporary accommodation the central bank can obtain advances either from the National Bank or from the National Savings Bank.

In HOLLAND there are three central banks founded in 1896 (Eindhoven), 1898 (Utrecht) and 1901 (Alkmaar). The Eindhoven and Utrecht banks are limited liability organisations; 400 societies are affiliated to the latter and 350 to the former. The State official responsible for co-operative credit observed to the present writer, when in Holland in 1913 for the purpose of studying agricultural credit, that these central banks may be regarded as the mainspring of the movement: that despite years of work progress was only made subsequent to the creation of these banks. In a written statement which he placed at the disposal of the writer the following words occur: "Profiting by the experience of other countries it was decided to found a central bank with which the local banks would become affiliated. *Hence this central bank may be considered as the very heart of the organisation.* In fact, this institution promotes the establishment of new banks, controls and guides those already in existence: it acts as their banker, lending them money and keeping their money in safety."

The State inspects and audits these central banks regularly at its own cost and it makes grants to the banks for the expense of auditing their affiliated societies. When requiring accommodation, which rarely happens, as the local societies lodge large deposits with them, the central banks obtain it usually at the Bank of the Netherlands.

In PRUSSIA there is a powerful State Co-operative Bank, established in 1895 and endowed with a capital of £3,750,000, to

which are attached a large number of provincial central banks. (In Germany there exist in all about 50 central co-operative banks of the provincial type). There is also the central Raiffeisen Bank, which broke off relations with the State Bank in 1911; it has about 5,000 share-holding local credit societies, which are distributed over its twelve branches, one for each of the separate zones into which Germany is divided for the purpose of the Raiffeisen organisation. The units in each of the zones deal directly with their particular branch which in turn works directly with the Berlin office. The State Bank deals similarly with the provincial banks only and not with the local societies. The Schulze-Delitzsch societies have an arrangement with a great joint-stock bank with which they deal directly on ordinary commercial terms. In 1911 the Raiffeisen Central Bank also made arrangements with this bank for accommodation in case of need.

In BAVARIA, SAXONY, BADEN, and WÜRTEMBERG, the co-operative central banks are all in receipt of state aid. Thus in Bavaria a capital of £200,000 is placed at the disposal of the co-operative central bank at three per cent. interest and a further open credit of £50,000 at one per cent. below the Bavarian Royal Bank rate: assistance was also given for a number of years towards meeting the cost of management of the bank. To this central bank then, are affiliated about 2,700 local societies. The bank at Dresden is accorded by the State a credit not exceeding £150,000, and that at Stuttgart a credit up to £50,000, at a low rate of interest.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. The co-operative credit organisation in Austria has been modelled upon the German movement. There are numerous central banks, the most important of which are members of a central bank in Vienna. State aid has been given lavishly to the Austrian movement since its inception; and for the last fifteen years there has been a special agricultural department at the Ministry of Agriculture. A bill for the creation of a special State Bank for co-operative credit societies was introduced some little time ago into Parliament. Not only the national but also the provincial governments have actively interested themselves in the co-operative credit movement, both local and central.

HUNGARY created a state co-operative bank in 1898. This bank was designed to serve as the central bank and as the organ for the supervision of its affiliated societies and for the extension of the credit movement in town and country. It has contributed in great measure to the rapid development of co-operative credit which has taken place since 1900.

ITALY. There are about a score of central institutions, mostly in Southern and Central Italy, created to serve co-operated credit societies: in the north several Luzzatti banks also act as central banks to small societies within their area of operations. Special central institutions have been endowed often by the State itself; sometimes great banks have been enjoined or stimulated to devote part of their funds to assisting local co-operative efforts. Thus the Bank of Sicily, authorised in 1906 to create a special department for co-operative credit, has been responsible for the organisation of about 300 local societies in Sicily since 1907, and to all these societies it serves as a central bank; in 1912 an agricultural credit

bank was created for the province of Rome with a capital of about £20,000. In 1913 a great central bank for Italian co-operative credit was formed with the aid of the State and great public savings banks.

The BALKAN STATES. In all the Balkan States co-operative credit flourishes, and in every case there is a state central bank. The Bulgarian central bank dates from 1894, the Servian from 1895 and those of Roumania from 1903. Endowments of capital varying from £80,000 to about £800,000 (Roumania), besides assistance towards cost of management in early stages, have been given by the State in these countries to central banks.

RUSSIA and FINLAND. The General Committee for Small Credit, which was created at the Imperial Bank of Russia in 1904, makes loans to local societies and supervises their working. It now lends about £12,000,000 a year to co-operative credit societies. The State in Russia plays a most important part in furthering co-operative credit, and the marvellous results of the last ten years must be in large measure ascribed to its active interest since the passing of the Act of 1904. A more recent Act (1910) procured great additional resources from the savings banks for lending to co-operating credit societies. Central banks are now to be gradually established for separate zones. The central co-operative bank of Finland was established in 1902, the State advancing a large capital sum and providing an annual subsidy for ten years for working expenses. The extension of co-operative societies quickly followed its establishment.

In order to render the statement complete a brief reference to the remaining European countries may be permitted. In PORTUGAL the French system was introduced in 1911. In SPAIN a bill was recently presented to authorise the establishment of a State National Agricultural Bank. In SWEDEN, NORWAY, and DENMARK, the co-operative credit movement has not made progress: in the case of the two latter countries a ready explanation lies in the fact that the commercial banks are almost entirely small undertakings working only in their own localities, and that local savings banks, which are empowered to invest their funds according to their discretion, do in fact lend largely in their own districts. Thus Denmark, which has half the area of Ireland, has over 500 local savings banks, of which over 400 are in country places, and out of 136 company banks there are 58 whose capital does not exceed £8,333, (100,000 kr). In Norway the 108 banks have only a total of 10 branches between them (excluding the 19 branches of the Bank of Norway). In SWITZERLAND, although something in the nature of a central agency has been at work, there is not as yet in that country, to the writer's knowledge, a co-operative central bank in the full sense of the term. Swiss banking institutions are, however, highly localised (only about six banks have branches and only in one case do these appear to exceed eight in number); and the beneficent activity of the Swiss savings banks in their districts is well known.

It will be gathered from the preceding remarks that practically every country in Europe has experienced the necessity of solving

the problem of co-operative central organisation, and that while in every case the aid of the State has been invoked either for the provision of capital or of other facilities, in very many cases it has intervened directly and has established a special institution under its own management or supervision.

CO-OPERATIVE BANKING IN ENGLAND.

By Dr. Gilbert Slater.
Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford.

Dr. Gilbert Slater said that his subject was what a previous speaker had termed "the somewhat uninteresting grocery store." The British co-operative movement comprised besides grocery stores and great trading and manufacturing establishments a banking system in which close upon three million men and women were concerned, and yet this banking system was carried on, quite successfully and securely, on lines entirely at variance with all the principles of sound banking which had been laid down by Mr. Malcolmson.

What were called the shares in a co-operative society were really members' deposits, and the co-operative system of receiving deposits from members under the title of withdrawable shares had developed also into a system of loans from the societies to their members. For example, one large society in the London neighbourhood had at a certain time a share capital of about £300,000: *i.e.*, it had deposits from its members to that amount and all these deposits could in practice be withdrawn at a moment's notice. True the society had power to demand a certain amount of notice, but it habitually allowed the money to be withdrawn by depositors without notice. About £80,000 was actually used as capital in the society's business, and the remaining two-hundred thousand odd pounds was lent out to the members. Mr. Malcolmson had said that amateurs conducting a bank ought not to offer a higher rate of interest on deposits than the bankers do, but this typical society at that time gave members five per cent. on deposits. And while it paid five per cent. to its depositors, it also lent money at the same rate of interest to members; and he was assured by the secretary that it made a profit on the transaction. The explanation of this apparent impossibility was that interest was calculated on the pound and not on the odd shillings and pence; or on the minimum sum to a member's credit during quarterly periods. Almost all the co-operative societies were connected with the Co-operative Wholesale Society (C.W.S.) and the majority with the C.W.S. bank. At the present moment a thousand societies were banking with the C.W.S., making deposits and being accommodated with overdrafts according to their needs.

Now if they held that the fundamental merits which a banking system should have were (1) that it should encourage the development of saving, (2) that it should distribute the capital of those who had it to spare among those who required it at the smallest

possible cost, and (3) that it should secure the distribution of capital to the utmost possible social advantage, the second desideratum at least was conspicuously secured by the co-operative movement in its central as well as in its local organisation. The rule of the C.W.S. bank was that a society which made deposits received interest at the rate of 2½ per cent. and a society which borrowed paid 4½ per cent. Out of the two per cent. difference a first charge was made for reserves; but all the remaining profit was divided between the depositors and borrowers in proportion to their credit or debit balances. Last year the dividend amounted to one per cent., so that the depositors actually received interest at 3½ per cent. and the borrowers only paid 3½ per cent.

The C.W.S. bank is not a big affair compared with some of the Joint-Stock banks except in the enormous number of people connected with it. Deposits amounted only to about six millions, but it was continually showing itself capable of new developments. Thus there has recently been a notable extension of the benefits to Trade Unions, many of which had transferred their banking account to the C.W.S. bank. Next, provision had been made for the individual co-operator when he had invested with his own society all that it would accept, to deposit with the C.W.S. bank. It was further contemplated that the C.W.S. bank might arrange for current accounts, though the difficulty of making such arrangements satisfactorily was obvious.

If now they turned to consider the manner in which the funds so created were invested, it must be admitted that from the point of view from which they were considering the question of banking that afternoon, co-operative banking in England was very restricted. The rule was practically to lend only on mortgage. Societies borrowed from the C.W.S. bank on the security of their land and buildings. Individual members borrowed from their societies to purchase their houses, giving the society a mortgage on the house. This was a serious drawback to the value of the Rochdale system of co-operative credit from the point of view of small industries. It seemed, however, quite feasible that a local credit society should apply for membership of the C.W.S. bank and gain considerable advantages in so doing, pending the creation of more specialised institutions designed to meet such needs as had been referred to that afternoon.

In conclusion, it was a great mistake to look on foreign methods of co-operation for industry or for credit as being the only forms which were interesting or which had any element of romance in them. Although the ordinary British co-operator was perhaps not on the surface a very inspiring individual, being excessively cautious, still he had a genuine enthusiasm for the fundamental principle of co-operation. The British co-operative movement would welcome any new development of that principle and still more the spiritual linking up of the different forms of co-operation. It was impossible to attain unity of co-operative spirit without unity of co-operative organisation.

THE RELATION OF CAPITAL TO CREDIT

With Special Reference to Rural Housing.

By Mrs. Victor Branford.

At the present time there is a good deal of capital invested in housing schemes paying regular but limited interest. In the Co-partnership Tenants movement there was, taking public and private money together, getting on for 1½ millions at the end of last year; while in the recently started Rural Housing Organisation Society there is over £125,000, including money derived from the Public Works Loan Commission and others, though not yet fully paid up, as schemes are not completed.

But the demand for capital for these purposes remains very much greater than the supply. Dealing with the rural question only, the demand is on an enormously large scale, even putting aside the need for more and better cottages for the rural labourer in the south and midlands, in districts where the wage does not allow him to pay a remunerative rent and in circumstances which clearly cannot be met by these societies. But there is a very large further demand for suitable cottages: (1) in the many districts where rents run at about five shillings, and (2) in those districts where, although the ordinary labourer cannot pay more than say 2/- or 2/6, there is a class of somewhat better-paid labour that can do so and whose vacating the cheaper older cottages would leave them for the occupation of the worse-paid men and thus relieve the pressure on housing accommodation. The R.H.O.S. could do a great deal more to meet such cases if it were not hampered by insufficiency of capital, for (except where we can prove unemployment, which is difficult to prove in rural districts owing to the war conditions) we have to find one-third of the capital privately in order to get two-thirds from the Public Works Loan Commission. We can give security and regular interest at 4½ per cent. in the Rural Housing Trust we have established, but undoubtedly what causes investors to hesitate is the difficulty of realising the money invested. Our societies are not quoted on the Stock Exchange and we are indeed not anxious to put them in this position, even if it were possible to do so. Under these circumstances I venture to think it is essential that we should work out for social investments some alternative system which shall have a steadying effect upon investments and keep the amount at its par value as far as is humanly possible, so that the investor may rely on being able to realise his investment at will. The following suggestions towards attaining this object are purely an individual contribution and do not represent the views of any society; they are merely put forward for criticism. For the sake of definiteness I will put the case as for a particular society.

In the Rural Co-partnership Housing Trust we are taking certain steps towards possible repayment under certain circumstances by frequently making only temporary investments in local societies; but it is obvious that if we were able to go much further, to promise (and to make the investor realise that we were able to

carry out such a promise) that we would repay when called upon to do so, we should stimulate a flow of investment at 4½ per cent. which of itself would enable us to carry out the promise where required, if we were working on a sufficiently large scale, as we soon should be. This, I am informed, is really a form of banking. It is, as we have heard from Dr. Gilbert Slater, carried out to some extent in the co-operative store movement, which has with-drawable capital as its working basis, as well as by the Co-operative Wholesale Bank.

To make it possible to carry on business in this way it would be necessary to accumulate a fund deposited at short notice. Such a fund could be acquired in various ways. Further, in order to prevent a run upon the movement at any time of panic, the proviso should be made that the Central Trust should only be asked to repay up to one-tenth of its capital in any one year. It must therefore be left to the committee, in case demands exceed this amount, to decide which should have the first claim, and it would not be difficult to lay down certain rules for their guidance, *e.g.* the winding up of an estate owing to death, etc. Each investor should be guaranteed that in any case he would be repaid in ten years from the time of his investment if he so desired. We must remember that the bulk of the shareholders would be genuine investors who would have no object in changing such an investment; for by our rule allowing the society to repay at par, we have eliminated rise as well as fall in value, so that they would not gain by realising investments. In all probability therefore anyone who wished would be able to withdraw at any time.

We may note as important elements in this system the fact that the whole scheme of provision for amenities renders it probable that the capital of such societies will tend to appreciate rather than depreciate in value with time, so that the actual value of the property on which money is lent is an increasing asset, and in any case this condition is assured by the gradual repayment over 40 years of the loans from the Public Works Loan Commission, which materially and steadily increases the security of the remaining investments, as well as by a sinking fund.

I venture to suggest that all that is needed in addition is a guarantee to investors from some known source and its acceptance by a banking establishment. Under such circumstances the guarantee would in all probability not actually be called upon, for new investments would not only replace the old but pour in so quickly as indefinitely to develop the resources of the movement. The greater the credit of such a guarantor the less the likelihood of his actually having to pay up. Where can we find such a guarantor? Why should not the trade-union movement supply what is wanted? If for example, the Building Trades Federation would guarantee, to begin with, £100,000 to the R.H.O.S., they would enable it to cope on a large scale with the problem of rural cottage building and to make use of the two-thirds contribution of the State, thus increasing by a large amount the work available in country districts without in actual fact having to pay anything towards this end. The guarantee would provide credit, and with credit capitalisation would follow.

I venture to think that this dependence of capitalisation on credit suggests that, after all, the whole problem as to the supposed distinction between credit for short periods and investments of capital, and between these again and what is usually called the currency of the realm, is of less importance than has been supposed. Is not the whole tendency of modern business to bring about an approximation between them in the direction of reducing all, if not to actual currency, yet to such condition of greatest liquidity as to constitute potential currency; or perhaps we should say reducing all to credit, a matter which could be shown on books merely? The old plan of investing in a factory or farm meant that the owner could not easily realise his capital; it was tied up in a particular object or objects. The modern method of investment in shares means that the owner, by exchanging shares for currency, can liquidate the investment on better or worse terms at any time. If he can liquidate it at par value at any time, in what does it differ from currrency to the same amount? We have eliminated the difference which is the amount by which he stands to gain or lose through the investment. That is exactly what we desire to eliminate where possible in the interests of the community, and this done it is desirable that the investor should be able to realise the currency value. Credit, speaking generally, and apart from personal considerations, measures the approximation of fixed capital towards currency; it exists in inverse ratio to the speculative risk, and therefore in the case we are considering, in which par value can be obtained for the investment at any time, its credit value is also complete, and such an investment might be expressed as potential if not actual currency, or as credit.

But such an account of credit is incomplete. Other forms of credit take into consideration personal standing and character; trade indeed is usually carried on in this way, and the co-operative bank system in Germany and Italy has developed such methods and capitalised character and combination. It is this belief in integrity and power to make good which is, indeed, as we have heard from Mr. Ross, an element underlying ordinary credit at some point or other, if we push the matter far enough back; and it is as a special case of such consideration that a trade-union guarantee would be accepted and put the investor in guaranteed societies in the position of enjoying credit practically up to the amount of his investment. Such a guarantee should not depend upon capitalised funds of the union, but upon its willingness to make a levy on members if required. The greater the credit of such a guarantor the less the likelihood of its having to pay up. Funds for temporary use could be found by such methods as we have suggested, and also by the use of banking facilities by arrangement say with the bank of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, or with a central co-operative bank, when it comes into active functioning, or possibly by the ordinary banks of the country which would have in such a guarantee a perfectly good security if they could be induced to see it.

We might consider this as a return to something corresponding to the guild system of the middle ages. The trade unions while not directly controlling such developments would, by the giving or refu-

sing of their associated credit, determine what forms of betterment should be adopted on a large scale and would thus be able to ensure the carrying out of such reformed methods and such ideal aims as appealed to them and to their leaders. Instead of being merely regulative agencies they would become constructive, and would be able to decide to a large extent not only the conditions under which men should work but what they should work at and what sort of world they should produce. If it is possible to induce the trade unions to act in this way it might be preferable to the alternative method of government guarantee even if that were possible, for the regulations imposed by the Treasury tend to be of such a nature as not to enable the full use to be made of government help. Again, it might be possible to work out on a large scale some form of special guarantee society whose operations would tend to develop something in the nature of insurance to deal with the problem.

Such a method of guarantee, however accomplished, would take away from the main difficulty in the way of carrying through not only housing reform but countless other social objects. There is a large and growing class of investors to whom the social effect of their investment is or could become of great importance. They are contented with a moderate and safe return, but they must have the power of withdrawal. It is therefore a matter of paramount importance to think out and adopt some system which will ensure this all important consideration. Whatever method be adopted, I venture to suggest that this is the chief problem before the constructive social reformer at the present time, for it is the ethical indifference of capital which constitutes the central barrier which has to be overcome by those who would deal in any thorough concrete fashion with the ills of the world to-day. What is needed is that capital should be diverted from anti-social or non-social purposes to turn its fertilising streams where they will be of the most use for social ends; and it seems clear that only by some such method assuring its liquifiability after such use can this end be attained.

THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN CREDIT.

SIR WILLIAM H. LEVER.

THE subject is full of interest and its solution whould be of the very greatest service to the community. The great Napoleon when asked what was the most important thing for the successful conduct of war, said, "Money." When asked what was the next most important thing, he said, "More money," and when challenged as to what was the most important thing of all, he said, "Most money." It is quite evident from this that Napoleon was not blind to the enormous importance of finance in successful warfare.

I suppose this is the first war in which the Government has given consideration to the continuance of industries disturbed by war. Our firm has Works in Germany, and by an Act passed in Germany last September, corresponding to a somewhat similar Act passed in England relating to German works in

England, German controllers were put in charge of the Works, and since then they have been conducted entirely without any control from ourselves. But immediately on the outbreak of war the chairman of the Company, himself a German, wrote to me that under an arrangement made by the Government, all manufacturers could receive an advance up to fifty per cent. of the loose stock they had at their factories—this to enable the manufacturers to provide the finances for wages and for buying fresh supplies, etc., in order that their industries might be continuous. We had no such arrangement in England. On the contrary, bankers were inclined to withdraw facilities previously given, and in no case were they willing to extend them. If the Government had not taken a broader view than the banks, the shock to British industries would have been disastrous. A friend of mine, a bank manager who has since died, whom I had known for a great number of years, told me that as far as his knowledge went, the best security a bank had was the character of the business and of the people conducting it, and that the banks in his experience lost more money in making advances on security, which without security they would not have made, than they made in providing facilities, without security, relying entirely upon the character of the industry and the character of the persons connected therewith and to whom the advance was given. Judging from my own experience in business, this is probably a universal experience, not only with banks, but with all those giving credit. In most manufacturing business dealing with traders and retailers in the United Kingdom, the losses from bad debts, although no security is asked for or given in connection with the credit extended, can be covered by an average of 1/- to 2/- per cent. In other words, if an insurance company offered to guarantee manufacturers doing business with retailers and distributors payment of 19/11¾ in the pound on their turnover, we ourselves would not find it profitable to insure. When I was a wholesale grocer doing business with small shopkeepers, where risks are of course a little greater, my experience was that the bad debts never exceeded a quarter of one per cent. and insurance payment upon 19/11¾ in the pound on the turnover would not have been wise. I mention this to show how sound the credit is of businss firms in the United Kingdom.

Our experience in foreign works and in the Colonies is very much the same, although the rate per cent. lost on bad debts is slightly lower in the United Kingdom than in any other country we have had experience in. I do not see why bankers should have a different experience, especially as they would in the future, as in the past, ask for and receive what at the time appeared to be ample security. German bankers charge a much higher rate of interest for facilities than English bankers—at least one to two per cent. more in interest than corresponding advances can be obtained from bankers in England. The same applies to the Colonies and the United States. On the other hand, German bankers and other foreign and colonial bankers take greater risks, but these greater risks still leave a most profitable business after making all allowance for losses from bad debts owing to the higher rate of interest they charge. English bankers, wisely and properly, are extremely cautious, but it seems to me that the industries could be greatly helped, and the

banks do a much more profitable business, if they were not quite so cautious, but of course made a correspondingly higher charge for accommodation given. Suppose we take an illustration from the Stock Exchange. A person who wants absolute security on a commercial undertaking would, before the war, have taken debentures at 4 to 4½ per cent, or preference shares at 5 to 6 per cent. but would not be attracted to ordinary shares unless there was a possible 8 to ten per cent. and I am convinced that the ordinary shares would on the average, calculating the loss on unsuccessful companies, still work out at a higher rate of interest than the preference shareholders' 5 or 6 per cent. The higher rate of interest is practically insurance fund. If the above mentioned rate per cent. on bad debts experienced with traders and small shopkeepers is correct, then one per cent. increase in interest to the borrower would more than provide the margin to cover any possible making of bad debts. The extending of facilities to those who have not got stocks and liquid capital available would be more difficult, and I gather your suggestion is some arrangement on the co-operative system for dealing with this. In my opinion a very small increase in the rate per cent. would more than cover this possible increase of losses, provided an advance was made on the security of character.



"THE CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SIMPLER PEOPLES."

The study of the Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples, by Professor Hobhouse, Mr. G. C. Wheeler, and Mr. M. Ginsberg, some chapters of which appeared in the July and October numbers of the *Sociological Review*, is being published by Messrs. Chapman and Hall for the London School of Economics. Copies of the Tables and other supplementary matter relating to the chapters printed in the Review may be had, post free, upon application to the Editor, 21 Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

REVIEWS.

THE GREAT SOCIETY.

THE GREAT SOCIETY: a Psychological Analysis. By Graham Wallas. Macmillan, 1914. 7/6 net.

"WE are forced now to recognise that a society whose intellectual direction consists only of unrelated specialisms must drift, and that we dare not drift any longer. We stand, as the Greek thinkers stood, in a new world. And because that world is new, we felt that neither the sectional observations of the special student, nor the ever-accumulating records of the past, nor the narrow experience of the practical man can suffice us. We must let our minds play freely over all the conditions of life till we can either justify our civilisation or change it." This passage may perhaps be regarded as the keynote to Mr. Wallas's new book. In *Human Nature in Politics* one felt overmuch the influence of that narrower social psychology which was concerned merely to know and utilise "the moods of the great beast." *The Great Society* is no less rich than the earlier work in observation and suggestion and in that minuter sight so often lacking in the political philosopher: it is also profounder in purpose and in fulfilment.

As economists speak of the Great Industry, so Mr. Wallas calls the whole social world of which that industry is an aspect the Great Society. He describes his work as an analysis of the general social organisation of a large modern State. It is more immediately a discussion of the psychological conditions, the motives, hopes, and fears, the ways of willing, feeling, and thinking, which characterise and have gone to constitute the Great Society. The discussion is introduced by an interesting analysis of human nature into what Mr. Wallas regards as its constituent "dispositions." These he divides into "elementary," which "include the senses, and such measurable facts as memory and association, habit and fatigue," and "complex," which "may be divided into the Instincts and Intelligence." One must admit at the outset that there are real difficulties in this analysis. Every human disposition seems to involve what Mr. Wallas calls "the irradiation of instinctive action by intelligence," but he speaks also of the "independent action of intelligence," as if instinct and intelligence were separate "faculties" of human nature. Again, the relation of the "elementary" to the "complex" dispositions does not seem clear. We are told that "there at least two dispositions—Curiosity and Trial and Error—which sometimes cause action which is rather instinctive than intelligent, and sometimes action which is rather intelligent than instinctive." But may not the same be said of every disposition—Fear, the Desire for Happiness, Love, Anger, Imitativeness, and so forth? One finds also some difficulty, though this may be inevitable, in the use of terms. It is difficult, for instance, to speak of Language, Property, etc., as dispositions alongside Fear, Anger, and Love. And what is the meaning of a statement such as this: "In the case of Thought the essential functions of the disposition are clearly intellectual"?

Mr. Wallas follows up this general account by a special analysis of

certain dispositions selected for their sociological importance. In other words, he discusses, in five admirable chapters, the part played in social life respectively by Habit, Fear, Pleasure-Pain, Imitation and Sympathy, Love and Hatred. In each of these characteristics of human nature men have discovered the single foundation of human society. Bagehot and Maine, for instance, seemed to find it in Habit, Hobbes in Fear, Bentham in Pleasure-Pain, Comte in Love, Tarde in Imitation. These one-sided doctrines are successively analysed, their inadequacy revealed, and their true functions as social factors suggested. Mr. Wallas allows his mind to play freely over these doctrines and the relevant facts, and the result is an important contribution to social philosophy, written with an ease, charm, and freedom altogether rare. Nothing, for instance, could be more admirable than the restrained refutation of militarism in Chap. IX.

If one were to offer any criticism at all on this part of the book, it would be on the following points:—(1) The estimate of Happiness, as distinct from Pleasure-Pain, is not very clear. Mr. Wallas definitely and cogently rejects the identification of social good with Pleasure, but his view of the relation of social good to happiness is somewhat vaguely stated. I am not sure, for instance, of the bearing of the remarks made on that subject on pp. 110-111, repeated on pp. 341-342. And the chapter ends abruptly where one would gladly have welcomed a discussion of this question. For, be it noted, here is the most vital problem which the social philosopher—and the practical man no less—must face: Is the general happiness, or the maximum of happiness, the main object at which governments and every social organisation ought to aim? And if not this, what more or what else? (2) I find Mr. Wallas's views on heredity difficult to follow. Apparently he would accept the distinction between "inherited" and "acquired" characters (see p. 23) and the current doctrine as to the non-inheritance of the latter. It is a distinction involving grave logical difficulties, and the doctrine based upon it may not be so sound as is generally believed. But however that may be, various other passages are more easily reconciled with the contrary doctrine. To illustrate, Mr. Wallas explains thus the "intense moral discomfort" experienced by the political candidate in the pursuit of votes: All his instincts were adapted ages ago to life on a smaller scale, and to a more spontaneous and less mechanical contact with his fellows." Again, the distinction made on this basis between "natural" and "artificial" ideas seems to me wholly untenable (pp. 210 ff).

The first part of the book concludes with a chapter on Thought, a chapter of great interest and practical value, in which Mr. Wallas discusses the conditions and attitudes favourable and unfavourable to thinking and the methods by which thought may be directed or controlled. Underlying the argument there is the important and to-day most necessary thesis that in the Great Society the guidance of "intuition," "instinct," or whatever we call that attitude of mind which rejects the arduous processes of rational thought, is utterly inadequate and full of peril. "If Reason has slain its thousands, the acceptance of Instinct as evidence has slain its tens of thousands." In any case, "in the Great Society instinctive action on a great scale is impossible. The vague impulses of modern nations can only result in corporate action on lines which some one, whether wise or foolish, has deliberately laid down."

Mr. Wallas now abandons the psychological scheme of the earlier part, and, relying on the usual threefold division of mental activity, discusses

in turn the organisation of Thought, the organisation of Will, and the Organisation of Happiness. Here he has given us a fine piece of applied psychology. The method is perhaps not final, but the treatment is most suggestive. Mr. Wallas sees men and women not as "trees walking" nor as types or members of associations merely, but in that sympathy and understanding which reaches to the intimate setting of their every-day lives. What form of organisation is best fitted to stimulate efficiency of thought in the political sphere, in the civil service, in business life, in the general life of the whole community, in the relation of communities—these primary problems are discussed in the clearest and directest terms. Thus we are led to the question of the organisation of Happiness, perhaps the final problem of society. The treatment of this insistent problem is tentative and partial, but nowhere does Mr. Wallas show better his realisation of the complex conditions and needs of actual life. I have not read for years a discussion of the conditions of happiness as socially determined so full of insight and suggestiveness. The spirit of the argument may perhaps be found in the following passage, though its full significance can only be learnt from a study of the book itself:—"If I try to make for myself a visual picture of the social system which I should desire for England and America, there comes before me a recollection of those Norwegian towns and villages where every one, the shopkeepers and the artisans, the schoolmaster, the boy who drove the post-ponies, and the student daughter of the innkeeper who took round the potatoes, seemed to respect themselves, to be capable of happiness as well as of pleasure and excitement, because they were near the Mean in the employment of all their faculties. I can imagine such people learning to exploit the electric power from their waterfalls and the minerals in their mountains, without dividing themselves into dehumanised employers or officials, and equally dehumanised "hands." But I recollect also that the very salt and savour of Norwegian life depends on the fact that poets, and artists, and statesmen have worked in Norway with a devotion which was not directed by any formula of moderation. When I talk to a New Zealander about the future of his country, and about the example which she is creating of a society based upon the avoidance both of destitution and superfluity, I sometimes feel that she may have still to learn that the Extreme as a personal ideal for those who are called by it, is a necessary complement of the Mean in public policy."

Undoubtedly *The Great Society* is that rare and important thing—a real and significant contribution to the science of sociology.

R. M. MacIver.

WORK AND WEALTH.

Work and Wealth. By J. A. Hobson. Macmillan and Co. 8/6 net.
Poverty and Waste. By Hartley Withers. Smith, Elder & Co.

Mr. Hobson has undertaken a task at once urgently necessary and enormously difficult. He has set himself to evaluate economic goods, economic activities, and the whole of our economic processes, both productive and consumptive, in the light of humanistic and sociological considerations; and his aim is to do this scientifically. Herein lies the difficulty of the task. It is easy enough to apply moral or æsthetic tests,

and to condemn off-hand the insane conception of wealth which sets brothels and bottles of gin much higher in the scale than bibles and benevolence. It is easy, too, to wrap up the real truth of the matter in a single phrase, as Ruskin did, when he defined wealth as valuable things in the hands of the valiant. And it is easiest of all to win general consent by inveighing against sweated labour or extortionate monopoly gains involved in the wealth-making process. But it is a very different matter to examine in detail the whole of the "costs" and "utilities," or the origins and uses, pertaining to the vast complex of activities and satisfactions which form humanity's economic sphere: to do this, not from the point of view of consumption or of production regarded as separate processes, but in relation to a single organic system in which producers and consumers are inseparable: and then to estimate the whole in the light of the standards of social, personal, and spiritual welfare. That this tremendous task is necessary, every sociologist will allow; that Mr. Hobson should be the first qualified economist to undertake it is not only a sign of its difficulties, but also a condemnation of accepted economics and economists. But it must be admitted that Mr. Hobson is probably the only British economist who *could* undertake the task with any sort of hope of success. It is an old reproach that economists have seldom realised that the economic man is really a human being. A few seem to see men as trees walking: Professor Pigou does so when he attempts to correlate wealth and welfare, though the vague signs of life disappear as soon as his argument begins. But Mr. Hobson sees men as men; and they not only walk, but feel and think and have souls. And—a further advantage—he has always approached economics from the concrete side. Economic activities belong, in his view, to a real organic system: he is as much opposed to any sharp separation of consumption from production as he is to the unreal reduction of all "value" to a comparison of marginal increments. Thus, in his hands, the estimation of wealth in terms of *organic* value has a real meaning; he is able to intertwine costs and utilities easily because he has never really separated them.

But this very ability has, I think, a little blinded him to the deeper difficulties of his task. He does not quite realise the profound difference between the organic and the spiritual, or the social and the personal, when it comes to evaluating the various elements of welfare. After all, there is a sound reason why we all separate production from consumption. Whenever I try to analyse the good and bad elements in my own economic condition, in my own work and wealth, I discover two things. First, I naturally think of my producer-function as entirely distinct from my consumer-function. The former relates me outwardly, as it were: the organic and social reactions are the most important. But the latter relates me inwardly, to my own feelings and standards: the personal reactions are the most important. This ought not to be so—would not be so, were I more perfectly social; but it is so. Secondly, I do not connect costs and utilities at all. The irksome efforts involved in my work are quite unrelated to the good or evil of the satisfactions derived from my use of income. I do not even analyse them in terms of the same kind of feeling or resultant condition. And for the vast majority of worker-consumers this must be so. The cost or effort side of life is as negative, as little related to conscious desire for satisfaction, as the hours of sleep. It is an accepted necessity, irksome but inevitable, marked indeed by certain pains and reactions, but all of a narrow and negative kind. These, so far as

valued at all, are estimated by reference to a crude standard of freedom from ill; and the standard is almost wholly one of simple organic, vital well-being. For this reason it is often best applied by outsiders, who, as specialists, may be able to judge the real effects, physical and organic, of my work-activities. But the enjoyment of my income is positive all through, and intensely personal. I have my standard, from day to day or for the whole of life; and it is mine alone. No one can apply it for me: to do so would be to check my progress; and the reactions upon the social or industrial organism are entirely secondary to the effects upon my personal and spiritual condition. If this is so, then even for a single life no one joint calculus of pleasure and pain is possible. It is therefore quite reasonable that the community should apply a different calculus to the results of each of the two processes, production and consumption. We must estimate the costs of labour in one way, the satisfactions of labourers in another; and the difference between the two is closely connected with the deeper difference between the organic and social on the one hand, and the personal and spiritual on the other. The two must be more and more closely correlated, of course; but this does not mean that they can be brought under the same method of valuation.

Still, Mr. Hobson's treatment of the whole complex question is extraordinarily suggestive and illuminating. Especially is this the case in the latter half of the book, when he examines in turn all proposed "remedies" for the admitted waste and misdirection of both efforts and satisfactions; and even more when, in the final chapters, he deals with the social and the personal will in relation to the individual and the social organism. And the whole work stands out as the first honest attempt to apply systematically and scientifically the spirit of criticism which Ruskin applied unscientifically, and Cliffe Leslie and Bagehot and other economists have applied unsystematically. It is the first—and a very big—instalment of that genuinely sociological treatment of economics which, since the days of Comte, we have all wanted, but wanted in vain.

Mr. Withers's little book may be mentioned here by reason of the relation of its subject matter to that of Mr. Hobson. The treatment is delightfully simple. The one theme is the waste arising from "luxurious" or careless expenditure of incomes—that is, of incomes of any considerable amount. Mr. Withers states the plain case against luxury both clearly and trenchantly. I know no better short exposure of the fallacies ingrained in most well-to-do spenders. He then goes on to criticize various shallow but very popular doctrines which connect poverty with the capitalist's gains or the wage-earner's ineptitude—according to the prejudices of the various doctrinaires. And finally, with perhaps exaggerated loyalty to his main theme, he finds his one hope of real improvement in a changed attitude to spending on the part of all who have any margin of income to spend on luxuries. The real responsibility for the poverty of the poor lies with the well-to-do consumer. Let him save and invest and spend his money productively, instead of on his own trivial satisfactions, and there will be no more poverty. I should be the last to find fault with this conclusion; but it is just a little rigid, and a little too simple. The value of the book, however, lies in its simplicity and clearness. I wish all well-to-do spenders would read it.

E. J. URWICK.

THE PHILOSOPHIC VALUES OF FAITH.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAITH: AN INQUIRY. By Bertram Brewster. Longmans, 1913. 3/6 net.

PERHAPS the most marked tendency of the present period is the advancing democratisation of thought, resulting in a dislike and contempt of intellectual superiority and a refusal to admit the claim of reason to decide problems, theoretical or practical. Its necessary result is the exaltation of feeling and an appeal to instinct, frequently under the name of faith. The moment therefore is ripe for an inquiry into the nature of faith and its philosophical justification. An attempt to assert the philosophical value of faith may proceed on either of two lines. On the one hand we may attempt to show that faith and reason are essentially diverse and are based upon fundamentally different needs of the human mind; on the other, we may recognise that while faith passes beyond reason and penetrates into the region of the unseen and the eternal, nevertheless faith submits to reason the assurance thus gained, admitting that it is the function of reason to harmonise and give expression to the discoveries of faith. By the first method faith is regarded as *extra*-intellectual, by the second as *ultra*-intellectual. Mr. Brewster's inquiry appears to proceed along the line of the first method, but he combines with it a strong conviction that the deliverances of faith will ultimately be found to be beyond but not outside reason.

Admitting that "a man's beliefs, no less than his actions, should be conformable to reason," he begins by pointing out an important ambiguity in the meaning assigned to 'rational' which may be (i) what is "prescribed immediately by reason," or (ii) what "can be shown to be conducive to ends which reason prescribes or adopts as actual." (p. 1.) But if we adopt the second meaning, as opposed to the first, is there not some danger of our reaching the paradoxical result that an end prescribed by reason may require the use of non-rational methods? In this part of his discussion Mr. Brewster appears to some extent to confuse the issue by regarding "rational" as equivalent to "scientific." "Knowledge as such" is for him "knowledge in the scientific sense," and he admits that here "for the risk of error there can be no possible compensation or justification," while however, urging that "a man may conceivably have other ends in his thinking, some of which may perhaps seem to him no less important and no less justifiable." (p. 8.) So much may be admitted, but if thinking be the work of reason, surely all thinking must be subject to reason, so that all irrational methods are *ipso facto* excluded.

No one would, I suppose, deny that people for the most part entertain beliefs for which they could offer no rational justification and which have been induced by wholly irrational causes. Our likes and dislikes, our prejudices, and, still more, our highest aspirations influence our beliefs and incline us to a too partial examination of evidence. But Mr. Brewster intends to assert more than this. He declares that the "merely practical and passionate element may be considered as the mortar or cement in the structure of knowledge, or of rational belief, which is nowhere more indispensable than in the basal concrete" (p. 3), and he urges that we must recognise in ourselves "a responsibility in regard to the government of assent." (p. 16.) His contention is that we have power to some extent over our beliefs because "the influences which determine conviction both immediately and ultimately are very largely extra-rational." Hence we

can "will to believe" and we *ought* to do so. In any significant sense both these statements appear to me to be highly disputable. It is true that our belief depends upon our voluntary attitude, but is not that voluntary attitude itself determined by the perception of reason? Before then we examine the "reasonableness of voluntary belief" we must be shown in what exactly its voluntariness consists. To speak of will as determining the content of a belief is meaningless. Certainly Mr. Brewster does not appear to agree with James that our will to believe a certain truth can bring about that truth's existence, but what exactly it does involve he does not say, merely confining himself to the statement that "it may open the way to mysterious and strangely beneficent influences." He has no difficulty in showing that experience taken alone cannot give a valid basis for knowledge, and that the theory of probability itself rests upon the assumption of law. We may further agree with him that the rational pursuit of knowledge does in fact rest upon the conviction that truth is not merely knowable but "ultimately worth knowing." Nevertheless, belief that whatever is found ultimately to satisfy reason will at the same time satisfy all the needs of our moral and passional nature cannot surely be grounded upon the denial of the supremacy of reason within the sphere of truth. If it were possible for truth not to satisfy our moral nature that could not make it less true. But the supposition itself only shows the absurdity of attempting to divorce the moral from the rational. Yet, though inseparable, they are distinct, and the ideal of the one cannot be made the criterion of the other. Mr. Brewster appeals to Hume as the type of the pre-eminently passionless philosopher whose fate was to end in blank and powerless scepticism, and he proceeds to argue that "there are grounds for universal scepticism if anyone should choose to rely upon them" which can only be expelled by an "exertion of will." But surely the case of Hume entirely fails to prove his point. It was not because Hume "had neither any twist of vice nor any bias for doing good, but was a philosopher because he could not help it" that he so soon found out "the utter hollowness and inadequacy of all ultimate reasons and evidences whatsoever," but because he misinterpreted the nature of experience and based his philosophical reasoning upon a radically false conception of the psychological facts. Hume's scepticism pointed only to the fact that his premisses were wrong; it did not prove the rational necessity of fundamental scepticism.

The rest of the book is taken up with an inquiry into the constituents of the Good. Virtue as well as knowledge is based upon utility. In adopting the principle of utility, which he describes as happiness, Mr. Brewster reintroduces the distinction of quality, and while admitting that this "is virtually a recognition that something else is desirable besides pleasures" (p. 62), he nevertheless contends that the qualitative superiority carries with it the quantitative. But it is clearly evident that pleasure is not for Mr. Brewster the main element in happiness nor the chief constituent of virtue, for he lays stress upon self-respect as an indispensable element that is forfeited by indulgence in sensual pleasures. The admission that remorse and loss of self-respect follow sensual pleasure involves the denial that the pleasure was virtuous though admittedly pleasurable. In fact, both in morality and truth Mr. Brewster's use of the principle of utility appears to be half-hearted and is so safeguarded and restricted that it offers little cause for offence to those whom he regards as opposed to his views.

The remaining chapters on "Freedom," "Optimism," "Beauty,"

"Highest Good," contain nothing that is new, although the first is a clear presentment of the case for self-determination. In his treatment of the problem of evil Mr. Brewster seems to me to fail to appreciate the real sting of the problem in denying that there really is a problem as to its origin and compatibility with Divine wisdom and power. (p. 162.) The assertion that mechanism is inadequate to account for the universe provides no solution of the problem. To castigate materialism is, moreover, merely to flog a dead horse. L. S. STEBBING.

THE C.O.S. IN LONDON.

SOCIAL WORK IN LONDON: a History of the Charity Organisation Society By Helen Bosanquet, LL.D. John Murray, 1914. 8s. net.

Mrs. Bosanquet's first title claims too much: a history of the C.O.S. is not equivalent to the history of social work in London. Even her second title is not quite happy. Her book is a chronicle rather than a history, consisting as it does chiefly of excerpts from annual reports, and from speeches at public meetings. With the author's comments on these long quotations, the work no doubt forms a record of the society's many activities from year to year which will be useful and interesting to members, but it is with some surprise and disappointment that we miss in its pages that philosophic statement of the C.O.S. aims and ideals which Mrs. Bosanquet is so eminently qualified to have given us, and which was naturally anticipated in the present work. The book appears to be addressed mainly to an inner circle of friends and sympathizers, who will understand allusions without needing explanation. Criticisms from outside are occasionally mentioned, but are dropped as if unworthy of attention. On p. 145, for instance, a certain pamphlet is said to insinuate "base motives," but no notice is taken of the actual points brought forward, and no attempt is made to shew the society's position and principles from its own point of view differ from the representation of them by an adverse critic. The reader indeed has some difficulty in discovering precisely what the society's view of itself and its activities really is. A great deal of the practical work here recorded must command the admiration and sympathy even of those who do not entirely see eye to eye with the society: we would especially mention its exertions in connection with the improvement of sanitation described in some early chapters. But throughout there is a vagueness in regard to matters of principle, the society having apparently committed itself here and there to an uncompromising individualism, as in its opposition to Old Age Pensions from the State, (p. 295) while in another place (p. 190) we are assured that it is not "blindly opposed to all interventions of the State on behalf of the poor." The two positions are not of course irreconcileable; what we miss is a statement of the society's method of approach in reconciling them. Again we all know that the C.O.S. desires co-operation between charity and the Poor Law, and it is generally understood that the C.O.S. ideal is to treat the superior, or deserving poor by private charity, leaving the hopelessly unemployable "unhelpable," as he is sometimes called, to the Poor Law. This particular division of responsibility was advocated by the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission, and appears to be a fundamental article in the C.O.S. faith, but it is not discussed, or explained, or justified in the present work, and we do greatly regret not to have Mrs.

Bosanquet's view fully set forth on a question which represented not perhaps the most striking, but certainly one of the most subtle and intimate of the many differences of opinion between the majority and minority.

In short, while the present volume contains much information in regard to much admirable practical work, it fails to gather the threads together and give a clear idea of the policy animating that work. We particularly regret the omission from the point of view of the Sociological Society. At its best the C.O.S. is an example of the influence of sociological knowledge on social ethics: even at its worst it is an interesting study of some of the infinite ramifications of class pressure and class prejudice. In Mrs. Bosanquet's work we cannot see the wood for the trees.

B. L. H.

THE WORKING BOY.

THE TRAINING OF A WORKING BOY. By the Rev. H. S. Pelham, M.A. Macmillan, 3/6.

A REVIEWER who desired to be unpleasant might point out that the very title of Mr. Pelham's book is largely its own condemnation, for it is typical of a certain confusion which often exists in the minds of philanthropic workers among boys. The "working boy" refers in this connection to the boy whose lot it is to spend the years between 14 and 17 in unintelligent work, usually fetching and carrying of sorts, for the sake of a small but valued wage. Since this is necessarily the dominant factor in such a boy's life, it practically disposes of the hope of "training" in any true sense of the word. This is not all. The title might also be taken to assume that to train a lad of the poor class successfully different qualities were needed from those required to train other youthful human beings. This is a profound mistake. Mr. Pelham's own success with Birmingham newsvendors is due to just the same qualities of sincerity and robust goodness which make for success with boys of all classes. The present reviewer knows what he is talking about because he himself in his regenerate youth was also befriended by Mr. Pelham. He hopes he was one of the successes at the time, but is conscious of a sad falling away in these latter days.

The real danger in these conventional confusions is that would-be reformers may forget what is really wrong with the poor boy—namely, his poverty and the things it denies him. No amount of lads' clubs, no army of guardian angels of university standing, will right this wrong in the world. True that every boy, be he rich or poor, may be the better for the influence of a guardian angel, but far more he needs the influence of a sufficient education and what is to a large extent the same thing, a properly equipped home. The author is fully alive to the difficulties and drawbacks with which the average working boy has to contend, and the first part of his book is largely taken up with an attack on things as they are and the effect of home life and school life upon the boy who at 14 must be cast upon the industrial world to make or mar his life. Most of his criticisms have been heard before, but there is not one of them which is not sound. Mr. Pelham deplores the lack of corporate feeling in the elementary school:

> There is one defect in the elementary school wich impresses itself most forcibly on the mind of an old public-school boy or university man, and that is the weakness and sometimes the utter lack of any *esprit de corps* shown by the boys for their school. To neglect this is to rob education of a most important factor. For it should clearly be an

> essential feature of any system of education to develop in the boy a willingness to forget himself for the good of others. . . . No man is of much value unless he has learnt the duty of serving the community of which he is a member.

He commends isolated instances where this feeling has been fostered by such means as school colours, honours boards, or organised games, for imitation by the large majority where nothing whatever has been done. Here again is a difficulty which it is not easy to overcome. The space provided by the State for recreation after school hours is very inadequate, and unless the school playgrounds are to remain open during the evening it is difficult to find room for the many activities which might help to keep school feeling alive. Up to the present most reforms of this sort have been carried out by ardent amateurs in necessarily restricted areas and not by the authorities with whom the power rests to make them universal. Mr. Pelham is, however, an individualist of the very best sort and has a horror of treating boys as a class requiring to be organised in all their goings and comings. A certain amount of organisation, he grants, is inevitable, and he refers with gratitude to recent legislation connected with the education, health, and morals of the young. He says: "Much is being done, and we are thankful for it. But all this help, advice and restraint suffer from one defect. It is organisation, and as such must tend to deal with the boy as one of a class rather than as an individual requiring individual treatment. Indispensable and valuable therefore as this work is, it does not meet a most pressing need." To treat the elementary schoolboy as an individual according to Mr. Pelham, requires a large army of "guardian angels." These Mr. Pelham would recruit from the public schools, where, presumably, the boys have lavished upon them all the individual care and attention which is lacking so far as their poorer brothers are concerned. There is already an organised campaign afoot to imbue our public schools with a sense of social service in this direction and to bring to their knowledge by means of lectures and talks some of the difficulties of the slum-bred youth. Mr. Pelham would like to see this extended and make the public-schoolboy in his holidays share the life of the elementary-schoolboy in camp and other places so that they might acquire a living interest in each other. On the whole we think this process is likely to be more valuable and amusing for the boy from Harrow than for the boy from Bermondsey, but in any case it cannot be seriously regarded as a remedy for the misfortunes of the working boy.

CATHOLICISM AND DEMOCRACY.

CATHOLIC DEMOCRACY: INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM. By Henry C. Day, S.J. Heath, Cranton, & Ouseley. 6/- net.

Two contradictory charges, both of them false, according to this book, have been brought against the Catholic Church in respect of modern democracy. "Catholics are sometimes very unfairly dubbed Socialists," says Archbishop Bourne in a prefatory note, "because they are unwilling to condemn as contrary to Catholic teaching remedies suggested by Socialists, which, however undesirable in a political or economic aspect, still do not contravene the teaching of the Church on faith or morals." Father Day, on the other hand, says that "not long ago the Catholic Church was freely attacked as being anti-democratic"—notwithstanding

the fact that "in the great democracy of the United States the Catholic Church was at that very time flourishing beyond all others." Father Day admits the existence of "an ominous breach between the existing organisation of democracy in Europe and all positive Christianity," and his purpose, as we should expect, is to show that the cleavage is the result of a misunderstanding, on the part of those who speak for socialism and democracy, of Church and democracy alike. He confesses, at the outset, the fullest acceptance of the democratic faith: "The vital elements of democracy, coinciding as they do with the rational and progressive forces of man's higher nature, are co-extensive with civilisation"—surely a significant admission. But in the historical survey, which fills the greater part of the volume, Father Day is generally hostile to the great democratic thinkers. The division of opinion upon the main issue, he says, truly enough, "is acute at the present time in all civilised countries."

> But undoubtedly the trend of popular sentiment is strongly in favour of the widest possible extension of the Collectivist principle. So universal, in fact, is this feeling that it may be avowed without fear of contradiction that few thoughtful persons would be found nowadays ready to go back to the individualistic legislation of the past, and that many sensible and honest men would, on the contrary, willingly see the pace of advance on the lines of this sort of socialistic reform hastened rather than retarded in the future (p. 101).

Socialism, however, is condemned both on economic and moral grounds. Its scheme for the regulation of commerce and industry is unsound and impracticable; its ethical principles "militate against fundamental ideas of religion and justice"; its aim and method likewise conflict with Christianity. Father Day is, naturally, altogether contemptuous of the popular exponents of Socialism in our own day, from several of whom he quotes largely. The book, if not new or profound, is clearly written and is agreeably free from pretentiousness. It should do good service in stimulating many readers of the author's community to thought on the general problem. But Father Day should not attribute Sir William Harcourt's familiar saying, "We are all Socialists now," to so unlikely a person as Lord Melbourne.

STUDIES IN FOREIGN EDUCATION. By Cloudesley Brereton. G. G. Harrap and Co., 1913. 5/- net.

THE comparison between French and English methods of teaching is Mr. Brereton's special subject. The first half of this volume is taken up with a careful study of the secondary schools of the two countries. It was prepared as one of the special reports of the Board of Education, and its substance will be familiar to the readers of the *Sociological Review* through the paper which appeared in October, 1913. Other chapters dealing with French education discuss the problems of moral instruction, physical training, the infant schools, and the Paris International Guild. More briefly Mr. Brereton surveys the educational systems of Germany and the United States.

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FRANCE AND THE WAR.[1]

THE position of England in the war has been much discussed, although to the unbiassed onlooker it seems plain enough, no doubt because the matter has been clouded by reason of certain charges brought against England by Germany. England has become Germany's "dearest foe" in this war. As a result the place of France and the reasons for French participation in the war have remained under certain obscurities which, in justice to the French, should be cleared up.

It is remarkable, at the outset, that the Germans do not bring any charges against France, save the vague one—put forth officially late in the game—that France had intended to violate the neutrality of Belgium. They confess, on the contrary, that it was their own intention to crush France utterly in any case. On this showing, they admit that France was fully justified in resisting; and they admire the heroism with which she resisted. There is a good deal more in the subject of the place of France in the present war than this, however; and certain of the current presuppositions on the subject—current in the United States at least—are ill-founded. I wish to show this in what follows.

I.

My principal object is to show that modern France, the France of the Third Republic, is not a military or martial country, in either of the two distinct senses, moral and political, of the term "militarism." It is said, by apologists for Germany, that France has a standing army larger in proportion to her population than Germany, and that the term of compulsory service is longer than in the former country. These facts present the outward signs of militarism, superficially understood. But they do not indicate either a military attitude toward life, a psychological and moral militarism, so to designate it, or an official military attitude toward other countries, a political militarism. They are to be explained as

1. An address prepared for a semi-popular English-speaking audience. Having lived in France the better part of each of the last six years, I have had unusual opportunities of observation by reason of the great hospitality shown me in scientific and literary circles. It is only fair to add, also, that my previous and more remote pre-judgments were, in many respects, favourable to Germany, because of my sojourn in Berlin and Leipzig as a student.—J. M. B.

issuing from two general causes and as reflecting two great facts in the life of Republican France—facts one of which the French have accepted until recently with resignation, and the other of which they are only now appreciating at its full worth. Both have become so prominent and ever-present to the minds of the people that they are fixed in special phrases—the "German menace" and the "Triple Entente." In French opinion, from coachman to minister, from Royalist to Radical Socialist, the German menace had become, since the Tangier incident of 1905, a sort of datum of the emotional life, an assumption that needs no argument, an ever-present fact, like the danger of a cholera epidemic or the menace of a flood in the Seine. And the Triple Entente, the alliance with Russia, taken together with the understanding with England, has been considered, in all educated and well-informed circles, the available political weapon, the tool of diplomacy, the pledge of the preservation not only of the liberties of France, but of those of all Europe. It has ensured the superior power by which alone military aggression could be met. Before 1905, the date of the Tangier incident, neither of these facts had its true value in popular opinion. Although the German menace existed, it was not perceived in all its meaning save by certain prudent statesmen, like Delcassé, who were not, as so many of the politicians were, chasing the rainbows of international Socialism.

I wish to enlarge a little on these two things, especially the former, as explaining the moral and psychological tolerance extended in recent years to the military establishment, and justifying the political policies by which the Triple Entente was maintained and extended.

II.

The German menace dates of course, in its present form—speaking as if before the present war broke out—from the war of 1870, after which France found herself in a position of humiliation. She had good reason to see, in the terms of the treaty of Frankfort, a threat of repeated aggression and possible extinction. During the early years of the Republic, however, the theories of the Jacobins were so "violently pacific," and were to such an extent based on international tolerance and brotherhood, that the French lost their fear of German aggression and also much of their own proper patriotic feeling. The sense of security based on internationalism was aggravated by the success of the socialistic party in 1902, and by the subsequent radical development of theoretical democracy during the administration of Combes.

But the fear and the patriotic feeling were both revived by a series of unprovoked diplomatic and military provocations which seemed to the French to be due, on the one hand, to the German

appreciation of the national *insouciance*, and on the other hand, to German jealousy of the cultural successes of France.

During a series of years, the French met this policy of pin-pricks with a moderation, *sang-froid*, and dignity to which all the world testified on the occasion of the Agadir incident and during the entire Morocco imbroglio; the more striking in that this incident followed the Tangier affair and other events all calculated to excite suspicion and arouse resentment. Any one who cares to look up the files of the *Temps*, the *Débats*, the *Figaro*, during those anxious days of 1911, when the issues of war and peace were in the balance, will find evidence of this. Calm, resolute, as in the similar days of last July, the French press pointed out reasons for the aggression, finding in it only that spectre, the *menace allemande*, in a new form. There was no public excitement, none of the hysterical display that superficial British and American opinion sometimes associates with the French. Admiration of this fine moderation was publicly expressed at certain American functions held in Paris at the time. The French attitude was recognised as showing a certain stoical resolution, based on the anticipation, not then to be fully realised as it is so horribly now, of the inevitable war. Of the coming war there has been no doubt at all since the fall of Delcassé in 1905, a sacrifice to Germany. But in 1911 there was a sense of adequate preparation, as there had not been in 1905, a sense of the mastery of the vital and material resources of war which appears so nobly to-day in all the French people.

Soon after came the Zabern affair, followed by a remarkable series of pin-pricks to French susceptibilities as represented by their sympathy for the unfortunate people of Alsace. In certain villages, the populace had ventured to smile at the arrogance of the Prussian military authorities and some had even joked at the expense of the strutting German soldier. In the contest that ensued between the civil and military authorities, the latter were of course victorious: military personages found guilty by the civil courts of outrages against the populace, were freed by Berlin from all penal responsibility; and innocent citizens, suspected of French sympathies, were crushed by the imposing authority of the mailed fist. An officer found guilty of slashing a cripple with his sabre was given military justification, under cover of a nominal reproof. These petty tyrannies were accomplished by subterfuges which show that the methods now employed in Belgium are no new discovery. Had not the cripple shown himself guilty by trying to run away? Finally, the famous cartoonist and man of letters, Hansi, who ventured to portray the grotesque side of militarism in daily life, had to flee covertly from the country into France, to escape a sentence of imprisonment.

All this pettiness was met by the French with good humour,

but humour tinged with the melancholy of a deep-seated presentiment. The subtle irony seen in French publications of the year 1911–12 had a touch of bitterness and withal of disgust. What does it show? was the question asked in those days. The reply was—not Prussian conceit, coarseness, braggadocio only, but an underlying anti-French policy, a smouldering jealousy, an unsatiated appetite. French opinion, aroused before, was now shocked; its native chivalry was outraged. And more than this, its conviction of German animosity was confirmed. Are such things, they asked, as free speech, public criticism of officials, the rights of the press, suppressed in Alsace? Do the Germans themselves accept elsewhere such violations of the elementary rights of free citizenship? They were justified in thinking that even the Teutonic thoroughness was stretching itself a little in thus presenting to the gaze of the sensitive people across the border such a spectacle of the lost territory.

But the more essential fact was that the French were unable to put themselves in the shoes of the Germans, to think as the Germans thought. Their mentality was different, and the training they had received. Since the day of Gambetta, the French had been losing respect for the military point of view, which makes the soldier the centre of things temporal and eternal. They were busy working out their theories of democracy and the rights of man. They shrugged their shoulders in private at the German *cochons*, the people who dressed untidily, left their hands uncared for, trod on one's toes in summer hotels, talked constantly of the *nasionales Bewusstsein*, and displayed a sort of egoistic religious sentiment which flattered their national vanity (I speak as the Frenchman would). But they now found in this same Germanism something to be watched, something allied openly with force, something that authorized its apostles to preach conquest and world-dominance. This is what the French have found growing up in their minds these last years, becoming a nightmare as every evening paper was found to report some new sign of what they now call "bocherie." Since the war broke out, I have heard more than once the sentiment, "Thank God, now we know what is to be done." There is no longer the uncertainty, the hesitation, the dread; these have been replaced by the task, the duty.

What right, does one ask, had France to prepare to meet such a menace as this? The right of any nation to live, to cherish its national aspirations, to pursue its mission in peace. France found herself living in a fool's paradise, indulging in the socialistic dream of universal fraternity. There had even been a Germanophil movement—or at least a movement of imitation—in science, education, and letters, similar to that from which the United States

has been recently recovering. But when the ominous clouds appeared, French patriotism was reborn in a day.

That this was the state of the French mind at the outbreak of the present war, there are abundant external signs to show: for example, the character of recent French governments. France has had a socialistic government for years. The dominant coalition of parties has been professedly anti-military. Every increase in the budget for army or navy—increases which have been continuous since the Tangier incident—has had long and passionate discussion and has required overwhelming justification from the point of view of the national defence. Cabinet after cabinet has felt the drift toward disarmament, being obliged to pacify the pacificists, so to speak, in respect to the most moderate measures of military prudence. The Radical Socialists, led by Jean Jaurès, outspoken and persistent both in the Chamber and in their organs, *l'Humanité* and *La Guerre sociale*, have continued the tradition of Combism. Fortunately, the rising tide of nationalism has been more than a sufficient antidote.

The significance of all this is shown in the last great struggle of the kind, that which took place over the new law requiring three years of compulsory military service—the *loi de trois ans*.[1] The passage of this law, while not technically the cause of the fall of the Barthou Cabinet, was practically so, by reason of the sharpening and solidifying of the opposition which it brought about. Never in recent years—never since the Dreyfus affair let us say—has the Republic had a time of greater storm and stress than during the period of the discussion of this measure. Never was the policy of militarism as such more plainly and vigorously condemned; never were those of national defence and racial integrity more earnestly and forcefully advocated. Never was the German menace more eloquently, and withal more convincingly, presented to the people of France. The measure was passed in a great outburst of popular

ge, declaring it to be essential to the national safety. Here
he German menace taking on concrete numerical form; and
s such men as Barthou, Léon Bourgeois, Alexandre Ribot,
aré—economists, scholars, statesmen of diverse political
s—who formulated the national sentiment; supported by a
c press which was conducted with unusual ability and high
tism. How the wisdom of these men was justified by the
!

the subsequent cabinets, dominated by extreme Radicals,

[1] The history of the laws regulating the term of service is itself significant. The term had been reduced by successive steps until it stood at two years. The return to military prudence and preparation was then reflected in this new law restoring the term of three years.

the law of three years has remained on the statute book. Its former enemies, although in power, have not dared to repeal it in the face of the national sentiment. Its wisdom was finally acknowledged by Doumerge and his fellow-ministers, Caillaux *et al.*, whether from patriotism or from party policy one may entertain a doubt. It had come into effective operation when the war-cloud burst; and its immediate effect was a considerable increase in the army, through the retention of the "class" of men who would otherwise have been released in 1914. Since the war began, socialists of the most radical type have declared their satisfaction that the law became effective in time. No doubt the martyred Jaurès would have joined in this view had he lived to see the course of events. In the present war cabinet, formed from all the political parties for the national defence, two portfolios are held by well-known militant socialists, Guesde and Sembat. In no party, moreover, is there any sign of disaffection in respect to the conduct of the war.[1]

So far then from indicating a military state of mind, in the nation at large, the will to be a great military power, the renewed warlike preparations of France in the last decade represent something very different—a growing apprehension, and with it a reaction against the loose unnational liberalism of the democratic *doctrinnaires*. Such military precautions may have increased the danger of war; the increase of armaments usually does have such an effect. This was one of the arguments of Jaurès and others against the law of three years. The German Chancellor, in fact, made use of the passage of this law to support his demand for new military credits in Germany. But there is every reason to believe that this and the other military measures taken in France were in themselves motived by considerations of national defence; it is certain, at any rate, they were received by the people in this sense.

Another motive of aggression attributed to the French is that of revenge—revenge for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Such a passion of revenge is constantly charged to them by what the French characterise as the clumsy indulgence of patronising enemies. The Germans find in this feeling a sufficient reason of all the French military measures. It is so generally taken for granted, indeed, as being a natural feeling, that the entire absence of it

1. The opinions of Guesde and Sembat on the war and the future of socialism are to be found in the newspapers of February 11 (see the *Figaro* of that date); they both gave out interviews outlining their attitude in respect to the proposed conference of socialists of the allied nations, held in London during the week of February 14. It is to be regretted that the same united front has not been presented by the English socialists, as may be gathered from the remonstrances addressed to Mr. Keir Hardie, and his associates of the Independent Labour Party, by Mr. Hyndman and by the Belgian leader Vandervelde (see recent issues of *l'Humanité*).

before the present war, a fact to which I can testify, is more than noteworthy. Never have I heard such a feeling expressed in any French circle; nor have I heard the topic of revenge discussed except in historical connections. The *revanche* of the Gambettists, and that of the special prophets of Alsace like Déroulède, were discussed with the ordinary French love of analysis and paradox, but not as being a living national purpose or motive. The feeling was really one of humane pity for the inhabitants of the lost provinces and the wish that at some future time they might be delivered. It was pro-Alsacian more than anti-German. So radically unmilitary have their ideals become under the Republican régime, that the French cannot conceive of happiness or contentment, in unfortunate Alsace, under the Prussian rule. Of course now, since the outbreak of war, the people talk of revenge and the literary men of retribution[1]; it is part of the new war spirit. But to speak of the French nation as having prepared its army and built its navy in order to wreak vengeance on Germany is nothing short of grotesque. The motive of revenge in such a form would conflict with the profoundest elements of the culture of modern France.

A quite different sentiment, entertained by the French people generally is everywhere in evidence—that which is directed against the religious chauvinism found associated with German militarism. This is to them a form of pretence, of religiosity, accompanied by a ridiculous inflation of personality. The Kaiser's frequent appeals to the Deity on terms of equality, and with the suggestion of a private *entente*[2] between himself and God, illustrate so well what is meant that the reader will have no difficulty in recognizing it. French writers find in this religiosity one of the prime factors of racial exclusiveness; to the onlooker it offers a real problem in the psychology of the military State. Looked at from the point of view of French liberalism, it proves the Germans to be at a tribal stage of political development and religious culture alike. Respectful to religion always, reverential now—as I am to show lower down—the unpolitical everyday Frenchman has no patience with the form of religion in which the Deity identifies his interest exclusively with those of a self-elected tribe or race, and issues to a "chosen people" a mandate to conquer and destroy. In Germany,

1. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities copies of the treaty of Frankfort were sold on the boulevards; and a play, entitled *l'Aube de la Revanche*, is now (Feb.) being produced in one of the Paris theatres.

2. An entente, however, which, *through no fault of the Kaiser's*, does not always produce the results desired. His Majesty is reported to have said to his troops (*Vossische Zeitung*, as quoted in the *Figaro*, February 17): "I hope with all my heart we shall be able to celebrate the sacred festival of Easter in peace and joy at our homes. I call upon God to witness that if this is not the case, it will not be my fault."

as all who have lived there know, this is not an accidental, local, or superficial thing. Taught in the schools and universities by means of state-edited text-books, enforced by church, press, and public opinion, equally under state supervision, it has been wrought into the national tissue. It is the justification, in theory and practice, not only of the Germany that now is, but of that which is to come—*Deutschland über Alles*. The "national destiny," gained by alliance with the Almighty, is the end that justifies the means. The Chancellor so declared in reference to the violation of the territory of Belgium. With this end goes the most varied means: the sword, the torch, the bomb, the mine, the diplomatic subterfuge. It restores the commission of Gideon who slew the enemies of Jehovah, and that of Elijah who destroyed the prophets and also the "high places"—the cathedrals, such as they were!—of Baal.

In contrast with this, the cosmopolitanism of French culture shows itself possessed of all the benign and pacific marks of true toleration. Call it free thought, if you will, call it enlightenment, attribute it to rationalism or to positivism or to socialism, its character remains the same. It shudders with horror at the invocation of a Deity who spreads his glory by the shedding of blood; and it cannot restrain the shrug of contempt for the devotee who makes himself the chosen instrument of such a Deity. Professor Boutroux has declared that a certain brutality is inherent in the nature of German national culture; we see here, perhaps, the reason for it. It finds its prototype in the relentlessness of the "destroying angel" of tradition—now taking form in the Uhlan, equipped in German casque and mail. No doubt there are many men inspired with the zeal of crusaders among the hosts that have invaded Belgium and France. I think the French feel that the great body of the German middle-class people look upon themselves and their nation as true crusaders, following a divinely commissioned Gideon; but they believe that these are directed in their mission by religious egoists and conscious hypocrites,[1] and the very severity of their judgment of the military class and of its resort to religious cant, shows how far removed the French point of view is from that of such a militarism.

1. This impression of hypocrisy is just now brought out in the comments upon the German war circular, "Appeal to the Christians of Protestant Churches of the French Language," addressed to "Foreign Protestants in Neutral and Hostile Countries," in which Germany makes herself champion of Protestant Christianity and Christian Missions as against England! One is constrained to ask: How about Catholic Austria, and Mohammedan Turkey? Signers of this manifesto, among them Eucken, Harnack, and Wundt, must know that similar appeals issued in the Orient describe the Kaiser as "His Islamic Majesty," who is to impose upon Europe the Mohammedan faith now espoused by him! The similar cultivation of the favour of the Vatican is left to Austria!

As to cosmopolitanism, the French value it as being the priceless pacific agency of life, the destroyer of racial prejudice, the begetter of sympathetic relationships among men. But they are coming to recognise that in the theory of internationalism there are the germs of national weakness, since in practice it destroys true patriotic feeling and produces symptoms of political palsy.

To one who has lived in both countries, Germany and France, the contrast between them is striking in the extreme; and both differ from the complacent but tolerant provincialism of the English. Not only in popular sentiment does the difference appear, but in the avowed purposes and policies of institutions and social organisations of all sorts. The Germans declaim against the use of French fashions, deplore the introduction of French words even on menu-cards, read lectures, in the press and by resolution of Germanic societies, to the Germans in America who give their sons and daughters un-German names, boycott music not made in Germany. I was once publicly reproved on a German liner, when at the captain's dinner given before landing, as the different national flags were taken in turn out of the cake in the centre of the table by admiring citizens, I rose, in the absence of any English passenger, and waved the Union Jack along with the Stars and Stripes. "There," said the officer in charge of the table, "is a man who does not love Germany—der Deutschland nicht liebt." Not that sort of Germany, certainly! In what other country would an order be possible forbidding all diplomatic agents of the government, in time of peace, to marry foreign wives?

In Paris there is none of this, little of it anywhere in France. In fact up to a recent date, true national sentiment has exposed itself to the risk of being called narrow and provincial. Recently the French waiters in Paris have complained of the overwhelming and unrestricted invasion of their trade by Germans, but without result. The complaint of the Parisian opera dancers, in view of the declining favour in which they were held beside the Russian and other foreign dancers, met only the reply that they must improve their performance and maintain the French superiority. Last year, toward the close of the musical year, a prominent daily paper said, in a spirit of banter: "Now that we have had a Russian season, and a Viennese season, and Italian and American seasons, there is nothing in the way of our hearing something French!" What Paris dressmaker would talk of excluding German or American models, and what French artist would wish to forbid the importation of German or Italian paintings or sculptures? The sort of national feeling that refuses hospitality to the best things, that fears competition with alien methods and ideas, that sets more store by the accidents of place and birth than by what is essential to the universal ideals of art

and of humanity—this is not French. If anyone doubt this, he may question any typical Frenchman of education as to his feelings on hearing of the destruction of architectural monuments at Louvain and Rheims; or, to get a wider answer, consult the editorial opinions of the French newspapers of the dates of these occurrences. He will find horror expressed and protest, it is true; but not merely national horror, not merely protest in the name of Belgian or French art. Rather will he be impressed by the sentiment of universal loss, of the outrage committed upon art as such, of the affront to human aspiration and the insult to the genius of the past. "Mon Dieu," says he, "c'est irréparable"—it cannot be replaced! While from Germany comes the sentiment, "What matters it, really? It is a pity, but we can make better ones!"[1]

None of the methods characteristic of a militant civilization, as we may call it, are tolerated among the French. They reject the idea that real culture can be imposed by requiring this or that mode of life or standard of taste, an idea which, in societies where it is current, betrays the reflection of military discipline into the moral life. How can free art, free science, free speech, live in an atmosphere in which the spontaneous activities of the individual, his impulses to live his life and express his opinions in the light of his conscience, are checked at every turn? In France, the wonderful development of the fine arts testifies to the absence of that mode of deference which refers all things to the over-lord, from the cut of the mustachios to the genuineness of an antique statue. In the third Republic the popular heroes have not been military men, but literary men—artists, dramatists, the laureates of the Academies, and the winners of the *prix de Rome*. The appearance of a new book by Anatole France or Paul Bourget has been a national event. The production of *Chantecler* and the activities and death of Gaston Calmette touched the Paris of the time as much as the successful sorties made by the troops in Morocco. Whatever this may have meant—and for some time it betrayed possibly a spirit too careless of the things of real national import, due to an ideology of liberalism rather than to a sound philosophy of society—it showed, without any doubt, that the military interest held no dominant place in the public mind. Just this state of things, indeed, has led to the under-estimation of the present strength, and also of the real patriotism, of the French in the minds of foreign critics who have not read the more recent signs of the times.

1. I quote the following from the report made to the German Government, by its expert, Professor Paul Clemen, on the destruction of Rheims Cathedral (cited by M. Dalimier, French Sub-Secretary of Fine Arts): "This extravagant worship of monuments is a strange sentimentality, an anachronism . . . at a time when our existence and the victory or decline of German thought (*Deutschen Denken*) are at stake."

Nowadays, while war is waging, the *tristesse*, the resigned patience of the people, is touching, pathetic. Theatrical performances, save of certain types, are forbidden; light music, gaiety in public places, modish dress, are not countenanced. Public sensibility revolts at the suggestion of lightness, in view of the usurpation of the resources of life by the fatalities of war. There is a moral *élan*, a desperate earnestness, a new hope, an enthusiasm for the cause; and these give the assurance of victory. But there is also the shock to the feelings of a high-minded people who look forward to a long struggle against the tendencies to debasement and materialisation of moral values which always follow war. "Alas, everything will have to be repaired," says a prominent writer. But over against this is the recognition of the new purpose, the spirit of self-mastery, of which I speak again just below. Remarking upon such an unimportant incident as the hissing, at one of the theatres, of an actress who danced the tango, M. Alfred Capus says, "Perhaps it will be one of the miracles of the war, under the favourable conditions of victory, to have reformed the public taste." I may cite in this connection two snatches of conversation—almost at random. Early in the war I asked an officer whether the French aviators would follow the German example of dropping bombs upon undefended cities. "Impossible," said he, "nous ne sont pas des brutes!" I remember well the look on the face of a society woman on hearing it said that the theatres in Berlin were patronised as usual: "How can they," she said; "do they not mourn for their dead?"

In another respect, France has shown herself for some years occupied with other things than armaments and military projects. I refer to the growth of a new idealism.

Last winter a well-known English writer, Mr. J. E. C. Bodley, published an essay on "The Decay of Idealism in France," [1] from which he read extracts before the Academy of Moral Sciences. His point was, in effect, that the age of machinery, the mechanical age, had succeeded the age of idealism; and that in France, as everywhere, there had been a materialising of the spiritual life, a decline in the force of ideals. The French answer to this, repeated many times in my hearing, and formally expressed by different writers (among them M. G. R. Lévy, in the *Revue Bleu*) is always the same, as to the main point. The writers point out—as foreign observers, including myself, have done—that things have changed in the last decade. We have witnessed the commencement and positive growth of a new and fruitful idealism in France. It appears in practical life, in legislation, in public taste, in literature, philosophy, and religion. Practical signs of it are to be seen in the growth of stricter sentiments of personal and

1. A chapter in Mr. Bodley's book, *Cardinal Newman and Other Essays*.

social morality, of temperance, of the limits of individual liberty, of the requirements of social solidarity and collective responsibility. The widespread discussion, focussed in the Institute of France, of the alarming fall in the French birth-rate, has shown this new spirit of public concern and awakened conscience. The same may be said in respect to the question of alcoholism. The abolition of absinthe is probably only the beginning of constructive temperance legislation. As to other legislation, a large body of measures of direct practical import have been before the Chamber of Deputies, and many of the most important have been enacted: those on gambling and illegitimacy being of great importance as signs of the movement of opinion. In many other things to which the extreme *laissez faire* theory of liberty, on the one hand, and equally extreme anti-clericalism, on the other hand, had given the respectability of popular tradition, are now frankly criticised and condemned; among them, the extreme licence formerly accorded to theatrical performances.

In philosophy this new idealistic movement is taking the form, on the negative side, of a revolt from the positivism and naturalism of the late nineteenth century, and on the positive side, of a new intuitionism allied with spiritual mysticism. This latter, the spiritual, assumes positive religious form, filling the churches with worshippers, if not with converts, and modifying the public attitude in such important matters as laical education and the treatment of religious organizations. The change in the attitude of the press toward the Church in the last decade has been most noteworthy. An analogous change in public taste and in those purveyors to it, the writers of popular literature, shows itself in a note of moral severity and literary austerity. Since the outbreak of hostilities, articles have appeared in England and the United States suggesting that the war itself had served to produce in France a new devotion, a more united national purpose, a higher synthesis of spiritual values, a rebirth of the historical ideals of this great people; and there can be no doubt that the fact of such a change has been made plain by the war. What an exhibition of unity, restraint, persistence, chivalry, truthfulness, added to the ordinary military virtues of loyalty, bravery, heroism! And on what a background!—the usual canvas of war, painted over with figures which disgrace even the military life—brutality, licence, hate, deceit, piracy! How unspectacular, too, the French campaign has been. No blowing of bugles, waving of banners, or boasting of victories. And these are the people who, above all others, love the dramatic!

But although the war came at a good time to emphasise and crystallise these motives, it did not produce them. The future student of national culture will find abundant evidence to show that

the finest preparation for the war, the most convincing assurance of victory, lay not in the military equipment and armaments, not in the law of three years, not in the high financial credit of France, but in the moral purpose of the people, in their new view of life and duty. It lay in the national aspiration for a place in the brighter sun of world influence in literature, art, and morals, which was gathering force and already seeking instruments of expression, when the explosion of war startled it into self-consciousness. In a series of eloquent papers written before the war, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself one of the founders of French colonial policy, pointed out that in view of the apparent growth of German commercial interests in the Orient, it was France's true mission to reassert in Eastern countries her ancient conquests in the higher things of the mind.

III.

So much for the psychological and moral side of our topic. Let us now look very briefly at the political side: the existence and rôle of the Triple Entente.

This is not a political paper; a political discussion in detail would require minute quotations from state papers and diplomatic utterances. I wish merely to point out that the existence of the Triple Entente had both its motive and its justification, so far as France was concerned, in the state of French opinion and feeling which I have described above.

The theory of the balance of power in Europe is expounded in many treatises on European politics. As long as one nation or combination of nations seems bent on aggression or territorial expansion, it is necessary that its power should be balanced by that of another combination of equal military strength. This was the *raison d'être* of the Franco-Russian alliance as negotiated by M. Delcassé. France was compelled to be ready to meet the German menace, which carried in it all the power of the triple alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. It is generally believed that it was due to the acute diplomatic insight of King Edward, that England entered potentially into this coalition with France and Russia. It is admitted, with practically no dissenting voice, among international jurists, that the preservation of the European peace until now has been due to the creation of the balance between these two groups of allied powers. The utility of such a balance then is evident; nothing could replace it, as long as any one nation or coalition maintained armaments which threatened the security or existence of others. The only possible alternatives were disarmament, in whole or part, by common consent, or the establishment of some court of adjudication of international disputes to take the place of war.

In respect to both these directions—proposals for disarmament and suggestions looking to the judicial settlement of disputes by the development of the Hague Tribunal into a true international court of justice—France has positively shown her pacific intentions again and again.[1] Although taking a somewhat secondary place, on account of her alliance with Russia, France has almost uniformly supported the suggestions made by England and the United States, while in both the alternative directions mentioned, Germany has consistently and always found means to hinder progress or to block the way completely.[2] One of the late cases of this, outside the sphere of the Hague Tribunal, was the rejection of the proposal of the British Admiralty for a "naval holiday"—the cessation for a time of the building of battleships by the two countries. On certain occasions, when pacific suggestions failed of success, the utterances of German official personages have been of the most brutal frankness, extolling the sword as the arbiter of international differences, and war as the most effective means of argument. The Kaiser's "rattling of the sword," while the subject of humorous sarcasm across the ocean, has been serious enough on the continent, since it represented the colossal military machine now being used for the ends for which it was constructed. In France, on the contrary, there has been no war party, no pan-Franc campaign, corresponding to that of the pan-Germanists, no military bureaucracy, serving the diffusion of Jingoism; but a steady movement, led by men of the character of Baron d'Estournelle de Constant, in the direction of the establishment of international judicial institutions. The admirable efforts of Mr. Taft, while president, to negotiate treaties covering all possible subjects of dispute, were seconded by England and France, but rejected by Germany. It was reported that Germany gave a reluctant consent after the other treaties were prepared, but as a fact no treaty with Germany was presented to the American Senate. Even with the United States, Germany was unwilling to forgo the future right to resort to the sword.[3]

All these external political signs pointed in the same direction. They gave formidable body to the French fear of German aggres-

1. According to Mr. Andrew Carnegie, France had six cases before the Hague Tribunal, more than any other nation. The figures given by Mr. Carnegie are: France 6, England 5, the United States 3, Germany 3.

2. See the admirable brochure, *How Britain Strove for Peace: A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898–1914*," by Sir Edward Cook (Macmillan, 1914).

3. The suggestion made by the present writer, in an address before an American organisation in Paris, of an "All-Atlantic Alliance," a moral affirmation by England, France, and the United States in the sense of Mr. Taft's treaties, was well received by prominent publicists. The treaties, as presented to the Senate, only to meet defeat, practically amounted to such an affirmation.

sion. They justified fully both the military preparation and the formation of the Triple Entente, considered as the means of preventing or checking such aggression. When the moment arrived and the pretext arose, it became evident that the voice of diplomacy, the cry of alarm of all Europe in the interests of millions of people, and the trumpet call of national honour, were together not to be sufficient to stay the fearful thing; it was to be after all the appeal to arms for which the nation trained in military science had always declared its preference. To France the menace turned in a day into the onrushing monster, and the Triple Entente showed itself the adequate defence provided by a wise and prudent foresight. For the attack took just the form that all the world had anticipated, a crushing blow at France. The first object of the war—the means to the ultimate end, if not that end itself—was the destruction of France; a means which doubled itself when this object required, as further means, the violation of Belgium.

Was ever a people better justified in the maintenance of an army and navy, in the deliberate adoption of the machinery of a military state, than twentieth-century France? What else could have prevailed against the German sword? It is written, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword."

It is now plain, I think, that the German menace, taking on acute form in 1905, has meant to the French the imminent danger of war. Not desire for revenge, not military ambition, has finally led them into it; but the necessity of national defence, combined with a duty to the public right of Europe. To England the latter, the duty only, was urgent when the moment came; to France, both the duty and the necessity were immediate.

The attitude of the French people in this war is well summarised, in my opinion, in the following words spoken by a man now high in the counsels of State: "The war, to all good Frenchmen, a necessity to face, a duty to fulfil—but with what heaviness of heart (dans le coeur du vrai français, quelle lourde tristesse)!" M. Viviani, the Premier, closes his patriotic New Year's address to the Chamber of Deputies with these words:—

> "If this contest is the most gigantic ever recorded in history, it is not because the people are hurling themselves into warfare to conquer territory, to win enlargement of material life, and economic and political advantages, but because they are struggling to determine the fate of the world. Nothing greater has ever appeared before the vision of man. That is the stake. It is greater than our lives. Let us continue then to have but one united spirit, and to-morrow, in the peace of victory, we will recall with pride these days of tragedy, for they will have made us more valorous and better men."

As to the future, no one can prophesy; we must await the course of events. A recent book, full of fine analysis and able criticism, *France Herself Again*,[1] by M. Ernest Dimnet, gives reasons for thinking that the factors of reform and vigour will dominate those of political disruption which, in his opinion, are the cause of most of the social complaints of the past. I believe his optimism is fully justified, the more because there are reasons for thinking that his indictment of the democratic régime, apart from the character of some of its politicians, is somewhat severe. M. Henri Bergson, commenting upon the recent excellent book of M. Charles Heyraud, *La France de demain*, pronounces this eloquent verdict[2]: "The difficulties which our theories laboured so painfully to resolve, have been overcome by action—the action in which France is just now engaged. The diseases which we ourselves discovered, and for which each of us proposed a remedy, have not lasted to be cured; they have been suppressed by the sheer uplift of our vitality. Internal dissensions, depopulation, alcoholism, what will remain of all this to-morrow if our *élan* be maintained? From now on France will be able to say, with one of her own great poets:—

'Le mal dont j'ai souffert s'est enfui comme un rêve.'"

JAS. MARK BALDWIN.

1. In this book, issued too late to be utilised in my paper, I find conclusions strikingly similar to those expressed here. I commend the book to English and American readers (Putnam, New York and London). A remarkable lecture, analysing the practical and moral effects of the war, has been published by M. Emile Boutroux, "La Guerre et la Vie de Demain," *Revue Bleu*, 16–23 January, 1915.

2. From M. Bergson's presidential address, December 12, 1914, before the *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*.

AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WAR.[1]

FROM the time of Montesquieu there has been a general agreement among the best sociologists that the influence of the material environment decreases with the development of civilisation. While in the earlier stages, the environment, especially as it controls the prevailing forms of industry, shapes the general character and the main institutions of society, in later stages the prevailing determinant is the social *heritage*,[2] the accumulations of knowledge, skill, and wealth, the traditions and the ways of life handed on from previous generations. Of this an obvious instance is the retention by colonists of the chief characteristics of the mother country, as is seen among the Dutch on the South African veldt in an environment as far removed as possible physically and industrially from the moist climate, the intensive culture, the fisheries and commerce of Holland. In considering, therefore, the relations of the nations of Western Europe, we must consider them all as in various degrees the inheritors of the peculiar civilisation of the West, *modified* but never overborne by the special situation of each country. Therefore the first simplification that historical inquiry, within the bounds of Western civilisation, admits is to distinguish between the general development common to all nations and the particular circumstances which have led that general development to appear in each nation under somewhat different aspects, *i.e.*, to distinguish between the common mean of the whole and the deflections or the different rates of development of the various elements. It must, however, be remembered that each of these various nations not only shares the common heritage, and at the same time is affected by its particular environment, but also is stimulated or retarded by its contacts with the world outside and with its fellow-members, which as a consequence of their particular environments have followed a somewhat different line or have arrived at a different stage.

The main source of the social heritage of the nations of Western Europe is that earlier civilisation that grew up around the Mediterranean, and was carried beyond the Alps by the arms of Rome; and the first great distinction between these nations is derived from the completeness with which that conquest was carried out: whether in fact the barbarians found—as in Gaul, Spain or Italy—a completely Romanised province, on whose institutions and way of life their own was merely superimposed, or whether, as in

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, March 9, 1915.

2. I use the word "heritage" for social transmission, keeping "inheritance" for biological or racial transmission.

Britain, they entered a province already abandoned by the Romans, or, as in North Germany, there existed a people that had never suffered the Roman yoke. As against this difference, there were other forces in the mediæval world tending to restore unity. The extension of Charlemagne's empire, the conquest of England by the Normans, who had already accepted the language and civilisation of Gaul, brought to the conquered much that had come from ancient Rome; and England and a great part of Germany had already by adhesion to the Catholic Church come under the influence of an institution which combined the three strands of theocratic tradition, Greek philosophy, and Roman organisation. Moreover, all the nations of the West had a common task, for all had, though in different measure, to protect Western civilisation from those outside it and gradually to extend its borders. The Western world in the middle ages had attained a unity which it afterwards lost and has not yet regained. Doubtless, that unity depended on a very insufficient and temporary basis. The idea of Christendom sprang from a religious unity which has not been preserved. The common ways of life depended on feudal institutions fitted well enough for defence against the barbarians, but unsuited either to offensive war or growing industry. The contact of East and West, of Moslem and Crusader, the new intellectual life that began to stir in Europe, undermined the complete domination of the Church over European thought and morals. The growing weakness of the spiritual power opened the way for the increasing strength of the temporal authorities and the rise of the great centralised monarchies. The renascence of ancient learning still further weakened Catholic morality and the Catholic view of life; and if the Renascence brought to men's minds the glories of the pagan past, so the discovery of America foreshadowed that the future was to be greater still. The world was confronted with new problems political, intellectual, and industrial to which the learning, the devotion, the piety of the middle ages afforded no answer. Finally, there came the Reformation, as it is called, and the Church that had so long been a bond of union broke violently asunder. Christendom became a mere name. The nations stood forth as the highest social units, crossed for a time by the international leagues of Protestant and Catholic. Eventually, as the religious wars came to an end and sectarian animosities died down, patriotism for a time became—not only a great virtue—but the highest of the social virtues. The very tradition of anything greater than the country, the nation, became dim. I shall trace later on the growth of new forces under which a larger patriotism, a devotion that should surpass the bounds of country again became possible.

These movements to which I have referred were all general to the whole West. The Reformation, the least general of all, was

found in germ in all countries, and even in those which adhered to the Catholic Church the public mind was profoundly modified. The Church of the counter-reformation, while it claimed to have maintained its doctrinal unity with the Church of the middle ages, was much altered in tone and temper. It even produced a Catholic Puritanism which for a time shut up the theatres of Madrid half a century before the theatres of London under our Puritans shared a similar fate. But the various nations experienced the effects of these movements differently, both in degree and in time. The general movement was modified by the particular environment. Let us consider, as perhaps the most interesting case at the present juncture, how these changes affected Germany, for the fundamental cause of the present crisis is the existence among the great European nations of a retrograde Power, organised for war. That country shared with Spain the task of fighting to defend the borders of Christendom, long after England and France had ceased to have any part in such work, save in the general and distant expeditions of the Crusades. But there was this difference between Spain and Germany that while the Spaniards were fighting against an enemy in many respects equal, and in some, superior, to themselves in civilisation—for the Arab University of Cordova was long a centre of light to Moslem and infidel alike—the German had as his neighbours wilder Slavonic and Tartar races, not merely outside of Western civilisation, but at that time distinctly inferior to it. Further, when once the Moor was expelled from Europe, Spain obtained a definite frontier, the Eastern frontier of Germany always remained indeterminate. Compared then with Spain, and still more with France, Germany, which had inherited to a much smaller extent the results of the ancient civilisation of the Mediterranean world, found her available energies much more occupied with the defence of her frontiers against the barbarians. There was a secondary influence acting in the same direction. The aspirations of her rulers to be the successors of the Emperors of Rome led them to aim rather at extending their power in Italy than at consolidating it at home. Hence, there came about a phenomenon often noted by historians that while German feudalism went through the same stages as feudalism in France, each change took place some centuries later. When the time came for the consolidation of France into a great centralised monarchy, Germany was still split up into numerous principalities; and the Reformation under which some of these became Protestant and others remained Catholic did not make subsequent unity more easy.

In fact, as Germany emerged from feudalism, she received a double set-back, one due to a loss of commercial importance, the other to the religious wars. The first she suffered as a result of distant events. The products of the East, brought from the Levant

to the Italian ports, reached the north of Europe in large measure through Germany. It was a source of great wealth, which she lost when the old trade routes to the East were closed by the Turks. With the discovery of the Cape route to India, the nations on the Western sea-board gained at the expense of Italy and Germany, while they monopolised the trade with the New World.

Much less obvious is the explanation of Germany's share in the Reformation. If that was a great advance, it is difficult to understand why it began in a part of Europe relatively backward. Nor is it easier for those to explain it who consider it a retrograde movement, a breach in that Catholic unity which it had taken so many ages to build up; for it is certain that there was both a more fervent and a more implicit belief in Christianity in Saxony than in Rome, where in the time of Luther the Renascence was in full force. The Reformers did not profess to take a step forward to new truth, but to return to the pure doctrine and practice of the primitive Church, as they imagined it to have been, and such questions had ceased to have a paramount interest for the Italian world. There are really two problems involved. Why did the Reformation occur when it did; why did it begin in Germany? The Reformation occurred at the time it did because the new forces intellectual, moral, and social had escaped from the control of the Church. Confronted by new and difficult problems, its discipline had decayed and its power weakened. The Reformation began in Germany rather than elsewhere for many reasons of varying importance: (1) because Germany was less Romanised than the other nations of the West; (2) because while the intelligence of the country was sufficiently advanced for the study of great issues, theological issues were still regarded as more important than science and the ancient learning which were occupying the minds of Italy; (3) because there was an economic advantage in stopping the drain of wealth to Rome; Germany had been called the milch-cow of the Papacy; and (4) because the German princes coveted the possessions of the Church. Some of these conditions were found in many other countries, but in none did all work together and encounter so little opposition from other circumstances. For instance, in those countries where there was a centralised monarchy, the greed of the nobles was checked—permanently in France, for a time in Scotland—by the fears of the monarch and the interests of the monarchy. In England, the crown was strong enough to take the possessions, and to some extent the authority, of the Church for itself.

The effect of the Reformation was: (1) to separate Germany from the general life of Europe—though as other countries became Protestant, this in time ceased to be so important; (2) to divide the country itself—adding to the many political divisions a great cross-

division between the two religions, following roughly the boundaries of the Roman Empire, the South and West being in the main Catholic, the East and North Protestant, with a preponderance of the free cities on the Protestant side; (3) to produce the terrible thirty years war, which again put Germany behind the rest of Europe. The Congress of the Nations at Munster by which that was ended, was a great triumph for international law and the commonwealth of nations. It was the starting point of European unity in the political world. But it put further off than ever the unity of Germany; for the compromise, now finally confirmed, by which each German Prince was to regulate the religious conditions of his own principality, strengthened the position of these sovereigns and increased the diversity even between neighbouring states.

This Peace of Westphalia marks decisively the abandonment of the old unity of Christendom as it had existed throughout the middle ages and the rise of new bonds of unity. What were these bonds? Science unifying men's thoughts, common results reached by the same methods in all nations; art, more subject to national tradition, and yet a universal heritage and a common inspiration; commerce and industry joining the nations by mutual advantage; and following these, the growth of the ideal of duties above those due by the citizen to his country, the recognition of the comity of civilised nations, and eventually of the unity of all mankind. But it was shown decisively that that unity was not to be brought about by conquest at the hands of one Power, as Rome had brought about the unity of the Mediterranean world. Thrice has that been attempted since the Peace of Westphalia, and in each case the other nations have combined to check it. What the persevering industry of Louis XIV, and the genius for war and organisation of Napoleon failed to accomplish, will not, we may be sure, come about as the result of that war which even, as I speak, is claiming its tale of death in France and Poland.

There have been two opposite methods proposed for bringing about the unity of our Western world, each of which receives little support from the experience of the last three centuries. The first, to which I have already alluded, is the forcible union by one conquering nation. Every attempt of that kind provokes, sooner or later, a union of all the other powers. The modern conqueror has not, like ancient Rome, to meet communities still organised as city states, or barbarians in a lower stage of civilisation. The common civilisation of the West, while it makes for unity, is at the same time a barrier against the imperial pretensions of any one member. There are some, however, who propose to bring about this unity by the abolition of all national distinctions, by recognis-

ing no claims save the claims of all mankind, and no citizenship save the citizenship of the world. It is an enticing mirage which, unlike schemes of universal conquest, appeals especially to those of wide sympathies, but it breaks on the impregnable rock of fact—the great fact of nationality. The nations of Europe, where each nation has its long tradition of glory and suffering, of great deeds accomplished and good work done, where the general life is closely entwined with the life of each individual citizen from youth to age, cannot be obliterated; nor would it be wise to obliterate national distinctions if we could. The richness of our Western civilisation depends on the harmonious blending of different elements; and each nation brings to the service of Humanity those special qualities which result from its past training and its present resources. Patriotism can never be blotted out. If it is to change its character in the future, it is by each nation bringing its special qualities to the general good—instead of trying to impose on others its own type of civilisation as the only one worthy to survive. What would the world have lost if, to take but one instance, the clear thought and intellectual courage of France had been overwhelmed in some common mean? The unity of the future must arise from the comity of nations, working not against but through the national consciousness of each. Without stretching the comparison between society and that very different organism, the human body, we must have in the former as in the latter a unity arising from the harmonious working of various organs.

Now as a national organism Germany is in a different position from the other nations of Europe. If we except Italy the other nations may be divided into two, or perhaps three, classes: (1) Those like France, England, Spain, Portugal, Holland, which have behind them a long past in which, whether weak or powerful, they have lived their own life and developed in their own way; (2) those like Ireland and Poland which, dominated by more powerful neighbours, have through long ages struggled to keep alive their national life under the domination of their conquerors; (3) Those aggregates, nations in the making which without any long national tradition, are being welded into national unity and consciousness by their corporate life and common fortune. Of these perhaps the most signal instance is Belgium. Italy and Germany form a class apart. From very early times the Italian and the German were distinguished from their neighbours. In numbers and in service they have for centuries taken their place among the great peoples of the West; but they failed to achieve political unity till our own time. In both countries the memory of the long ages of political impotence has led their new rulers to aim at military power. But the Italian people are, as a result of their whole history, of their country's ancient civilisation and geographical

position, essentially pacific. In Germany, the iron has entered into the people's soul.

The situation of Germany, as it existed in the eighteenth century, might seem in some respects especially favourable to a recognition therein of European unity. Its political decentralisation rendered all dreams of universal conquest impossible. It had no colonial empire to distract it from the interests of Europe. Compared with the narrow politics of each German state, the intellectual life of the whole country seemed vastly important. But the Germans of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century who rose to the ideal of human unity, did so without transcending the ideal of country, for politically they had no country. The French preachers of human unity in the same period, Diderot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, arose in a nation long powerful, united, and assured of its own place in human history; they separated the dross of vulgar ambition from the pure gold of human service, and taking their own national position for granted, they advanced from the love of France to the love of all mankind. They had no need to ask if their duty to their country conflicted with their duty to Humanity, for assured of the national independence and unity, they found the true greatness of their country in their country's service to mankind. The ideals of the Revolution and of Bonaparte, of light and darkness, might clash, but those who took their stand on the great principle of human fraternity had no need to ask themselves if their fidelity to that principle was treason to France. It was only after 1870 that doubts began to arise; and never in her long history has anything been more creditable than the way in which those doubts were met. Through all these years she has remained, even by the admission of her present enemies, essentially pacific and humanitarian, not seeking war, and yet when war was forced upon her, shrinking from no sacrifice, and bearing all its sufferings with unflinching fortitude.

Now let us consider the position of Germany. As we saw she passed through the successive phases of feudalism long after the nations further West. She failed to attain unity when they attained it; and as a consequence she was for many ages insulted and ravaged by her more powerful neighbours. It is true that—some centuries after England and France—she gained a great place in the world of thought and letters; but that perhaps served to make her political humiliation the more apparent and the more galling. Some, indeed, of her greatest sons were prepared to bow to the tyranny of Napoleon, but the war of liberation awoke new hopes. While other nations were passing beyond a narrow patriotism, and were founding on the national unity the hope of the brotherhood of the nations, Germany was engaged in the task of transforming her old political organisation into one which should

enable her to take her place as a great world-power. It was a task that required all the resources, material and intellectual, of the people. It could only be brought about by successful war. It therefore meant the acceptance of the leadership of Prussia, the most military among the German states, and the organisation of the State for military ends, supported by a scientific and industrial development, such as had never been at the disposal of the great conquering nations of the past. The very forces which in the history of the modern world have relegated war to a secondary place, here were subordinated to its service. The result was extraordinarily successful. The country practically attained its unity in a few years. It passed to the first place among military powers. It organised the life of its people for its chosen end with unequalled efficiency. But it did so by making that one aim paramount.

Students of the historians and philosophers of modern Germany find in their teaching the root of the evil; and it is at least true that a nation whose intellectual life is free, alert, and receptive of outside influences, may triumph over political disabilities, even as France did in the eighteenth century. But this teaching has been the product of, as well as the incentive to, the present political attitude of the German people. Many streams have gone to fill the swollen river of German *Kultur*. As a consequence of its late emergence from the middle ages, remnants of feudalism still linger in the supremacy of the Junkers, and the subservience of large masses of the people—a supremacy and a subservience which are reflected in the opposing notion of the class-war. From the course of the Reformation and the compromise of the peace of Westphalia, the Protestant Church has been subservient to princes and magistrates in a way unexampled in Western Europe. In this island the subordination of Church to State has been carried very far in the past, but who can imagine in the nineteenth century the Kirk of Scotland and the Anglican Church, or indeed any two separate religious communions, submitting to amalgamation by royal decree in the same way that the King of Prussia united the Lutherans and the Calvinists in his dominions. Worse still, the universities, which much more than the churches constitute the real spiritual power of the country, are completely under state control; and their professors give a willing—a zealous service. In the industrial field, not only does the great industrial expansion render possible the support of the military machine, but the military machine by its training, and by the method of recruitment, disciplines the workers and strengthens their subordination. What a power is given to the industrial chiefs when they can decide in practice the age at which and for what time their subordinates have to serve in the army. So, too, the various social schemes to benefit the

workers all make for regimentation and subordination. Political, intellectual, and industrial influences all converge to the creation of a Germany organised for war.

Nor are there any corrective influences that could stay the process. There can be no union of intellectual forces for emancipation where philosophy and science start from different principles and pursue different methods to different ends; but there can be a united support of the action of the state where the leaders of thought are not dispersed among the general population, but regimented in state-supported universities. There is nothing in the old metaphysical philosophy of Germany, without a scientific and therefore an international basis, which could withstand the influence of the political and social environment. Nor can science serve the purpose of emancipation unless it takes large general views. Still less can the meticulous learning for which Germany has long been famous. Nor in the political field is more aid to be found. German socialism is itself a magnificent regimentation. Idealistic liberalism, so strong in 1848, is discredited by its failures. On the other hand, judged by the tests of national unity, wealth, and power, the present régime has been a great success. Its weakness is that it lives on the reputation of a past era. Will the coming failure of the successors of the men of 1870 awake their nation to more beneficent purposes and larger ideals?

I have already compared Germany with her Western neighbour. On the East there is another great nation, which attained to civilisation even later than Germany. If Germany may be said to have received the results of the old Mediterranean civilisation at second hand, Russia may be described as receiving them at third hand, save so far as they were conveyed to her in some small measure by the channel of the Greek Church—an institution throughout its history tending to make the State theocratic and the Church subservient. The Germans speak of the Russians as barbarians. In a sense it is true, and yet in Russian society there is a primitive spontaneity and a sense of human brotherhood which atone for much barbarity. It has been the boast of Prussia that she is a barrier against these Eastern barbarians. As a matter of historic fact, she protected Europe, if such was her duty, only by betraying it. She was on most occasions the friend and ally of Russia, till the rise of Pan-Germanism made her the protector of Austria, her semi-German neighbour. Then the conflicting ambitions of Austria and Russia in the Near East ranged Russia and Germany on opposite sides in two great leagues of nations. But this division of Europe had an earlier origin. When at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Alsace and part of Lorraine were annexed to Germany, it became inevitable that Europe would be divided. France was utterly defeated by the Allies in 1814 and

1815, but the old territory of France was left intact. There was no cause for lasting estrangement between victors and vanquished. In 1871 a different course was taken. France was dismembered. A population which—though in part originally Germanic—had long been French in national sentiment, was annexed to Germany against its will; and the conquerors took little pains to reconcile their unwilling subjects. A permanent source of enmity between France and Germany was thus created, and the nucleus of the division of Europe into two hostile camps, two opposing systems of alliances, was established. Of this enmity, the new Empire, proud of its own strength and contemptuous of its defeated rival, had little fear. That enmity only became dangerous when, having taken Austria as her dependent ally, Germany crossed the path of Russia in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, her growing power, her expanding trade, awakened a new ambition in Germany. Far back when she was still weak and divided, the more westerly nations had spread themselves over the world. Spain, Portugal, and England had reproduced their civilisation in new communities beyond the sea. England and Holland had gained large empires in the tropics. Germany, belated in this as in more vital matters, had been in no position to take part in the scramble. To the great men who achieved the unity of their country, the absence of colonies and sea-power seemed of little importance. Bismarck apparently was glad that France should weaken herself in Europe by devoting her energies to the extension of her empire in Africa. It may be that he recognised how great would be the antagonism to a nation strong at once on sea and land. The sea-power of England has been acquiesced in grudgingly enough, and only because she never aimed at domination on the European continent; when she has fought there her allies have contributed a far greater quota to the armies of the alliance. Colonies were not wanted for Germany's emigrants; for, owing to the industrial development at home, the tide of emigration began to slacken about the time that her new sea policy began; and the lands best suited for settlement were already occupied by civilised and for the most part self-governing communities. Moreover, her coast-line is small in proportion to her size, and thus ill-fitted to supply a great navy. In itself, the desire of Germany to be a great naval power may seem one to which no other power had a right to object. Practically, it meant that strong at sea and all-powerful on land, Germany was aiming at a predominance which neither Louis XIV nor Bonaparte had ever held.

The way to Germany's ambition both by sea and land lay through Belgium—a country she was pledged to defend. A somewhat idle controversy has grown up as to whether England's

interference in the war should be justified by the breach of Belgium's neutrality, or by the desirability of averting the predominance of a retrograde Power organised for war; and the advocates of the latter view ask if any treaty can be eternal. But the violation of Belgium neutrality—no ordinary breach of a treaty, but the commission by Germany of the very wrong against which she had promised to defend her weaker neighbour—the shepherd turned wolf—is itself the most flagrant symptom of the disease of Prussianism, with its double evil, its steadfast organisation of the whole nation for war and its exaltation of that one nation over the consensus of nations, of the national will over international law, of the interests of one people over the interests of the whole human race. The West has long tended towards a comity of nations, forming a whole, loosely joined by many common traditions and interests, and in which no one Power predominates. Circumstances have made Germany more backward than its neighbours in its general development. By a great concentrated effort she has at last attained unity and safety; and on that success she has built the hope of predominance by a devotion to militarism perhaps impossible to countries in a more advanced stage of civilisation. In resisting German aggression the other nations are endeavouring to keep Europe to its old lines of development; their action will be justified in so far as it revives the free consensus of the nations of the West, and the recognition that each nation is but an element of a larger whole.

S. H. Swinny.

THE HAGUE COURT:

ITS CONSTITUTION AND POTENTIALITIES.[1]

To speak on the Hague Court at a time when war is raging among the Powers of the Earth and law and order are being defied as hardly ever since the middle ages, may seem at first sight like mere trifling. In reality it is nothing of the kind. From the date of the creation of the Hague Court in 1899 to now, I have never ceased pointing out that neither it nor arbitration in the ordinary sense of the word could be regarded as capable of serving as a substitute for war in all cases. I mention this once more to prevent any misunderstanding as to the nature and objects of this paper. All I propose to do is to explain why the Court exists, its constitution and procedure, what it has already done, what it is capable of doing, and the reforms which have been suggested to give greater scope and effect to its work, a work quite useful enough to justify confidence in its future without expecting from it realization of any of the dreams of a millennium in which some of its more ardent apologists have indulged.

I.—Origin of the Court, its Constitution and Procedure.

The Hague Court owes its origin to the Peace Conference of 1899, but to understand its true nature and objects we must go back to an earlier period in the history of International Arbitration. International Arbitration means simply the reference of disputes between independent States to Arbitrators chosen by the parties themselves. It is this voluntary and agreed selection of the judges that distinguishes Arbitration from adjudication in disputes in ordinary Courts of Justice. Arbitration is no new thing in the settlement of disputes between nations, as anybody can ascertain for himself from Dr. Evans Darby's valuable collection of the different schemes which have been propounded and the different cases which have been decided by this method of adjustment. All these cases, however, down to the great one about which I shall speak presently, had been decided by an Arbitrator or Arbitrators without regard to any particular procedure and without any attempt to assimilate the forms of any national judicature. There was no question of deciding international differences as differences between individuals are decided in our Law Courts. It was due to the statesmen of the two great Anglo-Saxon communities that the first attempt was made to deal with international differences of the deepest gravity in accordance with the forms of national justice. Few among the audience to-day may remember what is known as the Alabama case; I am among those few. I well

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, March 23, 1915.

remember the furious controversy which accompanied every stage in the development of the question of its settlement. In spite of the violent opposition of excited patriots the two Governments signed a Treaty at Washington in 1871 referring the Alabama and several smaller analogous cases to the decision of Arbitrators. The Alabama was a vessel built in British waters for use as a war vessel in the service of the Southern Confederates during the great American Civil War. That the vessel was being built for this purpose was notorious, and the attention of the British Government was called to this fact by the United States minister in London. The vessel was, nevertheless, allowed to sail and at the Azores she was equipped for active service in the then pending war.

For the first time in the history of Arbitration a system which has now become almost common practice was adopted. The Court was constituted of three foreign Arbitrators, viz., Count Sclopis, an Italian, M. Stoempfli, a Swiss, and Baron D'Itajuta, a Brazilian. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn sat on the Court on behalf of Great Britain, and Charles Francis Adams on behalf of the United States. Count Sclopis presided. This Tribunal met at Geneva in 1871, and after sitting for nine months delivered an award condemning the British Government to pay a sum of, in round figures, three and a quarter million pounds, as an indemnity for the damage done in particular by the Alabama in the capture of Northern or Federal ships for the benefit of their ultimately defeated adversaries, the Southern or Confederate States. The result eventually came to be regarded as highly satisfactory, and excited patriots were obliged to admit that high as the indemnity was, it was an infinitely better solution than submitting the question to the arbitrament of brute force; and we cannot at the present day but rejoice that the Government had the foresight to resist the combative instincts of those who regarded our acceptance of a peaceable settlement as the abdication of England's proud independence and an acceptance of foreign dictation in a matter governed by no then existing rules of international practice. So true is it that there were at that time no such rules that the Treaty of Washington had to lay down certain principles of law which were stated in the treaty not to be of general acceptance but only to have been adopted for the purpose of the case in question. These principles, however, in spite of the British reservation, have become the law of civilized nations, and are now incorporated as such in one of the Hague Conventions. The precedent of the Geneva Court, however, remained a solitary exception among the numerous arbitrations which followed it for thirty years.

Meanwhile, in both England and the United States, the idea that arbitration might some day become a standing international institution never ceased to occupy the minds of pacific reformers.

It became almost a commonplace to advocate the principle of arbitration in every case of international difficulty, and in 1895 Lord Alverstone, at a meeting of the International Law Association at Brussels, stated that "arbitration was now regarded as so fully recognized by all civilized nations that it had become unnecessary to argue in its support." Schemes of procedure were drawn up by different international bodies, and towards the close of the last century men began to talk seriously about general and standing treaties of arbitration and the possibility of a permanent Court for its application without that ironical under-current which until then had marked the expression of the practical man's feelings towards arbitration. It had, in fact, been made slightly ridiculous by the exaggerated hopes expressed by some of its more injudicious advocates. At length the idea of a standing treaty of arbitration struck the highly practical mind of the late Lord Salisbury as feasible, at any rate, between the United States and ourselves, and in 1896 he was personally directing negotiations for this purpose with the Department of State at Washington. The negotiations resulted, in 1897, in the signing of such a treaty for five years. I cannot help thinking that the principles of that treaty were full of wisdom. It did not attempt to do the impossible but only to meet different contingencies which could arise between two nations in the way best adapted to avoid national susceptibilities.

There were to be three classes of arbitration tribunals. For questions of indemnity up to £100,000, three arbitrators were to be necessary. When more than that sum was in dispute, five arbitrators were to be called in. For territorial or national questions of supreme importance the number of arbitrators was increased to six. In case of the arbitrators finding it impossible to form the required majorities, a friendly Power was to be called in to mediate. The chief clauses in the Treaty were Article VI and Article VII. Article VI was as follows :—

> "Any controversy which shall involve the determination of territorial claims shall be submitted to a tribunal composed of six members, three of whom shall be Judges of the British Supreme Court of Judicature, or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to be nominated by Her Britannic Majesty, and the other of whom shall be Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, or Justices of the Circuit Courts, to be nominated by the President of the United States, whose award by a majority of not less than five to one shall be final. In case of an award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award shall also be final, unless either Power shall, within three months after the award has been reported, protest that the same is erroneous, in which case the award shall be of no validity. In the event of an award made by less than the prescribed majority and protested

as above provided, or if the members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be equally divided, there shall be no recourse to hostile measures of any description until the mediation of one or more friendly Powers has been invited by one or both of the high contracting parties."

Article VII provided for decision by a tribunal similarly composed of all questions "of principle of grave general importance affecting the national rights" of either State, "as distinguished from the private rights whereof it is merely the international representative."

The essential point in this project was that for these questions of supreme national importance the arbitrators were to belong exclusively to the two contracting States. The idea which had prevailed until then in the constituting of Courts of Arbitration was that the arbitrator or umpire, if more than one, was necessarily a person who, by his independence and entire detachment from the interests involved, had the requisite impartiality for the pure and simple application of principles of justice. It was thought that nations could only apply as between themselves the same principles as regulate litigation between citizens. And indeed the assimilation is reasonable and perfectly practicable for questions of indemnity, which constitute the majority of international differences.

The use of the word "arbitration" in connection with this proposed mode of dealing with such vital issues is therefore to some extent misleading. The Court provided for in Art. VI of that treaty is called an "Arbitral Tribunal." In reality it is a "Joint Commission." This Joint Commission, then, was instituted to meet the difficulty of bringing grave national issues within the operation of the Arbitration Treaty in question. The draftsmen of the Treaty of 1897 knew that no Great Powers would dare to leave the decision of any vital issues between them to the hazard of any independent judgment, however great and unquestioned the impartiality of the judge. It has always been felt that such issues could never be committed to the decision of foreign arbitrators, or of a foreign umpire, an umpire being, for obvious reasons, necessarily a foreigner. The negotiators, therefore, provided that there should be neither outside arbitrators nor any umpire at all. Furthermore, to allay fears that any great national interest might be exposed to quixotic or unpractical views taken by any single judge, it was provided that, to be binding, the decision should require the concurrence against it of two out of three of the judges appointed by either party. This precluded, by a simple and practical method, for both countries, any danger of decisions contrary to the national feeling. The object of the two Governments was, manifestly, not so much to create a substitute

for war, as to provide a further stage of negotiation, and thus enable Governments to issue from any deadlock, into which they might have been drawn in the heat of controversy or by pressure of public opinion.

They consequently limited their efforts to the creation without the introduction of any third or independent element, of an automatic system, calculated to remove questions between the two States from irritating discussion by irresponsible politicians who can seldom be sufficiently conversant with the facts to deal efficiently with them. They hoped thereby to arrest the development of those vague hatreds, created by prejudice and ignorance, which grow no one knows how, and soon break away from their initial cause. Unfortunately this Anglo-American Treaty was not adopted by the United States Senate, although there was a majority of sixteen in its favour, owing to the fact that the United States Constitution requires a two-thirds majority for the adoption of a treaty. There were 42 votes for and 26 against it. Four more votes would have sufficed to ratify it.

At length came the Czar's famous rescript of 1898. Count Muravieff, his Foreign Minister, included among the subjects for discussion the establishment of a uniform practice in reference to good offices, mediation and facultative arbitration, but the proposal of a Court of Arbitration once more came from the representatives of the two Anglo-Saxon communities. It was more particularly, in fact, Lord Pauncefote, the British Delegate, who had signed the Anglo-American Treaty when British Ambassador at Washington two years before, to whom the proposal of the Permanent Court was due.

II.—Early Distrust and its Eventual Cessation.

There is something colossal in the very idea of a permanent Court of Justice for the decision of differences between States. One thinks of the graduation of our national Courts, of how our judicial organization provides an ever higher rank and greater function, as it ascends from rung to rung in the hierarchy, and yet the highest rung only deals with very small matters compared with the immense interests involved in the decision of an international issue. Our sense of proportion asks where we should find the judges great enough to inspire awe and confidence in the mighty litigants who are to sheathe their swords and humbly submit their differences to this highest jurisdiction of mankind.

We must therefore not be surprised if States shrank from making recourse to the new Court compulsory. In fact they repudiated the idea of compulsion in every provision of the Convention of 1899, and much to the disappointment of many of the more ardent votaries of arbitration, it contains specific warnings of

its purely optional nature. Thus the signatory Powers undertake, in case of grave disagreement or conflict, before appealing to arms, "as far as circumstances allow," to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers, and, "as far as circumstances allow," the Powers may tender their good offices, and the exercise of this right can never be considered as an unfriendly act. Provision is made "as far as circumstances allow," and where involving "neither national honour nor vital interests," for international commissions of inquiry which are to have no binding character for the parties. Lastly is constituted the Permanent Court of Arbitration to which all questions may be submitted, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, but everything again of an obligatory character in connection with it is most carefully eliminated.

The rules relating to the procedure of arbitration had already been drawn up and, as the Convention on the subject states, the object of the Permanent Court was to facilitate immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences which it had not been possible to settle by diplomacy. This Permanent Court of Arbitration was to be at all times accessible and to operate, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of procedure inserted in the Convention. The Conference, it is seen, left it to the Powers themselves to organize the Permanent Court, but it made a suggestion of what might be the composition of the Court failing direct agreement of the parties, viz.: that each party should appoint two arbitrators and that these together should choose an umpire.

It was also agreed that each signatory Power should select four persons of known competency in questions of international law and of the highest moral reputation to form a panel of members of the Court from which the Arbitrators could be selected. The panel was duly created, but for some time it seemed as if the Court was destined to remain a mere pious wish, if not an ironical demonstration of the absurdity of "pacifism," a term invented by the adversaries of pacific methods generally. For three years no recourse was had to the new institution. To the English judicial mind in particular it merely appeared as a sort of concession of the practical man to popular sentiment, even perhaps to popular ignorance which it would be safe to ignore. At length the United States and Mexico, less susceptible to the ridicule of the ignorant, gave it its first case, and the two great republics of North and Central America determined to cross the Atlantic and in the home of Grotius submit a difference between them to the new Court. As Baron Descamps, the eminent Belgian Senator and ex-Minister, who argued the case of the United States before the Court, said: "they gave a lesson to the old world."

The lesson had its effect. It was *le premier pas qui coûte*, and since then the Hague Court has had many cases. I do not say that they have all been cases which would not have been settled by arbitration without the existence of the Hague Court, but I do say that the existence of this Court has facilitated recourse to arbitration, that irritating discussion preliminary to the adoption of its procedure has been avoided, and that it has had a suggestive influence generally which has relieved states from any need of public justification of recourse to its peaceful agency. Its utilisation, moreover, may be the means, as we shall see, of proceeding further in the development of arbitration by the broadening of the area of its jurisdiction, so to speak, and by the adaptation of its methods to the varying requirements of international controversies.

International Law is not backed up with a police force to carry out its fiats. It depends for its observance upon the reasonableness of its rules. Diplomacy, the chief agency by which, in time of peace, International Law is applied, on the other hand, like the procedure of our domestic courts of justice, is largely a congeries of devices which have grown up to provide for requirements shown to exist, owing to the inherent intellectual shortcomings of the men who resort to law or even of those who have to apply it. In our domestic courts we distrust leaving irrevocable decisions to the judgment of one man: we distrust decreeing finality either to arguments or to evidence. And, to a great extent, circumstances have also led in diplomacy to the employment of many different forms to enable Governments in a similar way to avoid the calamity of deadlocks. Yet deadlocks do occur, and in recent times we have been more than once brought to the verge of war with powerful neighbours by practical deadlocks. Our diplomatic machinery, in spite of its arsenal of forms, failed for want of a further jurisdiction, which, by operation of law, without further discussion, should become necessarily possessed of the question at issue. We cannot disregard the natural weaknesses of mankind in the relations of nations with one another. Patriotism, ignorance, "bluff," improvidence, thoughtlessness, courage, love of excitement, conceit, conviction (right or wrong), misunderstanding, exaggeration, all affect the course of international questions, when public opinion is appealed to or allowed to take any part in their decision. This is the danger, and it is on account of this danger that so many great statesmen are agreed that, successful as our diplomacy usually is and admirably as it is recruited, we can no longer rely, in the circumstances of the present age—with a vigilant and enterprising press ruthlessly day by day dissecting every international incident, and a nervous, overstrained democracy which, especially in overcrowded cities, claims its say in all public matters—we can no longer, I say, rely on the quiet settlement of difficulties,

which the accredited diplomatists have not solved, without the aid of some further dilatory amicable procedure by which Governments can at least gain time.

Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the mode in which arbitration can be best adapted to cover such and all cases of international difficulty, we have the great, if only, precedent of a general Arbitration Treaty between great Powers, the unratified Anglo-American Treaty of 1897. It cannot be denied that that treaty is based on a reasonable view of the difficulties which beset arbitration in the minds of statesmen, where national questions of vital importance are involved. It embodies, at any rate, as President Cleveland said of it, a "practical working plan" for bringing these delicate matters within a general treaty. On the other hand, the Hague Convention has dealt with all matters but this very class, which was excluded from the purview of the Conference, and as regards all others but this class, reference to the Hague Court is fast being made compulsory. Then what is wanted, to complete the work done at the Hague, is to graft upon it some such provisions as those contained in the Anglo-American Treaty, confining the choice of the arbitrators, where the question is of vital importance, to persons exclusively of the nationality of the States concerned.

III.—Compulsory Arbitration and the Scope of its Application.

I have dealt with the first two great landmarks in the history of systematic arbitration, that is arbitration as a judicial method of adjusting international differences. The first was the Anglo-American Alabama arbitration at Geneva in which the forms and procedure of law courts were followed. The second was the constitution of a permanent court of arbitration at the Hague modelled more or less upon the principles of the Geneva arbitration court. I come now to the third great step in the story—the first standing treaty of arbitration, under which two great Powers determined to submit all differences of a judicial character to the decision of this court. That treaty was signed by Lord Lansdowne, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, on October 14, 1903, after an agitation lasting three years in which I had the honour of playing the part of leader, a treaty for ever memorable because it was the first of the series of agreements which consolidated the Entente between this country and France. This Anglo-French treaty provided as follows:—

> *Article I.* Differences of a judicial order, or relating to the interpretation of existing Treaties between the two Contracting Parties, which may arise, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the

Permanent Court of Arbitration, established by the Convention of July 29th, 1899, at the Hague, on condition, however, that neither the vital interests, nor the independence or honour of the two Contracting States, nor the interests of any State other than the two contracting States, are involved.

Article II. In each particular case the High Contracting Parties, before addressing themselves to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shall sign a special undertaking [in French—*compromis*] determining clearly the subject of dispute, the extent of the arbitral powers, and the periods to be observed in the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, and the procedure.

The terms of agreement as adopted by Great Britain and France became a sort of common form, and in the course of a few years there were but a few states in the world which had not concluded with each other similar treaties. The Hague Court, in fact, was now universally recognized as an international institution with a definite function, and the self-dubbed "practical man" ceased to regard it as a mere concession to popular prejudice and ignorance.

To understand, however, the full bearing of the Anglo-French treaty I must ask you to revert again to the Hague Conference of 1899, and remind you of a fact which has probably been forgotten by most people by this time. It was thar the Russian original project of a general treaty of arbitration provided that it should be obligatory. The then famous Article 10 of that project provided as follows:—

From the ratification of the present Act by all the signatory powers, arbitration is obligatory in the following cases, in so far as they do not affect either vital interests or the national honour of the contracting states:

1. In cases of difficulty or contention relating to pecuniary damage suffered by a state or its citizens, in consequence of illegal acts or negligence of another state or its citizens.

2. In cases of difference relating to the interpretation or application of the treaties or conventions herein mentioned.

(*a*) Treaties and conventions relating to posts and telegraphs, railways, protection of submarine cables; prevention of collisions on the high seas; navigation of international rivers and inter-oceanic canals.

(*b*) Conventions relating to copyright and industrial property (patents, trade marks, etc.); to money and weights and measures; to sanitary and veterinary matters and the phylloxera.

(*c*) Conventions relating to successions, cartel and mutual judicial assistance.

(*d*) Conventions relating to boundaries, in so far as of a purely technical and non-political character.

To the first class in this enumeration some exception was taken, but the conference was practically agreed on the general principle of the article—viz., that the signatories should oblige themselves to refer to arbitration all matters not involving a vital interest or the national honour. After recasting the Russian project to meet different objections of detail, the idea of making reference to arbitration obligatory, even on these minor matters, had to be abandoned. One Power alone, but a very great Power, refused to agree to obligatory arbitration in any case whatsoever. That Power was Germany, who "did not consider that she could enter into any treaty binding herself beforehand to submit new cases to arbitration."

At the time it seemed as if this opposition on the part of a leading state on an essential point would make the whole work of the conference in reference to arbitration a mockery, and there was general disappointment, not confined to those who had hoped that, though the Russian Emperor's original idea of disarmament had not found favour with any of the chief participants in the conference, at any rate some sort of obligatory arbitration would be adopted which would largely compensate for its rejection. Obligatory arbitration, in fact, had become for many the chief object of the conference, and it seemed to them as if without it no headway in the cause of peace would have been made at all. When the conference came to an end the stormy petrels of the press and magazines were jubilant at this apparent failure of the conference to do anything but put in the form of an agreement the rules already practised. They pointed out with derision that the objection raised to the obligatory character of Art. 10 had been translated into every article of the Convention. Every step forward was attended by a step backward by the addition of the proviso: "as far as circumstances allow." This had been the price of Germany's adhesion to the Peace Convention. Well, nevertheless, one of the earliest treaties based on the formula of the Anglo-French treaty was one between Great Britain and Germany.

The effect of this new Anglo-German agreement was that Germany thereby withdrew her opposition, so far at any rate as regarded Great Britain. This was a point of considerable significance. Germany appeared to have changed her attitude towards standing treaties of arbitration, and had now become by the new treaty an active party to the promotion of the prestige of the Hague Court. There could be little doubt that thenceforward the statesmen of the Western nations intended to treat the Hague Court seriously and, with a recognized Court to

apply it, there was no longer anything utopian in the idea of a code of international law. But we see the still more important fact of general application, viz., that by the adoption of the permanent court of arbitration and by the obligatory reference to it, through the conclusion of numerous treaties, of all the very cases which were proposed in the furthest-going scheme submitted at the first Hague Conference, the then "wildest" of schemes had now become the "mildest" of commonplaces. For all cases of a judicial character the Hague Court had become as much the appropriate jurisdiction as any national court for similar cases. We heard no more about the futility of a Court which had no means of enforcing its decisions. Universal public opinion afforded the necessary sanction. Although as many as thirteen cases have now been decided by the court, and two at the outbreak of the war were still pending, and the powers which have submitted differences to it number seventeen, including some states which have even been regarded as unruly,[1] not a single instance has occurred of a state showing even the slightest disrespect for the decision given.

We must, however, remember a point which is often overlooked. It is that the parallel in national justice to an international court of arbitration is a civil not a criminal court, and that the complaints of critics of arbitration assume that the advocates of arbitration propose to give powers of punishment to a jurisdiction which is essentially a court for the decision of points of law and the assessment of damage. Whether we are likely ever to reach a stage in which such a court can deal with any but questions of judicial right is the next point we shall have to examine.

IV.—"Vital Interests" and Moral Potentialities.

You will have observed that the Anglo-French treaty contained the proviso that it should not apply to questions involving vital interests, the independence or the honour of either state. This was the class of questions which in the Anglo-American treaty corresponded to questions of "grave general importance affecting the national rights" reserved for a joint commission as distinguished from a court of arbitration. This exclusion of the very matters which seem the only kind capable of inflaming public opinion to a dangerous point shows the limit to which in both America and Europe statesmen are prepared to go so far as arbitration is concerned. What is a vital interest?

"Vital," I venture to suggest, means some difficulty which can

1. The States which have agreed to references are as follows: Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the United States of America, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Peru, Venezuela.

only be solved by reversion to the *status quô ante* or the reversal pure and simple of the act committed. If, for instance, the English port authorities had declined in time of peace to allow a French man of war to leave Gibraltar until a case arising out of a collision were tried, France would probably have refused to submit the question of the detention to arbitration, but might have agreed to the determination by arbitration of the liability of the vessel and assessment of the damages. The freedom of movement of her vessels of war she would have considered as a vital interest, the other as a difference of a judicial order. We may understand what is a vital interest from this example.

The determination of what is a question involving "national honour" is less easy. An insult to an ambassador or to the national flag may be regarded as examples. Though an indemnity may be paid by way of damages, it is obvious that no state would willingly agree to an arbitration in which it might be competent to the tribunal to declare that no damages were payable or would allow a third party alone to assess the payment which would repair an insult. It is only where there may be a doubt whether a certain act is an insult or not that conceivably arbitration would be accepted by a state which felt some doubt itself. On the other hand the over-heated discussion of any question or the difficulty of receding from an erroneous or one-sided view of a question may be regarded as involving a national honour conspicuously absent in most such cases from the controversy. In short the Hague Court is for the trial of civil causes—a court which can have no punitive character, which decides between the judicial rights of the litigant parties, and which can only deal with precise points submitted to it or assess the amount of damages payable when required to do so in the protocol of reference signed by the parties.

It has been proposed by the United States Government that the court should be assimilated even in its composition to a national court, that judges as in the case of national judicatures be appointed and sit in rotation, and that a special selection of arbitrators *ad hoc* should become unnecessary. An exhaustive scheme was submitted by the American delegates at the conference of 1907 for the purpose of creating this "Court of Arbitral Justice." Out of the panel forming the court three judges were to be selected to form a special delegation, and three more to replace them if the former were unable to act. They were to meet in session once a year on the third Wednesday in June, the session to last until all the business on the agenda had been transacted. The difficulty of an annual selection by all the powers involved might no doubt be overcome and probably the scheme of the United States with some minor modifications will some day bring the court into a closer harmony with existing judicial systems.

What then are the potentialities of the Hague Court? Since it came into existence in 1899 there have been six wars—the South African, the Russo-Japanese, the Turco-Italian, the Turco-Balkan, the Inter-Balkan, and the present gigantic conflict. In none of these cases has there been matter for arbitration. They have all been wars of conquest, deliberately undertaken with a view to conquest. In the Turco-Italian and the present war no time was left after the declaration of war for any mediation which might have led to arbitration, if there had been, in either, any arbitrable matter. In the Inter-Balkan war the hostilities broke out without even a declaration of war. In the Turco-Balkan war even the disguise of a grievance was dispensed with, and in the South African war in which grievances were alleged and there was time for arbitration, it was firmly declined.

It is obvious that where one of the parties is decidedly in the wrong, he will not agree to arbitration. We may therefore eliminate from among the potentialities of the Hague Court all recourse to it where one of the parties to the difference has an unavowed object or an avowed object which according to the principles of justice would have to be condemned. In the Turco-Italian war, Italy frankly admitted that her object was to occupy and annex the Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. Had the matter been submitted to arbitration she could but have been declared in the wrong. If, in the present war, Germany had agreed to arbitration she could not have hoped to obtain by an award either any part of Belgium or of the Baltic provinces of Russia. If England had agreed to arbitration with the Boer Republics the question of a South and East-African dominion would have passed out of realization and the Republics, with the assistance of Germany, would have finally blocked the road between Egypt and the Cape.

Then it is evident that arbitration, in none of these cases of war since the Hague Court was instituted, could have saved the states in question from war. The rôle of the Hague Court, therefore, is just that which it has played since its creation. It is a court for the determination of cases in which there are disputed questions of right and damages, questions in which rules of law and justice are applicable, and in which the parties seek in good faith an honest solution.

And yet there are powers which might be given to it, even in cases like the present terrible war, in which the bulk of the nations of the earth are engaged in a life or death struggle while only the weaker nations are neutral. It might sit as a sort of court for grievances before which all alleged violations of international treaties or usages might be laid; by which all cases of futile cruelty might be judicially examined. It might not only condemn such violations of law and humanity but it might offer recommendations

and help to prevent the growth of illegality which marks the progress of the present war.

It may be a dream but I wonder whether, some day, out of the Hague Court and its further developments, some institution may not be evolved in which men of different nations may be elected by civilized mankind to possess in common the citizenship of all nations and relinquish patriotism or political attachment to any one of them, an institution entitled to express its opinions and give its advice with all the sanctity of the oracles of antiquity. Or perhaps a special state may, some day, be created like the District of Columbia, created to fulfil the purpose of securing independence among the United States of Europe, or it might be a special college of jurists having an existence as independent as the Vatican. In any case some such body of "supermen" who have nothing to gain and nothing to lose might come to wield a power over the minds of mankind not unlike that at present wielded by the Holy Father at Rome or by the Caliph over Mahommedans. It may be a mere dream, as I say. Certain it is, however, that the world needs some great moral force to guide and uphold it amid the ambitions of sovereigns and statesmen, to protect men against their own cruel and rapacious instincts and to set a higher tone of human sympathy and fraternity among mankind generally.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

GERMANY AND AMERICAN OPINION.

PROFESSOR ALBION SMALL TO PROFESSOR GEORG SIMMEL.

For the following communication, addressed by a representative American sociologist to a German sociologist no less representative, we are indebted to Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, who writes: It may be of interest to the members of the Sociological Society to know the trend of academic opinion in the United States, and especially of American sociologists, regarding the present war. I have tried to keep in close touch with this matter, and I think it safe to say that nine out of ten American academic men in responsible positions are non-sympathetic with Germany in this war, in spite of the systematic campaign which German professors have undertaken to influence the opinions of their American colleagues, and in spite of the traditional influence of German over American universities. The enclosed copy of a letter from Professor Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, to Professor Georg Simmel, of the University of Strassburg, well illustrates the attitude of those Americans who have been most friendly to German scholarship. As your readers know, Dr. Small is editor of the *American Journal of Sociology*, is a leader of sociological thought in America, and was for two years president of the American Sociological Society. He has always been a protagonist of German scholarship in the social sciences, and is closely related by family ties to the German people. His letter was written in reply to one of Dr. Simmel's claiming that "all the world is believing lies about Germany."

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
October 29, 1914.

Professor Dr. Georg Simmel, Strassburg.

My dear colleague and friend,—

A message from you is always welcome, but I share most genuinely with you the pain of the occasion which gives rise to any conferring at all upon the subject which is uppermost in my mind, as it is in yours. Indeed, I have postponed my reply from day to day because I felt unequal to the delicate problem of conveying on paper precisely my own reaction, which so far as I can discover is substantially that of nine out of every ten academic men in the United States. There are certain things which must be emphasized: first of all, that in a mere measuring of sympathy with the various peoples of Europe, apart from any judgment upon specific issues in controversy between them, American academic sentiment for the past thirty years, and to-day as emphatically as ever, is overwhelmingly in favour of the Germans. We do not express

ourselves in the German way. We do not pronounce German civilization as a whole superior to other civilizations. We think that is repeating in varied form our own naive blunder in the formative days of our nation, viz., for nearly a hundred years it was the almost unchallenged American formula that our Constitution is not only the best possible for ourselves at the given moment, but that it is the only government fit for progressive human beings anywhere. We have changed our minds about that. So we try to restrain ourselves from violations of courtesy when we encounter, face to face, German expressions of the German estimate that German culture is superior to that of the rest of the world. We think—or at least the Americans who know the Germans best think, and say very freely—that the Germans are particularly strong in traits which we conspicuously lack, and that Americans would be a nobler people than they are if we could reinforce American life with a liberal infusion of German superiorities.

In the second place, it would be a great mistake for Germans to suppose that Americans are relatively misinformed about the great outstanding facts in the European situation. On the contrary, it has been evident from the second day of August that, as compared with the other nations of the world, the Americans are posted up to date. I heard Professor Kühnemann say this with emphasis to a large audience of Germans a week ago. He confessed that he was astonished on arriving here to find out how much more fully informed the Americans are than any of the Europeans about what has actually occurred. The main reason for this is obvious. Not being at war we have no censorship, as each of the belligerents must have. Each of the warring nations gets only such statements about the war as its own censors think it wise for the public to have. We get everything that the wires are allowed to take from every country in Europe, and Amsterdam and Rome send us every day more or less useful means of checking up the statements of the combatants. Our newspapers are the greediest in the world for news. In this upheaval of civilization, the only news that is sure to be read by everybody is that from the different war zones. The great rival newspapers are in the keenest competition to be known as purveyors of the most complete and accurate reports. Every day we read in them side by side the official statements of each of the contending nations, together with all the other evidence that can be collected by their regiments of European correspondents. The sources of these reports are carefully indicated—whether official, semi-official, the unsupported statements of such and such an individual, or mere rumours, the source of which cannot be traced. Each of the leading papers has a staff of so-called "military experts," *i.e.*, retired graduates of West Point and Annapolis, our military and naval academies, who digest the official reports every day, and interpret the strategic meaning of the different situations as they develop. Maps drawn by them are published sometimes as often as every day. These digests and charts are syndicated to the smaller papers throughout the country. Of course, we are not informed of precise military details until they are ancient history, measured by our attentive interest; but the experience of two months proves that our information has kept us in the main accurately informed several days, and often

weeks, ahead of the general public in either of the countries directly involved.

To what extent this is true about the developments in the several countries among the civilians, we are in a less favourable condition to judge. The situation is such that we are evidently more in the dark about the civilians in Germany than in France or England. We had long since made up our minds, however, that we were mistaken in our primary theory as to the probable reaction in Germany. The Americans are extremely rare—I have been unable to find one in my own range of acquaintances—who believed that the governments would allow the spark which started the conflagration to kindle anything more general than a settlement between Austria and Servia. It was the well nigh invariable opinion here that the governments could not permit themselves to be drawn into the incredible folly of a general war. When we found that the unbelievable was actual, we declared that the great body of the German people certainly could not endorse a war which from our standpoint is the most damning indictment of European diplomacy that has ever been drawn. We were early convinced that we were again mistaken. We now know that the Germans are making one of the most wonderful exhibitions of national unity in the history of the world. We also admire the spirit of this unity while we believe the course of reasoning upon which it is based is one of the most deplorable mistakes in history. I will say more about that in a moment.

In the third place, because of what I have already said you may be able to see at once that two things are quite probable: first, that the lies which have been told about Germany have not had the influence in America which you suppose; secondly, that you do not sufficiently take into account the effect which lies told in Germany about the other nations have had upon the minds of Germans. As to the first, I think it is highly probable that the Americans are the most incredulous people in the world. "That which is written" has notorious potency to palsy the judgment, and Americans are no exceptions to the rule. On the other hand, Americans are omnivorous newspaper readers, and one of the few mitigating circumstances connected with this fact is that it results in a gratifying case under the law "familiarity breeds contempt." We have an unlimited capacity to swallow sensational reports, but we have a corresponding scepticism about their value. In the first days of consternation that war was possible at all, the only reports we could get came from Belgian and French and English sources, and were, of course, of the most lurid character. They had the effect of increasing the general horror and indignation. After there had been time for second thought, and after we had heard substantially the same stories about each of the armies, that whole phase of the situation lost its hold upon our interest. We not only doubt that one army is more guilty than another of unnecessary brutality, but we decline to be excited about the by-products of war so long as the essential barbarity of war itself is unrestrained.

As to the other matter, I may not be able to convince you, but I state the facts as we see them. The German people will some time discover that at least one lie has been in circulation in Germany

about the other peoples of the world for every lie that has been invented elsewhere about the Germans. As we Americans see it, one of the antecedents which have made this war possible, and which have made the Germans regard it as a holy war, is a whole fictitious psychology of the other peoples. A single illustration on which I can give testimony will indicate what I mean. Shortly after your letter reached me I received a paper from Berlin, on the first page of which, under prominent headlines, was an account of an alleged disturbance on the Canadian border, with indications that the United States would presently take possession of Canada! One would hardly suppose that a Berlin editor could imagine that there is a single individual in Berlin stupid enough to regard such a report as worth the ink which it took to print it. There is less probability that such an idea could be taken seriously on either side of the Canadian border than that Saxony at this moment should fear an incursion from Prussia: yet a whole mythology of this sort has misinterpreted the rest of the world to Germany. I do not mean to assert that all Germans have been uncritical about these fables. All that I urge is that it would be extremely hazardous for the Germans to assume that they have clear white light about the other nations, while the other nations are befogged about the Germans. It is perfectly evident, for instance, that the Germans have taken for granted many things that are wide of the facts about the relations of the British colonies to the mother country, and that these misconceptions have had not a little weight in calculations of the probable fortunes of war.

Then I want to testify about the American judgment as to the antecedents of the war. In a word, we have debated in private and in public, in newspapers and magazines, on the lecture platform and in the pulpit, the merits of the cases as presented by the warring nations each for itself. We shall doubtless make these claims the texts for much more discussion till long after peace is concluded. But our first reaction has been ratified by the general consensus of our accumulating conviction, viz., "a plague o' both your houses." Our general judgment is that if the controversy were settled beyond dispute, it would merely save the face of one chancellory or another as to the matter of skill in diplomatic manœuvres. That whole question looks to us unspeakably paltry in comparison with the underlying fact. The essential thing, as we see it, is that all Europe is living on a militaristic basis, and is sacrificing the interests of the citizens as human beings to an arbitrary monster of "military necessity." The report has reached us within a few days that a delegation of German professors will be sent to this country after Christmas to lecture on the German side of the war. They will be welcomed almost everywhere, and audiences will listen to them and applaud them. But so far as changing any one's opinion is concerned, they would do Germany much more good by staying at home than by bringing to us amplifications of the type of argument by which German scholars have thus far tried to support the German programme.

We do not believe the political morality of Germany is either higher or lower than that of England or France. We are not very much deceived about the essence of the Belgian incident. We

know perfectly well that if the objective and subjective conditions had been turned about, and if England or France or for that matter the United States had been in the place of Germany in the closing days of last July, either of the three would in all probability have done just what Germany did in Belgium. Not being directly concerned in the complication, however, we can see that in fact it was an appalling confession of the essential barbarism of a militaristic civilization. To Americans this is not a war of Germans against Slavs, nor of Germans against England. In its ultimate causes and effects we believe it will turn out to be *a war against war*.

Americans are judging the Germans to-day not on the ground of anything that anybody else has said about them, but on the basis of their own declarations about themselves. Nobody knows better than the Germans that they have nowhere more startlingly exemplified their racial superiority of *thoroughness* than in their preparedness for war and in their theories about war. The German literature of militarism from Treitschke—not to go back further—to Bernhardi has not been hid in a corner. In this country we have been reading it, particularly for the last dozen years, but we have regarded it as what Herbert Spencer would call the "professional bias" of the officers. Very few of us have believed, even in our most imaginative moments, that the German people could ever be manœuvred into a position in which as one man they would regard it as the only moral alternative to endorse that militaristic philosophy. In this country all but a feeble minority regard the militaristic conception as a betrayal of reason and an appeal to chaos as the ultimate cosmic principle.

Kühnemann's address that I referred to above filled two hours, and was the most passionate declamation that I have ever heard. He announced as his subject "German Militarism." It turned out to be one of the most curious webs of fallacy that I have ever met. He never once in the two hours so much as hinted at "militarism" in the sense which every one in this country attaches to that term. He assumed throughout that "militarism" has no other meaning than the "German people armed for defence of the Fatherland," and he wasted his breath defending the right of the Germans to train themselves for military duty. To Americans that sort of thing proves either stupidity or evasion. We mean by "militarism" the creed that war is the foremost means of national self-realisation, and that the "interests of the state" justify the making of war by a stronger nation upon a weaker. Americans do not want any nation of Europe to gain a foot of the territory of any other nation without the free consent both of the nation and of the occupants of the possible cession. They do not believe that there is any difference worth speaking of between the European nations in their willingness to make the most of their military or naval strength in pursuit of the militaristic ideal. They know what is open to all the world, that *Germany has done more than all the rest of the world put together in the way of elaborating and publishing this militaristic ideal.* They do not want Germany humbled, but *they do want this hideous cult so discredited that no nation in Europe will profess it after this war is done.*

When I began this reply I had no intention of letting it run to this length, and what I have said amounts only to the introduction to what I wanted to say; but I must stop. Let me assure you that Americans hate the idea of aggressive might so genuinely that they will have no sympathy with vindictive might, however the war results. So far as I can judge of our whole people by the indexes which I can use, we hope the war will result in an absolute stalemate. We should be delighted if every bit of military and naval equipment of all the nations were to be wiped out of existence to-morrow, without the loss of another life, and if the cabinets should then be forced by the respective peoples to do what was their duty in the first place—join in a candid and rational adjustment of a *modus vivendi*. Our most influential men are talking seriously of proposing to Europe at the close of the war a system of international police composed of quotas of troops from all the nations, representing an international tribunal, and proceeding against any nation which refuses to abide by the findings of the tribunal. Possibly we are so far removed from the fumes of the battlefield that this, which Europe would regard as a diseased dream now, may turn out to be a forward look into the clear air of a better day.

Sincerely,

ALBION W. SMALL.

Obituary.

THE HON. G. K. GOKHALE, C.I.E.

The late Mr. Gokhale was for a short time a member of the Sociological Society. Statesman and patriot, teacher and saint, he stood for the highest type of Indian—a very high type indeed. He was a Chitpavan Brahman, born in the Mahratta town of Kolhapur in 1866, and from early manhood he deliberately and finally consecrated his life to the service of India. His *guru* was the renowned economist and jurist, the late Mr. Justice Ranadé, to whom his debt was admittedly very great. He graduated at Bombay at eighteen and soon after attached himself, characteristically, to the Fergusson College, a purely Indian institution. He remained on the professional staff for twenty years at a monthly salary of £5. From the outset he gave himself lavishly to the public service: as editor, secretary, agent, collector of funds—in every capacity energetic and efficient. In 1900 (this was soon after his first visit to England, on the Welby Commission) he was elected to the Bombay Legislative Council, and two years later to the Viceroy's Council. Here his brilliant natural abilities and his remarkable mastery of facts made him Lord Curzon's powerful and merciless opponent. His Budget speech became the event of the session, and to his constructive criticisms practically all subsequent reforms can be referred. His political mission to this country in 1905 first brought him, and to some extent the condition of India, into general public notice. He never recovered from the grave overstrain of this year. In June he had founded at Poona the Servants of India Society, a lay brotherhood for the training of young Indians in the service of the Motherland. Nothing else that he has done more clearly reflects his ideals: nothing was nearer to his heart. Nor can one omit to mention his services to the Indian National Congress, over which he presided in Benares at Christmas of the same year. Great significance must attach to his visit to England in 1908 when the Morley-Minto reforms were under consideration. His work on the Public Services Commission brought him here again in 1912, 1913, and 1914, and he had expected to sign the finished report this year. His arduous campaign in South Africa in 1912 on behalf of the resident Indians did much to bring about the satisfactory solution of a difficult problem. For the last four or five years of his life he laboured, as it seemed to him, in vain to obtain free compulsory education for his countrymen. That a man of his ability and statesmanship was never given a share in the government of his own country must remain an ironic commentary on our management of Indian affairs. He died in Poona, the old Mahratta capital, on February 19. His death has withdrawn a spiritual force from Indian public life.

K. M. R.

SIR OWEN ROBERTS, M.A., D.C.L., LL.D., F.S.A.

By the death of Sir Owen Roberts, which occurred on January 6th, the Sociological Society has lost one of its most distinguished members, who will always be remembered as one of the pioneers of technical education in this country. He was born in Carnarvonshire in 1835, and he spent the greater part of his active life in the service of the Clothworkers' Company, first as clerk and afterwards as master. His sphere of usefulness and activity covered a much wider area than the confines of the City of London, for it was due to his exertions that the clothworking and dyeing industries

of Yorkshire and the West of England were revived upon a scientific basis through the foundation of special Chairs, buildings for this purpose being founded in Yorkshire College at Leeds and in the University College of Bristol; and greatly through his influence these colleges were raised to university rank. He had great sympathy with women's work, and was one of the promoters of Somerville College, Oxford. It was publicly acknowledged by a deputation from the Incorporated Association of Headmistresses that the name of Sir Owen Roberts was foremost in regard to the benefits conferred upon schools and colleges for girls. He was a warm supporter of the London School of Economics, and was one of the prime movers in the foundation of the City and Guilds of London Institute, acting as its honorary secretary from 1876 to 1888; and for eleven years he served on the Technical Education Board of the London County Council. From 1891 to 1902 he acted as the Chairman of the Polytechnics Committee, while for the same period he served as Chairman of the London Polytechnic Council. He was for many years a member of the Senate of the University of London, and he was a member of the Royal Commission for the reconstruction of this University on a teaching basis. He was a man of the shrewdest judgment, and he possessed a wonderful capacity for estimating the value of other men's work and for getting the best results out of it. His business instincts and financial capacity were altogether exceptional. For twenty-five years he was Treasurer of the Society of Arts and afterwards the Chairman of the Council. He also served as Treasurer of the Society of Antiquaries. He was one of His Majesty's Lieutenants for the City of London and a Deputy Lieutenant for the counties of London and Carnarvonshire, of the latter of which he was the High Sheriff in 1908; and he was a Justice of the Peace for the counties of London, Surrey, and Carnarvonshire. He was knighted in 1888 for his work in connection with technical education. He leaves a widow and two daughters. R. A.-J.

M. RAOUL GUERIN DE LA GRASSERIE.

M. Raoul Guerin de la Grasserie, who was for many years a judge in the civil courts of Rennes and Nantes, died on September 12th last at the age of seventy-five. He retired some years ago in order to devote himself to poetry, general literature, psychology, sociology and languages; and in every one of these departments he excelled the specialists who had devoted a lifetime to them. The bibliography of his works which Messrs. Melle Goussard and Co. have published is itself a volume; and the matter is arranged under no fewer than nine headings. The last section is, perhaps, the most wonderful, for it contains references to as many as fifteen translations from and grammars and dictionaries of the languages of Central America which this remarkable scholar had mastered. But it is for his writings on general sociology, economics, ethics, criminology, political science and comparative religion that sociologists will always remember and be grateful to him. To students of religion as part of the social order his *Cosmo-sociologie* is invaluable; and for the modern-spirited lawyers who wish to substitute a positive for a prohibitive system of laws his *De la justice en France et à l'étranger* is a veritable scripture. His *Essai d'une sociologie globale et synthétique* has a philosophic grandeur which only a Frenchman, and among Frenchmen only M. Raoul de la Grasserie, could have achieved; and if his life-work had consisted in writing that book alone he would have been a man of distinction. He was a corresponding member of the Sociological Society. M. E. R.

REVIEWS.

SOCIAL UNDERCURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. Vol. xiv (New Series). London: Williams and Norgate. 1914, pp. 438. 10/6 net.

THE latest volume of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY contains the thirteen papers read before the society during its thirty-fifth session, 1913–14. The topics discussed represent nearly every department of philosophy—logic, ethics, psychology, epistemology, ontology. The authors include some of the most eminent of living British philosophers. Their views are representative of every leading school of thought—idealist, realist, and pragmatist. To the general public the names and teachings of some of our most original thinkers are wholly unknown; they have seldom published papers and have never written books. We must, therefore, be peculiarly grateful to a society which prints contributions not only from such well-known writers as Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, but also from great thinkers who seldom write like Professor J. A. Smith. None of the articles deals directly with sociological problems. Yet each has an interest for the sociologist; either because it discusses assumptions that happen to underlie all sociological study, or because of the concrete, practical, and therefore social tendencies which, in common with most recent philosophical work, it exhibits.

The first paper to which the sociologist will naturally turn is that dealing with *The Treatment of History by Philosophers*. A prose narrative of past events, literary in form, moral in aim—such was history as conceived by the early historian. To the modern historian it is something more. It has become rather a descriptive and retrospective form of sociological research. The truly scientific character of recent historical work has profoundly modified the philosophical significance of history. This Dr. Morrison's paper does not perhaps sufficiently emphasize. But his discussion clearly demonstrates how history (mainly, we venture to think, in virtue of its sociological character) raises the most fundamental problems of philosophy. Can the growth and destiny of societies be adequately explained by the mechanical principles which seem to have sufficed for the processes of inanimate nature? May not the world as a whole have a purpose, related in some way to human purposes? Were the human wills, which worked these purposes, free wills, or was their freedom illusory? Is time, the medium through which history has manifested itself, real, or but the illusory appearance of a timeless reality? Are the human consciousnesses, which form the agents or the victims of social progress and decline, real and permanent, or are persons but stages in the development of an impersonal Absolute, or a vast inanimate automaton? And what, finally, is the significance of feeling? These are the questions which, as Dr. Morrison shows, are raised by history for philosophy to solve. Some of the philosophers' solutions, however, would scarcely satisfy historians. To Dr. Bosanquet, for example, history is "a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness." "The doubtful story of successive events cannot amalgamate with the complete interpretation of

the social mind, of art, or of religion." Nor does such a view satisfy Dr. Morrison. He himself inclines rather towards the attitude of Lotze and of Ward; though for the clearest formulation of certain problems he turns rather to M. Bergson and Mr. Bertrand Russell.

A detailed consideration of many of the issues thus raised we may find in other papers in the same volume. Professor Alexander, for instance, deals with the problem of *Freedom*. His paper is a valuable continuation of the series in which he has expounded his own original and suggestive system of philosophy. Freedom is defined as "enjoyed" determination. Save "enjoyment," it involves no feature which distinguishes it from natural or physical action, which is "contemplated." But beings on a higher level of existence—for instance, God or the angels—"contemplate" actions which we "enjoy"; hence, actions which for us are free, for them are determined and natural. Professor Alexander does not tell us whether the historian or sociologist occupies the position of an angel or of a god.

Miss Shields maintains *The Notion of a Common Good*, and applies it, in a section which is all too brief, to practical social problems: the opposition between Capital and Labour, the Home Rule crisis, and the incompatible interests of conflicting nations. Two men are in love with the same woman; one is refused, the other accepted. Was the woman's choice "good" for all three? A hundred candidates apply for a post; one is successful, the rest fail. Is the appointment "good" for the ninety-nine? Philosophically, Miss Shields maintains that the choice, if good for one, is good for all. If there be such a concept as good, then it must be recognisable as such by all rational individuals. The *opinions* of different individuals as to what is good may conflict; their *interests*, falsely identified with their good, may genuinely clash; but their good itself, never. Nevertheless the realization of good in one form limits or hinders possible good in another form. If one individual eats a piece of the cake, neither he nor anyone else can continue to have it. Hence, all the possibilities of human nature cannot be realized in every man; nor can all the inherent capacities of one individual find adequate scope or fulfilment. Endowments and opportunities alike are limited. But this only implies that the amount of good actually realizable at a given moment is a finite quantity. It does not prevent that good being common. Indeed, it is the very community of that good which demands that society make the most of the peculiar contributions of every individual: and if any one person's apparent good cannot show itself to be common—if A's education involves B's starvation, or if C's life involves probable death for D and E—then we are justified in challenging the value of that apparent good.

Miss Shields' thesis is thus a criticism of atomistic individualism. At bottom the question resolves itself into pyschology. The gap separating my consciousness from your consciousness is (as she points out) not so utterly impassable as it appears. Selves are not absolutely impervious or impenetrable. At times they interpenetrate. This may be verified by falling in love. And the fact thus corroborated may be generalized. "Suppose," Professor Nettleship has suggested, "that all human beings felt permanently and universally toward each other as they now do occasionally to those they love best." Then, so far as individuality means mutual exclusion, there would be no individuals. Consciousness would be common. And good for one would be good for all.

To apply Miss Shields' principles to the Home Rule problem or the European War may seem strained. Such crises show us rather how

far from clear and complete is the communal consciousness even of the most civilized nation: and how conspicuously undeveloped is the common consciousness of the civilized world. The distinctness of personal centres of consciousness is the rule; their coalescence the exception. Hence, for practical purposes, Miss Shields' philosophical criterion remains but a formal and negative one. The common good constitutes, not the presupposition of ethical and social endeavour, but rather its goal.

A converse problem in personality is raised by Dr. Mackenzie's paper on *The Psychology of Dissociated Personality*. Moralists and metaphysicians may discuss how minds attached to different bodies may fuse in a common consciousness: the medical man discovers that within one and the same body there may at times appear a number of different minds. As yet, however, the philosophical questions involved have scarcely been formulated, much less resolved.

The social psychologist has come to recognize the immense importance in practical life of feeling. The philosopher has seemed rather to ignore it. In a valuable paper on *Feeling* Professor J. A. Smith concludes that the psychologist may be permitted to use the term as a heading; but denies that it can be the name of a philosophical conception or category. "Pain is real only as an element in a whole that is Pleasure; and if Pleasure is Feeling, Pain is non-Feeling within it, just as Feeling which is Pleasant or Painful, is ignorance within knowledge, and inactivity within activity."

Directly or indirectly the foregoing papers emphasize the psychical aspect. A similar emphasis upon the psychical is observable in Dr. Wildon Carr's treatment of Time. His paper on *The Principle of Relativity* is, to the layman, perhaps the most interesting and suggestive of all. As Dr. Shelton elsewhere in the volume has insisted, one of the most neglected functions of philosophy is the co-ordination of the ultimate results of science. With a courage and a knowledge rare even among contemporary philosophers, Dr. Carr starts from some of the latest and most technical experiments upon the transmission of light. Light, it is commonly supposed, is propagated in a medium called ether. The ether, it is inferred, must, in relation to the earth's movement, remain at rest. Hence, when measured by an observer stationed upon the earth, the apparent speed of light should prove to be faster or slower according as the observer is being carried to meet or carried away from it: just as the speed of a flying cricket-ball appears greater if one rushes up to it, but less if one drops the hand as it is caught. In the case of light the most careful experiments have been made. The result is negative. The velocity of light never varies in spite of the movements of the observer or even of its source. And it has proved wholly impossible to discover the motion of a system, for instance the earth, relatively to other systems, for instance the sun or stars, by means of experiments performed wholly within the first system.

From this curious paradoxes follow. It has been calculated, for example, that were we to leave the earth in a system of translation moving at 1/20,000 the speed of light, remain absent two years, and then return, we should find the world had aged 200 years in our absence. To borrow Dr. Carr's illustration, suppose Gulliver, when shipwrecked on Lilliput, had himself shrunk during his sleep to Lilliputian dimensions, then, on waking, he could not have discovered that everything around him, and himself as well, were one-twelfth their normal size. Suppose, further, that after twelve Lilliputian years he returned to his former world, unconsciously restored in transit to his original proportions. He would still be unaware that things were twelve times as large, years twelve times as long, as in Lilliput.

But, whereas he would have lived through twelve years, he would find that his former world would have lived through but one. According to the Relativists, a change in our physical conditions, precisely of this kind, is taking place at every moment. Their generalization may be formulated as follows: "Neither space, nor time, nor matter, nor ether (if there be ether) is absolute: none of these is one and the same reality for every observer: each is particular to the observer."

Dr. Carr accepts this inference from the experimental results; and shows that it raises three philosophical problems, to which he suggests three philosophical and indeed Bergsonian answers. The first is Sir Oliver Lodge's problem of continuity. The notion of physical continuity seems to have broken down. Hence it appears it is our psychical continuity alone that makes experience uniform. Similarly, all physical movement seems to be relative. Hence, the only absolute or original movement is to be sought in "the reality we know as life or consciousness." Thirdly, if, as perception itself indicates, "pure duration" is a quality and not a quantity, we shall be able to rationalize the empirical principle of the relativity of time and space. Thus the latest conclusions of physics seem to imply the latest doctrines of philosophy. We may, however, hesitate to accept the original inferences of the physicists. The experiments themselves are at present few in number. And alternative explanations are still possible. The velocity of light itself appears to change in passing through different media: it travels more slowly in water than in air. Yet, under certain conditions, for instance, the measurement of the aberration caused by the movement of the earth, the influence of the medium cannot be traced. It is, therefore, possible that the apparent constancy of the velocity obtains only under special conditions.

The tendency toward psychological and even social criteria may be traced in papers whose topics at first sight least suggest it. It may be traced, for instance, in the lively controversy between Dr. Wolf and Dr. Schiller upon the value of logic—or rather upon the value of Dr. Schiller's latest book, *Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem*. It may even be traced in the discussion between Mr. G. E. Moore and Professor G. F. Stout upon the status of sense-data. Of all the contributions of the session the results of this symposium are perhaps philosophically the most important. The relation of our sensations to our minds on the one hand and to things on the other forms a problem whose interest for the sociologist is but remote. But it must interest him to find how far both philosopher and psychologist have progressed towards an essential agreement, not only with each other, but also with the uncritical and unexpressed views of society in general.

CYRIL BURT.

NATIONALISM AND ETHICAL RELIGION.

THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A CONSTRUCTIVE ESSAY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION. By Stanton Coit. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914, 8/6 net.

THIS book by Dr. Coit, long one of the leaders of the Ethical Movement, should be welcomed by all who believe that religion is an essential factor in the solution of the social problem and who are interested in securing a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life and in harmony with modern science. Its frank disavowal of all supernaturalism will repel many,

while its use of traditional theological terms in new senses may offend others; nevertheless, a careful reading of the book will convince any unbiassed student of modern religion, despite its radical defects, of its great constructive value. Unfortunately, also, the book is wrongly named. Its chief title seems to imply that it is a study of the inner life of the American people. Its subsidiary title, however, more accurately describes its content. While specifically addressed to the American people its principles are universal; and with slight changes it might as well have been addressed to any other people. The work is really an attempt at a humanistic interpretation of Christianity, using the principle of nationality as the basis of such interpretation.

In Part I. Dr. Coit attempts to identify religion with the higher patriotism. "Religion and patriotism," he says, "are one and the same thing whenever the religion is sound and the patriotism is high." God is "the moral genius of a people." Each people should, therefore, worship its own God, the Redeeming Power, the Spirit of Social Service, among themselves. Naturally Dr. Coit finds many of his chief arguments for such a nationalistic religion in the history of the Jews. Applying the principles practically, he would make America the living church to which all Americans should belong, and the moral genius of America the God of their personal and social redemption. To many this will seem the least satisfactory part of Dr. Coit's book. To identify religion with "the higher patriotism," no matter how high it may be, would seem to undo much of the work of the Christian centuries in religious development. For practically it would be difficult to distinguish between the higher patriotism and national egoism, as the present European war abundantly illustrates. Hyper-nationalism is one of the rotten stones in the foundations of Western civilisation which should be removed as soon as possible. Unless a higher spiritual unity than the nation can be developed by our civilisation for the love and service of men, there can certainly be no assurance that the present terrific struggle among nations will not be repeated. For it is not true, as Dr. Coit asserts, that nations are to humanity what individuals are to the nation. This is the organismic theory of the state carried to its logical extreme—a theory which now is discredited by the best sociological thought. Humanity, not the nation, must be the unit of our ethical and sociological thinking, though a subsidiary loyalty to one's national group strengthens rather than lessens one's loyalty to humanity as a whole—a fact which cosmopolitans have sometimes overlooked.

It is in Part II., on the re-interpretation of Christianity in the light of science, in which we find the really valuable constructive elements of the book. While Dr. Coit rejects entirely traditional Christian theology, and indeed all theology in the ordinary sense of the term, yet, like Comte, he accepts Christian ethics. He sees clearly that the real struggle of the present is not over Christian theology but over Christian ethics; and he throws his whole weight on the side of a purified Christian ethics. "Christianity," he tells us, "as soon as it has become transfused with the spirit and transformed by the method of modern science, will bring about the millennium." "Christianity plus science" is, in a word, his formula for the solution of the social problem.

This section of the book abounds in so many constructive suggestions with reference to modern religious problems that we cannot do justice to it. For illustration, Dr. Coit would not ask present religious denominations to give up their creeds, but to unite in one co-operative body for humanistic and patriotic service. He would substitute, in other words, for our present

doctrine of religious toleration a doctrine of religious co-operation, present sects becoming simply parties in one national (why not universal?) church. But even here Dr. Coit seems to the writer of this notice to make one fatal blunder; and that is, his negative attitude towards the supernatural or superhuman element in the present religion. He would, apparently, absolutely exclude the recognition of this element from organised public religious practices, though inconsistently he speaks approvingly of Emerson's pantheism. Inconsistently, too, it seems to the reviewer, he recognises man as a spiritual being, while refusing to recognise God as universal spirit. Philosophically there is the same reason for demanding continuity on the spiritual side of the universe as there is for demanding continuity on the physical side. Moreover, man is so made that practically he cannot believe the best about humanity without believing the best about the universe; he must believe in the essential beneficence of the great forces of nature if he is to believe in the beneficence of human nature and society. Religion demands, therefore, belief in the ascendency and triumph of the spiritual element in the universe as well as in human society. Nor is this opposed to the scientific spirit; for the faith in the one case is as reasonable as the faith in the other.

One final criticism must be passed upon Dr. Coit's book, and that is that it contains no sufficient recognition of the extent to which it is based on Comte's "Religion of Humanity." Dr. Coit's religion, like Comte's, is a humanistic Positivism. Like Comte, he would reject Christian theology, while retaining Christian ethics and many Christian ecclesiastical forms. Any reader of Comte's later writings could not but see the close resemblances between their ideas and Dr. Coit's. Why should he, then, fail to give due credit to Comte as the source of many of his ideas? Can it be that he supposes that the same prejudice exists in America against Comte and Positivism as there seems to exist in England?

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

ROGER BACON.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF ROGER BACON. By John Henry Bridges, M.B., F.R.C.P. Edited, with additional Notes and Tables, by H. Gordon Jones, F.I.C., F.C.S. Williams and Norgate. 3s. net.

THIS work by Dr. Bridges, one of the founders of the Sociological Society, was originally published as an introduction to his edition of the *Opus Majus*. It now appears in a more accessible form. The subject was one eminently suited to its author's historical powers and wide sympathies, for Bacon was at once schoolman and man of science, a devoted Catholic and a precursor of modern thought. Bridges had the capacity of understanding the ideals of every age, and not least of Bacon's time, when the foremost minds could still hope to strengthen and uphold the Church by extending the field of scientific knowledge. The attitude of Roger Bacon to the old and the new, to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, to Catholic morality, to alchemy, to the nascent sciences of physics and chemistry, as here set forth, is a most fascinating study. What is perhaps most singular is not merely Bacon's anticipation of modern scientific method, but his superiority in this respect to many investigators who came much later, including his illustrious namesake, Francis; for Roger not only recognised to the full the importance of experiment, but the validity of deduction. Dr. Bridges writes:—

His protests against the intellectual prejudices of his time, his forecasts of an age of industry and invention, the prominence given to experiment, alike as the test of received opinion and the guide to new fields of discovery, render comparison with his great namesake of the sixteenth century unavoidable. Yet the resemblance is perhaps less striking than the contract. Between the fiery Franciscan, doubly pledged by science and by religion to a life of poverty, impatient of prejudice, intolerant of dullness, reckless of personal fame or advancement, and the wise man of the world richly endowed with every literary gift, hampered in his philosophical achievements by a throng of dubious ambitions, there is but little in common. In wealth of words, in brilliancy of imagination, Francis Bacon is immeasurably superior. But Roger Bacon had the sounder estimate and the firmer grasp of that combination of deductive with inductive method which marks the scientific discoverer.

The editor has appended some valuable notes derived from other writings of Dr. Bridges, including an account of Robert Grosseteste, the great bishop, and of the Mohammedan schools of learning. To Dr. Bridges's Introduction the sculptor of the fine statue of Bacon at Oxford attributes a large part of his inspiration. Assuredly, this is the best estimate of Roger Bacon and his work in a compendious form.

S. H. S.

JAPAN YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY.

La Societe Japonaise. Etude Sociologique par Teruaki Kobayashi, Chargé de cours de sociologie à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université Impériale de Tokio. Traduit du Japonaise par M. Junkichi Yoshida avec le concours de Mme. Laudenbach, sous le controle de l'auteur. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1914.

Professor Kobayashi, in this work, ably summarises the theories of Comte and many lesser writers on sociology. Subsequently he treats of the influence upon civilization, progress and national-characteristics of climate, topography, vegetation, etc.; but only in a general way, without mentioning any peculiar or distinctive qualities of the Japanese in this connection, so that the reader misses what should be the whole point of the chapter. Likewise, after an exposition of the value of the statistical method in gauging the social factors of any given race or nation, he truly remarks that to be of any scientific use these comparisons of percentages must be based on a quite reliable census of the total population. He then explains in detail how and why the Japanese census returns up to the time of writing have been far from accurate, and, this being the case, refrains from making any detailed statistical comparisons or analysis. Again, the reader seems to have missed the point and wonders why so much space was devoted to a purely negative statement.

In narrowing down his discourse to the actual qualities of the Japanese people the professor says: "The study of our country, of our people and our society to-day tempts a good number of Europeans, but they meet with obstacles at every step; to only mention one, the extreme difficulty of collecting materials." It is misleading to speak of the extreme difficulty of their enterprise without taking note of the vast quantity of material now made available to them in English. A very extensive knowledge of Japanese history, laws, government, religion, etiquette, family life, literature, poetry,

art and industries can be acquired, even without a knowledge of the Japanese language, through the many careful translations of original documents by Englishmen and Americans, many of them masters of style; while articles from the Japanese daily press and the public utterances of politicians and others are available in translation in the local English press in Japan within a day or two of their appearance. Is it not also rather misleading to speak of the unique unbroken line of the Imperial family without explaining the much used expedient of adopting a successor to the throne from a collateral branch?

On page 42 the author says that "Japanese civilization constituted itself in a world apart from that of Europe, India and China." He immediately qualifies this with a quotation from M. Revon to the opposite effect. On the next page he says: "In 285 certain classical books (it should be "a book") entitled *Rongo* were presented to the court by one of the ancient nations of Korea." This is an unduly brief reference to the introduction not only of the celebrated sayings of Confucius, styled by Dr. Legge "The Confucian Analects," but of the art of writing itself into Japan. The influence of the first ideas which the Japanese Court had ever encountered in literary form may well be imagined. The worship of ancestors and the paternal theory of the relationship between the ruler of a country and his subjects, which our author treats as distinctive features of the primitive state of his country, in reality were imported from China in the Confucian classics, other volumes of which were introduced later. Buddhism, from India by way of China and Korea, was introduced in 552. "The brilliant ideas of China and the profound ideas of India then spread and penetrated and their mingling took place in the current of Japanese ideas which made them its own while preserving and even accentuating the characteristics peculiar to itself. In 1853," continues the author, "an event of the utmost importance came to modify the life of this peaceful Eden, the unexpected arrival of the American ships." The suggestion that Japan between the years 552 and 1853 can in any way be compared to a peaceful Eden is indeed strange. The early contests between the introducers of Buddhism and the partizans of the older form of worship were carried out in a far from gentle manner, though fortunately on a small scale. Besides the wars for the subjugation of the Ainu and Kumaso tribes, which we find duly mentioned, there were struggles for power innumerable between the most powerful clans in the country. The history of the country is largely a record of continual internecine fighting until the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Tokugawa house of Shoguns began and an armed peace was established which lasted with only minor interruptions until after Commodore Perry's visit.

The author also omits to state that on the mental and spiritual plane there were changes and controversies, due to fresh contacts with outside ideas. Such were the rise of numerous and varied Buddhist sects, consequent on the study of particular books in the vast literature of the Buddhist scriptures by different learned monks, some of whom, like Kobo Daishi, spent years of study in China. The introduction, spread, and violent suppression of the Roman Catholic faith taught by the Spanish Jesuits deserves a mention, if only as the starting point of the rigidly anti-foreign policy which characterised the Japanese Government in Commodore Perry's time and which it was his task to overcome. Then there was the devotion of the learned advisers of the governing class to the philosophy of Wang-yang-ming and of the Sung schoolmen, Chinese writers who cast their metaphysical speculations on Nature and Man into the form of commentaries

on Confucius. Then we have the controversies between these and the party who aimed at a return to pure Confucianism, and of the latter with the new school (about the end of the 18th century) in favour of the "revival of Pure Shinto" so-called.

It is from the writers of the last-named school that superficial students of Japanese religion have derived the impression that the religious ideas prevailing at the present day are of Shinto origin. The movement called the "Revival of Pure Shinto" was really a process of bringing the primitive system up to date by patriotically attributing to it a great part of the Confucian morality and some Buddhist practices that had become so widespread as to appear universal and spontaneous. Filial piety and ancestor worship were given especial prominence in the revival. Lastly, not a few of the most inquiring minds had gained inklings of Western science through surreptitious contact with the Dutch at Deshima, risking imprisonment and even the death penalty in their zeal for the forbidden knowledge. These things formed the mental inheritance of the generation which added to them European culture and American methods, and a just estimate of their influence is necessary in order to understand the Japan of to-day; but Professor Kobayashi ignores all these and seeks an explanation of the qualities of modern Japanese society in the prehistoric age, in the prophecy of the sun-goddess and under the reign of her divine grandson, who is, everywhere outside certain circles in Japan, notably the Imperial University, believed to be about as historical as Deucalion.

In the few details given us of the state of things during the historic period, there are some curious mistakes. In the enumeration of the classes into which the population was divided before the Meiji period (the reign of the last Emperor) the merchants are placed before the farmers, an important transposition, as it conceals the fact that the Japanese, like the ancient Greeks, esteemed the traders below the farmers and artisans. This latter class, which ranked next above the merchants, the professor omits entirely from his list, though its works represent one of Japan's chief titles to fame among the nations of the world.

The whole volume throws singularly little light on the subject with which it professes to deal, and the reason may perhaps be found by altering one word in the criticism of Professor Takebé on the sociologists of another country: "The *German* savants are very peculiar in this respect, that they do not hesitate to sacrifice science to national policy" (page 46). The duty of accepting the official version of the origin and history of the reigning dynasty renders historical research and unbiassed thinking impossible for the holders of posts at the Imperial University of Tokio. Therefore the present generation of thinkers in Japan should not be all judged by the calibre of the writer of this work.

LILIAN HALL.

HENRI POINCARE ON METHOD.

SCIENCE AND METHOD. By Henri Poincaré. Translated by Francis Maitland; with a preface by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. Nelson. 6/- net.

THE brilliant genius of the late Henri Poincaré embraced a wide range of scientific thought, and a work of his on the subject of method cannot fail to be of interest to the sociologist as well as to the mathematician or the physicist, to whom it is more immediately addressed. The present volume is not a systematic treatise, but a collection of essays, grouped in an orderly

fashion, dealing with the methods of science in general and with some special applications. The author begins with a discussion of the principles on which we select facts for investigation, remarking incidentally that "sociology is the science with the greatest number of methods and the least results." This is said to be due to the complexity of the elements, which are human beings, and to the fact that, as history does not repeat itself, the historian is denied the privilege enjoyed by workers in other sciences of selecting for first study those phenomena which are most often repeated, and which are therefore most likely to disclose the underlying law. A protest might be made from the sociological side, but it is interesting to observe the impression made on so philosophical a mind as that of Poincaré by recent writings on sociology.

An autobiographical essay on the conditions of mathematical discovery, in which much use is made of the hypothesis of the subliminal self, and a chapter on mathematical definitions in education, are of special interest to psychologists. The theory of chance, a subject dealt with by Mr. Balfour in his recent Gifford lectures, is also discussed in relation to the discovery of scientific laws. The chapter on the relativity of space is very suggestive. Probably few of all those who admit in general terms the relativity of knowledge realise all that that doctrine implies, and physicists received a severe shock some few years ago on being shown the consequences of pressing home the doctrine in the domain of optics. The controversies that arose from that revelation are not yet closed, but their history contains important lessons for sociologists. The same lesson of the importance of the purely relative standpoint is emphasised by later chapters on the new mechanics, and on the influence of the discovery of radium on physics.

The author diverges slightly from his main path in order to discuss the attempts to reduce mathematics to a branch of logic. Here he is thoroughly at home, and his criticisms of the attempts of the logisticians to define "one" and "zero" without any appeal to intuition, whether they carry conviction to the minds of experts or not, are at all events most entertaining reading. Nothing that Poincaré wrote is dull, and it is impossible to read these essays, comparatively slight though they are, without receiving illumination on many questions of scientific method.

C. H. Desch.

TAXATION AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION.

English Taxation A.D. 1640—1799. By William Kennedy. G. Bell, 7/6 net.

This is a valuable study in an obscure region. Mr. Kennedy's aim has been to seek out not only the kind of taxes which English rulers have imposed, but also, and mainly, the ideas, economic and social, which moved them to select these particular taxes. He does not offer a criticism of these ideas; he expounds them. Incidentally he achieves two other results—he lets us see how political changes reflected themselves in financial policy, and he offers reasons for modifying the view that even so great a man as Adam Smith was as revolutionary and as redeemed from the past as is commonly assumed.

The Civil War marked a turning point, largely as a result of necessity, in English financial practice and thought. For some 300 years before that the budget was, in theory at least, sectional. The main source of supply was the royal domains. The customs, on both imports and exports, were

justified as tolls for the maintenance of the navy, although in practice they would be applied to ordinary expenditure. No question of distribution could arise properly, although the habit was to spare necessaries; and trade policy played some part in determining the nature of the customs dues. Direct taxes, the aids and subsidies, were thought of as occasional emergency taxes only, from which the poor were exempted.

The costly wars from the Civil War to the treaty of Utrecht modified these ideas. Direct taxes became a regular part of the revenue. Customs were no longer looked upon as intended peculiarly for the service of the navy. In point of fact many duties were mortgaged for the payment of the interest on debt, and this had the result of perpetuating many indirect taxes, and giving much rigidity to the financial system of the 18th century. Customs—which were levied mostly on luxuries—came to be regarded as the ideal tax, because it was assumed that the consumption of such articles was a good measure of means. They combined (so it was believed) the virtues of social policy because they fell on luxuries, of trade policy because they protected, and of equity because they were distributed according to capacity. Export duties were practically abolished.

The Long Parliament and its successors made numerous attempts at an improved direct tax. Mr. Kennedy is probably right in thinking that the aim was to make income the standard; but the failure, confessed in the stereotyped land tax of 1692, was complete. It was not till Pitt that the effective machinery for an income tax was worked out. It should be noted that between the Revolution and 1692 the century-old practice of exempting the poor from direct taxation was dropped, to be resumed, however, in the 18th century. One of the financial novelties of this revolutionary period was the excise, levied mostly on necessaries, and commended to the financier because easily raised and drawing upon the poor as upon other classes. But the excise was always unpopular. It was charged with being inquisitorial and therefore dangerous to liberty as well as oppressive to the poor.

Mr. Kennedy has some interesting things to say about the political philosophy of the 18th century, and its reflection in finance. The 16th century conceived society as composed of so many castes, each with its function to perform and enjoying property in virtue of that function. The contractual theory of Locke treated society as an association of individuals, enjoying property in their own right and demanding of society the protection of that property. It was the "freeholder" as opposed to the "functional" view of society. The earlier doctrine rather tended to the exemption of the poor from taxation; the later tended to subject him to it. The 18th century was always trying to reconcile its notion that all, as freeholders in the state, should pay, with the coarse reality that a great many were "freeholders" in theory only and in fact bitterly poor.

The 18th century had not the notion of compensatory taxes. It could not think of a budget just as a whole, although the constituent taxes might each bear with unequal weight. Each tax had to be equitable in itself. Add the theory that taxes on the poor were shifted on to employers by an increase in wages, and you have two of the leading financial ideas of the 18th century. Add again the prejudice against "inquisitorial" direct taxation (*i.e.*, income tax), and it will be seen that opinion was directed to taxes on commodities other than necessaries as the ideal tax. Apart from his views on trade policy Adam Smith showed the prejudices of his time. He opposed the income tax. He assumed, along with his contemporaries, that the consumption of certain articles is a fairly faithful index of income.

And he did not take the compensatory view of taxation. Some phrases of his lent the authority of his name to the easy device of taxes on necessaries. It is not unjust to conclude, therefore, that for a time at least his influence was for rather than against the taxation of the poor.

H. SACHER.

DR. HADLEY'S LECTURES.

SOME INFLUENCES IN MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT. By Arthur Twining Hadley, President of Yale University. Oxford University Press, 1913. Pp. 146. 4/6 net.

THIS is an age of specialisation and it becomes increasingly difficult for the scientist, the philosopher, the historian, the sociologist to survey other fields than his own. The John Calvin MacNair lectures were instituted for the purpose of showing the inter-relations of science and theology so as to break down the barriers between them, and this book is a reprint of the course given by President Hadley in 1912. The protest against specialisation is marked at the outset: "He who is content to be a specialist and nothing more, however long and well he may have been trained, cannot properly be said to have been educated." Everyone must have a philosophy, but each must win it for himself by actual contact with life and by study of the classics of literature, history and science, which will show him "which things have proved large at all times instead of simply looking large for the moment." The purpose of these lectures, therefore, is to indicate the main lines of thought in science, politics, and literature that have successively influenced men in the nineteenth century and to point to the causes that have produced one after another positive, evolutionary and pragmatist philosophies. Such a wide survey of the facts is necessary to enable us to understand why at the end of the nineteenth century men were seeking a different sort of explanation of the universe from that which had seemed satisfactory at the beginning. The subject is treated from the sociological rather than from the psychological standpoint, and an appendix on "The Influence of Charles Darwin on Historical and Political Science" is of especial interest to the sociologist. President Hadley points out how far-reaching is the effect of the Darwinian method upon political ideals. Here, as in biology, survival has been made the test of right. This, the author holds, is the main contribution of Darwin to political science, and it is an extremely important one for it involves a revolution in conception and method. A novel parallel is drawn between the philosophy of Darwin and that of Gamaliel—as given in the fifth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles—in that for both "the criterion which shows whether a thing is right or wrong is its permanence." In this also, we are told, lies the meaning and the force of Pragmatism, and its bearing upon political science is that it emphasises the truth that "we are members one of another." The last lecture on "The Spiritual Basis of Recent Poetry" traces the changes wrought in men's conceptions of the universe by the need to find again man's place therein. An interesting but necessarily brief review is given of nineteenth century poetry, of the later phase of which Browning is said to be at once the most representative and the most significant for the twentieth century, since endurance, not submission, is the watchword of this generation. It is to be regretted that President Hadley has published these lectures as they were given, for they suffer from too great

compression and would probably have gained considerably by expansion. Brief as they are, however, they serve a useful purpose in reminding us of the need for a wide outlook and of the dangers of undue specialisation.

L. S. STEBBING.

WOMEN UNDER POLYGAMY. By W. M. Gallichan. London: Holden and Hardingham, 1914. 16/- net.

POLYGAMY is one of those institutions which it is difficult for the Western mind to consider without prejudice. The author of *Chapters on Human Love* has now given us an impartial statement of the case, chiefly from the women's point of view. It is a statement that was needed, and a very interesting book Mr. Gallichan has made of it, though, as he would himself admit, it is only a sketch of a huge subject. He gives many personal documents from Oriental acquaintances, and thus the book is no mere arm-chair lucubration. "What," asked James Hinton, "is the meaning of maintaining monogamy? Do you call English life monogamous?" It is curious to find, as Mr. Gallichan shows, how much legalised polygamy there was in England until the 18th century. The author would call this "polygamy," but there seems to be little use in perpetuating so merely legal a distinction.

Economic reasons are chiefly assigned for the origin of the institution, working together with a certain masculine instinct for variety of mates. More important for practical politics are the estimates of the effect of the institution upon the character and development of women. European feminists should study these. Dr. Coomaraswamy says: "The power of women over men is far greater in India than in any industrial state in the West." Every polygamous country can show that the married women, and all are married, fulfil with some completeness their conjugal and parental possibilities. A Hindu in London remarked: "Probably you think, like most Englishmen, that polygamy is an evil." He stretched his hand towards the vista of countless houses. "In this suburb alone you have several thousand marriageable single women in excess of men. Is that an evil, or not? In India we cannot understand this anomaly. At the same time, you have a vast degraded class of women in your White Slave traffic."

Western ideas about feminism are beginning to penetrate Eastern social thought. But, though the East may modify its relation to women, sane though it is, it is hardly likely that the West will adopt any Eastern modifications of its system. There are here certain racial differences, which have not yet been analysed, but which seem to be concerned with the fundamental attitude towards questions of sex. In the West this attitude is reserved; in the East it is frank. The respective results are the same in practice, but not in law and opinion; consequently the Western method abuses womanhood, while offering it a superficial freedom.

A. E. C.

THE LAWYER: OUR OLD MAN OF THE SEA. By William Durrant. With a Foreword by Sir Robert B. Fulton, LL.D. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1913. 7/6.

LAW, we know, is "the science of human relations." In so wide a field one must expect some weeds. Mr. Durrant has found many, and, indeed, he protests that there is nothing else to find in all the law. He cites every

instance of miscarriage of justice, or hardship, which he has found in newspapers or books, new or old, every hard saying concerning lawyers gleaned from wide reading. He surveys England, India, and the United States, and everywhere finds all things legal bad. There is none good from the Lord Chancellor to the solicitors. The solicitors get off lightly with one short chapter, but the bar is the parent of all evils. Advocates intentionally mislead juries; juries are incompetent; criminals escape, or are acquitted on technical grounds; law reporters are careless; the common law is bad and the principal asset of the bar; unprincipled judges alter the common law; barristers settle their clients' cases against their instructions; they also spend long years in thwarting justice and continue their nefarious career as judges. All lawyers are tainted with mediævalism, legalism, Byzantinism. The law's treatment of illegitimate children and spendthrifts, of marriage and divorce, for which lawyers have no more responsibility than other citizens, is set down to their account.

The advocates whom Mr. Durrant despises would have taught him to make his attack more effective by selecting his strong points and discarding his weak ones. Mr. Durrant makes all seem weak alike. His remedies for the evils of the legal world are these: fusion of the two branches, shortening of the Long Vacation, codification of the law. These are familiar faces, grown a little old-fashioned. He would abolish the freedom of testamentary disposition; he would do away with juries, at least in civil cases, and especially he would have no barrister made a judge. A special class should be trained for judges, as on the Continent; and he would have many more judges and pay them much less. Some day a philosopher may extract from the long series of complaints against lawyers —once so much more common than now—the essence of the evil which the world suspects to lie in association with the law. It has eluded Mr. Durrant. Meanwhile the world perversely exalts the lawyers of whom it complains to positions more and more responsible in the government of the realm.

E.B.V.C.

THE LAW AND THE POOR. By His Honour Judge Edward Abbott Parry. Smith, Elder and Co, 1914. 7s. 6d. net.

JUDGE PARRY displays that entire freedom from professionalism which the expert achieves only when he has mastered his subject completely. His book is essentially sociological. Every chapter of it shows how people's actions and opinions are conditioned by the social environment. In commenting, for instance, on the notion that a judge ought to be unbiassed, the author points out that "he is just as much the product of the age as one of yourselves. He has toddled about in the same nursery, learned in the same school, played at the same university and lived in the same society as the rest of the middle classes. Why should you expect in him a superinstinct towards futurist sociology?" On another page he writes: "We arrive in the world knowing nothing much about it, we are brought up to believe that everything that has been going on for the last few centuries has been for the best, and the tired old ones who are leaving us are never tired enough to leave off telling us that they have made every possible

the world machine are grinding unevenly." The leading idea that the book sets forth is that men's thoughts are cramped into systems which make the reform of social abuses as slow as geological changes. The writer may well emphasise that conviction when such monstrous evils as imprisonment for debt and the bankruptcy laws are still in existence; but it prevents him from appreciating the achievements of reformers. For instance, he has nothing hopeful to say about the "Rules of the Supreme Court (Poor Persons) 1914"; and in complaining that the brewer and the puritan between them have robbed the poor of pleasant places for harmless refreshment and recreation, he makes no mention of the restaurants which have been founded by such bodies as the People's Refreshment House Association and the Central Public House Trust Association. But he is by no means over critical; and he has made some simple and excellent suggestions for the righting of the wrongs of which he complains that all sociologists ought to study carefully. From that process they will derive a good deal of enjoyment, for the book contains as much comedy as tragedy.

M. E. R.

LIFE AND HUMAN NATURE. By Sir Bampfylde Fuller, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. Murray, 9/- net.

THE failure of the Germans to systematise human nature ought to make this work particularly acceptable to a large public at the present time. It is everything that a German treatise on biology and psychology could not be, for it is full of well-arranged facts, but these are narrated with so much wit and humour that the book is charming as well as informative. The author divides the impulses which actuate living creatures into eight classes, of which four—the individualistic, social, reproductive and provident—represent essential activities; while four—kindness-and-cruelty, the æsthetic and ethical inclinations, directive instinct, and reason—represent the inessential activities. It is in his treatment of the tendencies that he ranges in pairs that the interest of the book centres, for it shows that if psychologists are to be true to life they must proceed as if they were writing a drama or painting a picture rather than making diagrams or giving lectures. The kindest of men sometimes commit acts of gross cruelty, and whether they will be cruel or kind on any given occasion depends upon the race to which they belong and the training which they have received, but cannot infalliby be predicted from one's knowledge of these. The æsthetic instincts give rise to self-abandonment, the ethical to self-restraint; and these two sets of instincts sometimes work in harmony but anon are at war with one another in one and the same person. Reason, Sir Bampfylde Fuller describes, as an impulse to link one's experiences in a next-to-next formation and make inferences from one link to another. His comments on the mistakes, both ludicrous and pathetic, that this process entails, form some of the most entertaining pages in the book. His judgments are distinguished throughout by shrewdness tempered with charity; but they are warped a little sometimes by an over-estimation of the power of money. These characteristics are concentrated in the closing chapter, which deals with human nature in governmental affairs and contains some suggestions for making parliamentary work positive and constructive, while yet maintaining the criticism of measures and men which is the redeeming feature of party politics.

M. E. R.

EPOCHS OF CIVILIZATION. By Pramatha Nath Bose, B.Sc. Calcutta: W. Newman & Co.

Mr. BOSE propounds a theory that the stability of civilisation depends upon a balance of animalism with rationalism and benevolence. He pictures all races and nations as passing through the different stages of development that these words indicate. Beginning with the year 5000 B.C. and closing with the present day, he divides history into three epochs, and shows how various peoples have advanced from an appreciation of material standards of culture to intellectualism and altruism, and then, like China and India, have attained an unprogressive equilibrium, or, like Greece and Rome, have perished. His first era, from about 5000 B.C. to about 2000 B.C., embraces the civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia and China; the second, from about 2000 B.C. to about 700 A.D., comprises those of India, Greece, Rome, Assyria, Phœnicia and Persia; and the third includes those of the Saracens and of the various nations of Europe. In spite of this rather crude way of arranging his thoughts, Mr. Bose has made a notable contribution to the literature of sociology in writing this book; and what he has learnt by studying Indian quietism is precisely the lesson that the present war ought to be driving home in the minds of Europeans—that national glory depends upon moral superiority no less than upon material achievements and intellectual acumen.

M. E. R.

ESSAYS AND STUDIES PRESENTED TO WILLIAM RIDGEWAY. Edited by E. C. Quiggin, M.A., Ph.D. Cambridge University Press. 25/- net.

THE many friends of Professor Ridgeway combined to celebrate his sixtieth birthday by the presentation of a volume of essays dealing with topics on which their own special studies impinged on those of the professor. The result is an extraordinary accumulation of curious learning, which the editor has been able to classify into twenty-five essays in classics and ancient archæology, seven in mediæval literature and history, and sixteen in anthropology. The character of the essays is as various as the subjects; we have, for example, brief treatments of broad issues, as "The Contact of Peoples," by W. H. R. Rivers, and "The Settlement of Great Britain in the Prehistoric Age," by W. Boyd Dawkins, passing by gradations to monographs on particular gems or inscriptions. The essay most likely to attract general attention is a very characteristic one by Sir James Frazer on "The Serpent and the Tree of Life," an extremely ingenious speculation on the original meaning of the legend, supported by a wide collection of serpent and lizard myths on the subject of death and immortality.

G. S.

MINDS IN DISTRESS. By A. E. Bridger. Methuen, 2/6 net.

"MINDS in Distress" is an illuminating and well-chosen title for a book; but one is a little prejudiced against the author by the title of another of his works, "Dyspepsia Perfect and Imperfect," which suggests a not very clear understanding of the use of words. The examination of the new book confirms that suspicion. The author maintains that there are two chief elements in the human mind, one the reasoning or male factor, and the other the instinctive or female factor; and that sanity consists in a healthy proportion of the former in the man's mind and of the latter in the woman's mind. If the word "reasoning" were abandoned and a more comprehensive word used; if "instinctive," which nearly all authors to-day use very loosely, were given up and a word wider than Laycock's "affectability" chosen, there

might be something to be said for the theory; but the writer nowhere defines the terms that he employs, and therefore the book is valueless from the scientific point of view, although it contains some arresting sentences that are worth consideration. J. L. T.

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GREEKS. By E. E. Sikes, M.A. David Nutt. 5/- net.

THIS is a useful book, summarising and setting out in clear form the line of inquiry that has been pursued by a number of Greek scholars, including its author, in recent years. It was not so long ago that classical scholarship and anthropology were poles apart. This little book (like the composite volume on *Anthropology and the Classics*, published some years ago) reveals the benefit that has accrued to both studies from their mutual influence. Of its five chapters those on the problem of race and on the city-state will probably be of most interest to the general reader. We have not done with these Greek problems yet. The old Greek antithesis between the "cultured" Hellene and the outer "barbarian" has been revived among German thinkers as a claim to domination; and the old controversy between Spartan militarism and Athenian amateurishness is being re-awakened in the struggle between Prussianized Germany and the State which Treitsche delighted to call Venice-Carthage. Mr. Sikes's book was written before these issues became acute, but to read it now is to remind oneself how all roads in political and social thought go back to Greece.

A. E. Z.

EARTH HUNGER AND OTHER ESSAYS. By William Graham Sumner. Yale University Press, 1913. 10/- net.

IN the remote and dark period of the early seventies Mr. Sumner was elected Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale. During the many years in which he held this post he appears to have excited the admiration of some of the students who passed through his hands, and who have done him the very doubtful service of collecting and republishing a number of his productions which had not previously been printed or which had been published in obscure, scattered, or inaccessible places. Professor Sumner's work does not favourably impress the British reader. It is full of confident generalisations unsupported by either evidence or argument. Here, for example, are two sentences from an essay entitled, with unconscious humour, "The Scientific Attitude of Mind": "There is never any correct process by which we can realize an ideal. The fashion of forming ideals corrupts the mind and injures character." "In the Middle Ages all men pursued phantasms . . . people had no idea of reality."

G. S.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE IN WAR-TIME.

AMERICAN, ENGLISH, AND INDIAN.

A CONSIDERABLE amount of periodical literature has appeared since the outbreak of the war, but the earlier publications were either written before the commencement of hostilities or were merely characteristic of the sudden change; and it is only comparatively recently that we have had any quantity of serious literature written and published under the altered environment created by the present conflict. At first it seemed probable that all serious writing would be postponed indefinitely and that we should have to depend on the daily papers for a criticism of current events. Such prophecies, however, have proved false; and although the contents of many of the current periodicals may be found unsatisfying the publications have appeared, and as far as quantity is concerned they seem to have preserved their normal standard.

At a time when even those most intimately concerned in the struggle consider and emphasise the ideals for which they are fighting, it would have been a calamity if the publication of the more serious journals had received any considerable check. Yet, although the periodicals have been published, it is disappointing to find many of the articles full of the most shallow rhetoric and a general failure to realize the grave responsibility which rests on thinkers, as thinkers, and not merely as mouthpieces, of the martial spirit. It is only occasionally, as in the symposium *What is Americanism?* in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, that the true ring of sound philosophic thought is heard, and there survives some appreciation of the ideas for which the world both in peace and war is really struggling. The excuse that we are fighting, and therefore as a nation should cease to think, loses most of its significance in a war of long duration and it is probable that a similar English symposium of our own ideals, followed by a similar synthesis, would perform no mean service in strengthening and consolidating our appreciation of the ends for which we are struggling.

The only periodicals which can be compared to THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for clearness of view and soundness of judgment are those concerned with economics. Originally one of the most abstract of social studies and one of the most questionable when applied to humanity, political economy seems to have far outstripped many of the less abstract sciences in its grasp of the realities of life. Mr. Liefmann, in an article on *Monopoly and Competition* in the February JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, develops very suggestively the fact that monopoly is the result rather than the antithesis of competition, a truth vitally important in many spheres of social science. In contrast to such sound psychological arguments we find Mr. Chambers in the January EUGENICS REVIEW repeating the old saying that "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of peace," without giving a thought to the fact that the instrument made by man reacts on the maker and demands to be used. Eugenists, who from the nature of their studies should be the most human of scientists, seem doomed to tread the same path as the older economists, and only after laborious courses of abstract reasoning come into real contact with the varying hopes and fears of our existence.

In the February OPEN COURT, a journal usually conspicuous for its calm and well-balanced thought, the editor, like Mr. Chambers, seems oblivious of the fact that man desires to use the machine he makes, and in dealing with a kindred subject seems equally unconscious of the fact that men and women have always been proud and glad to send those dear to them to the perils of war. To search for "the real and ultimate motive" of the present struggle may at its best be a somewhat complicated and perhaps futile task, but to start the search without a full grasp of human nature in all its various aspects must inevitably result in grotesque distortions of individual and social influences. No amount of detail of past treaties and subsequent violations, of perjured words and dum-dum bullets, will carry conviction if the writer does not feel in his heart and honestly describe the true stuff of which human nature consists.

A similarly narrow and one-sided view of individual and social psychology is to be found in the two recent issues of THE ROUND TABLE. Such sentences in the December number as "the beliefs and sentiments traditional in peace have no relevance in the supreme emergency of war," and "the sole question before us is how to win the war," seem to be an exact paraphrase of the Bernhardi principles which we usually condemn. It is not made quite clear whether at the outbreak of war we are to assume entirely new morals, beliefs, and national characteristics, hastily manufactured by the Government, or whether we are to fight without any beliefs or aspirations at all. In the first proposal we have the identification of God with the State so closely associated with modern German thought, while in the second we have a philosophy which teaches us, when our humanity is most needed, to descend to something lower than the beast. Among the practical suggestions contained in the same leading article we need only mention the idea that conscription suddenly imposed on England would turn the populace into an obedient and mindless machine, and that "if compulsion is adopted the War Office can get men as it needs them without publishing the state of affairs."

The curious philosophy outlined in December is continued in the March number of the same periodical. The conception of two worlds, one of peace and one of war, is combined with the idea of a temporary logic of war, and there follows an exhortation to carry out a measure necessary to victory whether we believe it or not. The dubious ethical value of such arguments is entirely ignored; but the culminating paradoxes are reached in such self-contradictory expressions as "private politics" and in the third article where a sentence advocating force as a means for instilling an ideal is followed in the very next line by an account of "the inevitable tragedy of a victory of force." Possibly the writer considers that in war time self-contradictory phrases contain substantial truths, but those who believe in the value of consecutive thought will find a great deal that is difficult to grasp. An article on *Nietzsche and the Culture State* is less inconsistent, and the difference between the fundamental principles of Nietzschean philosophy and our present conception of German ideals is clearly shown.

From the chaos of contradictions, evolved from an attempt to combine the essence of Bernhardi's philosophy with our old English ideals, it is refreshing to read the carefully selected articles in the current HINDUSTAN REVIEW. Dr. Dillon's excellent introduction to *Just for a Scrap of Paper* is reprinted from *"The Daily Telegraph War Books,"* with his suggestive comparison of the Pope's and the Kaiser's claims to divine revelation in the present conflict; and Mr. N. Gupta's article on *The Message of Hinduism*

should be read in conjunction with the curious forms of European ethics already mentioned. Miss E. M. White in her remarks on *Bergson and Education* suggests that the world, dissatisfied in turn with the guidance of authority and logical reason, will adopt some such idea of life as Monsieur Bergson expounds. It must, however, be remembered that compared to Eastern thought Monsieur Bergson shows himself a true Westerner when he says that harmony is rather behind us than before. The contrast between the Eastern idea of losing individuality and the Western idea of finding it is also evident in Mr. Pramatha Nath Bose's article on *Will Western Civilization Survive?* His suggestion that, if Western thought takes as long as Hinduism to pass through the material and intellectual stage, we cannot expect any higher ethical standards before the close of the present century, should be qualified by Mr. Horniman's opinion, quoted by Professor Rawlinson, that there are few who "appreciate to the full the extent to which English society and English institutions and everything in England benefit by the connection with India."

It has been said that Christianity must contain some great truth or it would never have survived the harm done by its exponents, and if we take the general tone of the present periodicals as specimens of the serious thought of the last few months, the same might well be said of patriotism; only occasionally and often in quite unexpected places does one find any but the most ephemeral and shallow of patriotic sentiments. But there may emerge from the present conflict a patriotism which helps to fulfil other needs besides those of the recruiting sergeant, a patriotism perhaps a little less confident, perhaps realizing more the claims of something higher than nationality, yet resting on a surer and more lasting foundation. What it loses in sweeping and showy statements it may find in a reality which will be respected in all ages and appreciated alike in the councils of the learned and in the meetings of the market-place. Its simplicity, however, must be a sign of profundity and not of shallowness; and in such a patriotism there can be no great change on the outbreak of a war, no divorce of thought and action either in war-time or peace-time. During periods of war it must preserve much of the calm, clear judgment of peaceful thought, and in times of peace retain some of the enthusiasm and unselfishness of war: in storm and calm it must rest on the same foundations, too surely tested to be injured by the jest of any idle cynic. Let us hope that by the love of home and country such patriotism will satisfy a feeling deeply rooted in the Western mind, while by a wider love of humanity it will transcend all shallow nationalism and absorb what is finest and most lasting in the philosophy of the East.

C. B. ANDREWS.

FRENCH.

AMONG the French and Belgian journals of sociology that the war has, for the time being, swept away, there is none that sociologists will miss so much as the BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE SOLVAY. The staff of the Institute has, of course, been dispersed; and from M. Varendonck, who is now in this country, we learn that M. Waxweiler is engaged in lecturing, on behalf of Belgium, in Switzerland. With the help of Queen Elizabeth, in the early days of the war, he turned a number of hotels and villas in the neighbourhood of Ostend into hospitals; and when he was driven into exile

he wrote a book entitled, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, which is being published at Lausanne by Messrs. Pargot and Co. There he gives a scientific analysis of the documents by means of which the Germans have sought to incriminate the Belgians; and the evidence he brings forward is such that no German in the future will be able to gainsay it.

Our readers will regret to hear that LE MUSEE SOCIAL has also vanished for the time being, likewise L'ACTION NATIONALE and LA REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE; but happily LA SCIENCE SOCIALE and LA REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE have appeared as usual. In spite of the important public duties which he has undertaken, M. René Worms has found the time and the courage to put as much matter as ever into the *International Review*, and he has maintained the philosophic tone of the journal admirably. The January number contains an article which ought to be useful to the Law Group of the Sociological Society. It consists of a chapter on *Les sciences et la méthode reconstructives* from Professor Antonio Dellepiane's book of that title. By the reconstructive sciences the professor means those, like geology, palæobotany, and history, which have to be built up by the imagination from vestiges of the objects of study which form the heritage of the present from the past. He works out his theory from the principles which constitute the validity of legal proof, and argues that the magistrate in order to be efficient must have a philosophic as well as a legal training. The lawyer must be able to reconstruct the past from the facts belonging to the present which are brought before him in the court. A mere knowledge of the law will not enable him to appreciate them, and to give its just value to every element of the evidence and put all the elements together into a scientific judgment. It is hardly clear, however, that the judge would learn this method of appraising and synthetising facts from the study of geology, or even of history, as well as from that of philosophy. M. Dellepiane seems to think that he would. The truth appears to be that all sciences are reconstructive in the sense that they are founded on common, everyday knowledge of what is happening in the present, but that they include a large number of facts which are beyond the range of observation and experiment and which must, therefore, be taken on faith, or rather reconstructed. One does not necessarily acquire a philosophic habit of mind, however, from the study of any science. The fact is that the lawyer's education is defective from both the philosophic and the scientific viewpoint. In order to fix the data he collects into an appropriate framework he needs to have a philosophic outlook, and also to possess the sociological information which would enable him to judge the past from the present instead of always examining the present in the light of the past.

The rest of the article space in the January number is occupied by half of a long paper by the late M. Raoul de la Grasserie on *The Effects, both Beneficent and Harmful, of the Idea of Religious Salvation*. He establishes the truth which most modern students of religion seem to be arriving at—that the aim of religion is the achievement of happiness, and that only so far as that object is attained do men desire life on earth and survival after death. He gives many examples of the extraordinary ways in which devotees defeat the object of their religion by inflicting penances on themselves, manufacturing ritual sins, and forcing salvation on the members of their own communions while they neglect Jews, atheists and other outsiders; and shows how men seek to secure their own safety by these practices. With the solicitude of religious people for the welfare of others the subsequent paper will deal.

The report of the proceedings of the Paris Sociological Society shows that only two of the sittings have been abandoned on account of the war. At the opening of the session in January it was decided that the subject which has been on the programme since November, 1913, should be retained, but that instead of following up the discussion on economic, political and religious liberalism with debates on philosophic, moral, educational and artistic liberalism, according to the original plan, the members should reconcile their scientific with their nationalist interests by devoting their attention to "libéralisme et autoritarisme," and compare German ideas of liberty and government with French ones.

La Science Sociale for January and February is a study, by M. Ernest Picard, of the class organisation of the French nation in the sixteenth century, and is entitled *Les ancêtres de Pantagruel*. The introduction contains an appreciation of M. Philippe Champault, who died on December 21st, and of MM. Adelphe and Laffitte, who perished on the field of battle; and a lecture on the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente which M. Léon Poinsard delivered in Paris in the spring of 1914. He speaks of the bond between Germany and Austria as a device for promoting ambition rather than friendship; and of the compact between Russia, France and England as hardly a contrivance at all, but as a natural measure of protection of three countries, whose interests are essentially pacific. To the question—Will the understanding between the three allies be permanent?—he answers: . . . the very firm stability of England will be the determining factor in the maintenance of the agreement. The sense of responsibility which the British acquire from the discipline both of their homes and of public life favours continuity of policy to such an extent, that the disruptive tendencies of government in France and the revolutionary ideas to which the break-up of the mir system is giving rise in Russia may have no power to break the alliance. On the other hand, if the prestige of Prussia were destroyed, the motley populations which constitute the German Empire might find that their affinities were not strong enough to hold them together.

M. E. R.

PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

On Tuesday afternoon, February 9, Mrs. Mabel Palmer lectured on "Permanent Peace Policy: a Critique," the Rev. Dr. Walsh presiding. (Professor Herbertson, who had been announced to read a paper on "Some Sociological Geographical Problems of the War," was unable to do so on account of illness.)

On Tuesday, March 9, at 8-15, Mr S. H. Swinny read a paper on "An Historic Interpretation of the War," Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P., in the chair. The paper appears in the present issue.

On Tuesday, March 23, at 5-15, Sir Thomas Barclay read the paper on "The Hague Tribunal: its Constitution and Potentialities," which appears in this issue. Dr. Thomas Baty was in the chair.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GROUP.

On Tuesday, January 12, at 5-15 p.m., Dr. Beatrice Edgell read a paper on "The Foundations of Character."

On Tuesday, February 2, at 5-15 p.m., Mr. C. B. Andrews opened a discussion on "The Danger of the English Adoption of German Methods." (Miss Ida Sachs being prevented by illness from reading her paper on "The Analysis of Character.")

On Tuesday, March 2, at 5-15 p.m., Mr. Cyril Burt lectured on "Psychological Tests and Vocational Guidance."

Further meetings have been arranged as follows:—

Tuesday, May 4, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. E. A. H. Jay: "The Juvenile Department of the Labour Exchanges and the Choice of a Vocation."

Tuesday, June 8, at 5-15 p.m. Dr. Murray Leslie: "Nerve Strain and War Conditions."

Tuesday, June 22, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand: "Demonstration of Methods of Studying Character."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION COMMITTEE.

On Monday, January 25, Mr. Aneurin Williams, M.P., read a paper on "A League of Peace."

On Monday, February 8, Mrs. Palmer spoke on "The Bankruptcy of Pacificism."

On Monday, February 22, Mr. Brailsford read a paper on "International Organization and Economic Rivalries."

On Monday, March 8, Mr. R. C. K. Ensor read a paper on "Foreign Policy and Party Politics."

On Monday, March 22, Dr. W. R. Bisschop lectured on "The Possible Extension of International Functions."

Further meetings have been arranged as follows:—

Monday, May 3 (not April 26 as originally arranged), at 5 p.m. Dr. W. R. Bisschop: "The Constitution of the Hague Court."

Monday, May 31, at 5 p.m. The Rev. T. J. Lawrence, LL.D.: "The Concert of Europe."

The meetings of the Groups are held in the Rooms of the Sociological Society, 21, Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

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ECONOMIC MOBILISATION FOR WAR.

NEVER has there been a war in which economics played so prominent a part as it plays in the great European upheaval of to-day. Victory depends as much—perhaps more—upon economic resources and economic organisation as upon men and strategical skill. The importance of numbers and military training must not, indeed, be underrated; both are essential to success, as they have always been in the past. But the best trained and best led modern army cannot fight efficiently in the field unless it is backed and supported by a powerful organisation of industry and business. Food and clothing must be provided in greater quantity and diversity than was formerly thought necessary. Equipment of innumerable kinds, and an unceasing supply of engines and munitions of war, must be manufactured and delivered in constant profusion.

The economic organisation of war involves very much more than the gathering into the hands of the Government, by taxation, by borrowing, or otherwise of a large part of the national resources. It implies that the character of production must be altered, that from making goods such as are normally required in time of peace, industry must be adapted to produce the goods required in time of war. The industrial system must be made to yield in large quantities commodities which it has been accustomed to produce only in small quantities. But further than this, the adjustment of industry to meet the new requirements must be effected at a time when the normal processes have received a shock from the outbreak of war, and when a large number of men have to be withdrawn from the labour market to serve in the armed forces. Moreover, the needs of the civilian population cannot be ignored. Civilians must be kept in health and strength, and to this end the Government must see that the flow of goods and services available for their consumption is not unduly restricted, either generally or in any particular direction. The consumption of luxuries may be unsparingly cut down, many comforts and amenities of life may be sacrificed, and the resources normally directed to the production of goods for purposes of development may be turned to other uses, but the activities necessary for preserving a decent standard of living among the various classes of the community must be maintained.

The economic problems which have had to be faced in the present war are much more intricate than was the case a century ago, on account of the greater complexity of the economic structure. During the past hundred years commercial intercourse between nations has developed by leaps and bounds, stimulated especially by the cheapening of transport which followed the invention of the railway and the steamship. This development is an outstanding feature in the economic history of the past century. The results have been, on the one hand, much closer co-operation between the inhabitants of different countries than ever existed before, and on the other hand a much keener commercial rivalry. Nations have become less self-sufficient. They depend upon one another for their foodstuffs, their raw materials, their manufactured goods. The international trade of the world now amounts to over £3,000,000,000 a year, compared with only £200,000,000 a century ago. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the United Kingdom was practically self-sufficing in respect of wheat; at the present time she imports about five-sixths of the amount consumed. Consider again the extent to which Great Britain relies upon the Colonies and foreign countries for meat, butter, eggs, tea, sugar, and innumerable other foodstuffs. A very large amount of the raw material for our manufacturing industries is derived from over the seas, and the cutting off of these imports would be only less serious than the cutting off of our food supply. A hundred years ago the cotton industry was almost the only one which relied largely on abroad for its raw material. Imports of manufactured goods, though not so essential to the economic fabric as imports of food or raw materials, are nevertheless of considerable importance. A striking instance of the inconvenience which may be caused by the stopping of imports is the disorganisation resulting from our inability to obtain dyestuffs from Germany after the outbreak of war.

The continuance of the export trade is also a vital national interest. It is largely by selling in foreign markets that we are able to purchase the goods which we import. It is indeed true that the inhabitants of the United Kingdom have in past years lent large quantities of goods abroad as capital, that the value of these investments is estimated at the huge total of £3,500,000,000, and that the interest and dividends which accrue annually upon this capital amount to about £190,000,000. It would appear, therefore, that for some time the United Kingdom could obtain its imports without sending exports to foreign markets, that goods representing interest could be imported, and that further imports could be obtained by withdrawing capital as it fell due for repayment or by selling securities abroad. This is the case up to a certain point, but as events have proved only up to a certain point. For in

normal times the Colonies and foreign countries are accustomed to look to the London capital market for fresh loans approximately equal in value to the amount which they have to pay as interest and dividends. If fresh loans are suddenly refused, they experience difficulty in meeting interest charges and in repaying capital as it falls due, and are therefore not in a position to purchase securities from British holders.

The ramifications of finance are as complex and as far-reaching as those of trade. Up to a certain point, indeed, the two are indistinguishable, for trade involves finance. At any given time an immense mass of goods is passing on its way from the producer to the consumer. The producer probably wishes to obtain the value of his goods at the time when he parts from them; the consumer will not pay for the goods until they reach him. It rests, therefore, with the merchant to own the goods moving from the producer to the consumer. The merchant, however, has not an unlimited capital of his own. He therefore borrows money upon the bills accepted by his customers. The usual procedure is for him to take the bill to an accepting house, which in return for a commission guarantees that the bill will be met when due, and the bill can then be discounted on favourable terms with a bill broker or a bank. A very large amount of trade is financed in this way in the city of London. A large part of the business is in connection with trade between foreign countries, which does not otherwise concern Great Britain. The bill on London has become in fact a universally acceptable method of payment between merchants all over the world.

In addition to advancing money to finance trade, a great business is done in the City of London in financing industries of various kinds in foreign countries. Accepting houses frequently undertake to guarantee bills known as finance bills, by discounting which foreign customers can obtain funds to finance industries, or for other purposes. The bills run for short periods, and as with trade bills must be paid at maturity, though of course fresh advances are frequently made. A great business is also done in London in connection with the issue of loans for longer dates and with the flotation of companies. In addition, banks and other financial houses lend important sums to Stock Exchange firms in connection with speculation.

It is obvious that any sudden blow dealt at this complicated system of finance must produce a paralysing effect upon the Money Market and a serious reaction upon trade and industry. The position filled by London in the world of finance, and the extent to which international payments are made through British financial houses make the United Kingdom particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was in the sphere of finance that the most prompt and

drastic action had to be taken by the Government during the crisis at the end of July last.

In passing on to consider more closely a few of the measures actually adopted by the Government for adjusting the economic system to the requirements of war, it will be convenient to group the problems selected for discussion under three main headings: (*a*) The shock to the economic system caused by the outbreak of war, (*b*) The national finances, and (*c*) Industrial adjustments required to meet the needs of war. Finally a short section will be added touching upon permanent effects likely to be wrought by the war upon economic organisation.

(*a*) The Shock to the Economic System.

The political crisis at the end of July 1914, reacted instantaneously and in a most alarming manner upon the world of finance. The fabric of credit is built upon confidence, and when confidence is shaken credit begins to totter. The spread among business men of fear that money owing to them would not be paid, and that money owing from them would be called in, produced a widespread scramble to liquidate the financial position. The general public indeed remained wonderfully calm and self-possessed, and there was a conspicuous absence of the rush to withdraw bank deposits which has been so frequently associated with financial panics. The amounts withdrawn at the end of July were little above the normal for the time of the year. Among the banks, on the other hand, much more alarm was manifested, partly owing to fear as to what the attitude of their depositors would be, and partly because they saw that their holdings of bills, which they had always regarded as the most liquid part of their assets, were in danger of becoming unrealisable. They promptly took steps to call in advances made to their customers at home and abroad. But just as the banks themselves cannot during a "run" meet a sudden demand by their depositors for payment in cash, because their resources are not immediately available, so the persons to whom the banks lend their money are unable to meet demands of a like kind at a moment's notice. One of the most striking features of the situation was the extent to which advances made to foreigners were called in. As has been shown above, the London Money Market had lent vast sums to foreigners in order to finance trade, and for other purposes. These borrowers were, on the whole, perfectly solvent, but they were quite unable to meet the large demands suddenly made upon them. Even if they could have paid cash in some foreign country, they could not remit the money to London, because the supply of bills on London was entirely inadequate for their requirements, while other methods of remitting money, namely the sale of securities in London and the shipment

of gold, were checked by the closing of the Stock Exchange and the high rates of insurance which prevailed even before the actual outbreak of war. The supply of bills on London could be increased by the shipment of goods to the United Kingdom, but the goods were not ready and the process involved time. The supply of bills, therefore, was too small for the huge demand, and the price rose violently, but a very large number of foreign borrowers found it quite impossible to remit money to London. The situation is forcibly described by Mr. Hartley Withers,[1] who writes:—

> The chief reason for the suddenness and fulness of the blow that fell on London was nothing else but her own overwhelming strength. She was so strong and so lonely in her strength that her strength overcame her. She held the world in fee with so mighty a grip that when she said to the rest of the world, "Please pay what you owe me," the world could only gasp out, "But how can I pay you if you don't lend me the wherewithal?"

Reference has been made to the closing of the Stock Exchange, which occurred on Friday, July 31st. The difficulties of the Stock Exchange were similar in their essence to those which affected the banks, the discount houses, and the accepting houses—namely, the calling in of money advanced, combined with inability to obtain remittances from abroad. Stock Exchange firms normally borrow large amounts from the banks to finance speculation, depositing stocks with the banks as security. When prices fall the banks usually demand additional cover for their loans, and in case of default sell the securities lodged with them. At the end of last July, however, the position was that brokers, on the one hand, had large amounts owing to them from abroad in consequence of continental purchases earlier in the settlement; and, on the other hand, that a subsequent flood of selling orders drove prices down to an abnormally low level. The demand of the banks for additional cover or for repayment of loans would, therefore, have resulted in a large number of defaults among Stock Exchange firms. Hence the closing of the Stock Exchange, which prevented quotations from falling still further, and avoided giving the banks a handle for demanding further cover, while it also prevented them from selling the securities which they held.

The action of the Government, acting after consultation with prominent men in the city, may now be briefly outlined. The first step was the "suspension" of the Bank Act, combined with the raising of the Bank of England discount rate to 10 per cent. The so-called "suspension" of the Bank Act meant that the Government undertook to introduce a Bill into Parliament indemnifying the Bank of England against the consequences of illegally issuing

1. *The War and Lombard Street.*

a larger amount of notes uncovered by gold than it was allowed by law to do. The effect was to provide an increased amount of currency. The object of rising the discount rate to 10 per cent. was to check unnecessary borrowing from the Bank. The latter measure, however, has been adversely criticised as being based on too rigid an adherence to earlier practice, and being calculated to increase rather than to diminish public alarm. Doubtless it would have been better not to have raised the Bank Rate above 6 per cent. or 7 per cent. In view of the fact that Bank of England notes are issued in amounts of not less than £5, and that the public has little use for them in effecting everyday purchases, it was decided to issue Treasury notes of £1 and 10/-, which might be lent to the Banks to enable them to meet the demands of their depositors. As this new currency was not available at the moment, it was decided to prolong the August Bank holiday for three days, in order that the notes might be printed.

While provision was thus made to meet the demands of the public for additional currency, the major problem had to be solved: the problem, that is to say, of enabling borrowers to meet their obligations when they could not obtain remittances from their debtors. The solution consisted of the introduction, on the one hand, of a moratorium, and on the other hand of arrangements by which the Bank of England, with the guarantee of the Government, undertook to advance money on approved securities. A partial moratorium relating to bills of exchange only was proclaimed on Monday, August 3rd, the effect of which was to enable accepting houses to postpone for a month payment of any bill accepted before August 3rd and falling due, subject to interest at the rate of 6 per cent. On August 7th a further proclamation was issued protecting almost all classes of debtors for a month. The period in both cases was subsequently extended, and the moratoria did not finally lapse until November. The moratoria did little in themselves to straighten out business in the city; what they did was to gain time, and thus make it possible for other measures to be taken, while the mere lapse of time tended in some measure to restore public confidence. It may be noted in this connection that the banks availed themselves of the provisions of the moratorium only to a very limited extent and for a brief period.

The most important measures taken to cauterise the wounds in the financial organism were a series of arrangements for advancing money to financial houses which could not, owing to the war, obtain payment from their debtors. It was announced on August 13th that the Bank of England would discount all approved bills which had been accepted before August 4th, and the Government undertook to make good to the Bank of England any loss which it might incur in the process. It was also provided that the Bank of

England would forego recourse against the holders of bills. This meant that the banks which took bills to the Bank of England to be discounted were relieved of liability in the event of a bill not being finally met. But previous holders of the bills, in particular the accepting houses, were not relieved of liability in this way. The Bank of England undertook to give acceptors of bills the opportunity until further notice of postponing payment, on the understanding that interest would be charged to them at 2 per cent. above bank rate. Under this arrangement large amounts of bills were discounted at the Bank of England, and it was believed that the financial machine would again begin to work. Experience, however, showed that this was not the case. Trade had been crippled, and the supply of new bills on London created was small. Accepting houses were still afraid that their customers would find difficulty in remitting, and were therefore unwilling to extend further credit to them. This in turn tended to prevent the exchanges from working. More drastic remedies were evidently required to set the machinery right. Accordingly, it was announced early in September that instead of buying from the banks bills accepted before the moratorium, the Bank of England would lend money to the accepting houses to meet them. Repayment would not be demanded until a year after the end of the war, and the claim of the Bank of England upon the assets of the acceptors was to rank behind the claim of those who held bills accepted after the moratorium. It was further arranged that the joint stock banks, with the co-operation if necessary of the Bank of England, would advance to the accepting houses the amounts necessary to pay their acceptances at maturity. These measures went a long way to ease the position of the accepting houses during and for a time after the war. The exchanges became more normal, and the financial machine gradually got into working order. It may be noted, however, that the accepting houses have not been relieved of final responsibility for their acceptances, and their ultimate position therefore depends upon the ability of their customers to meet obligations after the war. For this or for some other reason, there is no doubt that the prestige of the accepting houses has suffered, and their acceptances are not regarded so favourably as was the case before the war. Whether the accepting houses will recover their former position after the war is over will no doubt depend largely upon the extent to which they are called upon in respect of their acceptances, upon their ability to meet these calls, and generally upon the solvency of those who were their customers before the war.

Details of the government scheme for relieving the difficulties of the Stock Exchange were announced at the end of October. It was stated that, with a view to avoiding the necessity for forced

realisation on a large scale of securities held as cover for account to account loans, the Government had arranged with the Bank of England to make advances to certain classes of lenders in order to enable them to continue their loans until after the end of the war. The banks, who are the principal lenders to Stock Exchange firms, were not, indeed, included in this scheme, but it was explained that all banks to which the Government had given the right to borrow Treasury notes, had agreed not to press for repayment of loans or require the deposit of further margin until after the war. Arrangements were made with the Bank of England to advance to other lenders to Stock Exchange firms 60 per cent. of the value of the securities held by the lenders against any loans which they had outstanding on July 29th, 1914. The securities were to be valued for the purpose of the advance at the making up prices of the July 29th settlement, and the rate of interest was to be 1 per cent. above Bank rate, with a minimum of 5 per cent. When any of the securities against which advances were outstanding reached the settlement price of July 29th, the bank concerned, or the Bank of England, as the case might be, was given the right of demanding repayment of loans to the extent of the value of the securities, and in case of default of selling the securities. In this way provision was made for a gradual liquidation of speculative positions outstanding at the end of July, and as prices improved a large amount of stocks was liquidated. The scheme, however, did not directly lead to the reopening of the Stock Exchange; indeed the Government, in return for its assistance, required that the Committee of the Stock Exchange should not reopen the Stock Exchange without submitting the proposed date and conditions to the Treasury, and obtaining its consent. The object of this was to enable steps to be taken to prevent enemy countries from realising securities in London. The Stock Exchange was eventually opened to business on January 4th, though business was not freed from the encumbrance of minimum prices.

The principle of extending public credit through the medium of the Bank of England or otherwise to those whose business was crippled by the outbreak of war has been extended beyond the limits of the City of London. The Treasury announced on November 3rd that a committee consisting of representatives of the Treasury, the Bank of England, the joint stock banks, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce had been formed for the purpose of authorising advances in approved cases to British traders carrying on an export business. Advances were to be made in respect of debts outstanding in foreign countries and the Colonies, including unpaid foreign and colonial acceptances, which could not be collected for the time being. The committee has absolute discretion in authorising advances up to 50 per cent. of

the outstandings. In this way solvent traders could obtain funds to continue their business and to pay their commercial debts to other traders or manufacturers.

Another example of the use of public credit to sustain the business of individual traders is found in the scheme for advancing money to the Liverpool cotton merchants. In this case the assistance given was in the form of a joint guarantee by the Government, the Liverpool Cotton Association and the Liverpool banks, of advances made to merchants by those banks. The difficulties of the cotton merchants were very similar to those of the Stock Exchange. They could not obtain payment from abroad on previous sales of cotton, and the sharp break in cotton prices made it necessary for them to write down the value of stocks, while the banks were inclined to demand more cover for their loans. Like the Stock Exchange, the Liverpool Cotton Exchange had to be closed for some months to speculative dealings. It was arranged that advances were to be made upon terms similar to those applicable in the scheme for relief to British traders in respect of debts abroad. Repayment of principal and interest was guaranteed as to 50 per cent. by the Government, and as to 25 per cent. by the Liverpool Cotton Association, leaving a risk of 25 per cent. to be assumed by the banks. It may be noted that the guarantee applies only to advances required by the borrower to meet market differences from 5d. per lb. downwards, which he may have paid, or may have to pay, in respect of cotton future contracts. The scheme appears to have been successful in its objects, and made it possible to open the Cotton Exchange to "future" trading.

The government scheme for dealing with insurance against war risks at sea was one of the few emergency measures which had been thought out in detail before the war crisis began. It was obviously important that commerce should not be interrupted by reason of inability to cover war risks of ships and cargoes, and that insurance rates should not be excessive. A scheme had been prepared, in view of a possible emergency, by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This scheme was put into operation immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. An arrangement was made with the big mutual insurance associations, with which the great bulk of British shipping is insured, in virtue of which the Government undertook to bear 80 per cent. of all risks in respect of voyages begun after the outbreak of war. In return the State was to receive 80 per cent. of the premiums, and was to have the right to vary the rates charged within a maximum of 5 per cent. and a minimum of 1 per cent. For the insurance of cargoes, a State Insurance Office was opened in London, to insure cargoes in British ships insured under the scheme which started on voyages after the outbreak of war. A flat rate varying from time to time

within a maximum of five guineas per cent. and a minimum of one guinea per cent. was to be charged, irrespective of the voyage or the character of the cargo. The scheme worked with marked success from the beginning, and greatly assisted the continuance of trade by reducing premiums and restoring confidence.

In addition to introducing these various schemes for restoring the finance and commerce of the country to a more normal condition after the breakdown at the end of July 1914, the Government has endeavoured to supplement private enterprise in obtaining certain goods which it has been difficult to obtain owing to the war. These commodities comprise sugar and dye-stuffs normally derived in large quantities from Germany; and wheat imported from India.

In regard to the supply of sugar, an announcement was made on September 11th to the effect that a Royal Commission had been appointed "to inquire into the supply of sugar in the United Kingdom; to purchase, sell, and control the delivery of sugar on behalf of the Government; and generally to take such steps as may seem desirable for maintaining the supply." Four weeks later it was announced that in order to avoid a sugar famine in consequence of the supply of beet sugar from Germany, Austria, and Belgium being stopped, 900,000 tons of raw sugar had been purchased in Demerara, Java, Mauritius, and elsewhere, at the price of about £20 per ton. It was arranged that this sugar should be sold virtually at cost price to the refiners, who undertook to sell it when refined at a fixed price, based upon the cost of the article plus a fair manufacturing profit.

The problem of obtaining an adequate supply of aniline and other dye-stuffs could only be solved by setting up works for the production of dyes. With the exception of an unimportant quantity of dyes produced in Great Britain or imported from Switzerland, and of some natural indigo imported from the East, the whole of the colouring materials used in the textile industry are normally obtained from Germany. At the outbreak of war, Germany prohibited the export of dye-stuffs, and British consumers therefore had to rely on such stocks as existed, and on what could be produced outside Germany. In the middle of November it was announced that the Government had made arrangements to encourage the immediate expansion of the various existing sources of supply as an interim measure. With reference to the permanent supply, a scheme was under consideration for forming a limited company with a large capital, of which the bulk would be subscribed by the consumers of dye-stuffs and colours, and others interested, the Government indicating their willingness, conditionally on this being done, to subscribe a certain proportion of the share capital, and to guarantee the interest on a large debenture capital for a term of years. The scheme first put forward did not

meet with the necessary support, and a modified scheme was submitted at the end of January. It was proposed to form a company with a share capital of £2,000,000, of which £1,000,000 should be issued in the first instance. The Government would make to the company a loan for twenty-five years corresponding to the amount of share capital subscribed up to a total of £1,000,000, and a smaller proportion beyond that total. The Government advance was to bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, payable out of net profits, the interest to be cumulative only after the first five years. Until the loan should be repaid, the company's dividend was to be limited to 6 per cent. In addition to making a loan to the company, the Government undertook for a period of ten years to make a grant to the company for the purposes of experimental and laboratory work up to an aggregate of £100,000. A company was eventually constituted on these lines, though the full amount of capital appealed for was not obtained. Options have been exercised for the purchase of dye-works in this country, and steps have been taken to increase the output of dyes. The task before the company is by no means an easy one, for the German dye-stuff industry has only been built up after years of research, and many shades of colour produced in Germany cannot be produced in this country because the secret of their manufacture is unknown. But in any case, so long as the dyes cannot be imported, the new company will be of great assistance to the textile industry.

A further important step taken by the Government was its decision last April to control the Indian wheat export. The necessity for regulating the trade sprang from the serious rise in the price of wheat in Northern India, in sympathy with the simultaneous rise in other parts of the world. In the interests of the Indian consumer it was desirable to keep down prices in India, but at the same time it was undesirable entirely to cut off one of India's chief exports. It was estimated that this year's crop would yield an exportable surplus of at least 2,000,000 tons in excess of the normal Indian consumption. The Indian Government decided to prohibit absolutely the export of wheat on private account until March 31st, 1916. The export trade was to be entirely in the hands of the Government, which appointed as its agents the firms usually engaged in the trade. The maximum price to be offered by these firms to Indian sellers, instead of being regulated by the price ruling in London, was to be determined from time to time by the Government of India. It was announced that the price would be gradually reduced so that there should be no inducement to hold up supplies in India. Under this ingenious arrangement, a large quantity of wheat has been exported from India, and the price in Great Britain has been considerably reduced, while the price in India has been kept near its normal level.

(*b*) THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

To meet expenditure entailed by the war the Government has had to undertake financial operations of vast magnitude. Expenditure for naval and military operations alone will represent during the current financial year about one-third of the normal national income in time of peace. Including civil expenditure, and the amount to be advanced to the Dominions and to our Allies, the total sum which has to be found by the Government, assuming that the war continues until March 31st of next year, is estimated at £1,136,434,000, which is about half the nation's income for a normal year. It may be noted that the rate of expenditure is increasing. During the first four months the war cost £102,000,000, during the next four it cost £177,000,000, and the maximum rate of expenditure has not yet been reached. It must be emphasised that these sums of money and the goods and services which they represent have got to be made available now, during the progress of the war. So far as society is concerned there is no question of throwing the burden onto the future; although, of course, so far as a resort is made to borrowing, interest will have to be paid to individual lenders in the future, involving a redistribution of the national income in years to come. Except in so far as the productive resources of the community are injured, war does not mortgage the future from the social point of view.

The funds which may be drawn upon for the purpose of financing war represent two classes of wealth, viz., current production and savings. The extent to which a war can be financed by a drain upon savings is not without limits. The savings of past years are for the most part represented by concrete capital such as houses, factories, docks, railways, and ships. These cannot readily be converted into goods suitable for use in time of war. It is true that capital goods wear out in course of time, and that they require replacement and renewal. In the stress of war it is possible to postpone part of the normal replacements and renewals, and to devote the money and the resources which would have been spent in maintaining capital to producing goods for military purposes. No doubt both private individuals and business firms have in fact put off expenditure upon maintenance of buildings and plant, but the funds which can thus be liberated cannot in the course of a year be very great.

There is another way in which the expenditure of the British Government can be, and has been, financed out of past savings. It has already been pointed out that a very great amount of capital —roughly some £3,500,000,000—has been accumulated and invested abroad. If foreigners can be induced to purchase the securities which represent these investments, or otherwise to refund the capital lent, the proceeds can be used for the purposes of the

war. Practically it is impossible for foreigners to purchase securities or refund capital to any large extent, except from their own current production. There is no doubt that foreign nations—and especially the United States—have been able to take over in this way a large amount of British capital. Force of circumstances has induced them to increase the margin between the amount which they produce and the amount which they consume, and to supply to this country an unusually large value of goods, while receiving from the United Kingdom much less than at normal times. Clearly, however, the extent to which foreign nations can enable British investors to realise their capital depends upon their ability and willingness to save, either by cutting down their consumption or by increasing their output; upon their capacity to supply Great Britain with the kind of goods required; and upon their willingness to purchase securities or otherwise refund capital. In all respects the citizens of the United States have proved their capacity and willingness to assist British citizens to finance the war.

The current savings of the community which may be borrowed, and the wealth which can be transferred to the Government by taxation, form another source from which the war is financed. The net savings of the British nation were estimated in the Report on the First Census of Production at £130,000,000 to £170,000,000 in 1907. There is no doubt that the amount has been very much greater (probably some £300,000,000) in recent years, but it is difficult yet to form any definite opinion as to the effects of the war upon the amount currently saved. The wealthier classes of the community, which perform the great bulk of the saving in normal times, have on the whole reduced their expenditure, but they are paying more in taxation, and their income is probably less than before the war. It is not clear, therefore, that these classes have since the outbreak of war increased the amount of current savings which can be borrowed by the Government. It is possible that the working classes, whose income has undoubtedly increased owing to higher rates of wages, absence of unemployment, and overtime, have saved more than usual, but there is some evidence to show that their scale of expenditure has also increased.

The financial policy actually adopted by the Government has enlisted support in varying degrees from all the sources indicated above. For some months expenditure was met by borrowing upon Treasury Bills in the Money Market. As creditors had made abnormal efforts to withdraw advances made to borrowers both at home and abroad, and as large amounts of bills had been discounted at the Bank of England under the moratorium, money was unusually abundant, and the Government was able to borrow for short periods at very low rates. In December the War Loan of £350,000,000 was issued, the rate of interest being nominally 3½

per cent., though practically 4 per cent., owing to the loan being issued below par, and being redeemable in 1928. When the proceeds of this loan had all been spent, the Government again began to borrow large amounts on Treasury Bills. A plan was adopted by which the Government instead of offering a fixed amount of Treasury Bills to be taken up by tender, undertook to borrow any sums offered at a rate fixed by itself. The total amount borrowed in this way between 14th April and 5th June was £152,812,000, an amount sufficient to cover the cost of the war during this period, and to pay off £30,000,000 of old bills. This floating debt will probably be funded out of the proceeds of the new loan now being offered for subscription.

While the policy of the Government in the short loan market has tended to check advances to other would-be borrowers by raising discount rates, the Treasury has endeavoured to check the issue of new loans on the capital market, and the importing of securities. It was announced in January that, with a view to husbanding the financial resources of the country, projects for new issues of capital must be submitted to the Treasury for its approval before the issue takes place. Issues for undertakings in the United Kingdom would only be permitted where it was shown that they were "advisable in the national interest." To obtain approval for issues on account of undertakings in the British Empire overseas, the existence of "urgent necessity and special circumstances" must be demonstrated. It was laid down that no issues would be permitted for undertakings outside the British Empire. To hinder the purchase of securities from abroad (especially from enemy countries) regulations were laid down in connection with the opening of the Stock Exchange at the beginning of January. No securities were to be good delivery on the Stock Exchange unless supported by the declaration of a banker, broker, or other responsible party that they have remained in physical possession in the United Kingdom since September 30th, and had not since the outbreak of war been in enemy ownership. Moreover, no securities to bearer or endorsed in blank were to be good delivery unless impressed with the Government stamp dated previous to October 1st, and accompanied by a declaration similar to that required above. By these regulations the Government has to a large extent secured for itself a first claim upon the available capital of the nation. Whether the measures taken will prove adequate in view of the enormous sums required cannot yet be determined. Should voluntary savings and voluntary withdrawals of capital from abroad prove inadequate it might prove feasible to adopt some measure of compulsion either by forced loans or by expropriating owners of certain kinds of foreign securities which could be sold abroad.

There are, however, other methods of obtaining money which

would probably be found simpler. The most obvious method is taxation. Although, since the war began, the super-tax has been increased, the income tax has been doubled, and the customs duty on tea has been raised 3d. per lb., the limits of taxation are far from having been reached. The total revenue of the country during the present financial year is estimated at £270,332,000, compared with an estimate for 1914–15 (made before the war) of £207,146,000, so that the revenue is only about 30 per cent. higher than in peace time. Another method of increasing the resources available for the conduct of war would be to check the consumption of commodities which do not fall in the category of "necessaries," and thus to increase the national savings which might be borrowed. Probably an increase of taxation will be essential if the war continues for long, because in that case the revenue on the present basis would leave no margin after paying interest on the National Debt.

(c) Industrial Adjustments.

It is the industrial organisation of war that presents what are perhaps the most difficult problems to be solved by the Government. At a time when a large part of the able-bodied manhood of the country is required to serve in the armed forces, the character of industrial production has to be altered. Vast quantities of guns, ammunition, military clothing, and equipment of all kinds are urgently wanted, and must be turned out with the greatest possible speed. In many cases the existing supplies of plant and labour, specialised to the production of a particular line of goods, are inadequate to meet the abnormal demand. Workpeople and machinery from other industries must consequently be induced to adapt themselves to produce goods which they are not accustomed to produce. Thus coal miners have become machine tenders, and textile machine works are manufacturing shell fuses. The work of men has to be done by women or by juveniles. Labour has to be moved from one part of the country to another. The process of adaptation and substitution has to be extended, in some cases, to raw materials of which the supplies are inadequate and incapable of being rapidly increased. Thus when thick leather is not available, army boots must be made with a double thickness of thin leather. The industrial system, in a word, must be stretched and squeezed to make it produce goods which, in quantity or quality, it was not intended to produce.

The work of securing the necessary adjustments and of seeing that they are effected with a minimum of waste and delay rests upon the Government. The difficulty of such a task no doubt varies greatly from one country to another, according to the normal character of the nation's industry, according to the extent to which

preparations for war have been made in advance, and according to the degree in which the national institutions and the state of public opinion lend themselves to direction at the hands of a central authority. In this country the problem of obtaining the necessary output of uniforms or military boots is much simpler than the problem of manufacturing arms and ammunition in large quantities. On the other hand, a country like Germany, which has prepared its army and its industries for war through long years of peace, has fostered the munitions industry, and has endeavoured to prevent the decay of industries whose loss would lead to inconvenience in time of war. Again, the institutions and the national spirit of Germany are those of a military state, and stand in sharp contrast to the democratic and non-military organisation of the United Kingdom. The problem which confronts the Government in this country is to organise the industries of an individualistic, non-military nation, a nation which has not yielded to its Government the same extensive powers of compulsion over individuals which the German Government is able to exercise.

The theory on which industrial mobilisation would be based in a country whose Government had no compulsory powers is somewhat as follows. The Government would invite manufacturers and others to supply the goods required, and would offer such a price for them as would call forth the requisite quantities of goods in the time fixed. The work of adjustment in regard both to labour and to plant would be thrown upon private enterprise. Meanwhile enlistment would take place from among those whose industrial services were not in great demand; men engaged on the manufacture of munitions and other equipment would be less likely to enlist, because they would know that their services were more valuable in industry than in the army, and because they would be earning high wages.

This theory of organisation, however, does not work satisfactorily in practice, especially when war is being waged on the present gigantic scale. So long as governments contract merely for small quantities of goods to be delivered more or less at leisure, competition may prevent the contractor from making an abnormal profit. But when governments become large purchasers of particular lines of goods they are apt to find themselves bargaining at a disadvantage. The army contractor has been a curse of belligerent governments from time immemorial. The result of pursuing ordinary methods of purchase at an extraordinary time has too often been that the Government obtains inferior goods at an exorbitant price. Producers of raw materials, manufacturers and middlemen of all kinds vie with one another in making money out of the public needs. So far as enlistment is concerned, experience has shown that the system under which the State accepts

for the armed forces every able-bodied man who volunteers does not produce perfect results. Men enlist who would be more usefully employed as industrial producers, and conversely men who would be less usefully employed as industrial producers do not enlist.

At the outbreak of the war the Government found it necessary to take control of the railway system, and an Order-in-Council was made on August 4th, in accordance with the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871, placing the control of the railways in the hands of an Executive Committee composed of general managers of the railways. The terms of compensation which it was agreed to pay to the companies were announced in the middle of September. It was arranged that the compensation to be paid shall be the sum by which the aggregate net receipts of the railways for the period during which the Government are in possession of them fall short of the aggregate net receipts for the corresponding period of 1913. If, however, the net receipts of the companies for the first half of 1914 are less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913, the sum payable is to be reduced in the same proportion. This sum, together with the net receipts of the railway companies taken over, is to be distributed amongst the companies in proportion to the net receipts of each company during the period with which comparison is made. A slight modification was subsequently introduced into the arrangement, according to which no reduction will be made if the net receipts for the first half of 1914 are less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913. Instead, the railway companies are to pay 25 per cent. of the war bonus granted by the Government to railway employees. It may incidentally be noted that the assumption by the Government of control over the railways has made it possible to dispense with the services of a large number of townsmen, canvassers, and agents, and to abolish the Railway Clearing House with its staff of over 700 clerks.

In addition to taking into its own hands the control of the railways and fixing terms of compensation, the Government requisitioned a great quantity of other means of transport soon after hostilities began. A large number of horses and motor vehicles were commandeered early in the war, the price paid to the owner being determined by the Government. Many ocean liners too were taken, to be converted into cruisers and patrol boats, and a large tonnage of shipping was impressed into government service as transports. In all these cases the terms offered as compensation have been lower than than would have been paid for the same quantity in the open market, though probably, on the whole, not less than the price of the articles individually at the outbreak of war. Shipowners have complained loudly that the Government was paying less for their vessels than foreign governments or than

could be obtained from private charterers. It would, however, be obviously unfair to expect the Government, owing to its large requirements, to raise prices against itself. Moreover, in spite of, or perhaps in consequence of, the large tonnage taken over by the Government, shipowners as a whole have been able to exact extraordinarily high freights in their ordinary commercial business.

The policy of nationalisation has not yet been carried very far, and there are strong reasons (speaking merely from the point of view of efficiency and economy in war) for maintaining that it has not been carried far enough. Private individuals have been allowed to make huge fortunes out of the needs of the community. Merchants who had stocks of foodstuffs or raw materials have been able to sell out at high prices, and manufacturers and others who happened to possess the means of production required for producing commodities most urgently required have been permitted to "hold up" the community. If the available stocks of coal and the coal mining industry, the available stocks of grain and wool, and the woollen mills, had been treated in the same way as the railways, there is no doubt that fewer fortunes would have been made by private individuals, the Government would have spent less, and the distribution of wealth among the community would have been better than it is. No doubt there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a policy, even though nationalisation be only for the duration of the war. The public departments might be overstrained by having suddenly to undertake such a vast task, in the middle of a war. Moreover, whatever might have been done to limit the profits of merchants and manufacturers within the country, nothing, or at any rate very little, can be done in bringing pressure to bear upon those outside the United Kingdom. Producers of military requirements in America and other countries were bound to reap a rich harvest. It may also be argued that nationalisation is not the only way in which individuals can be prevented from squeezing the public purse; that it is quite feasible to secure for the community by taxation a large part of the exceptional war profits obtained by private individuals. Whether this is the case or not, there can be no doubt that these exceptional war profits are much impairing the efficiency of the country during the war. For the desire to realise special profits is infectious, so that a coalowner or woollen manufacturer who is in the process of making a fortune finds his employees naturally anxious to share his profits. Hence the unseemly strikes and squabbles which have broken out at various points of the industrial organism during the past few months.

There have recently been signs of a tendency to strengthen public control over some of the principal industries. The Government did, it is true, last autumn obtain powers under the Defence

of the Realm Act to take over and exercise control over works where war material was actually being produced. But little appears to have been done for some time. Recently, however, arrangements have been made for limiting the profits of some works manufacturing munitions of war. The Secretary to the Treasury on June 16 forecasted a Government Bill "for getting at the extra incomes made during the war and taxing them substantially." In March, the Government obtained powers in respect of works where war material was not actually being produced at the moment, but which were capable of being used for that purpose. In view of recent speeches by Ministers, and of the formation of a Ministry of Munitions whose special object is to supervise and promote the output of munitions, it may be expected that Government control over certain branches of industry will now be considerably strengthened.[1] Meanwhile the position as it affects labour is not being neglected. It appears that in the munitions industries recruiting has been carried too far. The intention of the Government appears to be to recall a considerable number of engineers from the forces, in addition to definitely prohibiting further recruiting of engineers. A departmental committee has recently also reported in favour of stopping recruiting among colliers. To put a stop to the practice which appears to have been common among firms engaged on government work of luring away one another's workpeople by promises of better wages, a remarkable Order-in-Council was issued at the end of April, making it an offence for employers in these industries to induce workmen of other firms on government work to leave their employment. The Order also prohibits employers engaged on government work from inducing anybody resident more than ten miles off to accept employment except through the agency of a Labour Exchange. It appears that a scheme is under consideration for prohibiting strikes and lock-outs in the munitions industries, disputes being submitted to compulsory arbitration. It is probable also that statutory force will be given to the promise made by the Government last March that at the end of the war Trade Union restrictions and working rules which have been suspended are to be reimposed precisely as before.

(*d*) After the War.

A word must be said in conclusion about the permanent effect likely to be produced by the war upon the economic organism. The matter is of course a question of pure speculation. Much depends on the duration of the war, the circumstances in which it

1. Since this article was written, the policy of the Government has been expressed in the Munitions Bill.

ends, and the skill and foresight with which economic adjustments during the period immediately after the war are effected.

It appears probable that there will be a permanent strengthening of the ties which unite the individual to the State, and the State to the individual. A powerful stimulus has been given to the individual consciousness of obligation to the State, and to the corresponding feeling that the individual has a right to expect reasonable conditions of life from the State. These ideas had been slowly developing before the war, and it seems likely that after the war they will exert a much more potent influence than ever before. Some further approach in the direction of what is vaguely called Socialism may be expected. It appears to be questionable whether the railways will ever be handed back to private enterprise. It is possible that the world of finance may be watched over more closely than before the war. The problem of securing a more efficient utilisation of the national resources is bound to call for more attention, and questions connected with the distribution of the national income will certainly not be neglected. The country will of course be saddled with a large national debt, while a large sum will have to be provided annually out of the public purse for pensions. But unless the political centre of gravity is shifted in an unexpected way, it appears reasonably certain that the principal burden of taxation will be thrust upon the wealthy classes. Broadly speaking the classes which are able to save money for investment in the war loans will be taxed to pay the interest and sinking fund of these loans. To this extent the service of the national debt will merely involve a readjustment of wealth among the relatively rich. The war, however, is bound to cause a loss of material capital, in addition to the terrible drain of personal capital to which the casualty lists bear witness; and this will react unfavourably upon the working classes. To counteract these losses it will be essential to check waste wherever it occurs, and to secure that the energy of the nation shall be more effectively applied in the processes of production. Rule of thumb methods and slovenly ways of thinking will have to go by the board; scientific training and organisation and education in the widest sense of the term will demand much greater attention than they have received hitherto. In this process the State organisation will doubtless play a leading part.

C. K. HOBSON.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY.

In the eyes of its early prophets Nationality was a principle either too holy to be analysed or too simple to require analysis. But that principle brought into the modern world new and insistent problems, and these cannot be understood, still less solved, without a scientific analysis of the meaning and character of nationality. The spirit of the scientist has become no less necessary than the spirit of the devotee—though, in this as in other things, that people is happiest which can best combine the two.

It is noteworthy that we often speak indifferently of "nationality" or of "consciousness of nationality." We speak of the "growth of nationality" when we mean that men become conscious (or more conscious) of some common quality or nature, and attain a conscious unity of life, a common inspiration and activity, on the basis of that recognition. Without this *recognition* of what is common, nationality cannot exist, or at any rate cannot work and live. It is therefore a first step in analysis to consider what those common factors are on the recognition of which nationality depends, to consider the *foundations* of nationality, as a pre-condition of any insight into its nature and working.

No quality or interest, however common, can be a basis of nationality unless it is regarded as common by those who possess it, and any quality or interest whatever, if so regarded, can be a basis of nationality. But we cannot therefore say simply that nationality depends on the recognition of common social qualities or interests. For we may not only fail to recognise factors of community which really exist, we may also "recognise" factors of community which have no reality beyond the recognition. Not all the foundations on which the structure of nationality rests are equally substantial. In particular the consciousness of race, at one time regarded as the corner-stone of nationality, has proved to be in nearly every case a delusion. But it is important to remember that the opposite error, the failure to recognise existing community, is far more common, and that all actual consciousness of community has some true basis, though it may not be that which it seems to have. Thus the consciousness of race is often a falsely simplified expression or reflection of the consciousness of nationality itself. Again, it is of the very essence of nationality that it rests on the consciousness of difference no less than on that of likeness. For each nationality is determined by contrast with others, and a

nationality regards itself not only as distinct from others, but nearly always as possessing some *exclusive* common qualities, being thereby separated from others as well as united within itself. Now what holds in respect of the recognition of likeness holds even more of the recognition of difference—the recognition may not always correspond with the reality. This is especially true of difference because as a general principle men assume difference until they are driven to recognise likeness. The whole history of society bears this out. Differences lie on the surface; likenesses have to be sought deeper.

The significance of these facts will be perceived when we have (1) set out the chief qualities or interests in the recognition of which, either as common or as exclusively common, the foundations of exclusive nationality lie, and (2) drawn up a table showing how far these various factors are actually united in particular instances of nationality. The chief qualities or interests in the recognition of which, either as common or as exclusively common, the foundations of nationality must be sought are these :—

(1) Race.
(2) Language.
(3) Territory, *i.e.*, as occupied effectively, not as politically owned (7c).
(4) Economic Interests.
(5) Culture, *i.e.*, characteristic standards and modes of life.
(6) Religion.
(7) Political Unity.
(7a) Political Tradition, outcome of (7) when long established.
(7b) Political Subjection.
(7c) Political Domination.

These factors are of course not wholly independent of one another, but they are all distinguishable, and are found variously combined and separated. Further, any or all of them may be common but not exclusive to a particular nationality or both common and exclusive. When a factor is both common and exclusive it may be regarded as a pure determinant of nationality and is then denoted by the figure I in the table which follows. When common (to the whole or the vastly greater part of a nationality) but not exclusive, it is denoted by X. Thus the English language is common to the English people, but not exclusive, being shared by the American people. In the case of territory, when a nationality occupies the whole of a definite area and is in no way territorially mingled with other nationalities we may likewise denote them by I; in all other cases we must denote

them by X. Thus nearly all imperial nations must be marked X. Again, when nation and state exactly coincide, we may represent the coincidence by the figure I under the factor of political unity; but when either a nationality is divided over more than one State, or a State includes more than one nationality, we must write X under the same factor in respect of any such nationality. For instance we must set X against this factor in the case of the American nation, since they have admitted negroes to their political rights. In the case of some other factors, and particularly of economic and cultural interests, it is or should be obvious that, especially in the world of civilisation, absolute objective demarcation as between nationalities is quite impossible. In the civilised world national differences, whatever they may amount to, are not differences in "culture-stage"—they are differences in the subtler group-qualities, differences of moods and manners and temperaments, not in the universal character of their standards and achievements. One nation excels in one art, another in another, one has a more favourable opportunity than another for some economic or scientific achievement, but no one possesses a unity of culture at once independent of and in every respect superior to that of others. But if a nationality is deeply conscious of its own culture as being unique, or if it is deeply conscious of the severance of its economic interests from those of its neighbours, we may, in terms of our previous definition, regard such cultural or economic interests as for it pure determinants. In the case of economic interests, this sense of absolute severance seems to occur in the modern world only under the coercive control of dominant over subject nationalities; and in fact it is clear in every case that political conditions, the establishment of tariff-walls, for example, largely determine both the unity and the separation of such interests.

Since we are concerned with the *consciousness* of common quality or interest, variety of opinion may exist in respect of particular items in the table which follows. I have taken various representative nationalities—the terms British, German, Russian, etc., referring to those and those only who are conscious of *being* British, German, Russian, etc., not to all comprised within, or possessing *legal* nationality (*i.e.*, merely political rights) within, the British or German or Russian Empire—and sought to show the factors on which they depend for unity. Being subjectively limited, these may vary somewhat from time to time—a state of war, in particular, intensifies the consciousness of common national qualities and may turn a normally imperfect determinant into an abnormally pure determinant. I have tried to represent the various factors as they are determinant of the normal consciousness of the respective nationalities.

TABLE SHOWING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY.

(I denotes a factor *recognized* as exclusively common; X a factor recognized as common but not exclusive; O denotes, in respect of any factor, that there is no community co-extensive with nationality; X+ denotes a near approach to I. The last column shows the "pure determinants.")

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(7a)	(7b)	(7c)	
British ...	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	I	O	I	(7a) (7c)
Americans (U.S.A.)	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	O	O	O	None
French ...	X	X	X+	X	X+	O	O	I	O	I	(7a) (7c)
Italians ...	X	X	X+	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	None certain
Russians ...	X	I	X	X	X+	O	X	I	O	I	(2) (7a) (7c)
Germans ...	X	X	X+	X	X+	O	X	O	O	I	(7c)
Jews	I	O	O	O	X	I	O	I?	I	O	(1) (6) (7b)
Japanese ...	I	I	I	X	X	O	I	I	O	?	(1) (2) (3) (7) (7a)
Spaniards...	I	X	I	X	X	X	I	I	O	O	(1) (3) (7) 7a)
Swiss	O	O	I	X	O	O	I	I	O	O	(3) (7) (7a)
Poles	I	I	I	X	X	X	O	I	I	O	(1) (2) (3) (7a) (7b)
Czechs ...	I	I	I	I	X	O	O	O	I	O	(1) (2) (3) (4) (7b)
Magyars ...	I	I	I	X	X	O	X	I	O	I	(1) (2) (3) (7a) (7c)

There is possible, we may repeat, a divergence of opinion in respect of particular items in the foregoing table, and there is sufficient heterogeneity within modern nations to make generalisation in respect of certain factors, *e.g.*, religion, always precarious; but the general result remains unaffected. A number of very significant conclusions may be drawn from the table. Here we must notice in particular that, for the various nationalities we have selected as representative, (1) there is no single factor present in *all* cases of the consciousness of nationality, (2) in no two cases are the factors on which this consciousness is based exactly the same, (3) it is not necessary for nationality that there should be any "pure determinant" whatever. It does not follow from the last-mentioned fact that nationalities need not represent distinct types. Thus there is undoubtedly an American nationality although there is no exclusive basis for it in the form of some *specific* common quality or interest. It does clearly follow, on the other hand, that nationality is not to be identified with any or all of its foundations, that it is something essentially psychical and necessarily indefinite, being a certain consciousness of likemindedness which may be developed in a great variety of ways and under a great variety of conditions. It is certain that in every case of the *formation* of nationality there must originally have been subjection to the two great formative influences of common social life and common environment. But there are all degrees of common life and there is generally continuity of environment, so that there are also all degrees of likemindedness. How then can we distinguish

that degree which makes nationality? It can be only in terms of the desire of a group for political unity, for a common (not necessarily exclusive) political organisation. The criterion is by its very nature imperfect, but no other seems available. If then any people who bear a common name do not, however scattered they may be, desire to share in a common political life, they may be conscious of common race, as perhaps Gipsies are, but they cannot be called conscious of common nationality. If it be true that the Jews (who are represented as a nation in the table above) have lost the desire of political reunion, then it may be said of them that they have lost the national self-consciousness, retaining the racial alone. If again a self-governing colony lacks the desire to be at least federated to the mother-country, it must be said of it that it has lost its original nationality and become a new nation.

Why is it that a community may waken, as it seems in a moment, to the consciousness of nationality? Why is it that the most diverse or opposite influences, the glory no less than the misery of a people, the desire for deliverance or the lust of domination, the materialism of the exploiter or the idealism of the orator and poet, can evoke or direct that spirit? Why is it that the sense of nationality expands, diminishes, or is transformed from time to time, and that the members of a nation may, having changed their sky, change also in time their essential nationality, as the Americans have done? Why is it that the spirit of nationality may be hailed as the liberator of the world, and that yet some profound minds can look upon it as an evil thing, whose course "will be marked by material and moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind." ?[1] And how must so ambiguous a spirit develop if it is to resolve the troubles which it brings no less than maintain the benefits which it can bestow?

We may find some help towards the solution of these questions in the analysis we have already made. The sentiment of nationality depends for its character on the character of its many and various foundations; it is transformed with the transformation of any or all of these; and it finds its true fulfilment when men recognise the true nature, the interdependence and co-ordination, and the rightful claims of these. This may be shown if we trace, though here it can be done only in the most meagre outline, the evolution of nationality. It is commonly said that the sentiment of nationality is a quite modern phenomenon; it would perhaps be more accurate to say that this sentiment has in modern days revealed itself in new and decisive forms. The process of its evolution, leading to these modern revelations of its power, is necessarily, in the universal

1. Acton, *History of Freedom*: Essay on Nationality.

interdependence of social factors, complex and hard to trace, but the main stages are sufficiently clear. They may be stated as follows:—

(1) There is a stage of society, before government has grown strong or any political fabric developed, when the group is held together by an intense and exclusive communal spirit, the spirit of the clan or, in a somewhat more developed society, the spirit of the tribe. A good instance of the working of the more primitive type may still be seen in the institutions of such simple peoples as the Veddah groups. Here the group-consciousness is wholly isolated. "Most clans [a clan consisting of merely two or three families sharing a single cave or meeting on one hunting ground] have only a dim idea of the bare existence of others, and in consequence there is no question of marriage outside the clan, which is so common a feature of the next higher stage of development."[1] To the clan-limited consciousness even the tribe, as a union of clans, is a circle too vast to be one inclusive community, and here, as always, the limit of community is the limit of the intelligence of its members. It is noteworthy that these wretched Veddahs, who cannot even count and have no names for days or months, yet regard themselves as vastly superior to all outside the group.[2]

It is rare to find a clan-limited consciousness of this type, but the tribe-limited consciousness is the commonest of phenomena in primitive life. Here again the consciousness of community rests upon a number of factors regarded as all common and all exclusive. It is not that kinship determines the tribe, *or* religion, *or* tradition.[3] Locality, kinship, religion, tradition, customary law, perhaps also communal ownership, together weave the magic circle which bounds protection, service, and fellowship. To belong to the tribe means to belong to the kin, to worship the tribal gods, to be initiated into the tribal institutions, to have the same friends and foes, the same interests, the same thoughts, as all the tribe. In the analysis of such a community it is necessary to set I under all the factors of community. The primitive tribe is a circle wherein universal uniformity is the absolute condition of exclusive devotion.

(2) But all development is achieved at the cost of uniformity, at the cost of the simplicity of old allegiances. The development of society implied in the first place the growth of the institution of

1. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, on the Rock-Veddahs as described by the Herrn Sarasin.

2. Cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, ii, pp. 170 ff., for other illustrations of this attitude among primitive peoples.

3. The false simplification due to regarding any one factor, as, for instance, Maine and Bagehot regarded kinship, as the sole or even primary determinant of early communities is well pointed out by Westermarck, *op. cit.*, ii, cc. xxxiii and xxxiv.

government and created a new devotion that at first may have seemed identical with, but in time revealed itself as distinct from and on occasion contradictory to, the old—the "loyalty" of the subject to the ruler, the chief, the government, the dynasty, as distinct from the devotion of the tribesman to his whole tribe, of the citizen to his country. "For chief and tribe," "for king and country," made an easy and inspiring phrase, but the identity of service implied in the phrase was by no means always a reality. The new sentiment was greatly fostered by militarism and by the alternative consequences of militarism, victory or defeat, domination or subjection. Victory enhanced the power and glory of the ruler, defeat revealed the more the necessity of his strength. The same influences developed the distinction of class from class within the community, and created conditions under which the opposition of classes—which came, and still comes, very near to being an opposition of subject classes and governing classes—broke finally the homogeneity of the tribal life. Thus was born in every developing community a long period of confused and crossing loyalties which men sought, often vainly, to harmonise or identify. It might be shown, were it not for the limits of an article, how the confusion became intensified when different associations began to appear in their distinctness from the State and, in the name of the specific interest for which each stood, to make claims contradictory to those of the State—or rather of the actual governments of existing states—on the common members of both. Thus in particular the conflict of religions which followed the Reformation created also the antithesis of Church and State, and so introduced a new and profound disturbance of the old unity of communal devotion, just as the trade-union is to-day creating a newer and, as it may prove in the end, no less profound a disturbance. It is not suggested that these great disturbing principles have come like serpents into the Eden of a primitive life. Primitive Edens are really very wretched affairs, and the seeming serpent may reveal itself as the deliverer of social man, in showing him the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. In the Western world the culmination of the confusion of loyalties was reached under Feudalism.

(3) The sentiment of nationality proper emerged when men again sought, under the conditions just described, to realise and distinguish the claims of the complete community to which they felt themselves to belong, discerning this devotion from other conflicting loyalties. It is not to be supposed that this new development was in its turn due to simple or merely "ideal" motives, though we cannot here delay to consider this question. But the desire for the political freedom of the nation was the dominant motive which gave strength and direction to the senti-

ment of nationality, as could easily be demonstrated by an account of the historical circumstances under which that sentiment arose. The two great political developments of modern days, the growth of nationality and the growth of democracy, have thus a common principle, or rather they reveal the same principle working under different conditions. (*a*) On the one hand, when a community which feels itself one is either parcelled out between several governments or is in whole or in part subject to what it regards as alien domination, there arises the nationalist claim proper, the demand of a nation not so much for self-government as for a government of its own. (*b*) On the other hand, when a nation already possesses, as a whole, a government of its own, just the same principle is now revealed in the completer demand of democracy. Nationalism is the spirit of protest against political domination, the impulse to that free national unity which itself is the foundation on which the common interests of the nation must be achieved. To attain the demand of nationalism is not to achieve these interests, it is to have built the foundation only of their achievement. Nationality is not the end but the beginning.

Hence we have to realise very carefully the limits of the ideal of nationality. It is the failure to realise these limits which perverts that ideal from a savour of life into a savour of death. *Nationality can be a true ideal only so long as and in so far as nationality itself is unrealised.* As soon as it is attained, as soon as a nation is a unity free from alien domination, a new ideal must take its place. The ideal must now be to realise, on the basis of nationality, the interests of the nation—and that ideal must be sought in other ways, for though nation is marked off from nation the *interests* of one nation are not, as we have seen, similarly marked off from those of others. The preliminary idea of nationality, the establishment of the autonomous nation-state, is sought through difference; the ideals of the enfranchised nationality must, in view of the interdependence of the interests of nations, be sought through co-ordination and intercommunity.

Nationality provides an adequate ideal only while men are seeking liberty from alien political control. That ideal is, until that attainment, certainly of all ends the most imperative and most fundamental, for the attainment of a true basis of common action is the necessary pre-condition of the realisation of common good. But when an ideal is achieved it is vain to regard it as any longer an ideal. When national liberty is achieved, the true inspiration of nationality is fulfilled, except in so far as it is necessary to maintain what has been attained—but no community can live merely to maintain its foundations, it necessarily builds upon these. If on the attainment of the claim of nationality no further ideal emerges, then nationalism moves rapidly to the corrupt extreme of

chauvinism. It was so in the case of revolutionary France, it has obviously been so in the case of many present-day nations. But chauvinism is the spirit in which one nationality exalts itself at the cost of others—in the long run at the cost of itself. That it is at the cost of itself is clear enough when we remember how many interests of present-day nations have ceased to be exclusive to each. In so far as interests are exclusive, the interests of each are independent of those of others; in so far as they are non-exclusive, the interests of all are interdependent, and what injures those of one injures also those of others.

(4) The slow recognition of interdependence and its consequences, slow especially as compared with that rapid growth of interdependence which the scientific development of the means of communication has ensured, has been leading towards a new stage in the evolution of nationality. It has been making modern nations, almost against their wills, or at any rate the wills of their governments, parts of a greater society, partners in a common interest. It has been breaking down the idea that nationality must be fostered in exclusiveness, an idea no less absurd than the supposition that the character of an individual must be fostered in isolation. Nationality is no more obliterated by international relations than personality is by interpersonal, i.e., social, relations. On the contrary, the current of social intercourse brings psychical stimulus to the nation no less than to the individual, as the whole history of civilisation reveals. Again, the development of international interests has been making inter-state co-ordination necessary and inevitable. But the two methods along which this has been pursued have proved hopelessly inadequate. The one method consists in special conventions and agreements in respect of particular questions, such as the international agreements in respect of passenger and freight transportation by land and sea, of post and telegraph, of patent and copyright, finally—and on these it is that governments have ironically lavished their greatest care! —on the rules of war itself. The other method consists in the system we call diplomacy, this fragile bond of connection, the breaking of which means so much, being the only definitely constituted relation between modern States. Whatever views we may hold as to the relative services and disservices of secret diplomacy, it is surely difficult to maintain that any such system can be an adequate organ of the inter-community of States.

The future of the nations of Europe, for a long time to come, will be decided by their ability to see past the accumulated hatreds and losses, tragedies and terrors, of this almost universal war, to the necessity of establishing some saner system, some international organisation as permanent and as extensive as the common interests of the nations. There are many and great difficulties to be over-

come in the realisation of such an end, but there is only one final difficulty, the refusal of men to will the end. Its realisation is Utopian only so long as men think it so.

If men cannot or will not advance to intrinsic ends—to the deeper level of common interests where they face the same problems, the same needs, the same destinies—they must pursue extrinsic ends. If the nations are not joined by the deeper common interests they are set against one another by their narrower differences; if they do not strive towards those common possessions that form abiding satisfactions they must wrest miserably from one another those most partial goods which one or another can still exclusively enjoy.

Because all civilised peoples pursue ends which are essentially common no one can really love his own people who really hates another. If he seem to, unless his hate be mere ignorance, yet he loves in her only what is external, superficial, picturesque, only what serves his *amour propre*, immediate comfort, or personal interest, for he loves only that which separates her from others, disregarding the deeper good which unites. In the light of this truth we may surely say, modifying Browning's phrase, How little they love England who only England love! If only, when the time comes, the nations, standing among the ruins of war, could be made to understand the significance of this truth, it would mean the commencement of a happier civilisation as well as of a new stage in the evolution of nationality.

R. M. MacIver.

WAR AND INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE aim of this essay is to raise the question whether the science of Psychology can ever shew us how to abolish War. It is a question that must have occurred to many of those who have been able to reflect on the events of the past months, and it is one of the most far-reaching questions that mankind as a whole has to face, one on which its future may to a great extent depend. We are beginning to realise as never before—for it is to be supposed that at the time of other cataclysms, such as during the destruction of the Roman Empire, mankind was less conscious of itself than now—how powerful is the check that War may impose on the advance of civilisation, and the sight, together with the accompanying horrors, has naturally stimulated the desire, always widespread even in times of peace, to devise if possible a means of surmounting this formidable obstacle.

This desire has already manifested itself in the formulation of many schemes, mainly legal and political—from systems of international policing to conventions for compulsory arbitration—and the evidently unworkable nature of these may be taken as a measure of the emotional pressure that has brought them into being. It is characteristic of emotional states that they lead to attempts at immediate action instead of to thought, the preliminary investigation necessary to secure suitable action being dispensed with. The general attitude of pacifists is that, both on the moral and the material side, the evils of war are evidently greater than its benefits, even if the latter are admitted, and that consequently steps must be taken at all costs to prevent its occurrence. The sense of urgency is felt so acutely that any calm study of the factors involved is regarded as an intolerable delay, while any expression of doubt as to the desirability of the goal is repudiated with impatience. Ill-considered and, in all probability, unsuccessful action is the natural result of such an attitude. Certain cooler-headed and more thoughtful people, on the other hand, who take a longer view of the question, realise better its complexity, and see that the matter demands an intimate knowledge of human motives, desires and emotions. They therefore turn to Psychology for assistance in a problem which obviously belongs to its domain, and ask psychologists how it is to be solved. It is the purpose of the present essay to consider what kind of answer can be given to such an inquiry.

Now this answer must always be the same whenever any science is approached with a similar question, one with a purely utilitarian

aim. Suppose, for example, that an engineer is asked to devise a plan for carrying out a given practical purpose, *e.g.*, building a bridge. He can answer the questions as to the possibility of the undertaking, the means that would have to be adopted, and the probable cost, in lives and money, that would be incurred. What would not be in his sphere is the question of whether or no the undertaking *ought* to be entered upon. All he can do is to supply the data relating to the points just mentioned, leaving to the promoters of the undertaking the decision as to whether they considered it worth while to carry it out. Science is thus the handmaid of the human will: it is not within her province to dictate what ought to be done in a given situation, but only to point out what will have to be done if a desired end is to be attained.

Psychology, however, holds a peculiar rank among the sciences in that it is concerned also with the instrument of valuation, the mind. When approached with a utilitarian problem, therefore, it has two additional functions to fulfil which do not appertain to any other science. In supplying the data to enable a decision to be made it has first to answer the three questions mentioned above, *viz.*, as regards possibility, means, and cost. But there are two further sets of important data that Psychology has to supply. The first of these relates to the decision that a given end must be achieved, the second to the choice of means. Fundamentally the two points come to the same, it being the place of Psychology in both cases to call attention to the mental factors that may unconsciously influence decision, so that they may be taken into consideration in making a judgement. This is a matter on which the greatest emphasis has to be laid, because the importance of such factors is commonly neglected or else grossly underestimated, and it will therefore be discussed here at some little length. Coming now to the question at issue, whether Psychology can teach us how to abolish war, we see that the first thing to do is to re-state the problem under the following headings: Is it possible? If so, how can it be done? What would the cost involve? And, finally, what is the full significance of the desire to accomplish this end?

It may as well be said at once that Psychology can as yet give no positive answer to any one of these questions, a fact which for the impatient will forthwith dispose of any further interest in whatever it may have to say on the matter. With those, however, who are chary of nostrums, and brave enough to suspend their judgement until the painful process of attaining truth is achieved, the following considerations should carry weight. In the first place, Psychology is already in a position to offer a considerable body of information directly bearing on the problem, and, in the second place, it is only through a richer and deeper knowledge of Psychology that a final solution of it is possible. It is hardly

likely that this conclusion will be doubted on reflection, for it should be evident that even physical factors, *e.g.*, economic ones, owe their influence only to the effect they have on human motives and instincts: it is in the sphere of these latter that we have to seek in order to obtain a better understanding of the causes of War.

It will be expedient to open the discussion by considering further the important matter mentioned above, namely, the influence of emotional factors on decision and judgement. Within the last twenty years a method of investigation, known as psycho-analysis, has been devised and elaborated by Professor Freud of Vienna, which has permitted access to a hitherto veiled part of the mind, designated the Unconscious, and the explorations thus carried out have yielded information of very considerable value as to the unsuspected significance of this more emotional region of the mind. It would appear from these investigations that man is endowed with a far more intense emotional nature than is generally imagined, and that powerful barriers exist the function of which is to restrain its manifestations. All the emotions of which we become aware, either in ourselves or in others, represent only tricklings through from the volcanic reservoir that is pent up in the unconscious region of the mind, *i.e.*, that region of which we are unconscious. The dams that impede a freer flow of emotion are the restrictions against uncurbed action that have been painfully acquired during the civilisation of the race and the training of the individual, and the reason for their existence is the fact that the pent-up or "repressed" emotional life is of a rude and savage character incompatible with the demands of civilised standards. In this buried mental life, which is prevented from readily translating itself into action, phantasies play a very extensive part, and these are fundamentally of a pleasurable kind. Any disagreeable piece of reality that may succeed in penetrating to this region of the mind is at once treated as material to be used for the building up of some pleasurable fancy; it is remoulded in terms of some wish, and thus robbed of all its unpleasant features. The Unconscious cannot endure any contradiction of its desires and imaginings, any more than an infant can; intelligibly so, because it mainly comprises the infantile and inherited portion of our mind. Perception and, in an even higher degree, judgement are thus grossly distorted by these powerful emotional agents.

We are, it is true, to some extent familiar with this process of distortion in conscious mental life also. The expression "the wish is father to the thought" is proverbial, and everyone will admit, in the abstract, that prejudices can influence opinions and judgements, at least of other people. The science of History, and in a very imperfect way that of Law, makes some attempt at estimating and allowing for errors due to this factor, and in scientific research

it is generally recognised that evidence of an emotional influence (jealousy, ambition, etc.) casts suspicion on the validity of the conclusions and even on that of the observations. But what is not generally recognised is that influences of this nature are far more extensively exerted than might be imagined, and that the most potent ones are those proceeding from sources of which we know nothing, namely from the unconscious region of the mind. In an emotional situation, such as is evoked by a horror of war, any judgement arrived at will infallibly be dependent only in part on the external evidence; in a greater part on unconscious emotional influences. If, therefore, we desire to form a judgement purely on the relevant evidence, *i.e.*, a judgement that is in accord with reality and so is likely to be permanent, it is essential to neutralise the influence of those other factors, and this, of course, cannot be done until it is known precisely what they are. As will presently be explained, this knowledge can be adequately based only on a study of Individual Psychology.

Similar considerations apply to the causes of war. The causes of any given war are exceedingly numerous, and these are usually so inter-related as to make the unravelling of them one of the most difficult of tasks; it is further notorious that success in this undertaking is rarely more than approximate. The most important part of the task is, of course, not the mere enumeration of a list of causes, but the ordering of them according to their scale of values. They constitute a hierarchy in this respect, and may be divided into the exciting causes, which merely precipitate the war, and the deeper or more underlying ones, which bear the main responsibility for it. Whereas popular opinion concentrates its attention almost exclusively on the former, the philosophic historian seeks to uncover and comprehend the latter. How difficult this is may be judged from the circumstance alone that it takes about a century before all the material is published on which valid conclusions can be founded. In the present war, for example, it would seem impossible as yet to answer even the apparently elementary and simple question as to which was the more important causative factor leading up to it—the so-called inevitable conflict between Teuton and Slav or the need for German expansion overseas; in other words, whether the war is primarily one between Germany and Russia or between Germany and England.

Supposing, however, that all the political factors bringing about a certain war have been elucidated, we are still left with the problem of the causation of war in general. That is to say, the question arises whether there is not in the human mind some deep need, or some set of recurrently acting agents, which tends to bring about wars more or less regularly, and to find or create pretexts for wars whatever the external situation may be. This would involve the

conclusion that man cannot live for more than a certain period without indulging his warlike impulses, and that history comprises an alternation of wars and recuperations. Another possibility, not identical with the preceding, though allied to it, is that man tends to prefer the solution of various socio-political problems by means of war to their solution in any other way: this might be because of the instinct just referred to or else because the other solutions are more difficult and irksome, or it might be due to both reasons combined. There is undoubtedly much that could be adduced in favour of this view, unpalatable as it may seem, and we should be prepared in any unbiassed investigation for the possibility that it is true. We have, for instance, the unvarnished fact that wars do invariably recur in spite of the best intentions to the contrary, and it might very plausibly be argued that what happens historically is a periodic outburst of warlike impulses followed by a revulsion against war—usually lasting for one or two generations—which is again succeeded by a forgetting of the horrors involved and a gradually accumulating tension that once more leads to an explosion. This feature of periodicity would be well worthy of a special study,[1] but we must leave aside here historical questions of a kind which are not directly germane to the psychological considerations of the present paper.

Returning to the problem of the psychology of war, we may at this point consider an objection that is likely to be brought against the mode of approach here adopted, namely, that of Individual Psychology. Many will take the view that, since war is obviously a social problem, it should be to either Sociology or Social Psychology that we should have recourse in order to obtain a better understanding of the nature of it. This might even more strongly be urged in the case of modern war, which is essentially the affair of whole societies, and in which the social phenomena of imitation, contagion, crowd psychology, and mass suggestion play an important part. Fully to meet this objection would necessitate a detailed discussion, impossible here, of the relation of Social to Individual Psychology in general. There are two schools of thought in the matter, the main point at issue being as follows: On the one hand it is contended that it is possible to pursue the subject of Social Psychology independently of the data afforded by Individual Psychology, on the ground that there are data pertaining to the interaction of social mass units which are provided by the former subject and which are accessible only to those who

1. Several writers, for example, have commented on the interesting circumstance that on the four last occasions the turn of the century has roughly coincided with a general European war of the same nature, consisting, namely, in a coalition against the predominance of the most powerful nation.

make a study of it. The second school maintain the contrary of this, namely, that Social Psychology must throughout be based on Individual Psychology, for three reasons. In the first place, the unconscious emotional influences and prejudices spoken of above affect judgement to a much greater extent in the domain of the mental than in that of the non-mental sciences, so that a student of Social Psychology is at a grave disadvantage unless he has on the basis of Individual Psychology submitted his own mind to a thorough analysis and in this way acquired a knowledge and control of the distorting influences in question. In the second place, the study of motives, emotions, instincts, etc., can for technical reasons be properly carried out only by the methods of Individual Psychology, where the material is susceptible of objective experimental control. Finally, there is good reason to believe that in what may be called the "social situations" that are the subject of social-psychological study no new factor is added that may not be observed apart from such situations. "Social" mental activities are nothing more nor less than the sum of individual mental activities. The reason for this has been pointed out by Wilfred Trotter,[1] who in his essay on the most exquisite of socio-psychological forces—the herd instinct—adduced considerations to shew that man is literally never anything but a social animal, and that all the agents specially insisted on by social psychologists, mob infection, press suggestion, etc., are constantly operative under all circumstances. The reason why some social psychologists have been misled into adopting the opposite conclusion is largely that the manifestations of certain instincts acted on by "social situations" may differ somewhat in their external form from those occurring apart from these situations, the underlying unity of the two sets being thus overlooked.

Something may profitably be said at this point on the mode of operation of these "social situations," for the matter has a direct bearing on the problem of the essential nature of war. It is necessary to recur to a topic mentioned earlier, that of the "repressed" unconscious impulses that are incompatible with civilised standards of thought and behaviour. The normal fate of these impulses is not annihilation, as might be supposed from the fact of their total disappearance from view in the course of education and development. On the contrary, they remain active throughout life, and furnish probably the greater part of all our interest, energies, and strivings. They cannot manifest themselves, however, unless they first go through a process of transformation, to which the name "sublimation" has been attached, whereby the energy investing them becomes diverted along other, associated channels that accord

1. *Sociological Review*, 1908.

better with the demands of social standards. The deflection of an ungratified maternal instinct into philanthropic channels is a familiar instance of this. Mental disorder, including the various forms of "nervousness," results from an inability of this process to work smoothly, and the very great prevalence of this in one shape or another, from slight eccentricities and character anomalies to the gravest kinds of insanity, affords some measure of the imperfection of the sublimating mechanism. Further, there is present in the mind a constant tendency to relapse in the direction of cruder and more primitive manifestations of the repressed impulses, and advantage is taken of every excuse to do so: examples are the relaxation of standards of modesty in clothing at the seaside and on the stage, the conduct responsible for the recent agitation about "war babies," and the temporary paralysis of ethical restraints by alcohol. Now the influence of social situations is very apt to be in just this direction of undoing the effects of sublimation, thus leading to the adoption of a lower or more primitive standard of behaviour.[1] A mild example of this may be seen in the circumstance that most committees will display types of behaviour, involving perhaps injustice, meanness, inconsiderateness, and lack of responsibility, of a kind that would be disavowed by any single member acting independently. The bloodthirsty and often indiscriminate cruelty of mobs is notorious, and in general it may be said that any large body of men can be got to commit acts that would be impossible to the component individuals. But it is important to realise that this massive social contact creates none of these impulses; it only releases them, by affording a certain sanction to them. The impulses themselves are deeply rooted in human nature, and lead to endless other manifestations besides those just indicated. These fall into three main groups: (1) social, those of social value, produced by sublimation; (2) asocial, those of no social value, neurotic and other mental disturbances, due to a partial failure of the sublimating process, *i.e.*, to mental conflict; (3) anti-social, due to paralysis of sublimation, whether this be brought about by massive social contact or in any other of the numerous ways in which this is possible. The manifestations of social situations so largely studied by social psychologists must, therefore, in no sense be regarded as isolated phenomena.

It is from this point of view that we obtain what is perhaps the

1. The reason why the influence of social situations is most often in the direction of lowering the standards of thought and behaviour can only be briefly indicated here. It is because sublimations are mainly individual creations, whereas the unconscious repressed impulses are more uniformly and generally distributed; a relapse therefore takes place in the direction of the greatest common measure of the whole, *i.e.*, in the direction of these impulses.

most profitable perspective of the nature of war. The essence of war surely consists in an abrogation of standards of conduct approved of by the ethical sense of civilised communities. By this is meant that in war an attempt is made to achieve a given purpose by means which are otherwise regarded as reprehensible. The best proof of this statement is to be found in the simple fact that no nation or government dares to assume the responsibility for initiating any war. At the present time, for instance, they are one and all engaged in an eager search for sanctions to justify their action in proceeding to war, and a cynical observer might almost say that the chief conflict in the war is over the question of who began it. On every side it is agreed that to have caused the war is a disgrace, the blame for which must at all costs be imputed to the enemy. To admit responsibility for it is universally regarded as tantamount to a confession of guilty wrong-doing, the thought of which is too painful to tolerate. Every nation whole-heartedly maintains the view that it was forced to go to war, regretfully and entirely against its will, by the wicked machinations of some other nation. Now this is just the attitude which in private life we see adopted towards any anti-social act or any act of which the ethical sense of the community does not approve. The person concerned makes every endeavour to shift his guilt or responsibility on to others or on to circumstances, and seeks to defend his conduct under cover of all imaginable excuses, pretexts, and rationalisations. This need for defence is in itself a proof that the act runs counter to the prevailing ethical sense. Seen from this angle, peace may be compared with the institution of monogamy, which society accepts in theory, but never in practice.

It is plain that the actual deeds of which war consists are so counter to the conscience of mankind that they can never be deliberately performed without some preliminary vindication; otherwise it would be mere murder and destruction of the savagest kind. The general theory of war is, of course, that the deeds comprising it are in themselves wholly repellent and abhorrent, but that they are justified by the necessity or desirability of the purpose to be achieved. As was indicated above, however, an alternative and equally possible view is that the repressed impulses leading to warlike acts accumulate such force from time to time as to incline the scales in favour of a bellicose solution whenever the opportunity offers itself in the form of problems otherwise difficult of settlement. Nietzsche, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra,* contrasts the two attitudes thus: "Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause." The fact that the second view appears repugnant and almost unthinkable is in itself no evidence against its possible truth, for *ex hypothesi* it relates to the unconscious and repressed

part of the mind, the part that is repudiated by our waking consciousness, but which none the less exerts the greatest influence on the latter. It is not without significance that every belligerent tends to impute to his enemy this motive for war; the Germans have a proverb *Der Hass sieht scharf*, which means that hate enables one to uncover the motives of an enemy to which the latter is blind.

Even if we accept the more flattering view of war, to the effect that "the end justifies the means," it is necessary to remember that historically the attitude of mind implied in this has frequently been allowed to serve as a cover for acts in which the means supplied the principal motive—a familiar instance being the passion for cruelty indulged in under the cloak of the Inquisition. It is an empirical rule of wide validity in psychology that the consequences of an act, so far as they could have been predicted, have to be taken into account as a probable motive, and usually the chief one, in performing the act, even when the author of it repudiates this conclusion. Applying this rule to the present question, we are led to ask whether the terrible events of war, the cruelties and so forth, are not connected with the underlying causes of war itself. Therefore, for more reasons than one, it remains a problem for psychological investigation whether the end or the means of war must be regarded as the ultimate cause of it. There is reason to suppose that both are operative, and also that the second set of factors is seriously underestimated, but it would be valuable to know which of the two is the more important. It will thus be necessary to institute studies into two broad groups of motives, on the one hand those alleged by the conscience and on the other the darker ones to be discovered only by a more indirect mode of approach. A few words may be added concerning each of these groups, so as to indicate some of the directions in which further research would seem to be desirable.

Most of the motives belonging to the first group can be summed up under the word patriotism, for it is much to be doubted whether the operations of cosmopolitan financiers have ever directly dictated the outbreak of any war and they have rarely been a factor of any importance at all. Patriotism, or devotion, love and loyalty towards one's country (or smaller unit), involves the willingness to fight for its interests, this taking the various forms of defending its material interests, avenging a slight on its honour, extending its prestige and importance, or resisting encroachments. The ultimate psychological origin of this complex sentiment is to be found mainly in the individual's relation to his parents, as Bacon hinted in his remark that "Love of his country begins in a man's own house."[1] It has three sources—in feelings about the self, the mother, and the

1. *De Aug. Scient.*, Bk. vi, Ch. iii.

father respectively. The last-mentioned is probably the least important of the three, but is more prominent in some cases than in others, leading then to a patriarchal conception in which the head of the state is felt to be the father, and the state itself the father's land. More significant is the relation towards the mother, as is indicated by the fact that a country is as a rule conceived to have the feminine gender (in the expression *la patrie* we see a fusion of both conceptions). Most important of all is the source in self-love and self-interest, where the self becomes more or less identified with one's fellow citizens and the state is a magnified self. Psycho-analysis has shewn that these three feelings are far more complex and deeply rooted than is generally supposed, and that they exert a correspondingly weighty influence in the most manifold relations of life, often in quite unsuspected ways. On the precise fate of these feelings during the stage of early mental development depends the greater part of a man's character, dispositions, including the form of his patriotism, whether aggressive, assertive, vainglorious, or the contrary; it would be tempting to compare the type of patriotism usual in different countries with the various types of family relationship characteristic of each, for instance in Germany, England, and America. Even the finer shades of conduct in diplomatic relations, and the decisions on intricate questions, are to a large extent determined by the precise manner in which the three feeling-complexes just mentioned have been developed and inter-connected; it should not be forgotten that the greater part of them is unconscious, an example being the concealed hostility towards the father and passion for the mother that makes up what has been called the Oedipus complex.

The second group of motives concerns a darker side of human nature. It is necessary to penetrate behind a veil which is well adapted to obscure it. This is the veil of restraint and discipline, the inculcation of obedience, loyalty, and devotion to the military unit and its commander, attitudes of mind which are akin to the first group of motives just discussed; they can hardly be regarded as important causes of war, for the emotions concerned are just as easily indulged in times of peace. Behind the façade, however, are to be discerned evidences of far less respectable motives. War is, of course, the replacement of peaceful methods of dealing with certain other people, through discussion, consideration, and so on, by the method of brute force, and that this reversion to a more primitive level of civilisation is of its very essence is shewn by the nature of the deeds that throughout compose it. Civilised warfare is a contradiction in terms, for under no circumstances is it a civilised act to blow another person's head off or to jab a bayonet into him, nor can we after recent events be any longer subject to the illusion that it is possible to exclude savagery from the warfare

of civilised nations. Four repressed instincts play a cardinal part in all war: the passions for cruelty, destruction, lust, and loot. It is popularly held that the manifestations of these are incidental to war, and not inherent in it; that they are regrettable, though perhaps unavoidable, complications which should be reduced to a minimum. But it is found in practice that where one of these passions is suppressed another flames out the more to take its place; one army may rape where the other loots. The most puritanical army of which we have record, Cromwell's Ironsides, indulged in orgies of sacrilege, pillage, and massacre—under, of course, the usual cover of military necessity, etc. One of these passions, the lust to kill, is so indispensable that without it an army would be paralyzed. The full analysis of these various passions, the sadistic blood-lust, the impulse to pillage and destroy, and so on, is of obvious importance for a proper understanding of their significance in regard to both the causation and conduct of war.

Where, therefore, the romantic idealist sees only the pure flame of patriotism feeding noble impulses to heroism and self-sacrifice, the psychologist detects the operation also of deeper forces dating from a past that is only too imperfectly overcome. Behind the guise of altruism work impulses of a more egoistic order, and who shall say which of the two is the more important, the visible or the invisible? What can definitely be asserted is that there is no hope of attaining to a real understanding of the meaning of war unless both are taken into full account and appraised at their true value. Whoever undertakes a psycho-analysis of men deciding to enlist in war time will be astonished at the complexity and strength of the unavowed motives darkly impelling him and reinforcing his altruism, from the fascinating attraction of horrors to the homosexual desire to be in close relation with masses of men, and one can only urge scepticism and caution in accepting conclusions on these and allied matters until our knowledge of every layer of the human mind is more complete than it is at present.

It may also be not out of place to sound a warning for those who accept the view that war is a reversion to a more savage state of conduct, but who draw the inference that the way to avoid it is through a still greater repression of the more primitive instincts that we inherit from the past. Doubt is cast on the validity of this apparently plausible conclusion by the following considerations. The investigations of psycho-analysis[1] have shewn that the influence on conscious life of these impulses that are in a repressed state in the unconscious mind is of an altogether unsuspected importance, and, what is more, that they are indestructible.

1. Those wishing to inform themselves further on this subject may be referred to the writer's *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1913.

Through the process of sublimation, however, they become of the highest value in furnishing much of the energy for our social activities, so that the only hope of diminishing their anti-social effects is to further this process. Now sublimation takes place automatically when repression is carried up to a certain point, the repressed impulses finding another outlet. In this there is necessarily an element of renunciation (of the original aim of the impulse), a circumstance which imposes an inevitable limit on what is possible in this direction. There are not wanting indications suggesting that we are nearly reaching the limit of natural sub-

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ontrol for blind repression. A corollary of this is the
suitable outlets for the impulses in question; the value
ports in this connection is undoubtedly great. One of
made by war is that it offers a permissible outlet for a
impulses that are insufficiently gratified in times of
is often described as the spirit of adventure seeking to
humdrum conventionality. The credit of first clearly
hat war could never be abolished unless suitable outlets
ed for the impulses leading to it belongs to William
his famous essay on "The Moral Equivalents of War"
d that such impulses should be deliberately guided into
hs, an example he gave being Alpine climbing to

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gratify the desire for danger. What was completely lacking in his day, however, was any knowledge of the springs of conduct and of the unconscious sources of warlike impulses. Thanks to Freud's penetrating researches, we are now at least in a position to undertake further investigations in this direction that hold out every promise of success.

The argument of this paper may now be recapitulated. It is the place of Psychology to point out the almost irresistible tendency of the mind to believe that a given aim is possible of achievement when there is present a burningly intense desire to achieve it. Under these circumstances the mind tends greatly to underestimate the difficulties in the way, and also the cost involved. Psychology has further to ascertain what this judgement of values depends on and ultimately signifies. When all the data involved are put before those who have to pass such judgements it is quite possible that reflection may lead to reconsideration of the criteria on which there had been a tendency to make a hurried decision.

Although these considerations are evident enough, psychological knowledge has realised that it is far harder to apply them than is commonly imagined, and proffers the explanation of this, namely, that the main influences distorting judgement are unconscious ones, the persons concerned being therefore unaware of their effect. This matter has a direct bearing on judgements relating to the causation and preventibility of war. It is at present quite an open question whether it is possible for mankind to abstain from war, whether the desire to abstain at all costs does not fundamentally signify something more deleterious to human development than the contrary attitude, and whether the psychological benefits that regularly recurring warfare brings to a nation are not greater than the total amount of harm done, terrific as this may be.

Some clues were then indicated as to the direction in which psychological research may profitably be further developed with a view to determining the ultimate meaning of war in general. This has to reach beyond the ostensible motives given by the belligerent, and to enquire also into the nature and origin of the various warlike impulses the presence of which is indispensable for a bellicose solution of a problem ever to be regarded as tolerable. It is even possible that the strength of these impulses, for the most part concealed from view, is greater than that of the conscious motives; in any case they are certainly of importance in rendering the latter more acceptable and plausible. Something has been said also about the source of the warlike impulses, and about the possibility of finding other than warlike outlets for their activity.

It is only when we have a fuller understanding of the motives and impulses concerned in war based on a detailed and exact knowledge of Individual Psychology that we can begin to form a

just appreciation of the merits and demerits of war and of its general biological and social significance. War furnishes perhaps the most potent stimulus to human activity in all its aspects, good and bad, that has yet been discovered. It is a miniature of life in general at its sharpest pitch of intensity. It reveals all the latent potentialities of man, and carries humanity to the uttermost confines of the attainable, to the loftiest heights as well as to the lowest depths. It brings man a little closer to the realities of existence, destroying shams and remoulding values. It forces him to discover what are the things that really matter in the end, what are the things for which he is willing to risk life itself. It can make life as a whole greater, richer, fuller, stronger, and sometimes nobler. It braces a nation, as an individual, to put forth its utmost effort, to the strange experience of bringing into action the whole energy of which it is capable.

The results of this tremendous effort are what might have been expected. On the one side are feats of dauntless courage, of fearless heroism, of noble devotion and self-sacrifice, of incredible endurance, of instantaneous and penetrating apprehension, and of astounding intellectual achievement; feats which teach a man that he is greater than he knew. The other side need not be described in these days of horror. To appraise at their just value these two sides of war, to sound the depths as well as explore the heights, what is this other than to know the human mind?

ERNEST JONES.

THE SOLVAY SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE.

I FELT greatly honoured when I received the invitation to write an article about the Solvay Sociological Institute, and yet for a considerable time I was in doubt as to whether I should accept it; for I came over to this country without any books whatsoever, so that I am writing without the aid of documents. But the desire to make British readers more fully acquainted with the institution to which I am personally so much indebted, and at which I received the best part of my scientific training, proved in the end to be stronger than my fear to proceed in an unscientific way. I console myself with the thought that if my description is necessarily incomplete and defective (seeing that I am relying solely upon my memory), I shall be excused on the ground of my good intentions.

The Solvay Sociological Institute is not, as is generally supposed abroad, a kind of sociological faculty; although it is connected with the Brussels University it is essentially a sociological laboratory, devoted to research. The fine building which forms its home stands in one of the public gardens of the capital, the Parc Léopold, on a piece of ground presented by the town council, and quite near to two other annexes of the University, namely, the Institut de Physiologie and the Ecole des Hautes Études Commerciales, both of them founded by the same wealthy philanthropist, M. Ernest Solvay. Its exterior appearance is that of a museum of a graceful architectural form.

I beg the reader to enter in my company. We do not ring the bell, although the entrance door never remains open, for all those who are allowed to frequent the Institute, and who may occasionally introduce a friend, know the secret lock. After having passed through the cloak-room we reach the main hall, which is as high as a church, and is at the same time the library and the main meeting-room. The bookcases are disposed along the walls, and the main space is occupied on the right and on the left by two rows of two-sided mahogany writing desks, on the middle portions of which are placed all the periodical publications which the Institute receives. Each desk has its peculiar kind of reviews: on the first on the left-hand side you find the psychological reviews, while the anthropological magazines are on the desk just opposite to it, and so on. In the middle of the hall are small tables, each one forming the centre of a set of armchairs of the special type which we appropriately call *causeuses*. Your eye is struck by the view of a match-box and an ash-tray? Oh yes, and I point out, as an explanation, that an ash-tray is to be found on every desk, for—suggestive of national customs—smoking is allowed here, except in the basement and the catalogue room, although many women students frequent the Institute.

The man of books, however, soon turns from the sight of the luxurious hall towards the book shelves, and his attention is at once attracted by their curious aspect and arrangement. Each

case bears its number, and each number corresponds to a special subject. There is the case for physiology and psychology, there is the one for archæology and history; farther on we see the cases for law, for anthropology, for political economy, for agrarian economy, for demography, for sociology, for statistics, etc. The books seem all of the same size, for each of them is put into a cartoon box, open from behind, whilst on the front is printed the title, the name of the author, and the date of publication, the last detail enabling you to infer that the books are stored in chronological order. The cartoon boxes offer another interesting peculiarity, for on the right flank each one bears three columns, thus headed: "Name of the borrower ——; Taken away on ——; Put back on the ——." Each borrower has to put down the required information. That this system allows one to see how often a work has been consulted—the statistical uses of which I need not point out here—is not its only advantage. You appreciate only its practical side if you find the box empty; but you see at once in whose temporary possession it is at the time, and as no books ever leave the Institute you are always able to get it with the assistance of the house-porter. I say the house-porter, for the permanent staff is very small indeed: you are in a library—and how fine a library!—without a librarian. You observe also that the front of the boxes is brown here, green there, blue lower down, etc. Indeed, each language has its own colour and each colour its own shelves.

These few explanations are quite sufficient to prepare you for being your own librarian and to go and fetch for yourself the book you want, provided you keep in mind that you must not look for a psychological book in the statistical section. Still, you may be looking for a book published in 1880, which is already an old book in so new a science. You will not find it here, for through want of space all the books previous to a certain year (I think 1886) are kept in the basement rooms, where you will find also the various collections of the reviews, each one in its own box, to which the principles explained above have been applied. If it is only for a hasty consultation that you want the book which I have helped you to get, then you can sit down in one of the easy-chairs or at one of the desks, where you will find all the materials required for taking notes. But if you are going to undertake research you can be installed more comfortably. The main hall is flanked on either side by an aisle, which is divided into small rooms known in the slang of the initiated as "cells," or "working cells." In each of them there is accommodation for two workers (desk, upright bookcase, etc.), and if you apply to M. Waxweiler, the director, for the temporary use of a cell, stating your purpose, the work you are going to undertake, etc., you will easily get the necessary authorisation, provided that some of these are unoccupied, and you can then make yourself at home. Still better: if you have made an interesting discovery or found a new truth, you will be able to enjoy on the spot the highest pleasure which is kept in store for a worker, for you will be invited to communicate it to fellow-students, who will understand and appreciate you, namely, those in one of the study groups of the Institute corresponding to your own special

subject. These study groups—either the sociological, the historical, the anthropological, the colonial, or the psychological, etc.—meet regularly in the lecture-room, which occupies half of the only floor of the left aisle.

Having now obtained a general and more or less complete view of the building (although I neglected to show you the small anthropological museum, a collection of some costly scientific instruments, etc.), let us now see what was the original aim of its creator, and also what use has been made of his really splendid creation.

The munificent founder and actual supporter, M. Ernest Solvay, is widely known also as a sociologist, and his particular view of sociology was expounded in the first volume published by the Institute, with the title, *Note sur des formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique.*[1] In this note the author wished to formulate the fundamental conclusions to which he has been led and to point out the close bonds which, in his opinion, unite sociological with biological phenomena. Both are manifestations of the universal energy; to build up a positive sociology the study of social groupings ought to be connected with the science of energetics, which dominates nowadays all the natural sciences. This theoretical direction which M. Solvay wished to give to the study of sociological problems was the primary cause of the creation of the Institute, which was to carry his view into practice.

It is interesting to note that Emile Waxweiler, the eminent student whom he happened to meet with in his immediate surroundings, and to whom he fortunately entrusted the leadership and further care of his creation, published in the same year his *Esquisse d'une Sociologie,*[2] which was nothing else than an actual concretising of the views of the founder. In this work M. Waxweiler aims first at linking the new science of sociology with the *ensemble* of the other fields of knowledge. For him sociology becomes "the science" of the reactional phenomena, due to the mutual excitations of individuals of the same species without any distinction of sex." And keeping in mind that the milieu is inseparable from the individuum, we may speak of a sociological ecology in the same sense as the naturalists of this country employ the word ecology. After having thus defined his standpoint M. Waxweiler examines how the framework of sociological science could be conceived, and then considers the problems which arise at once in his mind as a consequence of the above conception.

The second part of his book consists of a series of suggestions made with the object of provoking researches, almost exclusively in human sociology, wherein mental actions and reactions connect individuals with one another.

1. Cf. E. Solvay. *Note sur des formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique.* Notes et Mémoires de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, No. 1, 1906. Misch et Thron, Bruxelles.

2. Cf. E. Waxweiler. *Esquisse d'une Sociologie.* No. 2 of the same collection; cf. the former page.

These two treatises are in truth the manifesto, the programme, of the Institute. It is from their standpoint that all the work is carried on, that all the books which have been published in its collections have been written, that all the research work done under its roof is undertaken, that the discussions of the different study groups are conducted, that the review *Archives sociologiques* is written and its book-reviews conceived; it is from this standpoint also that the library is organised and the study groups subdivided. It is perhaps owing to their not having read these leading works that some students have not caught the general idea of the periodical *Archives sociologiques* published under E. Waxweiler's editorship—a fact which they have frankly admitted to me—although they have found the articles themselves interesting and inspired with a thoroughly original spirit.

Let us now consider the beehive in its full activity. Here arises the question: Who frequent the Institute? In the first place there are the students of the University, and not merely those belonging to the faculty of philosophy. One often meets with keen readers among those young men and women, for it is not only owing to the fact that several of their professors belong to the staff of the Institute that they learn the way to it, but perhaps still more as a consequence of the Belgian system of higher education. All our students, or nearly all, are specially trained for research, and they can only get their final diploma by the production of an original work, the conclusions of which they are required to defend in a public discussion. Still, the university youths form perhaps only one-half of the ordinary visitors, for Brussels is an important intellectual centre and the Institute is open, on demand, to all who are interested in any of the special sciences in the sociological field. You will meet there not only with scientists of Brussels but also with men from different Belgian towns who regularly visit Brussels on purpose to take advantage of its treasure of documents, while foreigners, who come and stay there to undertake special researches, are not a rarity. I remind you of the fact that every visitor is allowed to join the special study groups that happen to interest him most.

It may also be worth while to say what becomes of the numerous reviews and new books which are continually entering the Institute. On their reception they are handed to the leaders of the groups, who form in reality the staff, each leader receiving the books and reviews relating to his own subject. Through his care they are distributed among the members of his group for report, and those reports, as well as original contributions, form the programme of the discussions at the group meetings. When a book or an article seems important enough, the reports are developed into a contribution for the *Archives*. Moreover, every book, every article of any importance, is taken note of for the catalogue and for the bibliographical department. The catalogue is as far as possible complete, containing even the titles of works which the library itself does not possess.

In some important cases all the study groups meet together in one big session, on which occasions special invitations are sent to qualified persons who are not ordinary visitors. That was the case

four or five years ago when the rural exodus as a sociological problem was prominent before public opinion in Belgium. On that occasion a deputation of the London Eighty Club, comprisnig several members of the House of Commons, came to lecture about the measures adopted in England for dealing with the problem. The effect of this session in Belgium was particularly gratifying to all those who took part in it.

Immediately after the death of King Leopold II. public opinion demanded a complete change of the colonial system which had prevailed until then in the Belgian Congo. Some weeks before Parliament was to open the discussion our colonial study group organised a colonial session which was attended by all the Belgian colonial students, some of whom were Deputies and Senators, and the subsequent discussions in Parliament proved abundantly that this initiative had produced a deep impression.

Another characteristic feature of the Institute is the annual function known as "La Semaine Sociale." Every year before the end of the summer term all the students of the University especially, and all interested outsiders, are invited to devote a whole week to the study of one peculiar sociological problem. The programme of the last Semaine Sociale was, if I remember rightly, the study of what corresponds to British trade unionism; the year before it was "The Flemish-Walloon Linguistic Frontier." Such "social weeks" comprise introductory lectures by the best qualified men, besides visits on the spot, after which conclusions are drawn.

The enumeration of the immediate usefulness of the Institute is not yet complete. Forty works have up to the present been published by it, all of them having been written practically under its roof. (I do not mean to say that they are the only works written there, for that would give rise to a misconception.) They are classified under three headings: (1) *Notes et Mémoires*, including only original purely sociological studies; (2) *Etudes sociales*, a series devoted to works belonging to the domain of social sciences in general; (3) *Actualités sociales*, for books which have as their chief aim the popularisation of topical questions, with a view to increasing human productivity. It is through this last series, which comprises already a list of twenty works, that the Institute keeps in constant touch with the ordinary reader, and it is owing to its influence that the name of the Institute is popular throughout Belgium, so that its existence as a scientific creation has a meaning even to the man in the street.

I cannot help thinking that this is a fair balance-sheet after a dozen years of existence; and in the present instance I need not insist upon the scientific value of the work that has been produced. But perhaps I may, in conclusion, be allowed to draw the attention of some of the sociological students in this country to two smaller but very useful services of the Institute, namely, the *Intermédiaire sociologique* and the *Service de documentation*. The former is a kind of association of the sociologists of the whole world, the members engaging themselves to afford one another scientific help, to give mutual information about their special subjects, to communicate bibliographical details, etc. The *Service de documentation* provides the associates free of charge with, as far as possible,

complete bibliographical lists about such subjects as are asked for. The list of requests is published every year in the *Archives*, and it tends to prove that the Institute is gradually increasing the scope of its usefulness in the international progress of the sociological sciences.

All the various departments which have been gradually developed in the Institute are under the constant and active supervision of Professor E. Waxweiler, who is chiefly responsible for the creation, and—*cuique suum*—I shall probably offend greatly h modesty by stating that it is due to him, to his organising tale as well as to his vast knowledge, that the Solvay Sociologic Institute has become a scientific establishment of which Belgia students are proud, and which is probably unique in the world.

J. VARENDONCK.

OBITUARY.

EDWARD SPENCER BEESLY.

PROFESSOR BEESLY, who died in his eighty-fifth year on July 7, was one of the original members of the Sociological Society, and although unable by reason of age and absence from London to attend its meetings, he continued to take a keen interest in its work.

Born in the year 1831, he was educated at Wadham College, Oxford, where he had Dr. Richard Congreve as his tutor and Dr. J. H. Bridges and Mr. Frederic Harrison as his fellow-students. Like them, though at a somewhat later date, he became an adherent of the Positive Philosophy and the Religion of Humanity; he translated Comte's *Discourse on the Positive Spirit;* he was responsible for the translation of the third volume of *The Positive Polity;* and he spent a great part of his life in expounding and illustrating Comte's work—especially in its application to history and politics. For thirty-three years he was Professor of History in University College, London, and he gave many courses of historical lectures elsewhere. He was a frequent writer in the *Fortnightly Review,* and was the founder and first editor of the *Positivist Review.* Some of his articles in the former have been republished under the title of *Catiline, Clodius and Tiberius.* He also wrote the volume on Queen Elizabeth in the series of *Twelve English Statesmen,* and the chapter on "England and the Sea" in *International Policy*—a series of essays edited by Dr. Congreve, as well as the biographies of the statesmen of the ancient and modern world in the *New Calendar of Great Men.*

His sociology was essentially based on history, the ordered development of human civilisation. To keen discrimination in judging evidence and a wide knowledge of human nature and the springs of public action, he united a lively and incisive style. He was one of the most accurate and least superficial of historians, and yet no one was more free from a narrow specialism, for to him the history of Western Civilisation was a great whole, interconnected in all its parts, a drama of which each act carried on the central theme, an evolution each stage of which depended on all that had gone before, and led up to all that was to come after. He was fully alive to the human interests of historical narrative, as may be seen for instance in his *Queen Elizabeth;* and to the part played by great men, as shown in his studies of Cæsar and Trajan, of William the Silent and Richelieu; but he considered them rather as instruments of great social forces, accelerating the process, than as powers that could turn aside the course of human development. Nor did he believe that history consisted in a minute investigation or accumulation of small facts:—

> The thoughts and actions of individuals may baffle our scrutiny. But nations and societies, and even parties, act in obedience to simple motives and broad general principles. The footsteps of the solitary traveller may be easily lost. But he who would follow the track of an army has only to use his eyes.

This is taken from his paper on *Catiline*, and perhaps in no part of his work was he more successful than in bringing light and order to the obscure accounts of the Roman Revolution.

If Professor Beesly based his sociology in the main on the historic evolution, his politics were derived from his sociology. He was profoundly impressed with the relativity of all political forms —their utility depending on their consonance with the general civilisation of the time—a truth more generally recognised now than in his youth. Yet he had a profound distrust of the domination of any class or race. He was the great defender of trade unions when they had few friends. He was the untiring opponent of imperial aggression and domination. In common with the other members of the Positivist school, he was accused of exalting the contributions of France to civilisation at the expense of those made by Germany. In this he was obstinately recalcitrant. In 1870 he urged our Government to step in to prevent the dismemberment of France; he failed then, but he lived to see France and England allied to combat that German aggression which he had so long foreseen and feared.

S. H. SWINNY.

REVIEWS.

SOCIAL PHENOMENA IN ENGLISH TOWNS.

LIVELIHOOD AND POVERTY. By A. L. Bowley, D.Sc., and A. R. Burnett-Hunt, B.Sc. With an introduction by R. H. Tawney, B.A. G. Bell and Sons, 1915. 3/6 net.

THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA. By A. L. Bowley, D.Sc. P. S. King, 1915. 3/6 net.

THE publication of *Livelihood and Poverty* marks an important step forward in the evolution of methods of social investigation. To study the economic condition of the working classes on any comprehensive scale has hitherto been supposed to involve, not only the services of a directing brain of a high order and special qualifications, but also the expenditure of a very large amount of time and money. Experience has now pointed the way to a certain simplification of method. The co-ordinating brain, it hardly needs saying, is as necessary as ever for work of this kind, but a method of study has been developed by the authors of the present work which very considerably economises the time and money necessary for investigation. This is achieved by taking random samples in a town or district as subjects of observation instead of visiting every house in a street or every street in a district. The method has been subjected to mathematical tests and found satisfactory; its results also, when comparable with official statistics, such as the Census, are quite sufficiently in harmony therewith to inspire confidence. In this way the material necessary for economic analysis can be collected under skilled direction by a small body of social workers of average intelligence and training, working only for a comparatively short time. The present work therefore, for all its small size and unpretending exterior, is a brilliant example of selection; what was superfluous and over-laborious in these classical models has been dropped, what was valuable has been utilized in new ways, and for the discovery of new knowledge of an important kind.

A special feature of interest is that four towns have been taken for comparison, and we thus get a combined view of poverty under varying industrial conditions. Northampton is a boot and shoe manufacturing centre; Stanley is a district almost entirely dependent on coal mining. Warrington and Reading, on the other hand, are similar in possessing a larger number and variety of industries than the other two towns; they differ in that the one shows large groups respectively of well and ill paid workers, while the other has no considerable group of highly paid workers.

Tables analyzing the composition of the family into earners and non-earners, and also according to age and sex, are given on pp. 29 and 30. It has been sometimes alleged that the employment of women in manufactures tends to drag down the average wage, and that family incomes where women work tend to approximate to the wages of the male head of the family where women do not work. This is hardly borne out by the tables before us. Northampton has the largest percentage of women and girls earning (13.5), and the lowest percentage of poverty (9). On the other hand, Warrington and Reading show but little difference in the percentage

of women and girls earning (8.5 and 9.7), and a considerable difference in the percentage of poverty (15 and 29).

To measure the proportion of poverty in a given district or its relation in several districts some standard must be adopted for purposes of comparison, and the standard here favoured follows Mr. Rowntree's with some slight modification. The "new standard," as it is called in this volume, means a regular income capable of purchasing a bare sufficiency of food and clothing for the members of the family, after paying for rent, fuel, and household sundries. The percentage of families falling below this line is found, as we have seen, to be 9 in Northampton, 15 in Warrington, and 29 in Reading (p. 43). In the case of dependents (young children, invalids, aged, etc.), however, the proportion living in poverty is much higher, *viz.*, 13, 19, and 37 per cent. respectively. (The figures for Stanley are considered too few to be reduced to percentages, so we need not reproduce them.)

The figures in regard to young children and infants are worse still. Of infants under 5, 17 per cent. in Northampton, 22.5 per cent. in Warrington, and 45 per cent. in Reading are living below the poverty line; and of school children who are not earning, 16 per cent. in Northampton, 25 per cent. in Warrington, and 47 per cent. in Reading are so placed (p. 44).

An analysis of the principal immediate causes of poverty (p. 40) shows that in a large majority of cases poverty is due to insufficiency of earnings on a basis of regular employment, and only in a minority to irregular earnings or to the death, incapacity or unemployment of the chief wage-earner. We reproduce these figures in an abridged form. The Rowntree standard is the one used in this case, and Mr. Rowntree's results at York, 1899, are added for comparison:—

Immediate Cause of Poverty.	Percentage of Households below Rowntree Standard.			
	N.	W.	R.	York.
Chief wage earner dead, ill or old	35	7	25	37
out of work or irregularly employed ...	—	6	6	6
Chief wage earner regularly employed:				
at earnings insufficient for 3 children:				
3 children or less	21	22	33	
4 children or more	9	38	15	57
Wage sufficient for 3, but family more than 3	35	27	21	
	100	100	100	100

"It can hardly be too emphatically stated," the authors write, "that of all the causes of primary poverty which have been brought to our notice low wages are by far the most important. We would go further and say that to raise the wages of the worst-paid workers is the most pressing social task with which the country is confronted to-day."

In view of the tremendous ordeal through which the nation is now passing, the problem of poverty and inefficiency is likely to receive little immediate attention, yet perhaps its urgency has never been greater. We all depend now on the nerve, health, and energy, the self-control, vigour, and good habits of the whole people; that is, of all of us. Poverty, sordid, mean and unhealthful poverty such as is here shown to be the lot of so many, is not exactly a school of patriotic virtues. And poverty here appears not as the just reward of laziness or misconduct, or even as a result of accident or unforeseen misfortune which can be remedied or consoled by

personal help and charity. It appears as the inevitable result of defects in our industrial system, not to be avoided by the most regular, plodding, uncomplaining persistence in work. The facts here collected and studied with complete scientific impartiality are likely to induce reflection in the minds of many social workers, and may probably effect some shifting of values in the ethics hitherto largely accepted by the middle and upper classes.

The Measurement of Social Phenomena contains the substance of some public lectures delivered in the spring of 1914, and is mostly taken up with the criticism and appraisement of the statistical material issued by and for government departments, much of which is "merely a by-product of administrative needs," not related to any orderly scientific connected view of the nation's life and activity. The "scepticism of the instrument" is a phrase that will recur involuntarily to most readers on their way through the book; but Dr. Bowley is not altogether a sceptic. "If we can define the task of sociological measurement, determine what are the facts which it is essential to know, and devise a means of ascertaining them, half the task is accomplished. Official information, imperfectly and badly adapted for sociological purposes as it often is, generally suffices to show the magnitude, nature and locality of a problem; common knowledge, obtainable by conversation with those who have lived in close contact with its circumstances, will place it in fair perspective; while a rapid investigation by sample will give an approximation to detailed measurements." To obtain a clear view of a given society, judgment and criticism are of more value in the use of statistics than the laborious accumulation of figures for its own sake; indeed, a hint is given that the latter process has had in recent years an "over-luxuriant growth." Exact measurements are often not possible, but we can arrive at a relative exactitude by the use of a margin of uncertainty.

While less important, or at all events less arresting, than the original work contained in *Livelihood and Poverty*, the companion volume affords a valuable brief survey of statistical material up to date, and its suggestions should be a powerful aid to sanity in the mind of the student. Neither volume, unfortunately, is provided with an index. B. L. HUTCHINS.

RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONGRESS, 1865—1867. By Benj. B. KENDRICK, Ph.D. New York: Columbia University. London: P. S. King and Son.

DURING the eighty years that followed the Declaration of Independence, the Union of the States constituting the great republic seemed to be more and more firmly established. Certainly there was an immense veneration for the Constitution and its founders, a pride in the greatness of the country, an unchallenged belief in its glorious future. But if these were tendencies making for union, on the other hand, the institution of slavery and the economic interests bound up with it were a growing source of disunion. The founders of the Republic who boldly faced so many difficulties, rejecting the drastic medicine of abolition proposed by one of the greatest among them, the Virginian slave-owner Jefferson, left to their posterity the solution of a problem which became more difficult with every generation.

The nice balance by which a slave state and a free state were admitted alternately, as the new territories filled up, was threatened by the geographical formation of the continent which, widening to the North, gave promise that the free states must sooner or later outnumber the slave, at the very moment when throughout these free states the tide of indignation against slavery was beginning to rise. It is not possible here to enter into the attempts to introduce slavery into Missouri and Kansas, to recount the foundation of the Republican Party, or to discuss whether a Sovereign State that had entered into the Union could leave it at its pleasure. It is sufficient to note that the South, after having had at least its full share of power during the nation's history, plunged into secession, as soon as Lincoln was elected President and before any hostile action had been taken against it. Nor is it necessary to enquire whether the existence of slavery was the cause of the conflict. Without slavery there would have been no civil war; and with the victory of the North, whatever may have been the professions made at the beginning of the conflict, slavery was bound to pass away.

But that victory placed a new problem before the victors—the treatment of the seceding states. Were they to be still considered as States in the Union or had they by their rebellion lost that position? Were they to be administered as Territories or as conquered provinces? On what terms were they to be re-admitted to full rights? Under the old arrangement, in calculating the number of representatives to which a State was entitled, five slaves counted as three free persons. Were negroes, now free but not entitled to vote, to be counted on this or on some other basis? Were States which kept large numbers of adult men disfranchised, nevertheless to be allowed to count them, in order to obtain a number of representatives in Congress out of all proportion to the number of their voters? Was the vote of a rebel in the South thus to outweigh the vote of a loyalist in the North? Again, were the few Whites and the many Negroes in the South who had supported the Union to be left at the mercy of the majority of Whites who had inflicted on their country all the horrors of civil war? Were the civil rights, the property, even in extreme cases, the life and liberty of the loyal to be within the power of the disloyal and the defeated? Were the Southern States to be at liberty to repudiate the Union debt and recognise that of the rebels? All these were questions that on the assembling of the thirty-ninth Congress in the year 1865 required a speedy and definite answer.

There were also some minor complications. Andrew Johnson, who had been elected as Vice-President, and had become President on the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, never secured the confidence of Congress or the country. His attempt to set up governments in the secessionist States, without securities for future good behaviour, and his use of the veto, angered the great majority of his own party. The Republicans in the Senate were, however, more moderate than those in the House; and Johnson might have come to terms with the former. To obviate any differences between the party in the two branches of the Legislature, the expedient of a joint Committee of Fifteen was resorted to. The volume under our consideration deals with the constitution and work of this Committee, to which for the time all questions of Reconstruction were referred. The book contains an Introduction, the Minute Book of the Committee, an account of its personnel, and a series of luminous essays on the questions at issue.

The Joint Committee consisted of six members of the Senate and nine of the House. Of these fifteen, three were Democrats, five conservative Republicans, and seven more or less radical Republicans. The radical Republicans, who eventually controlled reconstruction, could therefore have been outvoted, had the Democrats supported the conservative Republicans; but on the Committee and still more in the House, the Democrats adopted the desperate policy of trying to ruin Republican schemes of reconstruction by supporting the extremists, and so gave the latter the victory. If the South had to suffer from governments run by corrupt adventurers supported by an ignorant negro vote, the fault was largely due to the action of their own especial friends and defenders. The chairman of the Committee, Senator Fessenden of Maine, was a statesman of considerable ability and unblemished character. Though conservative in his views on reconstruction, he kept an open mind and on one or two critical occasions voted with the extremists. Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the extremists in the House and on the Committee, is a more interesting and more hated personality. His ability as a speaker and still more as a parliamentary tactician, has been acknowledged or rather proclaimed by his foes. As the chief author of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing, among other things, the civil rights of men of every race, and as the promoter of the measures of reconstruction ultimately adopted, his memory has been vindictively pursued by the friends of the South. Much of this abuse he certainly does not deserve. He was the reverse of a professional politician. He only cared for politics when associated to some cause on which he felt deeply He twice retired into private life—the second time when sixty-one years old. He was no doubt a negrophile, but if an exaggerated belief in the capacity of the people of colour detracts from our estimate of his intellectual power—which has never been questioned—his steady championship of the oppressed, who could make him no direct return, is a testimony to his moral worth. He was that dangerous creature, a clever and unselfish fanatic, a class rich in heroic deeds and always the especial objects of hatred to their victims. But the fanaticism of Stevens was combined not only with intellectual dexterity, but with more common sense than his tribe usually possess. Later writers have ridiculed the gift of a vote to the ignorant negro on the verge of economic ruin. Stevens, however, proposed a great confiscation of rebel lands, whereby the cost of the civil war could be defrayed and the emancipated slaves—each on his own holding—might obtain a secure position. The clemency of the North prevented this; and there is no doubt that that clemency, acting on a people completely defeated, did much to unite in friendship those who were so recently opponents in battle.

But was it necessarily wrong to give the Negro a vote, even if he had no share in the land? With those, if such there be at the present time, who consider the vote a "natural right," the claims of the Negro need not be argued: it follows from the fantastic premises. But those who look upon the vote as either an instrument of government or a means of protection, will have more difficulty in answering the question; for the two considerations are sometimes in opposition. Let us first, to clear up this point, take a case of a claim to vote when the verdict will generally be in the negative. Lads under twenty-one would not on the whole be likely to make as good voters as men—they are not "political animals" even to the same small extent as the latter. But as their economic interests are to some extent antagonistic to those of men, is not the vote necessary for their

protection? In this case certain circumstances mitigate the antagonism. The majority of youths live with their families. It is the interest of their fathers that their sons should not be underpaid; it is the interest of the sons that their fathers' economic position should not be undermined by the competition of boy labour; and both sides are united by the ties of family affection and daily intercourse. Hence it is recognised that there is no such disparity of interests as would justify the introduction of a great body of immature voters. In the case of the Negroes, on the other hand, there are no bonds of interest or affection which would make the white voters safe guardians. Even if it be admitted that negro voters just emancipated would not be likely to aid good government, might not the vote be necessary for their protection? Are Stevens and his friends to be blamed because they allowed the second object to outweigh the first—because, at the risk of enfranchising immature unfit voters, they gave the coloured people a weapon of defence?

S. H. SWINNY.

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM. By Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri. Macmillan. 5/6.

THIS book has considerable value, as a symptom and a stimulus, though we cannot subscribe to the special terms of praise, quoted from another American professor, on the cover. It summarises a good deal of wisdom on various social problems of the day and shows what is the general social philosophy needed to inspire and hold it all together. But it contains no new or very penetrating analysis of any one topic and is disfigured by a large amount of unnecessary commonplace and of balanced statements which leave no definite impression behind. Sociology must necessarily deal with generalisations which have passed current through many minds before they are put in their scientific setting, and this fact often causes a revolt in critical minds which have discussed these questions abundantly before they are presented to them in the guise of a new thought. The disappointment and the revolt are in such cases natural, but in the opinion of this reviewer, do not deprive the restated commonplace of its value. It is to be hoped indeed that the greatest truths will become more and more the greatest commonplaces, but they will need fresh point and new setting to justify their repetition. This maxim of prudence and of art one cannot feel that Professor Ellwood has sufficiently observed, and when he tells us that it "may take the labour and wisdom of many generations to build the ideal society of humanity," or "humanity must, of course, become debarbarised before it becomes truly civilised" or "religion especially stands for the spiritual life of man," we are apt to hurry over the really important truths which give significance to his work

The gist of the book is that western society needs a new spiritual awakening in order to solve the many dangerous social problems which confront it, and Professor Ellwood, who is generous and candid in admitting his obligations, would probably not demur to our describing this spiritual awakening, as he envisages it, as the infusion of Comte's Positivism into an undogmatic Christianity. It is an interesting and possibly a tenable anticipation of the religious future, but like so many other points on which the book touches, it makes one wish for a more searching discussion of the question. However, the standpoint thus given is unmistakeable and on the whole sound. If we put a spiritual solution in the forefront, economic, material and political factors take a subordinate though important place.

"Intellect has been the certain factor in human progress in the past," and "intelligence and altruism must work together to produce the fully socialised character" in the future.

It is thus a higher social intelligence which is to inform and direct the ideals of western peoples in the future, and Professor Ellwood discusses briefly how this will affect "four lines of spiritual possession" which have been allowed to fall into decay, viz. the family, government, religion, and morality. This part of the book, to which we turn with most hope of guidance, is, however, confined to thirty pages, and it must be confessed that the conclusion does not amount to much more than telling us that in each case the service of humanity must dominate sectional and selfish interests. It is profoundly true and supremely important, and we are glad to hear the ring of so honest a voice from the other side of the Atlantic in accord with our own, and speaking evidently for many more in America than would avow themselves Christian Positivists in England. Yet the inquirer who turns to the volume 'as the best existing application of sociological thinking to practical problems' will be inevitably disappointed in not finding any definite guidance in the vexed problems that arise when we begin to apply the new and wider notices of science and humanity to the old 'spiritual possessions' of the family and religion, the state and morality. To name only one great topic under each heading—divorce, church membership, international sanction for international law, the religious and moral education of the young—these are the matters on which the far-thinking men and women of the twentieth century will have to learn how to apply their principles. I do not complain that Professor Ellwood does not enter into these and similar questions in detail, but I do assert, without fear of contradiction, that anyone who does so will pursue his path without any inkling of the direction in which the Professor, or his principles, as here expounded, will lead him. It may be permitted to one who, heartily sympathising with Professor Ellwood's general attitude, leans rather to the Positive than the Christian side of his combination, to suggest that what is needed is more stress on the actual achievement of man's intellect in the past, more confidence in what it may do in the future by boldly facing the difficulties which confront us. Civilisation is not really, as Professor Ellwood asserts, "from its very nature a fragile affair." On the contrary, it is a very solid and deep-rooted thing, the result of a slow and steady, though sometimes interrupted growth. Nor ought we to regard ourselves as 'transmitting unimpaired to the future our spiritual possessions' now threatened with decay, but rather as transmuting and strengthening them by the far greater power of a deeper intelligence more widely diffused. Even the Labour troubles of the recent past and the greatest war of the present need not make us despair or doubtful of the future. But we need to think steadily and clearly and to believe in thinking.

F. S. MARVIN.

MODERN MOVEMENTS IN INDIA.

MODERN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN INDIA. By J. N. Farquhar. Macmillan. 8/6 net.

THE ARYA SAMAJ. By Lajpat Rai. With an introduction by Sidney Webb. Longmans. 5/- net.

MR. FARQUHAR has undertaken a task that has long been awaiting a competent hand. The many social, religious, and educational movements provoked or stimulated by Western influences in India have not hitherto

been surveyed as a whole, and there are very few scholars, either English or Indian, who have the necessary qualifications for the work. Mr. Farquhar, although he starts with a marked missionary bias, may be regarded as one of the few, since he has spent many years in the country, as student and teacher, working under conditions which brought him into direct contact with several of the larger movements and less directly into relations with some others less known. His book furnishes evidence of the number and variety of Indian socio-religious activities, and in this respect it will enlighten many readers who may have considered themselves fairly well acquainted with the main currents of contemporary India.

The basis of the volume is a series of lectures delivered in 1913 at the Hartford Theological Seminary under the Hartford-Lamson foundation. The lectures have been worked over and largely augmented, but they reveal here and there, in numerous repetitions, the conditions of the original preparation. The plan of the survey is clear and good. After a very brief historical sketch of India since 1800, Mr. Farquhar examines the movements "favouring vigorous reform"—that is, the Brahma Samaj, founded in 1828, and its derivatives; then those, of which the Arya Samaj is the most important, which he describes as "reform checked by defence of the old faiths"; next the various forces of the Hindu Revival, which he dates from 1870, the religious nationalism of the past twenty years, and finally the growth of bodies devoted to social reform and social service.

The first section deals with a movement which is, with one possible exception referred to below, the most familiar to European readers. The story of the Brahma Samaj has frequently been told. Mr. Farquhar rightly takes the ideas and aims of its founder, Ram Mohun Roy, as the starting-point of modern influences in India, and he shows how closely they were allied with the policy of the Enlightenment period represented by the governor-generalship of Lord William Bentinck. Mr. Farquhar, perhaps, does not sufficiently emphasize the striking personal qualities either of Ram Mohun Roy or of Keshub Chunder Sen, nor does he endeavour to depict the extraordinary social upheaval which occurred in Bengal during the middle of the nineteenth century, when the new theistic church, with its startling programme of social advance, came into collision with both orthodox Hinduism and Christian missions. Half a century ago the Brahma Samaj was a community of very great promise; and there are few more distressing chapters in the annals of reform than the story of its collapse. For a generation, says Mr. Farquhar, "the Samaj has been dismembered and rendered impotent by divisions and brawls; and there is no sign of betterment"—a conclusion which it would be difficult to contest.

With the exception of the Arya Samaj (with which we will deal later) there appears to be little of serious import to be discovered in the interesting organisations which Mr. Farquhar classifies as reform combined with a retention of specifically Indian ideas. This is a region almost unexplored by European students, who should be grateful for Mr. Farquhar's summary of the history and tenets of the Radha Soami Satsang, the Deva Samaj, and other attempts to adapt the old bottles to the new wine.

It is, however, in the section dealing with the Hindu Revival that the most interesting, and most controversial, part of Mr. Farquhar's material is found. He complains of being hampered by the lack of space. That being so, why devote a hundred pages to the story of Theosophy in India? The temptation, to be sure, is severe. Most critics who set out to follow the stages of the Theosophical Society, and especially the adventures of Madame

Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott, become fascinated by the Madras phenomena and Dr. Hodgson's inquiry and its results: perhaps the most curious chapter in the history of the modern mind in relation to facts and evidence. But after all it has comparatively little to do with Indian religious movements, and since it is widely known through the endless controversies of thirty years, Mr. Farquhar might have cut this chapter very short; but had he done so, he would have made his book considerably less entertaining.

Mr. Farquhar's review of the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement is singularly incomplete. He gives a sympathetic account of the life and influence of Ramakrishna, but of the disciple who carried his message to England and America he has little good to say. He is offended by what he calls his "swagger" and by his glorification of everything Indian, and he implies that Vivekananda's influence is actually greater in America than in India. This is a reading of a remarkable movement which Mr. Farquhar's wide knowledge of the student community in Bengal should have availed to correct. Nor is he, we think, quite satisfactory in his analysis of what he calls religious nationalism. A few accurate and searching sentences suggest the importance of Lord Curzon's viceroyalty in relation to the movement, and Mr. Farquhar expresses scepticism in regard to some of Sir Valentine Chirol's conclusions. He seems, however, to give too much weight to the Chirol view in general, and makes no reference to Mr. Edwyn Bevan's fine and understanding monograph on the subject. Also he adopts the word "anarchism" in the loose sense made current by the Indian Press. Mr. Farquhar's concluding chapter, on the significance of the movements reviewed, is in some ways the most important in the book. They represent, he points out, "the steady advance of the ancient faiths," and yet he contends that the advance is altogether illusory. In every one of the influences, in every programme, he sees the working not merely of Western but of Christian leaven, and he is convinced that all the Asiatic systems are in full decay. This, obviously, is a prophecy which the future alone can confirm or discredit.

Mr. Farquhar is a careful student and a practised writer, but there are chapters here that are not up to his level. He is careless about names. "Lord Bentinck" appears throughout for Lord William Bentinck, and one notes the too common carelessness and variation in the spelling of Indian names—*e.g.*, Dutt in one place is Datta a few pages off. "Sastri" is a very unscholarlike way of referring to Pundit Siva Nath Sastri even in abbreviation. The lists of authorities are both incomplete and undiscriminating. Nevertheless the book is eminently useful, and it has the advantage of being the only one in English on its very interesting theme.

Mr. Lajpat Rai is clearly the man above all others fitted to tell the story of the Arya Samaj and to expound its tenets and aims for Western readers. He has been a leader in the movement for many years, prominent in the manifold social activities of the Samaj, and he was among the creators of the important Anglo-Vedic college at Lahore. He gives an excellent biographical sketch of the founder, Swami Dayanand, and a full account of the remarkable work in education and social service that has been and is carried on by the Samaj. Not the least interesting part of the volume is the chapter devoted to the Gurukula at Hardwar, the great pilgrim centre on the Upper Ganges—the characteristic Arya School which Mr. Sidney Webb in his introduction refers to as "perhaps the most fascinating educational experiment in the whole world." It is, among other things,

an example of the new Indian monasticism. The chapter on the Arya Samaj in Mr. Farquhar's book, written before Mr. Lajpat Rai had entered upon his task, contains the prediction that the Samaj cannot grow because its tenet regarding the infallibility of the Vedas is entirely out of accord with the modern mind. The fact of course is so: but churches no less than other societies have an astonishing power of modifying or transforming the formularies of belief; and neither the census figures nor the facts as to the Samaj's varied activities go any distance towards supporting Mr. Farquhar's prediction of failure. Certainly it would be hard to think of any Indian movement in the social and religious sphere which displays at present so many evidences of vigour.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

A NIGERIAN PEOPLE.

WOMAN'S MYSTERIES OF A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE. By D. Amaury Talbot. Cassell and Co. 10/6 net.

Mrs. AMAURY TALBOT describes in this book the life-history, customs, and beliefs of the Ibibio women of Southern Nigeria. For nearly six years she accompanied her husband, the commissioner of the district, on his journeyings and so had a unique opportunity of studying at first hand the women of a hitherto little known race. The result is the revelation of a wealth of folk-lore, legend, customs, fetish rites and ceremonies which could only have been discovered by a woman "without some man intervening either as inquirer or interpreter," since they are by their nature absolutely closed to men. The legends are often beautiful and are told with great charm; the customs are ethnologically interesting, whilst the fetish rites and ceremonies are barbarous and cruel. The combination of the poetical sense, natural affection, and barbaric customs indicates, as Mrs. Talbot points out, that this people did not always occupy their present low rung on the ladder of culture. The wide variety in the types illustrated in the book supports her theory, for whilst some look like "mere mud-fish" (the description of one traveller), others appear of a distinctly intelligent type and capable of high culture.

The belief that twin children have a demoniacal origin and its cruel consequences, the destruction of the children and the outcasting of the mother, have far-reaching effects, one interesting development being the "twin town" of the outcasts which has produced a community of women who, having turned their disgrace into honour, dwell together in Obio Ibau-Ibau, *i.e.*, the Town of Women, where strangers seek them to learn magic and healing. The Ibibio women appear to be of a higher intellectual type than the men, and at one stage they rose to dominion over the men. The "Egbo," the most powerful secret society, we are told, was formed originally by the women, but the men wrested from them its secrets and drove out the women from participation therein. Of special interest is the chapter on "Woman in War Time," which brings home the close bond binding all women, the most highly civilized and deeply barbaric.

> "When the Efik warriors left the town, the wives who remained behind used to go to their sleeping rooms and there don the garments of their absent lords. . . . Once clad in this strange attire, the women sallied forth to visit the chief compounds of the town, drinking palm wine, laughing and jesting at each. No matter how heavy and anxious might be the hearts beneath this manly guise, they dared not show the least sign of sadness or anxiety, but must appear happy and brave, that by

sympathetic magic the courage of their absent husbands should be upheld." (p. 191.)

To women belong also the secret rites decreed by ancient law for the burial of a warrior.

"When a man in the prime of life is cut off in battle, the body is carried home to the dead man's town by wedded women who are his next of kin. No man may touch the corpse. Weeping and singing sad songs, it is borne by their gentle hands to a place of thick bush called 'owok afai' —the forest of those slain by sudden death. . . . No maiden may be present at these rites; only to wives may such sad mysteries be revealed." (p. 205.)

The book contains many descriptions of these interesting ceremonies which could only be revealed to women, and the reading of it suggests the great possibilities for women who can bring to their task the same sympathy and care as Mrs. Talbot, to reveal the inner mysteries of women of other barbaric and semi-barbaric races. The illustrations are from photographs by Mr. Talbot; they give some idea of the luxuriant vegetation and general beauty of Nigeria—a beauty which explains the poetic feeling of its inhabitants. A map of Nigeria would be a useful addition.

M. Ashworth.

SOME BOOKS ON THE WAR.

La Belgique Neutre et Loyale. Par Emile Waxweiler. Librairie Payot et Cie, 1915. 2 fr. 50.

This volume consists of a lucid explanation of the nature of neutrality, to justify his definition of which M. Waxweiler adduces very numerous facts. He writes with passionate conviction, but this does not at all warp his judgment or detract from the judicial value of the book, which furnishes irrefutable evidence of Germany's guilt and Belgium's innocence. But as the reader is conducted from point to point of the indictment he cannot help accusing the Belgians, and still more the English, of some unintelligence in their dealings with the Germans, and wondering whether failure to understand other people's crimes and evil dispositions is not almost as reprehensible as illiberality and aggression. Belgium, he will remember, paid for more than half of the railway without which the invasion would have been impossible; and not very long ago she allowed the Germans to show a map, at a Brussels exhibition, on which Holland, Belgium and portions of Hungary, France, Italy and Russia were assigned to the Kaiser's empire. But the generosity of her policy and the desolation which it has brought upon her dwarf these mistakes into insignificance; and anyone who reads this book, unless his mind has been poisoned, will more than ever admire and sympathize with the small nation which has suffered the bitterest sorrow endured by any people of the modern world.

The matter is admirably arranged and indexed, and is set forth on broad-margined pages, at any one of which the book will lie open, although it has only a flexible binding of paper. Both the form and the contents recall the scientific and artistic excellence for which the publications issued by M. Waxweiler and his colleagues have become famous; and they suggest that if the transgression of the Germans had consisted only in stopping the work of the Solvay Institute, for a time, it would have been a serious offence against civilization.

REFLECTIONS OF A NON-COMBATANT. By M. D. Petre. Longmans, 2/6 net.

"IN this little work," says Miss Petre, "an attempt has been made to show that mankind is working simultaneously on two planes: the plane of national and international politics, and the plain of human aspiration and endeavour, and that the laws of the one are not the laws of the other." In other words, that war is and must be ruthless destruction: it is not sport, and can never be humanized. "Civilized warfare is, properly and strictly, not warfare at all." Similarly, diplomacy is and must be Machiavellism, and the only successful diplomatist is the man whose aim is that of Bismarck: "My ideal for foreign ministers is that their decisions should be unprejudiced and free from all impressions of aversion or preference for foreign lands or their rulers." The facts of war and diplomacy being so, Miss Petre urges that mankind must decide whether they are to be a lasting factor of international life; and her conclusion may be almost as unwelcome to the orthodox pacifist as to the militarist. "One thing this war should have taught those who were in too great a hurry for the accomplishment of their ideals—and that is a fuller respect for the irresistible forces of life." Miss Petre's reflections are meant to stimulate thinking, and in that they are undoubtedly successful. They are full of vision and fine feeling, expressed with force and beauty.

WHY EUROPE IS AT WAR: the Question Considered from the Points of View of Several Nations. Edited by General F. V. Greene. Putnam. 3/6 net.

IN February last a meeting was held at Buffalo to hear addresses on the issues of the war from speakers representing four of the belligerent nations. These addresses have been revised and enlarged, and edited by General Greene, who contributes a somewhat sentimental introduction and a concluding chapter which is a fair statement of the position of the United States. Mr. F. R. Coudert, who presents the French case, deals at length, as we should expect, with the question of Alsace-Lorraine and with the Triple Entente. Mr. F. W. Whitridge, who published some months ago a book on the side of the Allies, speaks for England, but deals more with German ambitions and methods than with British policy. Dr. T. Iyenaga, in explaining the place of Japan in the war, supplies a useful summary of the relations between the European Powers and the Far East since the Japan-China war. This chapter and the one by Dr. Edmund von Mach on the German case will be, for readers on this side, the freshest in the volume. Dr. von Mach furnishes an instructive example of the German temper and controversial method. Revising his Buffalo speech, apparently at the end of March, he finds it possible to make the assertion that the Commission appointed by the British Government (presumably the Bryce Commission) had "found it impossible to substantiate one single charge of atrocity against the Germans"! Dr. von Mach's contribution to the discussion will help to make the English reader understand the fate of the German propaganda in the United States.

THE UNMAKING OF EUROPE. By Philip W. Wilson. Nisbet and Co. 3/6 net.

IT is not quite clear why Mr. Wilson should say that he approaches the events of the war "from what is, perhaps, an unusual angle": for, in point of fact, his book is a rapid journalistic review, which makes no claim to be critical, of the more conspicuous aspects of the moving scene down to

the end of 1914. It is effectively written, and the facts have been selected and grouped with more care than is displayed in many books on the war. We notice, however, here and there statements which went round the world last autumn but have since been corrected. It is an instructive exercise to compare point by point Mr. Wilson's summary of the diplomatic correspondence with that given from the opposite standpoint by Dr. von Mach in the volume dealt with above.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1914 IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM. By G. H. Perris. Hodder and Stoughton, 10/6 net.

MR. PERRIS was in France as special correspondent during the opening months of the war. From Paris in August and September he supplied to a London newspaper some of the most vivid and accurate accounts of the invasion and its reaction upon Paris, and he was exceptionally well placed for recording the events of the battle of the Marne and the retreat of the German armies. His book is a careful and lucid summary of the campaign to the end of the year. As an exposition of the strategy and movements it is, necessarily, tentative, as all histories of the war written at this stage must be; but it has permanent value as the record of a conscientious observer and a painstaking student of war. The introduction, resuming the diplomatic relations, might have been omitted, since it has been done elsewhere by hundreds of pens. In the concluding chapter, dealing with war as it is, Mr. Perris shows in how striking a fashion the late M. de Bloch anticipated some of the most important experiences and results of the European War.

EVOLUTION AND THE WAR. By P. Chalmers Mitchell. John Murray, 2/6 net.

THE thesis of war as a biological necessity, combined with the conception of the chosen race as expounded by the exponents of Teutonism, is examined by Dr. Chalmers Mitchell in one of the most suggestive little books provoked by the war. The reader who wishes to know how the philosophic biologist meets the militarist perversion of the Darwinian hypothesis will find here exactly the thing of which he is in search, together with a telling collection of scientific illustrations. The introductory chapter is an interesting piece of autobiography. It reveals the fact that Dr. Chalmers Mitchell was the author of a *Saturday Review* article (1896) on a biological view of foreign policy which has acquired some importance from the use made of it in recent Anglo-German controversy. It is a very emphatic statement of the argument which the book itself is written to demolish.

THE HEALING OF NATIONS. By Edward Carpenter. Allen and Unwin, 2/- net.

MR. CARPENTER'S aim is to discover the hidden sources of the strife of nations. His book is made up of reprinted articles and reflections jotted down at intervals since the outbreak of war. There is, as his readers know, a complete consistency in Mr. Carpenter's criticism of modern industrial society, and he does not find anything in the present conflict to drive him from his central position—the conviction that peace and stability are incompatible with what he regards as the profound disorder of the existing social system. "To live straightforwardly by your own labour is to be at peace with the world. To live on the labour of others is not only to render your life false at home, but it is to encroach on those around you, to invite resistance and hostility." In a short appendix Mr. Carpenter has brought together a number of extracts from manifestoes, speeches, and the letters of public men which illustrate current views of the struggle.

NATIONALITY AND THE WAR. By Arnold J. Toynbee. J. M. Dent and Sons. 7/6 net.

WHILE innumerable writers on the side of the Allies are content to talk vaguely about the necessity of a resettlement of Europe upon the lines of national tradition and consciousness, Mr. Arnold Toynbee has grappled with the problem in the mass and in detail. His book, one of the most valuable contributions to the study of international relations published during recent years, deserves a full review instead of the meagre notice which we are obliged to give it here. It has already, however, been welcomed in every part of the world, and serious students do not need to have their attention drawn to it.

GERMAN CULTURE: PAST AND PRESENT. By E. Belfort Bax. Allen and Unwin. 4/6 net.

IT is not often that we have to notice a book with a title so curiously and needlessly misleading as the one Mr. Bax (or his publisher) has chosen in this instance. A few pages only, at the end, are devoted to contemporary Germany, and the last chapter, headed "Modern German Culture," is prefaced by a repetition of the now familiar warning that "culture" in English means intellectual attainments while *kultur* is simply equivalent to our word "civilisation." As, therefore, the book is professedly concerned with German culture, the reader may have a sense of grievance when he finds that he has got hold of a short account of the social evolution of Germany since the fifteenth century. But he will acknowledge, none the less, that here is an admirable theme for a popular monograph. Mr. Bax has a wide knowledge of Germany during the mediæval and Reformation periods, and he had already dealt with several aspects of German social history in his books on *German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages*, *The Peasants' War*, and *The Anabaptists*, all of which are serious studies and have furnished part of the material for the volume now before us. Mr. Bax, seizing the present opportunity, passes in swift review the social aspects of the Reformation, German town and country life during the great transition, the religious wars and their results. Having done this he has only the scantiest space for the modern age, and what he has to say of the present is certainly not good enough for a man of the author's standing. Notwithstanding the failure of the Social Democratic Party "to stem the rising tide of militarism and jingoism in the German people," Mr. Bax holds to the belief that before many months are over the scales will fall from the eyes of the masses and "a revolutionary movement in Germany will be one of the signs that will herald the dawn of a better day for Germany and for Europe."

TOWARDS RACIAL HEALTH. By Norah H. March, B.Sc. Routledge and Co. 3/6 net.

WE do not hesitate to say that Miss March's book, which is commended by Professor J. Arthur Thomson as a wise and sympathetic study, is the best manual of sex hygiene for parents, teachers and social workers that has so far come into our hands. Miss March writes from practical experience of teaching, and in working out her scheme she considers the sex impulse in relation to the life history of individual animals and to the kingdom of sentient beings, giving the theme an admirable largeness and sanity of view. The care of the child, the mental development of the adolescent, the question of supervision, the right use of nature lessons for instruction in

the facts of life and transmission—these and kindred matters are discussed in a manner that will be found exceedingly helpful. The illustrations and practical suggestions are thoroughly good; but in preparing a second edition, which will certainly be called for, Miss March should avoid such a word as "youthhood" and cut out the repetitions (brevity in a book of this sort is a primary merit). She might also do worse than sacrifice certain irrelevant quotations, poetical and other. The teacher who is provided with this book and the volume by Geddes and Thomson in the Home University Library has all that is needed.

ECONOMIC LIBERALISM. By Hermann Levy. Macmillan, 4/6 net.

IN its original form this study is now twelve years old, and was, one may guess, a very early production of Professor Levy's pen. It has an immature air. There is evidence of reading, but the wood is rather lost for the trees. Professor Levy tries to discover the tap-roots of economic Liberalism—that is, of *laissez faire*—in the Puritan revolution. This linking up of economic thought with religious and philosophic ideas is, of course, no new line of inquiry, though little cultivated in England. This essay of Professor Levy's is not a particularly good specimen of its kind. The conclusions come out so blurred as to leave no clear impression on the mind. The closing chapter, in which the economic controversies of the last eight years loom large, makes us realise what a sundering thing the war is. Political battles, the smoke of which has hardly drifted away, seem to belong to another age. We shall resume something like them no doubt when Europe gets peace again, but it will be in another England.

THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE, 1400–1710. By Albert Payson Usher, Ph. D. (Harvard Economic Series.) Harvard University Press, 1913. 2 dollars.

THIS is an important contribution to the elucidation of the industrial and commercial history of France, the final fruit of which may be, in the hands of some future historian, the presentation of an adequate view of the social and economic condition of monarchical France up to the time of the Revolution, and hence the possibility of a clear understanding of that great cataclysm. Colbert stands out as the most notable figure in Dr. Usher's investigations, and as Colbert was the intellectual father of List, and List of our own Tariff Reformers, all that throws additional light on Colbert and Colbertism has a special interest to English students.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

FRENCH.

Considering that in France the moratorium is still in force, the journalistic and philosophic enterprise of the intellectuals there is remarkable. Of this the REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE is a striking example. The committee are now making arrangements for the publication, during the present summer, of Nos. 5 and 6 which were missed out last year, and for the issue, in November, of an extra number which will be given to those readers who renew their subscriptions for 1916. The Bulletin of the French Society of Philosophy will also re-appear within the next month or two. Some of the articles in the Review will deal with the war, but others will be purely philosophic as usual.

The REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE furnishes further evidence of the vitality of sociological and philosophic interests in France. The April number records that M. René Worms's January-to-March lectures on *The Synthesis of Social Facts* were as well attended as those on *The Analysis of Social Facts* which he delivered before the war broke out; and the March number contains a list of lectures given at the Free College of Social Science in Paris that is excellent though brief. The Sociological Society of Paris has been discussing *The Rights of Small Nations*. One of the debates, reported in the March issue, reveals the fact that the Germans have been hypnotised by the word "empire." The debaters demonstrated that this enshrined an ancient Roman idea to which, in spite of the existence of the British "Empire," no realities belonging to modern days correspond. M. Th. Joran pointed out that Cæsar's expeditions were not hatred campaigns, and that he did not attempt to interfere with "the home life, the customs, the soul" of the tribes he vanquished; and M. Grimanelli that in the days of the Roman conquests there were no nations at all, but only huge military monarchies, Oriental theocracies, or free cities with their colonies. He defined a present-day nation as "a collective being sociologically homogeneous, a moral personality every part of which has been intimately associated with every other part, in a well-defined territory, for generations and centuries, during which it has acquired a strong sense of historic solidarity and of a distinctive destiny fulfilling itself uninterruptedly." The debate as a whole very clearly brings out the truth that German imperialism is unsuccessful because it is old-fashioned, so old-fashioned as to be incongruous in a world that is governed by public opinion. In the discussion that is recorded in the April issue M. J. Gabrys and M. Paul Vibert dealt with *The Polish Question*. They deplored the idea that the composite kingdom of 1772 should be re-constituted. The former pleaded that the government of the Poles, who were Slavs, should be separated from that of the Lithuanians, who were a Balkan people; and that the mouth of the Niemen should be assigned to the latter, and the mouth of the Vistula to the former. This report is preceded by a fine paper on *The Future of Small States*, in which Professor Gaston Richard discusses Ratzel's notion that only as long as they are constantly increasing their territory can a people be resourceful and energetic. To this he opposes Comte's idea, of which the localism or regionalism advocated by Dr. Baty and Dr. Hans Torbel seems to be the up-to-date version, that no one could entertain a deep affection for any country larger than Holland, or, indeed,

than a single city with its suburbs. He unifies these two conceptions by showing that it is not the mere size of a country which constitutes its importance and determines the loyalty of the inhabitants to the government. "The grand state is that the people of which have, century by century, achieved great things and set fine examples to the world, and have distinguished themselves in the work of liberating mankind from slavery to blind and unconscious forces." Imperialism, he holds, tends to disintegrate society; but nationalism regenerates it by dividing it into natural groups the well-being of every one of which is compatible with that of every other group.

La Science Sociale for May and June contains a few notes from a lecture on *Les conditions d'une reprise industrielle* which M. Paul de Rousiers delivered in January before the Society for the Encouragement of National Industry; also an article entitled *En quoi le citoyen allemand est responsable de la guerre*, wherein M. P. Descamps gives an account of the insidious way in which Prussianism has been quelling Liberalism in Germany since the battle of Sadowa. He thinks that the process has completely robbed the people of initiative, insomuch that if they are ever to assert themselves and win political freedom they will have to work out their salvation under the guidance of Jews, "who tend to be as cosmopolitan and anarchic as the Prussian aristocracy is chauvinistic and formal." Under Jewish leaders, M. Descamps surmises, Germany would be less orderly and more exposed to aggression: but their influence would be integrative in those parts of the country in which they are forming large, wealthy, and stable communities; and on the whole it would be bracing and salutary. M. de Rousiers had a good deal to say about the superior intelligence and inferior morality of the Germans in business. Their enterprise in developing and regularising their steamship services and thus opening up markets for their colonial produce had been admirable; but their expedients for ousting rivals had been despicable. If foreigners despatched goods by their ships they would lure the buyer into their own custom by offering him better articles at a lower price, with longer credit; and they persecuted emigrants from Eastern Europe who booked passages to America by English or French or Dutch vessels. French traders could only beat such competitors in the future by co-operation between employers and labourers and by the organisation of production and distribution on a large scale.

To the main contents of the May-June volume the war lends a melancholy interest, for it is a study of rural industry in the central parts of the Lorraine plateau, and it is the work of M. Louis Adelphe, who was killed at Frescati. Fearing, when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, that he would have to serve in the army, he consigned his manuscript to the publications committee of the Society of Social Science, saying that he hoped he might have an opportunity of revising it later on; and the editor has made selections from it, but has given these to his readers just as they were written.

The March-April number consists mainly of an account of the prosperous population of the industrial districts between the Belgian frontier and the Weser. The author, M. Descamps, seeks to bring the virtues of the German workmen into prominence and does not dwell on their faults. He gives illustrations to show that in spite of the centralising policy of the government local experiments in administration are made oftener in Germany than in France, though not so often as in England; and that the citizens are zealous both in co-operation and in taking the initiative. He admits,

however, that their devotion is rather mechanical, and confesses that as far as poor-law work is concerned he prefers the methods of "The Charity Committee of London" to the Elberfeld system, although the latter certainly defines to perfection the duties of the community to the destitute.

Also received: BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE (October, 1914).

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

There is a marked improvement in the tone of the current periodicals and a general tendency towards a calmer and more careful criticism of current events. One of the best instances of the sounder type of thought is Professor J. Arthur Thomson's Galton Lecture reprinted in the April number of the EUGENICS REVIEW; his clear and well-balanced paper shows the kind of scientist who preserves a calm outlook both in peace and war and adds value and continuity to our national life.

When we turn, however, from the scientific to the more political reviews, we still find a considerable amount of looseness of thought and an apparent inability to penetrate beneath merely surface values. In the opening article of the ROUND TABLE for June the ultimate psychological difficulties of the war are obliterated by more or less misleading generalities representing only one point of view and only one type of mind. It is characteristic of this method of thought that the names of countries are often used where a reference to their inhabitants would be more significant, that generalities as to the tasks of our dominions are discussed without regard to the problems of each separate dominion, and that a journal which professes to deal with the politics of the British Empire devotes no regular section to India. In the first article, on "The Burden of Victory," the question of Britain's contribution to the struggle is discussed and the expedient of the National Register, since adopted by the Government, is recommended. "Finance in War" is an informing article containing a clear exposition of the sources from which wars are paid for and the financial methods which may be used for raising the money. The author, however, has nothing to recommend in the way of practical measures beyond "the most rigid economy throughout the whole community." The possibility of immensely and immediately increasing the home supplies of the necessaries of life is not referred to. Under the heading of "The War and Industrial Organisation" we are given a very useful survey of the Government policy with regard to Labour since the outbreak of war. Other papers on "The Foundations of Peace" and on European diplomacy since Bismarck go to make up a number which, if less valuable than some of its predecessors on the score of philosophical suggestion, is serviceable as a record of current events and problems.

Among many excellent articles in the American sociological publications some of the most interesting appear in the March supplement of the ECONOMIC REVIEW, and deal with speculation on the stock exchanges: there are few institutions about which there is so much prejudice and so little general knowledge, and it is refreshing to find so fair and lucid a discussion of the financial centre of collective existence. The more philosophic journals scarcely maintain their usual standard, but there are two articles in the OPEN COURT for April which are worth careful attention. One is an article by Mr. Westermayr on "The Psychology of Fear" in relation to human conduct, and the other contains extracts from an article by Professor Ostwald in the official German monistic publication *Das*

Monistische Jahrhundert. The first will further the reconstruction of our moral values of Bravery and Fear, a task daily becoming more necessary, while the second will teach us not to generalize too hastily on the narrow and ultra-national nature of modern German philosophy. The Editor's remarks on "My Opponents" in the May number of the same periodical are not as profound or thoughtful as some of his other writings. It is curious that philosophers, so careful in their own particular sphere of study, often enter the field of national psychology or international politics in quite another spirit; content with the most ill-considered and doubtful knowledge, they utter statements and prophecies on subjects which even those with the most experience and fullest information treat with diffidence.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1914.

THE past year has been, of necessity, the most difficult period in the Society's history. In normal times the Council is enabled as a rule to make partial arrangements for the work of the autumn session before separating for the summer holidays. In 1914 all possible efforts of this kind were rendered impossible by the European crisis of July and the outbreak of war. In the then state of the public mind it was impossible to say whether meetings could be held, or whether it would prove advisable for the Society to suspend operations. The alternatives were discussed by the Council, and it was decided that the better plan was to arrange for a somewhat smaller number of meetings than usual, the subjects of papers to be as far as practicable related to the social and international problems brought into prominence by the war. Such problems were very numerous, and any endeavour to organise discussion upon even a few of the more important of them would have involved resources far beyond those at the command of the Sociological Society. A further obstacle was the difficulty of obtaining papers from people of authoritative standing during the first stages of the war when work in all departments of professional life was gravely interfered with by the course of public events.

The programme during the first part of the year comprised the following papers:—

Jan. 12.—Professor Geddes on I. "A Notation of Life (Social and Organic)," and II. "An Interpretation of Parnassus."

Feb. 10.—Dr. William Brown on "Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Personality."

Feb. 24.—Dr. C. W. Saleeby on "The First Decade of Modern Eugenics, 1904—1914."

Mar. 10.—Mr. F. R. Cana on "The Future of the Kaffir."

Mar. 31.—Annual Meeting; followed by Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe on "Changing America."

May 5.—Mr. E. A. Filene on "Coming Social and Business Changes."

May 19.—Mr. G. Spiller on "Darwinism and Sociology."

The following papers were read during the last three months of the year:—

Nov. 10.—Professor C. A. Ellwood on "The Social Problem and the Present War." Lord Bryce in the chair.

Nov. 25.—Mr. J. A. Hobson on "War in its Relation to Wage Earners." Professor Hobhouse in the chair.

In addition, mainly through the efforts of Mr. Branford, two special conferences were held: one on "Co-operative Credit in Relation to Problems of the War" (The Mobilisation of National Credit), the other on "City and Rural Surveys," the original suggestion of the latter conference coming from the paper contributed by Professor Geddes and printed in the *Sociological Review* of January, 1915.

STUDY GROUPS.

The most noteworthy feature of the year under review was the development of the Study Groups. The success attending the work of the Social Psychology Group, formed three years ago, has been most gratifying; and as a consequence the Council sanctioned the establishment of other groups framed on a similar plan—each group to be small enough to secure effective discussion and large enough to bring variety of opinions into play. The European situation inevitably overshadows all other subjects of discussion, and towards the end of the year a group for the study of International Relations and Organisation for Permanent Peace was formed with Mr. J. A. Hobson as chairman and Mrs. Mabel Palmer as hon. secretary and convener. More lately a Law Group has been started under the chairmanship of Dr. W. R. Bisschop, with Miss Chrystal Macmillan as vice-chairman. The groups meet once or twice a month in the rooms of the Sociological Society. Steps have been taken since the close of the year to start several other groups, the record of which will properly come into next year's report.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

A question of some difficulty presented itself in October in connection with the *Sociological Review*. It was clear that the Society would be compelled to practise the strictest economy during and after the period of the war, and it was accordingly decided to reduce the size of the *Review* from 100 to 70—80 pages. By this means a small saving is effected, but there remains the difficulty of meeting that part of the expenditure which is not covered by the Guarantee Fund. The Fund was, through the generosity of the Hon. Treasurer and a small number of members, renewed in 1912 for three years. That term will end with the issue of the October number of the *Review* this year, and it will then be necessary for the Council to reconsider the whole situation, in view, more particularly, of the increased difficulty, owing to war conditions, of maintaining a journal upon which the yearly loss is unavoidably heavy.

MEMBERSHIP AND INCOME.

In existing circumstances and until peace is restored the Society cannot hope for any considerable increase of membership. The Council would indeed regard the situation as reasonably satisfactory if, so long as the war lasts, the membership were to remain at the level of 1913-14 and the expenditure, apart from the *Review*, be kept within the limit of the modest income at present obtained through the members' subscriptions. In 1914 this result was not practicable. The balance sheet shows that upon the year's working there is a deficit of £79 9s. 1d., including the deficits of past years. On the *Review* account the deficit for the year is £298 5s. 4d. This includes a deficit from past years of £230 14s. 8d. The total indebtedness of the Society and the *Review* is thus £377 14s. 5d.

THE
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
VOL. VIII. No. 4. OCTOBER, 1915—JANUARY, 1916.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

During the autumn months a Civic Survey of Westminster and of Chelsea was carried on by a group of architects and artists under the auspices of the Cities Committee of the Sociological Society and the Civics Laboratory of Crosby Hall. The resulting drawings and diagrams were exhibited at the Rooms of the Society in December. Those responsible for the Survey hope to commence its publication in book form at no distant date. The first instalment of the Westminster Survey will appear under the title "Westminster, historic, contemporary and incipient—an Interpretative Survey and Outline of Policy." For this a member of the Committee has written the letterpress. The greater part of his introductory chapter on method, and the whole of that on the mediæval city, appear in this number of the REVIEW. The Cities Committee, it should be explained, was formed in 1908 to promote civic sociology. Its work is partly outside the scope of the Sociological Society, which therefore, it will be clear, takes no responsibility for the facts and views expressed in the Survey.

The immediate occasion for the Westminster and Chelsea Survey was provided by the war. To meet the dislocation of the architectural profession caused by the general stoppage of building, there was organised, mainly through the efforts of the Royal Institute of British Architects, a series of civic surveys at various places throughout the country. The Cities Committee of the Sociological Society may fairly claim some share in this initiative, if not directly yet indirectly, for they have taken no inconsiderable part in the long-continued exposition and propagandism to substantiate the idea of the civic survey, to clarify its purpose and to work out its method. In all these respects much remains to be done. And it was in part with a view towards supplementing the efforts of the R.I.B.A. that the Cities Committee commenced the Westminster and Chelsea survey last autumn. Only in the smallest way was it possible to organise the survey as a war relief measure. But a more ambitious hope was entertained of influencing in a sociological direction the method and the purpose of the numerous surveys now being carried on under the direction of the R.I.B.A. But the appeal is not only to architects and to town-planners. It is even more to educationists and citizens in general. As "Nature Study" has now happily established itself in the schools as the right method—at once visual, first-hand, open-air—of approaching the several natural sciences, so the civic survey is advocated as the

similar concrete and complementary way of beginning the study of the several social sciences, including amongst these both history and human geography.

A further claim is made by the advocates of the civic survey and its counterpart the rural survey, which together combine into the Regional Survey. Starting out in the detached and dispassionate spirit of the naturalist to observe things as they are, the regional surveyor passes on to the study of how they have become as they are; and as the final reward of his research he begins to see something of the whither they are tending. From the observation of actual tendencies, the student is led on, by natural and even inevitable sequence, to a valuation of such tendencies. Ethical considerations thus emerge, and a bridge is thereby built for the passage from theory to practice, from science to art. Hence it is claimed that the regional survey, by its interpretations of historical values, constitutes the natural basis, grounded in the essential significance of things, on which to rear a framework of practical policy. Or, as the writer of the article in this number of the REVIEW puts it, "an interpretative survey has its final purpose and justification in the outline of policy which it yields and which is really its extension into the world of practice."

The opening paper—Mr. Zimmern's "Nationality and Government"—raises issues of the first importance. What relation does the concept of the "State" hold to that of the "Nation"? That is a question underlying alike the tasks of European reconstruction and the problems of clear political thinking which should prepare for the work of practical statesmanship. Mr. Zimmern's own answer to the question he raises turns on the contrast between the objective and the subjective aspects of public life. On the one side are the material forces of government—administrative officialdom, law courts, police and military and naval forces, etc. On the other are the immaterial influences that mould public sentiment and form public opinion. Mr. Zimmern sees the former set of forces, under certain conditions, concentrating as the "State"; the latter as the "Nation." It is an interesting hypothesis and merits the most thoroughgoing investigation and discussion. A symposium on it is being organised, by which we hope to collect the views of representative thinkers both inside and outside the Society. Their contributions will appear in the next issue of the REVIEW. We should be glad to receive communications on the subject from members.

One of the predictions to which the war has given rise is that the concept of Empire will give place in general European vogue to that of Commonwealth; and in this connection it is significant to note that the most thoughtful and scholarly group of British Imperialists already begin to speak of the British Commonwealth. Another current forecaste is that in the *post-bellum* reconstruction

of the occidental world, its states and nations will begin to mass themselves in three large groups—two nucleating round the present belligerents and a third aggregating as Pan-America. If both these predictions be based on real and dominant tendencies, there should be a movement towards a Rhine-Danube group of Commonwealths, a Pan-American group and a third with less unified geographical basis. All such speculations are desirable in so far as they stimulate first-hand study of realities, especially such as can be tested by recourse to history and geography. Mr. Wickstead's article in the present number suggests some of the broad lines on which such studies might proceed. His idea of an "Atlantic Fellowship" is happily phrased and should provoke discussion. Concurrently there should be studied such incipient actualities as the movement in the United States for closer political relations with Great Britain, which is manifesting itself in various forms, amongst others a call for a *post-bellum* naval entente. That, as other American movements of significant content and larger outlook, may best be followed in the pages of the "New Republic," an organ which in a remarkably short space of time has become for many English readers an indispensable guide to reflective and informed opinion in the United States.

In the programme for the present term there are two general meetings of exceptional interest. Mrs. St. Clair Stobart (Mrs. Greenhalgh) will give an address on "The Meaning of the War from a Woman's Point of View." The fact that Mrs. Stobart went through both the Balkan Wars and also was with the Serbian army throughout its last stand in the present war constitutes but a part of her warrant to interpret war from a woman's point of view. Mrs. Stobart's writings give evidence that she combines in unusual degree mental qualities seldom found together in either sex. To clear thought and large vision she adds sympathetic insight and dramatic power. By good fortune the Society will also have on its platform this term a French thinker and writer who represents one of the less noticed but not least significant movements which have constituted, so to speak, the spiritual preparation for the present intimacy of the Franco-English Alliance. M. Paul Mantoux, some fifteen years ago, published a large work on "The Industrial Revolution," for which the preliminary studies were made mainly in England. By this work M. Mantoux contributed to the growing number of specialised researches on English movements, social, economic and literary, by which French writers have of late given us new clues to the interpretation of our own history and institutions. Recognition of M. Mantoux's labours and services was made two years ago when he was offered and accepted a specially created chair in the University of London. On the outbreak of war he joined the French army at the front. At present he is in London on a special mission. His paper to the Society will address itself to the question of what lesson we may read from the war as to how far the individual is a cause of historical events and how far such events are brought about by impersonal social forces.

Professor Fleure, of Aberystwyth, will read a paper this term on "Berlin and its Region" at a meeting of the Cities Committee, convened to consider a proposal to organise a series of studies on "The War Capitals in Relation to their Regions, considered historically and geographically." It is not proposed that the studies should be in any sense of a general and popular character, but as recondite and technical as the available specialist resources necessitate. But members who are interested in geographical and historical studies are invited to hear Professor Fleure's paper, so far as the limited accommodation at the Society's rooms permits. Those desiring to be present should send a postcard to the Assistant Secretary to ascertain date and hour of the meeting.

Amongst public activities connected with the war, initiated or directed in part by members of the Society, two recent movements of special interest, in a sociological sense, may be noted. The first is an organised endeavour to bring home to the public and maintain in individual consciousness, the moral issues at stake between the two groups of belligerents. Statements of the aims and scope of the "Fight for Right" movement are being issued from its offices (Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place). A fuller and more reasoned exposition—as clear as it is persuasive—appears in the current number of the "Quest" by Sir Francis Younghusband, the founder of the movement. Another interesting adventure of moral purpose and sociological import is a scheme of ten lectures on "Ideals in Social Reconstruction" initiated and organised by a lady member of the Society. The lectures will take place in the Queen's (Small) Hall, Langham Place, on Saturdays at three, beginning February 12th.

THE Editors of the REVIEW have to apologise to members for delay in its issue and also for curtailment of its size. The REVIEW has never been self-supporting, and to aid the Society in its publication a guarantee fund was created, which terminated unfortunately in this very year of national stress and strain. The Council of the Society has therefore hesitated to ask the guarantors to renew their support and is endeavouring for the time being to continue the REVIEW with such means as are at its disposal. But in this interval of impoverishment it becomes necessary to institute economies. The first is to reduce the number of pages in the REVIEW, and another is to make fewer than the customary four issues per annum. How much curtailment in both respects may be necessary in the course of the year cannot at the moment be determined. But the Council will make every endeavour to diminish the publication as little as possible.

NATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT.[1]

Introductory Note.

The following paper was originally written to be read aloud, without thought of publication. In committing it to the printer it should be stated, to guard against any possible misunderstanding, that it is, purely and simply, a critical examination of ideas, not a condemnation of projects. Criticism of 'the principle of Nationality' does not imply any want of sympathy with those who proclaim it as their watchword: nor does criticism of the 'international' solutions proposed in some quarters imply any hostility towards the aims of their framers. The sole object has been to pierce below the surface to the real meaning of the ideas and phrases in question in the belief that, as confused thinking must always lead to mistakes and disillusionment, so right thinking is the necessary prelude to a wise and consistent idealism.

THERE is no more important duty at the present moment for those who can spare the time and the thought from more practical tasks than the close and searching analysis of political ideas. The war is being waged about ideas, and the settlement at its close will be determined by ideas. Yet those ideas, and the words in which they are embodied for current discussion, are often vague, confused and even contradictory: so that different words are used to express the same meaning, and the same word used to express several different meanings. My aim in the present paper is to interpret as clearly and definitely as I can what I conceive to be the meaning and importance of two such ideas, in the name of which thousands have laid down their lives in the last sixteen months—the idea of nationality and the idea of citizenship.

My object is not to persuade or convert, but simply to elucidate and to clarify. To many people my views on the subject, put on half a sheet of notepaper, would seem pure platitude: others may think them utterly paradoxical. I shall be satisfied if I really make them plain, and if I succeed in provoking a discussion which ends in everybody feeling clearer in their own minds as to the views they respectively hold.

Argument on abstract subjects is much more inspiriting and much easier to follow if it is enlivened by criticism. I propose therefore, not baldly and blankly to state my own views first, but

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, November 30, 1915, Professor Graham Wallas in the chair.

to lead up to them by examining certain prevalent phrases or catch-words which have lately passed into common currency among the public, without perhaps receiving their due share of criticism and cross examination.

The first word which I will put in the dock is the word "international." I am constantly meeting people who profess what they call international sympathies, who belong to international clubs or promote international causes or study international relations. Being international myself, in a precise sense of the word, I am anxious to know exactly what they mean. So far as I am able to make out, the word international has about seven different meanings. For the moment I only want to distinguish two of them—or rather, to divide the seven into two groups. Half the people who use the word international are thinking of something which concerns one or more nations: the other half are thinking of something which concerns one or more Sovereign States. When we speak of an English international footballer we mean a man who has represented England against Wales or Scotland or Ireland. We are not concerned with the purely political question whether Scotland, Ireland and Wales are Sovereign States independent of England. Similarly, if we speak of a writer having an international reputation we mean that his books are read by people of many different nations and have possibly been translated into many different languages—into German, Italian, Bohemian, Polish, Finnish, Serbo-Croat, and so on. Similarly, when we speak of an international movement we mean that it has taken root in many different countries—in Germany, Italy, Canada, Finland, Syria, and so on—irrespective of the question whether these countries form part of one or more Sovereign States. But when we talk of "international law" or "an International Concert of the Powers" on the other hand, we are using the word in quite a different sense. We are dealing with quite a different method of classification: we are thinking of the world as consisting, not of nations, but of States. For the international football player Canada, South Africa and Australia would all be separate units, while the various Central American States, if they wanted to produce a team, would probably have to club together to do so. But for the international lawyer Canada, South Africa and Australia are merged in the British Commonwealth, Bohemia merged in Austria-Hungary, Syria in the Ottoman Empire and Finland in the Russian, while Nicaragua, Bolivia, Montenegro and Liberia are classified separately, as Sovereign States, ostensibly on a level with the Great Powers. Just as Rhode Island and Texas are both equally component members of the American Union, so the representatives of Montenegro and Russia, Ecuador and Great Britain would sit side by side in a world congress of Sovereign States, from which the

representatives of great civilized communities like Canada and Australia would be excluded.

This distinction between Nationality and Statehood, thus revealed in the double use of the word "international," is so simple that it seems strange that it should be necessary to call attention to it at all. Looked at in the light of concrete instances it is as clear as daylight. Scotland is a nation and not a State. So is Poland. So is Finland. So is Australia. Austria-Hungary is a State and not a nation. So is the Ottoman Empire. So is the British Commonwealth. So is the United States. It may not be easy to define exactly what a State is. It is certainly not easy to define exactly what a nation is. But at least it ought to be easy to perceive that there is a difference between the two.

Yet how many current catchwords there are which have acquired their vogue simply by slurring that difference over! If matters which affected two or more States were always called "inter-State" instead of "international," and the word "international" confined to its strict sense, some of those who have the word most often on their lips would discover, perhaps with a shock, that much of what they are pleading for is already embodied in contemporary life. We are in fact living in what is, in the strictest sense, an international society. For good or for evil, the modern world is a large-scale world, and, as Mr. Norman Angell truly pointed out, its most characteristic institutions, those connected with finance, industry and commerce, are largely international in character. And not only business, but other departments of life have become international also. Science and art, philanthropy and even sport have followed the financiers. Toynbee Hall, the mother of settlements, has scores of children in the United States. The hats that are worn in Paris one season are worn at Athens and Bucharest the next: and if the climate forbids young Italians and Greeks from indulging in English athletic pursuits, they can at least pay tribute to the internationalism of sport by appearing in English sporting costumes. The ideas which are in vogue in London and Berlin to-day are the talk of New York and Chicago to-morrow, and long after they have been exploded in the Old World continue to form the staple of leader writers in the New. Good books, and even bad books, if sufficiently striking and well advertised, are read and quoted all over the world. Mr. Norman Angell and General Bernhardi have done the Grand Tour together: and each is now engaged in the Herculean task of correcting what have become international interpretations or misinterpretations of their views. The modern world is in fact international to the core. Its internationalism lies in the nature of things. It is neither to its credit nor to its discredit. Internationalism is neither good nor bad in the abstract: it depends on the nature of its manifestations. The

German Wolff Bureau is international; so is the White Slave traffic; so is the Anti-Slavery Society. It rests with men and women of goodwill to see that the good manifestations prevail over the evil; but, judging from past history, the devil generally has the first innings. International institutions and international philanthropic efforts have followed international abuses, as the policeman follows the malefactor or as the agents of civilized governments follow, in 'undeveloped' countries, the roving emissaries of private capitalist enterprise.

Nor has this internationalism, this inter-communication between the families of mankind, been abruptly cut short by the war. On the contrary it has been immensely extended. Never before have the communities and races of men met and mingled as they are meeting and mingling to-day. The war, which has touched all five continents of the world, has turned the earth into a vast mixing-bowl where men, and to no inconsiderable extent women also, are coming together and exchanging experiences. The rival combatants and their prisoners can perhaps learn little from one another: but think of the Allied armies and their encampments on either side! For the illiterate millions of Russia, with its wonderful assortment of nationalities, war, with its camp-fire talk, has always been a great educator. The Russian army might be described as a great national and international school. But with the Western allies it is almost more so. Was there ever a more international expedition than the army at the Dardanelles? It comprised Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotsmen, Frenchmen, Senegalese, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, and a contingent of Hebrew-speaking Jews from Palestine. Compare the catalogue of Sir Ian Hamilton's troops with the catalogue of the Greek and Trojan forces conveniently provided for us in the second book of the "Iliad," and you will get some measure of the increased power of man over nature since Homer's day, and of the internationalism which has inevitably resulted from it.

What then do a certain school of idealists really mean when they consider themselves a small group of internationalists in a world that will not listen to their doctrine? What they really mean, of course, is not that the modern world is not international in many of its habits and ways of thought, but that, in spite of its internationalism, it is still a tragically mismanaged place. It may be a single society, but that society has so little control over its life, or the members of it have such low ideals, that it is from time to time rent by such conflicts as we see to-day. Why, they complain, cannot the different communities of the world sit down together and cultivate the arts of Peace?

The criticism contained in remarks such as these is really a two-fold one. It is one thing to say that the world is wicked. It

is quite another to say that it is badly organized. The school of thought to which I am referring really combines two quite separate lines of policy. There is the policy directed towards making the world better, and the policy directed towards making the world better organised, irrespective of the fact whether or not that organisation is based on moral principles. Let us take the former policy first. The policy which seems to make the world better aims at promoting internationalism in its better, and at counteracting it in its worse, manifestations. It seeks to promote anti-Slavery Societies and to counteract the White Slave traffic. It seeks to promote happier and friendlier relations between nations and to counteract the international phenomenon that has become known as "Prussianism" in whatever quarter it originates and over however many countries it may spread. It seeks in fact to serve humanity by raising its moral level. One may criticise the phraseology or note the omissions in the programme of this group of thinkers: but for their outlook and their ideals one can have nothing but admiration. Men like M. Romain Rolland and women like Miss Jane Addams are the salt of the earth; if everybody were like Miss Addams the evil manifestations of internationalism would disappear for want of a public, and world-government itself—the inter-State problem—would be greatly simplified. It is easy to pick holes in the views expressed by this school of thinkers on the questions at issue in the inter-State sphere, but it is a thankless task to do so, since those problems are not really what they are concerned about. They are not interested in the purely political side of inter-State relations. Their object is not to establish a reasonable minimum of Justice and Liberty in a world of imperfect human beings. Their object is to make those imperfect people better, to combat malice, hatred and uncharitableness among all the belligerent peoples from their rulers and foreign ministers downwards. All power to their elbow! Only let us whisper one caution in their ear as they go on their errand of mercy—the famous caution of George Washington: "Influence is not government." However good and reasonable you may make people, there still remains over, for all of us who are not theoretical anarchists, the technical political question of the adjustment of the relations between the different Sovereign States.

I pass to the second line of policy—that which is directed not towards making men better (that, it is recognized, is too lengthy a process to meet the immediate emergency), but rather to averting war by making the world better organised—by improving the efficiency of the world's political machinery. This line of policy aims at the setting up of what is called an international or supernational organisation to ensure the peace of the world. Mr. Sidney Webb, for instance, is giving a lecture this very evening on "The

Supernational Authority which will Prevent War" and Mr. J. A. Hobson has written a book on the same theme under the title "Towards International Government." A pedant might criticise Mr. Hobson's title by saying that international government is a thing we have with us already—in Russia, in Turkey, in Austria-Hungary, in the British Commonwealth. Some of these governments are good and others bad, but they are all international, or, more strictly speaking, multi-national. If he had called his book "Towards Inter-State Government" his theme would have been made clear beyond all confusion; but he would have been convicted of working for a contradiction, for there is no such thing as inter-State government. If a government cannot give orders and secure obedience to them, it is not a government: but the essence of a State is that it is sovereign and takes orders from no one above it. Inter-State government therefore involves a contradiction. What Mr. Hobson really desires is a World-Government, and I wish he had said so. Probably he did not do so because he thought the title sounded too chimerical. But in reality there is nothing inconceivable or intrinsically impossible in the establishment of a world-government. The real difficulty is to establish free world-government—to ensure universal peace without the universal sacrifice of liberty. If it is better organisation that civilized mankind desires they can have it in almost any age for the asking. The Romans were ready to give it them; so were the great Popes; so was Napoleon; so are the Germans. There is no technical objection that I can see to the practicability of schemes like Mr. Hobson's. They involve the surrender of British, French, American and other sovereignties into the hands of a body in which the nominees of Russian, German, Hungarian and Turkish autocracy would have a proportionate voice. If the citizens of free States wish to surrender their heritage of freedom and to merge their allegiance with that of subjects accustomed to arbitrary rule, there is no more to be said. Peace and order and prosperity they may for a time receive in exchange. These may be goods more valuable than liberty. Many persons think they are, especially for other people. Our existing industrial order, for instance, is based upon the idea that efficiency is more important than liberty. But few Englishmen would hesitate to include liberty as an indispensable element in that 'good life' which it is the sole object of politics to promote. Judged by that ultimate test and in the light of the political ideals and constitutions of the existing States of the world, Mr. Hobson's and all other similar schemes fall to the ground.

So far we have been engaged in cross-examining the word international, and it has helped to bring out certain important distinctions. I now propose to put into the dock a more serious

offender, whom I think it will be useful to examine on our way to positive conclusions. I propose to take the third of the four points put forward as the programme of the Union of Democratic Control. It is not very different on the constructive side from suggestions by other writers who hold widely different views on the war. I select it because it crystallizes a mass of current thought in a conveniently compact and definite form. The 'plank' in question is as follows:—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 'Balance of Power'; but shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace."

This sentence contains a negative half and a positive half. I will not dwell on the negative half, as it is not relevant to our subject, except to say that it does not seem to be quite fair in its implied statement as to the object of British foreign policy in the past. I pass, therefore, to the second or constructive part of the programme, in which the Foreign Office, and the British democracy whose servant it is, is advised as to what it ought to do. The formula then runs as follows:—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be made public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the 'guarantee of an abiding peace.'"

There is nothing much to be said about the proposal for concerted action between the Powers. There is nothing new about it. The Great Powers of Europe have constantly throughout the last hundred years acted together in matters of common concern, especially in Near Eastern questions, and no State has a better record for loyalty and persistence in this direction than Great Britain. But the Concert has never created any organisation for itself beyond temporary conferences and congresses of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, and it has never shown itself amenable to democratic control. The important part of the suggestion lies in the proposed International Council.

If this suggestion is intended to be practicable it presumably means an *inter-State* Council—that is to say, a council composed of nominees from all the States or all the leading States of the world. A real *International* Council in which Poles sat next to Russians and Armenians next to Turks can hardly have been intended. Presumably also the council is to consist of persons nominated by their governments or according to arrangements made

by each separate government, and not directly or on a uniform plan by the citizens of the States concerned. It will be a conference of governments with governments, or of superior persons with superior persons, like the British Imperial Conference which meets every four years. Again, there is nothing particularly novel in the suggestion. The two Hague Conferences have been gatherings of this nature, and their deliberations, like those of our Imperial Conference, have been made public. If our foreign policy is to be directed to getting together a deliberate body consisting of representatives from the leading States of the world, that aim can be quickly attained.

But the real crux of the formula lies in the word 'decisions.' In what sense is this council going to *decide* things? Are they going merely to make up their own minds and embody the results in a series of resolutions? Or are they going to legislate? In other words, are they going to be an assembly of envoys or an assembly of representatives, in other words a Parliament? If the former, I welcome the suggestion. The more discussion and interchange and sifting of views we can have between public men in different States the better. But I see in such a suggestion no 'guarantee of an abiding peace.' The reason why many well-meaning people grow enthusiastic over the idea of such a council is that they look to it as the machinery which will prevent conflicts between States. A body of this character may help to make war less likely; or, by revealing a deep gulf of principle between two sets of members, it may (like the second Hague Congress) make it more likely; but it cannot make war impossible. So far as machinery is concerned, it could only do so if it had an executive responsible to it and obliged to obey its orders; and if it had armed forces to carry out those orders, backed up by a federal treasury and a federal system of taxation; if it could quench a smouldering war in Germany or the Balkans as the Home Secretary can quench a riot at Tonypandy. In other words, an International Council can only be effective as *an organ of government* if it is part of a World-Government acting according to a regular written constitution: and such a constitution could only be set going after it had been adopted by a convention representative of all the peoples or governments concerned. Before the suggested council could have authority to *decide* things, in the sense in which the formula suggests, Frenchmen, Germans, Turks, Russians and citizens of other existing States must have declared their willingness to merge their statehood in a larger whole and to hand over their armed forces, or the greater part of them, to the new central government. This may be what the formula means. It may be intended to allow a government of Germans, Magyars, Russians, Turks or any other chance majority to use the British and French navies to carry out

its purposes. If this is meant it should be said. If it is not meant it should be explained that the council proposed is not an organ of government but an organ of influence or advice, and it should be made quite clear, to forestall inevitable disillusionments, that, to quote Washington again, "Influence is not government." Such a body might be of very great service to mankind, both as a clearing-house of ideas and as a means for embodying agreed solutions into a practical shape. It might become at once a drafting body and an organ for giving expression to the growing unity of civilized public opinion. If it met regularly, and the world became accustomed to look to it for guidance, it might achieve more in both these directions than has been attained along this road hitherto. But it will not be a government. In matters of law and government there is no room for middle paths or soothing formulæ. Two States are either Sovereign or they are United or Federated: they cannot be half and half. A man must know of what State he is a citizen and to what authority his duty is due. We all have our duty to render to Cæsar: but we cannot serve two Cæsars at once. Not all the Parliamentary ingenuity in the world can overcome that dilemma, as Virginians found out to their cost when the inexorable question was put to them at the outbreak of the Civil War. To ask British electors to surrender their power of determining the policy of this country to a body over which they have no control is to plunge into a jungle of difficulties and incidentally to set back, perhaps for ever, the cause of free and responsible government for which the Western Powers are trustees.

The practical programme of the Union of Democratic Control and of other advocates of similar solutions thus turns out to be something of an illusion. What is practical of the suggested machinery is not new, though it is susceptible of fuller and more systematic use than in the past: and what is new is neither practical nor wholesome—or, at least, would not be regarded as such by most Englishmen if its real meaning were made clear. War cannot be abolished by inventing foolproof political machinery, for no political machinery can impose ultimate irreconcilable differences of political principle. Political intercourse, like trade relations, may strengthen existing ties and deepen the attachment to common ideals, but it cannot create agreement where a common basis of agreement is not forthcoming. It is well for us to face the fact that there is no short cut to universal peace. War will only become obsolete after far-reaching changes have taken place in the mind and heart of the civilized peoples: and the first and perhaps most important step in that direction is that the civilized peoples should feel called upon to exercise a responsible control over their own governments and armed forces. It is useless to dream of

making Europe a federated Commonwealth till the separate units of the potential Federation are themselves Commonwealths. Interpreted as a call to the fuller exercise of responsible citizenship, every believer in free government will respond to the watchword of Democratic Control.

Let us say farewell then, once and for all, to this idea of an 'International Council' as providing machinery which shall be an absolute guarantee against war. But before passing on it is worth while spending a parting shot on a phrase with which it is often associated, because it illustrates a typical confusion of thought —I mean the phrase—the United States of Europe. The constant use of this phrase shows how easily such confusions gain vogue. One can see how it originated. America is a Continent. Europe is a Continent. America has its United States. Why should not the States of Europe unite and so put an end to European wars. It is not an unnatural train of reasoning for a Western American who knows nothing of Europe or of the causes which tend to produce wars. It escapes his notice that he is using the word 'State' in two different senses. State in the word United States means province. The separate States are provinces, or component members of a Federation. The word State was put into the American Constitution as a deliberate misnomer, in order to gratify the thirteen original Sovereign States when they abandoned their sovereignty in entering into the Federation. Similarly the Orange Free State retains its old name in the South African Union. The survival of the word cost the American Commonwealth dear, for the word enshrined, and rightly enshrined, a conception of citizenship and indefeasible loyalty: and it cost the Americans four years of war and a million lives before the confusion inherent in the word 'United States' was cleared up and men knew for certain whether the American Commonwealth was one State or several. That is the price men pay for halting confusedly between two opinions and trying to serve two Cæsars at once. They not only failed to avert war, but actually promoted it.

I pass now to deal with an objection which must have been in some people's minds when I drew the distinction between Statehood and Nationality. It is quite true, they will say, that Statehood and Nationality are in fact, in the present condition of the world, distinguishable and often distinct—that Finland is a nation but part of the Russian State, and so on—but this is an unsatisfactory condition of things which it should be our hope to abolish. States and nations ought, they will say, to be coterminous. All States, or at any rate most States, ought to be Nation-States: at the very least, all self-governing States ought to be Nation-States. And they will invoke the authority of John Stuart Mill, whose words on the subject in his book on "Representative Government," have

passed almost unchallenged for two generations as the pure milk of Liberal doctrine. "It is," says Mill,' "in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."

This theory that the Nation-State is the normal and proper area of government at which believers in free institutions should aim, is sometimes known as 'the principle of Nationality': and many loose-thinking people believe that it is one of the causes for which we are fighting in the present war. My own view is exactly the contrary. I believe it is one of the most formidable and sinister forces on the side of our enemies and one of the chief obstacles to human progress at the present time.

Let us look into it more closely. What exactly does this belief in the coincidence of Nationality and Statehood mean? What is the principle underlying the theory of the National State, or of political nationalism, as it is sometimes called? The theory says that because the Poles feel themselves to be a nation, there ought to be an independent Poland. In other words, the independent Polish kingdom will rest upon the fact that its citizens are Poles. The Polish kingdom will be a kingdom of Poles. Polishness would be its distinguishing mark: the criterion of its citizenship. Districts of the territory or sections of the population which were not Polish, or had ceased to be Polish, would therefore cease to be 'national': and by ceasing to be national would lose their right to membership in the State. In other words, the State is not based on any universal principle, such as justice, or democracy, or collective consent, or on anything moral or universally human at all, but on something partial, arbitrary and accidental. "By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the State's boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence."

These last three sentences are not my own. They were not written to point the moral of the exterminations promoted by Turkish nationalism in Armenia, or of the various degrees of servitude, oppression and propaganda enforced by German, Magyar, Russian and other dominant forms of political nationalism? They were written by Lord Acton fifty years ago, when the Nationalist doctrines which overshadow Eastern Europe and Western Asia to-day were a cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

In his essay on "Nationality," published in 1862,[1] Acton remorselessly analysed its political claims and predicted, with the insight of moral genius, the disastrous consequences of basing government on so arbitrary and insecure a foundation. "The theory of Nationality," he said, using the strongest language at his command, "is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of Socialism." Time softens the edge of strong language, but in this case without blunting the force of the prediction. "Its course," he says, "will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. . . . Thus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system (Acton has been speaking of the theory of Nationality as a phase of revolutionary doctrine) makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, only to be controlled by an accident."

Lord Acton's words were not listened to, for more fashionable doctrines held the field. In England both Liberalism and Conservatism had their own special reasons for espousing the cause of political Nationalism. To the Liberals it seemed to spell liberty, and to the Conservatives it seemed to embody the force of instinct or tradition, as against doctrines which based government on more universal considerations of Reason and Humanity. But Acton, with his eye ranging over the whole course of human history, cared more for liberty than for any of the temporary formulæ in which it was sought to dress her up. He foresaw that to base government on anything less than a quality common to all the governed, in virtue of their common humanity, was for the State to surrender its moral pretensions and its rôle as a factor in the moral progress of the world. Time has borne him out: and what was in its inception little more than a pardonable aberration, a natural result of strong feeling combined with loose thinking, has become in more than one contemporary State the mainspring of a Realpolitik which avowedly bases policy upon considerations of national selfishness and seeks to propagate a dominant nationalism through the power of the government with which it is so unhappily associated.

Am I out of sympathy then, I shall be asked, with political nationalist movements? Do I look coldly on the record of Mazzini and Garibaldi, or regret the Union of Italy? Far from it. But I wish to make perfectly clear—what was too easily obscured by the

1. Republished in "The History of Freedom and other Essays," 1909.

circumstances of the time—that the reason why the people of Sicily, Venetia and other parts of Italy became incorporated with Piedmont in one Italian State was not because they were Italian, but because they deliberately desired thus to dispose of their destiny. Italian national sentiment might, and in fact did, contribute to promote that desire: but it was not the principle underlying the union of Italy. If it had been, there would have been many islands or enclaves in the new Italian kingdom. The sentiment of Nationality may, and often does, contribute to what is called irredentism, but it is not a justifiable basis of the irredentists' claim to a change of government. One can see that at a glance by considering what would happen if the sentiment of Nationality *were* admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government. French Canada would have to pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become the servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland. I have taken progressively impossible instances in order to show how easily the theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood can be reduced to an absurdity. But the fact that the theory is absurd does not prevent its being put into practice, and instances as absurd as those last drawn from the New World can be drawn in actual fact from the Old. To what State ought Macedonia to belong? It depends, according to the political nationalist's theory, on the nationality of the people of Macedonia. Magicians are brought upon the scene, in the shape of ethnologists and historians, to determine the question of nationality, and the unfortunate people, instead of being asked what they do desire, are told what they ought to desire, and schools are founded to enforce the lesson. Some friends of mine stayed some years ago in a village which changed its nationality more than once in a season under the persuasion of the bayonets of rival bands of wandering propagandists. Nationality has in fact become a matter of propaganda, like religion, and the wars that it leads to partake of the aimless and blundering brutality of religious wars, in which men try to save other men's souls by offering them the alternatives of conversion or the stake.

It is not the principle of nationality, as so many English people think, which will bring peace and good government to Macedonia and Eastern Europe generally, but the principle of toleration. It took Western Europe several generations after the Thirty Years War to discover that religion, being subjective, was no satisfactory criterion of Statehood and that a wise ruler must allow his subjects to go to Heaven by their own road. It may take Eastern Europe as long to reach the same conclusion about Nationality. But in the long run the theory of a National State will go the way of Henry VIII's and Luther's theory of a National Church.

In reality, of course, English people when they invoke the principle of Nationality mean the principle of Democracy—the principle that a people, however constituted, whether homogeneous like the Italians, or closely related like the Southern Slavs, or not homogeneous at all, like the Belgians and the Swiss, has a right to dispose of its own destiny. If we mean Democracy, let us boldly say so. It is no cause to be ashamed of.

Having thus cleared the ground, I will proceed to indicate my own view of Nationality and Statehood. I must be very brief; but, if I give little more than definitions, I hope my criticism of other views will have enabled the definitions to explain themselves.

It is clear that there is a fundamental difference between the two conceptions. Nationality, like religion, is subjective; Statehood is objective. Nationality is psychological; Statehood is political. Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a condition in law. Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood is an enforceable obligation. Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking and living; Statehood is a condition inseparable from all civilized ways of living.

What is subjective cannot be defined in strict scientific terms: it can only be interpreted; and the interpretation will only have a meaning for those who can appreciate the peculiar quality of the object interpreted. It is impossible to define the quality of a Beethoven symphony so as to make it intelligible to non-musicians. Similarly it is impossible to define the quality which makes Shakespeare's work characteristically English, or to explain to a German ignorant of England what exactly it is which has evaporated in Schlegel's translation. Jews and Gentiles both rock equally with laughter at "Potash and Perlmutter"; but the Jews know that they are laughing at the real Jewish humour of the play, while the Gentiles are only laughing at the jokes. Internationalism, in its finest and truest sense, involves an insight into the inner spiritual life of many nationalities and a sensitive palate to many various forms of national quality. A man who has no understanding of Jewish humour may have the highest liberal principles and the best and most enlightened intentions; but he will have an incomplete understanding of Jewish nationality.

How then shall we define Nationality? Nationality, I would suggest, is a form of corporate sentiment. I would define a nation as *a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country.* Every nation has a home, though some nations, such as the Jews, the Irish, the Norwegians and the Poles, live for the greater part in exile. If the Jews ceased to feel a peculiar affection for Palestine or the Irish for Ireland they would both cease to be nations, as the gipsies have ceased to be a nation; and when an individual Jew

ceases to feel affection for Palestine or an individual Irishman ceases to feel affection for Ireland, he ceases to be a Jew or an Irishman.[1] Once an American citizen, a man is always an American citizen until either the State is destroyed or his status is altered by process of law; but Nationality, being subjective, is often mutable and intermittent. History is full of the deaths and resurrections of nations, and amid the commercialism and cosmopolitanism of to-day many diverse forms of national consciousness are struggling to maintain their hold on the minds and spirits of the scattered races of mankind. Only those who have seen at close quarters what a moral degradation the loss of nationality involves, or sampled the drab cosmopolitanism of Levantine seaports or American industrial centres, can realise what a vast reservoir of spiritual power is lying ready, in the form of national feeling, to the hands of teachers and statesmen, if only they can learn to direct it to wise and liberal ends. To seek to ignore this force or to humiliate it or to stamp it out in the name of progress or western ideas is unwittingly to reproduce Prussian methods and to promote, not progress or enlightenment, but spiritual impoverishment and moral weakness. Driven from the throne and the altar, national sentiment is at last finding its proper resting place in the mission school and the settlement and in the homes of the common people. In the world as it is to-day, as educated India is discovering, consciousness of nationality is essential to individual self-respect, as self-respect is essential to right living.

Nationality, in fact, rightly regarded, is not a political but an educational conception. It is a safeguard of self-respect against the insidious onslaughts of a materialistic cosmopolitanism. It is the sling in the hands of weak undeveloped peoples against the Goliath of material progress. The political Prussianism of a

1. It may be argued that such men still remained members of their race even though they no longer acknowledged their nationality. This is true. Race is an objective test, and no man can change his race any more than a leopard can change his spots. But this is not the same as to admit that there is such a thing as a Jewish or an Irish race. Race is an ethnological and anthropological term and much confusion would be avoided if it were kept severely out of political discussions. The current scientific classifications of race (homo Alpinus, homo Mediterraneus, etc.) have no bearing on questions of national or political consciousness, except to make it clear that political theories (like that of Houston Stewart Chamberlain) which base themselves on race differences are unscientific and worthless. The world is, of course, full of the descendants of 'assimilated' Jews and Irishmen; but it is equally full of 'assimilated' Assyrians, Hittites, Goths, Picts, Angles, and other forgotten nationalities. To lay stress on facts such as these is no more helpful than to recall that we are all children of Adam.

militarist government is far less dangerous to the spiritual welfare of its subjects in the long run than the ruthless and pervading pressure of commercial and cosmopolitan standards. What is imposed on them by overt tyranny men resist, and win self-respect by resisting; but the corruption that creeps in as an 'improvement' men imitate and succumb to. The vice of nationalism is Jingoism, and there are always good Liberals amongst us ready to point a warning finger against its manifestations. The vice of internationalism is decadence and the complete eclipse of personality, ending in a type of character and social life which good Conservatives instinctively detest, but have seldom sufficient patience to describe. Fortunately we possess in Sir Mark Sykes a political writer who has the gift of clothing his aversions in picturesque descriptive writing, and in his books on the Near East English readers can find some of the best examples (which might be paralleled from other Continents, not least from America) of the spiritual degradation which befalls men who have pursued 'Progress' and cosmopolitanism and lost contact with their own national spiritual heritage. Here is his account of one such mis-educated mind, encountered in Kurdistan: "He said he was studying to be an ethnologist, psychologist, hypnotist and poet: he admired Renan, Kant, Herbert Spencer, Gladstone, Spurgeon, Nietzsche and Shakespeare. It afterwards appeared that his library consisted of an advertisement of Eno's Fruit Salt, from which he quoted freely. He wept over what he called the 'punishment of our great nation' and desired to be informed how, in existing circumstances, he could elevate himself to greatness and power."[1] Most of us, who have been teachers, have known the *genus* 'prig' in our time and have discovered how to handle him; but it is not so easy to discover how to handle a whole society of prigs from which the health-giving winds of nationality and tradition have been withdrawn. No task is more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect.

But to return to the definition. National sentiment is *intense*: it makes a great deal of difference to a man whether or not he is a Scot or a Jew or a Pole. It is not a thing which he could deny or betray without a feeling of shame. It is *intimate*: it goes very deep down to the roots of a man's being: it is linked up with his past: it embodies the momentum of an ancient tradition. The older a nation is and the more it has achieved and suffered, the more national it is. Nationality means more to a Jew and an Armenian (probably the two oldest surviving forms of national consciousness) than to a Canadian; and, to quote a famous phrase, "it means more to be a Canadian to-day" than it did before the

1. "The Caliph's Last Heritage," 1915, p. 429.

second Battle of Ypres. Thirdly, it is *dignified*. The corporate sentiment of a nation is of a more dignified order than the corporate sentiment of a village. It is as hard to say at what stage of size or dignity nationality begins as to say how many grains are needed to form a heap. One could go through the islands of the world, from a coral-reef to Australia, and find it impossible to say at what point one reached an island large enough for the common sentiment of its inhabitants to be described as national. Broadly speaking, one can only say that if a people feels itself to be a nation, it is a nation.

Let us follow out what follows from this definition. If a group of people have a corporate sentiment, they will seek to embody it in a common or similar mode of life. They will have their own national institutions. Englishmen will make toast and play open air games and smoke short pipes and speak English wherever they go. Similarly Greeks will speak Greek and eat olives (if they can get them) and make a living by their wits. There is nothing in all this to prevent Englishmen and Greeks from being good citizens under any government to whose territory they migrate. The difficulty only arises when governments are foolish or intolerant enough to prohibit toast or olives or football or national schools and societies, or to close the avenues of professional life and social progress to new classes of citizens. Arbitrary government, by repressing the spontaneous manifestations of nationality, lures it into political channels: for it is only through political activity that oppressed nationalities can gain the right to pursue their distinctive ways of life. Between free government and nationality there is no need, and indeed hardly a possibility, of conflict. This is clear from the fact that, whereas in reactionary States, the social manifestations of nationality invariably tend to become political, so that literary societies and gymnastic clubs are suspect to the police and constantly liable to dissolution, in Great Britain and America manifestations of nationality tend to become more and more non-political and social in character. Languages banned and prohibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia as dangerous to the State are freely spoken in the United States: and, though there are more Poles in Chicago than in Warsaw, and more Norwegians in the North Western States than in Norway, nobody apprehends any danger therefrom to the unity and security of the American Commonwealth. The American Commonwealth may, and indeed must, change its distinctive character and quality with the lapse of time and the change in the composition of its population; it may even become multi-lingual. But its governmental institutions will remain untroubled, so long as it remains a free democracy, by political nationalist movements. America will have to wait long for its Kossuths and Garibaldis.

Much more could be said about Nationality; but it is time to pass to Statehood.

What is a State? A State can be defined, in legal language, as a territory or territories over which there is a government claiming unlimited authority. This definition says nothing about the vexed question of the relation between the State and the individual, and the rights of conscientious objectors. It only makes clear the indisputable fact that, whatever the response of individuals, the claim to exercise unlimited authority is inherent in Statehood. It is involved in State sovereignty. The State, as Aristotle said long ago, is a sovereign association, embracing and superseding, for the purposes of human life in society, all other associations. The justification of the State's claim to peculiar authority is that experience shows it is mankind's only safeguard against anarchy and that anarchy involves the eclipse of freedom. Haiti and Mexico to-day are the best commentaries on that well-thumbed text, of which priests and barons in earlier ages, like Quakers and plutocrats and syndicalists in our own, have needed and still need to be reminded. Freedom and the good life cannot exist without government. They can only come into existence *through* government.

But Statehood in itself does not carry us beyond ancient Egypt and Assyria, or beyond Petrograd and Potsdam. Such States have subjects, and these subjects have obligations, both legal and moral: but they are not, strictly speaking, citizens. Citizenship is the obligation incumbent on members of Commonwealths or free States.

What is a free State? Here again one can give no exact definition; for freedom, like nationality, is not something tangible, like a ballot-box, but a state of mind in individual men and women. A free State is a State so governed as to promote freedom. What is freedom? Perhaps the best brief definition of freedom is that lately given by that bold psychologist, our chairman, when he spoke of that continuous possibility of initiative which we vaguely mean by 'freedom.'[1] A man is not free unless he feels free, and in order to feel free he must feel that there is a full range of thought and at least some range of action left open for the determination of his own will. How strong that desire for personal freedom, that sense of the importance of the possibility of initiative, is among Englishmen we have lately seen by their marked preference for being 'asked' to enlist as against being 'ordered' to enlist. For Englishmen, in fact, and for all men who set store by human values, the sense of personal freedom is an important factor in promoting happiness or a sense of well-being. Freedom may be

1. Article on "The New Statesman," Sept. 25, 1915.

hard to define in set terms: but the man who can be perfectly happy without it enjoys the passive contentment of an animal rather than the positive well-being proper to a man. The neglect of this obvious truth in the working of our industrial government is the simplest and most potent element in the inarticulate labour unrest which has so much hampered British trade and industry of recent years. Harmony can only be restored by frankly basing our industrial life, as our political life is already based, on the principle of responsible self-government.

Freedom and self-government, as this illustration shows, are closely associated: but it is important to recognize that they are not identical. Haiti is more self-governing than its neighbour Jamaica or Nigeria, but Jamaica and Nigeria are the freer countries. If British rule and its accompanying expert knowledge were withdrawn from Nigeria and the country were in consequence ravaged by sleeping sickness, the individual Nigerian would obviously not thereby have increased his freedom of initiative or his personal well-being. At certain stages of knowledge and education free government and responsible self-government are incompatible; but it is the root principle of democracy that the right, or rather the moral duty, of self-government is an essential element in full personal freedom. No State can be described as free unless it is either self-governing or so organised as to promote self-government in the future.

If the exercise of self-government is a duty and a privilege without which man cannot grow to his full moral stature or enjoy the full sense of freedom and self-respect, it follows that the object to which it is directed is a moral object. Citizenship is more than a mere matter of political gymnastics, designed to train the moral faculties of the individual: it is civilized man's appointed means for the service of mankind. It is through the State, and by means of civic service, that man in the modern world can best do his duty to his neighbour. An ordinary old-fashioned State may be no more than a Sovereign Authority, but a free State or Commonwealth is and must be invested with what may best be described as a moral personality. It could not claim the free service of its citizens unless it stood for moral ends. In so far as it ceases to stand for moral ends, its citizens cease to be moral agents, and, as we have seen in the case of Germany, this inevitable atrophy of moral action in its citizens means a corresponding decline in their moral freedom. Their sense of civic obligation comes into conflict with their sense of what is right and just, and the conflict ends in a degradation of personal self-respect and in the open acceptance of a two-fold standard of morality for States and for private individuals, resulting in the approbation of what is known as

Realpolitik. If the unashamed Italian ministerial phrase, "Sacro egoismo nazionale" (sacred national egoism), which could be paralleled nearer home, really characterized the guiding motive of the Italian State, as it does that of some others, then the people of Italy would not only be less moral but also less free and self-respecting to-day than they were when they responded to the very different watchwords of Mazzini.

To maintain and to live up to this high conception of citizenship is no easy task. A great political tradition embodies the work of generations of effort and service. Those who lightly ask us to transcend it and become citizens of Europe or of a World-State have often not made clear to themselves what civic obligation involves, or how necessary it is that, before we ask Europe to accept us as citizens, we must have been faithful in small things, so as to bring her a gift of service worthy of her acceptance. Membership of a free State, such as the British Commonwealth, means more than mere obedience to its laws or a mere emotion of pride and patriotism, more even than an intelligent exercise of political duties: it involves a personal dedication to great tasks and great ideals: it links a man to great causes striven for in the past and sets him a standard and a tradition to work for in the future. The functions of government may conceivably be divided; but dedication, like marriage, must of its nature be undivided. It can only be relinquished when it can be merged in all solemnity and in the fulness of time in a great free federation where the same causes and ideals can be brought to larger and happier fulfilment.

There is no time, at the end of this long paper, to work out a philosophy of government in detail, but this at least may be said to make clear my attitude to the inter-State problem which in my earlier remarks I have laid bare rather than attempted to solve. That problem is incapable of solution till men have come to regard States as moral personalities with duties as well as rights: till all the leading States, through the public opinion of their free citizens, have come to regard their duty to humanity as prior to the safeguarding of their selfish purposes: and until there is a far closer agreement among the civilized peoples than seems possible to-day as to the principles which should underlie the ultimate organisation of the world on the basis of morality and justice. Government exists to promote the conditions of a good life: and the anarchy and wickedness of the present conflict are a revelation at once of the absence and of the need of a world-government which shall promote those conditions for all mankind. But until mankind are agreed as to those conditions, until they know what kind of a world they desire to live in, and have achieved freedom of action to give effect to their wishes, it is idle to look to statesmen to give us more than

a temporary and precarious peace. Peace is not the birthright of the sons of men: it is the prize of right living. Let us first be clear in our minds and hearts as to what is the cause for which we stand and where our service is due, and let us be faithful in performing it: then haply, at the latter end, when the reign of Justice and Liberty has been assured, Peace too may be added unto us.

A. E. ZIMMERN.

THE ATLANTIC NATIONS AND CONTINENTALISM.[1]

I.

THE carrying power of water is clearly connected with the origin of civilization. The sluggish streams of Egypt and Mesopotamia, and the great rivers of China, did something more than irrigate the lands they flowed through. They were natural highways which fostered commerce and the localization of industries, and which ultimately became the parents of written laws. There is a pregnant contrast between the beneficent, humane and law-regulated civilization of Babylon about 2000 B.C., located as it was on the lower waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the martial, aggressive and predatory offspring of that civilization, Assyria, situated amongst the unnavigable mountain streams.

The early civilization of Crete was born, like Aphrodite, from the sea. Homer represents Zeus himself as supporting the Greeks of 'the high-prowed ships,' while Athene (who most significantly overwhelms Ares in single combat) is the inspirer of the seafaring Odysseus. Later it was Athens, the sea-power, that attained unsurpassed heights of intellectual and artistic genius; while the inland Sparta, who trampled her down, is remembered for little besides her military virtues and organization. Carthage is seen by us only through Roman eyes. But it may well be that the world has seen no greater disaster than the annihilation of this maritime power. For, though we are ourselves committed to the Roman civilization that actually prevailed, it does not follow that it was the best.

But the struggle between Behemoth and Leviathan did not end with the triumph of Rome. The sea ever remains, and gives birth, age after age, to a culture essentially contrasted with the military and continental type. Had the Hanse towns of the Middle Ages succeeded, as they came near doing, in dominating the nations of Northern Europe, it is conceivable that the Thirty Years' War might have had other issue, and, with the complete defeat of the Hapsburgs, the opportunity might have opened for a commercial and federal type of state to prevail over Central Europe.

However that may be, it can scarcely be an accident that our sea-girt and sea-faring nation is the one great European power that

1. A paper read before the Social Psychological Group of the Sociological Society, November 11, 1915.

has never aped the titles and insignia of Imperial Rome. Our kings have never worn the iron crown, like Charlemagne or Napoleon; they have never called themselves Cæsars or Czars, like the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns and the Romanoffs; they have never adopted the Legionary Eagle as their national emblem, like Austria, Germany, Russia, Napoleonic France, and even republican America. Nor have we, as a nation, gone out of set purpose to build ourselves an empire, since the time when our French-speaking kings contended for dominion in France; rather, we may say that, "in a fit of absence of mind," our enterprising commerce has created those scattered allegiances to the British Crown, which, we find with some surprise, now figure as an "empire over-seas." But, whether we consider it historically or psychologically, it is an empire in a different sense, and of a different type, from any former empire; and it is worth while to rehearse certain characteristic features, which justify us in regarding it as comparable to an organism, rather than to an organization: a living growth, than a creation of military might.

(1) The allegiance of our English-speaking colonies is practically optional, and even their contribution to the defences of the Empire is entirely voluntary.

(2) The highest alien races, such as the French and the Dutch, are able, without ever becoming anglicized, to join with us, as enthusiastic members of our empire.

(3) Natives of various races far removed from our own are employed in the guardianship of their own states. Unlike other empires, ancient and modern, we do not habitually draft, say, Indian troops to guard our African possessions, taking Egyptians or Bantus to guard India. India is policed and garrisoned by Indians, superintended by a very small handful of English civilians and soldiers; and Egypt by Egyptians.

(4) The principle of "letting alone" has been widely followed, with three typical results:

(*a*) We have native states, largely independent, bedded in our empire;

(*b*) We have protectorates, such as Egypt, in which native princes retain their titles undisturbed, and in which even the suzerainty of the Turkish Empire was acknowledged until that power chose to fight us;

(*c*) Though we have for a century enjoyed a paramount power on the sea, we have not laid hands on the colonies of weak but civilized states, like Holland, Denmark and Portugal, even when to do so might have saved us great expenditure of wealth and lives.

Of many of these characteristics we have no monopoly, but in their sum they are unique.

The accident of our position partly accounts for them, but they are also attributable to something in our psychology. As long ago as Alfred the Great we see the same principles at work in the way he drew together the different realms of the island. Having defeated the Dane he did not crush him, but established him in possession of a territory equal to his own. All the rest of the island gradually drew into his polity of its own will. Where he conquered he preserved and improved the local administration, and his wise policy was followed and carried to a final conclusion by his son, his daughter, and three grandsons after him. Even our island was thus first united in the spirit of confederacy rather than of empire, and it is this spirit which has gone forth to found our dominions over the world.

Our rule is therefore to be regarded as specifically different in spirit and origin from the empires of the Cæsars, Napoleons, Hapsburgs or Hohenzollerns. And the purpose of the present paper is to show that it is the type of a certain civic culture, or stage of advance, which we shall find exemplified also in parts of the earth owing no fealty to our crown (though to a greater or less extent under our influence), and which is destined to play a still greater part in the future history of civilization.

The following observations and conclusions are the result of a recent journey to America and four European neutrals, and subsequently to France and Russia. This journey was undertaken by the writer with a definite purpose which need not be described here. It will be sufficient to say that it was a private political venture, subsequently approved by our own Foreign Office. By leading to interviews with the Foreign Ministers and with public men of the first rank it brought together a number of impressions of national sentiment of great interest, at all events to the writer, and their incidental character perhaps rather enhances their value. I saw, not what I went to see, but what I could not help seeing. I also found a certain value in the fact that my journey led me to make America and not England the starting-point for a tour in Europe. The tendency to contrast the countries visited with one another and with America, rather than only with one's own land, made one more sensitive to those subtle differences of psychology in European countries which are significant of the cultural trends in modern civilization. And the consequent theory of the present conflict as the clash of two opposite principles of political consolidation active everywhere in different degrees, was the result of a later attempt to explain many things that had at first led to perplexity or surprise. In a paper such as this I must necessarily select my observations to exemplify my theory, but it need hardly be said that the theory was, in the first place, an attempt to explain my observations.

II.

After a wintry ten days on the grey Atlantic desert, to see the broken, rocky coast and picturesque hills of New York Harbour, and then the towering metropolis itself thrust out amongst them, is to be overwhelmed with a sense of exuberant achievement. The race that could resolutely settle that bleak and distant coast; could make itself at home and claim its independent maturity; and, in the course of years, could erect a city compared with which all other cities appear creeping, timid things—this surely is a race that bears enormous testimony to the power of the children of the sea. It is easy to deprecate mere size, but to think of the New York sky-scrapers as merely big is to lack imagination. As an engineering feat alone they are by no means contemptible, but they are also, like all unique achievements, interpretive of the land that begets them. Those twenty, forty, and fifty storied giants, crowned with bronze cornices or metal domes, and made brilliant at night by ten thousand lights and farflinging flares, are eloquent, not only of wealth and skill, but of the whole American psychology.

Here is a people filled with the sense that "all things are possible." When the slender tongue of Manhattan Island could no longer hold the business and financial centre of a metropolis whose heart-beats must reach across the Atlantic to Europe, and across the continent to the Pacific, the Americans, as they could not build to east or west or south, built upwards, ten stories, twenty stories, fifty stories, until in the centre of the busiest city on earth there are thousands of offices high up amongst the clouds and winds that blow straight from the sea and hills. And while the dust, the din, the stench and the flies are left far below, the city is reached in a period measured by seconds rather than minutes.

The factors which produced this result are of course many, but above all and embracing all is the fact that the Americans were free from the countless inhibitions which check the vigour of older peoples. Amongst these inhibitions is the dread of injury to one's neighbour, or, to be frank, the dread of being injured by one's more enterprising neighbour. The immediate effect of the erection of a sky-scraper is to darken the windows of all lower buildings within range, but this is a challenge to other buildings to rise too, and acts less detrimentally than might appear, even to the laggards. The shadow of an object is deepest at its foot, and the higher it rises the more the luminous quality of the atmosphere dissipates it, with the result that a building of fifty stories casts scarcely a denser shade than one of ten. The streets of New York city are not perceptibly darker than those of the city of London, and though some of the

lower stories are comparatively dark, the high upper stories of those same buildings are bathed in light. Moreover, the amount of window light per acre is of course vastly increased, so that, owing to a certain lack of social restraint, the Americans have achieved an immense social benefit.

The same principle is capable of a wide application. Trade unionism, for instance (including the corresponding institutions of lawyers, doctors, etc.), has as one of its objects the limitation of the supply of skilled labour and ultimately of output, and is of the same nature as the law of ancient lights. Our real problem in either case is not to keep down our neighbour, but to get up ourselves, and we must discover how to keep the good of unionism and such institutions, and yet apply them to their true purpose.

But with the strength of America, which is its intense individualism, go almost incredible defects. From the landing-stage one gets into a taxi and drives a mile or so to one's hotel, a mile liable to be well-nigh as rough and dangerous as the Atlantic itself. The abominable condition of the roads passes belief, and is such as only a nightly Zeppelin raid would make excusable. So incapable is this wonderful people of corporate action that, whereas there is no luxury or perfection of service which it cannot supply by private enterprise under the ground or up in the clouds, it is unable to keep those portions of the surface of mother earth which it entrusts to its public bodies in a condition which would do credit to the cities of Central Asia or Africa.

This characteristic, of daring flights of genius coupled with neglect of the most commonplace civic duties, is displayed in another way in the national politics. Take it for all in all, the United States Congress appears to be an even worse legislative body than those of Europe, and at times has certainly been more corrupt than most. But its shortcomings are in a fair way to be redeemed by that creation of the national genius, the American Presidency, an office which is the most popular and democratic institution in the world, and yet is the most powerful autocracy that a civilized people has begotten. In the hands of a man like Lincoln it becomes an engine of overwhelming power for good or ill, both for America and the whole world.

And this, too, is a realization of the possibilities of individualism. Every American boy grows up with the knowledge that no artificial or conventional barrier stands between him and the attainment of the highest office in the world. It fosters a type of character, individual, independent, emulous, and the fact that the United States has provided so remarkable a succession of men to fill the chair is in part due to the fact that the bent of the popular mind is turned towards the problem of qualifying for the position. But here again the pre-eminence of the single individual overshadows

the secondary offices of state, indeed of the state as a corporation at all, and there is, I imagine, comparatively little ambition among the most brilliant American youths to shine, in company with others, in the Cabinet or the highest branches of the services.

The American constitution, with its comparatively weak sense of corporate life, has produced an illogicality so amazing that it is little short of a miracle that it has survived. Some years ago, it will be remembered, America found herself very near war with Italy, arising out of the curious fact that the Central Government, which is the only power able to make treaties with foreign powers, is actually unable constitutionally to enforce their observance upon its component states. The United States are so individualistic, in short, that they are not a united state at all. A similar fact in a form only somewhat less startling exists with ourselves. The Imperial Parliament is responsible for the foreign policy of the empire. But it is well known to us that we are practically without power other than moral suasion wherewith to make our colonies conform.

It has been pointed out to me that this weakness of social organization in America does not involve a want of national coherence. The nexus is provided by the immense sociability of the individual. Every American, it is said, knows ten times as many of his fellow-citizens as we do, with the result that movements, opinions, and determinations are rapidly spread through the whole country. The corporate life is not therefore wanting, but has an individualist basis.

Nothing in my American visit puzzled me more at first than to find myself amongst a people of a sixth sense—at least that is the only way I know how to describe the American instinct for the financial aspect of things. Whatever kind of people I met—scholars, statesmen, philanthropists, journalists, theologians—it is scarcely too much to say that they never seemed quite sure that they understood my meaning until they had reduced my proposals, or ideas, to some form of financial statement or problem. In England one is inclined to feel injured if a university professor talks to one about the improvement of his estate when he ought to be describing the latest find in Crete, or the qualities of a new solar element. But just as every building must have a site, though the value of the erection does not depend upon the area, so every human endeavour is an edifice reared upon a basis of dollars, and the American realizes that to ignore this fact is to build castles in the air.

I have concluded that this characteristic is a further development of our insular psychology in one of its best features. Every Englishman conceives that he has not only a right, but an obligation, to hold his own views on political, medical, religious and military matters, as well as social, artistic and domestic ones.

Perhaps ultimately we have no more deep-seated difference with our German contemporaries than their readiness to leave high diplomatic, and therefore moral, questions unreservedly to their diplomatic and military authorities. We flatter ourselves that nothing would have led us to swallow unchallenged the military assertion that the invasion of Belgium was a necessary feature in their defence against Russia. However that may be, it is certain that our democracy has a fairly firm grasp of the great principle that experts and authorities exist to execute the will, that is, the moral and intellectual judgments, of the people, and in no case *vice versâ*.

The American, then, extends this principle to finance. The management of the dollar is too vital a matter to be delegated to a class of people. Like the Nonconformist conscience, it is a responsibility which he dare not depute to another. So far as the individual is concerned, this point of view is worthy of all honour. But if it has as its counterpart the incredibly rotten finance of certain American public bodies, it is too dearly bought. One cannot believe that so keen and far-sighted a people will long endure this reproach.

Before leaving our consideration of America, it must be noted that, despite the many saliently individualistic qualities of her civilization, she fought one of the world's greatest wars to uphold the continental principle. If in many ways she holds her component states with a singularly weak leash, she resolved not to tolerate the presence on her borders of a rival power comparable to her own. Yet even this was from every point of view a war of liberty, and the great division of British sympathies in the matter was partly due to the claim of both sides that liberty was the principle for which they fought: the North for human and individual liberty; the South for local liberty, the liberty of every state to regulate its own action, and in the last resort to establish its own government.

As we sailed from New York on a dreary January afternoon, the great buildings were soon shrouded in mist, which hid all ill-assorted elements, and showed nothing but sombre towering masses. From a few miles distance these form themselves into two groups, the Woolworth building thrusting up like a great cathedral spire, and the rest, a little lower, grouping like a high-pitched nave. Long after dark I looked back from the ship's stern towards New York, and there clear above the horizon were the dim lights of the city sky-line, with one bright flare above them all.

What kind of splendour was I going to find in Europe: palaces, fortresses, churches, symbols of domination in this world, or of aspirations towards another too often founded in despair of this? And here in America, rising above the city squalor, are the business offices of men and women, constituting the nerve ganglia of a

commercial continent. At first, I confess, I was a little ashamed of being so much impressed by the overwhelming bigness of the New York sky-line, but one soon grows to be proud of it. These sky-scrapers are the brain-cells of a civilization bound together by a commerce-nexus that is, with all its shadier sides, essentially beneficent. Let them frankly glory in themselves as though here on Manhattan democratic civilization had at last dared to stand erect.

From New York I crossed direct to Bergen, in Norway, seeing nothing of my native islands but a few barren rocks in the Orkneys, and the tiny town of Kirkwall. What if that had been all there was? A Boston lady had given me a grievous shock before I left by soberly and earnestly expressing the sentiment that the poverty and degradation she had seen in English towns were so appalling that (having given birth to the United States) it were better that England were henceforth sunk in the sea. The sting of her sentence upon us was more than half removed by her naïve belief that her own land was practically without poverty. But her words have, nevertheless, often haunted me. That it should be possible for an intelligent and cultivated visitor to our shores to think even for a moment that it would be a better and happier world if we were gone, like Sodom and Gomorrah, cannot but give one food for thought. Every nation judges itself by its aims, and its vision is prophetic; we judge one another by results, and our vision is photographic. Nor are these photographs usually recent. It takes years for the facts of a nation's life to come through into the common knowledge of other peoples. Abroad one finds an opportunity of seeing one's own country in the cold light of present or past performance, without the visionary gleam which blurs its darker features. And one finds opportunity to see other lands as living and growing things, instead of statistical aggregations, or as they appear depicted in humorous anecdote, and in the vision of some master who wrote ten, twenty, fifty years ago.

III.

The journey across Norway and Sweden to Stockholm is in some ways further psychologically than the voyage from New York to Bergen. The Norwegians are another of those wayward and erratic sea-peoples whom the continentals find so hard to comprehend.

The beauty and wonder of that mid-winter day on which we crossed the Scandinavian backbone were eloquent of the people bred amongst them. The Norwegians are a race at once casual and strenuous, friendly but uncommunicative, untidy yet permeated with artistic feeling in everything they produce, from roads and bridges to knives and spoons. That slender thread of line they

have built, and on which we crept that day along the precipitous sides of ice-bound lakes and fiords, past snow-shrouded villages, up into fairy valleys of frosted birch-trees, is a characteristic feat of Norwegian resolution. The crisp air was filled with brilliant sunshine, while the torrents below us could be heard growling under their chains. Slowly we wound our way high up amidst the glaciers and fog-hung rocks, and deep through barren summits in ten-mile tunnels, until the short day began to fail. This railway, built patiently year after year by a poor and scattered folk to connect two little towns about the size of, say, Devonport and Newcastle, across a thinly-peopled and sometimes entirely desert region of 300 miles, is in its way, amid circumstances so different, a demonstration of will-power and genius that need not fear comparison with the city on Manhattan.

When one enters Sweden, with her lakes and forests, her hills and rivers, one seems to have reached a land equally far from the Atlantic and from dreams of high emprise. Her ideal is smoothness, efficiency, scholarship, scientific method, leisure, not to say pleasure, and peaceful advance. The Swedes have everything that makes a nation great except transcendent genius, which is just what the Norwegians possess in so rare a degree. From a poor and scattered people, whose numbers are considerably less than half the population of greater London, have come in our own day not only explorers like Nansen and Amundsen, but immortal artists like Ibsen and Grieg. The Norwegian, adventurous and original, has given the world a new sport, with his peculiar snow-shoe; while the methodic Swede has given it a scientifically perfected system of physical drill. Sweden also originated the unheroic, but none the less admirable, Gothenburg system, and has recently made a further advance in the art of regulating, without abandoning, her national vice of drinking. In Stockholm the streets have recently been made respectable at nights by a system which neither England, nor Holland, nor France could imitate. Every man is obliged to carry with him a doctor's certificate defining the exact quantity of pure alcohol he may imbibe per diem, under severe penalties for exceeding this limit, imposed both on the purchaser and the vendor. And—strangest of all—it works!

The Swedes are a hospitable, generous-souled people, and a typical Swedish view of the War is that it is the tragedy of the Peloponnesian war repeated in Europe; the most civilized races of the earth strangling one another, to become the prey of a lower culture menacing them from the East. They see the fate of Belgium not without pity and grief, but they look nearer home at Finland—the land they once held and Europeanised—and ask, "Is it more cruel to fell a nation at a single blow than slowly to crush out its life for ever?" Amongst the intellectuals the general

expectation was doubtless at first that the Central Powers would ultimately prove the stronger,—the implicit faith in Germany's military machine leading to the expression of the view that the raising of Kitchener's Army was a tragic sacrifice of millions of helpless amateurs. Indeed, they seemed to look upon it much as we should if we heard of a new navy manned by clerks and bricklayers setting out to fight the British Grand Fleet.

It must not, however, be supposed that the country is solidly pro-German. Far otherwise. The working classes are mainly for England and France. The King is at least neutral. Many of the intellectuals see clearly the exaggerated nature of the Russian fear, and ardently advocate a rapprochement with England. But there can be little doubt that the majority of Swedes accept the arming of nations as in the order of nature, and the view is not uncommon that the British are guilty of a grave responsibility in having so long neglected to fill their place in the military scheme of Europe.

In Holland, which I next visited, a very different attitude prevails. The tragedy of to-day for the Hollander is not *this* war, as it is for the Swede, but the possibility of *any* war, and the appalling economic waste of even peace armaments. To realise the heroic pacifism of this small people one must read the diplomatic correspondence in the early stages of this war, on the subject of shipping, between the Dutch Foreign Office and those of England and Germany. At that time it was as impossible for England to defend Holland against Germany, as for Germany to defend her and her colonies against England. Yet, standing at the mercy of either of these two colossi, she corresponded first with one and then with the other, in a spirit of proud, not to say defiant, rectitude. In the full consciousness that within a space of ten days either of us might have reduced her historic cities to dust-heaps, or drenched her fertile flats in blood, she addressed us, both alike, as though principles of equity and international law were the only powers guiding the acts of nations, and as though no such thing existed as the difference between small powers and great.

It is well understood, however, that such an attitude can only remain permanently possible with the victory of the Allies, and the great majority of the Dutch look for this event with silent longing scarcely less ardent than our own. They believe that the security of their national existence is at stake, and in no country is the national sentiment more deep and passionate. The colonial empire which they have inherited from past centuries, but have now no navy to defend, is to them both a world of romance in itself, and the living memory of a glorious past. Nothing is more unthinkable than the quiet absorption of Holland by one of her great neighbours. Any attempt to engulf her would be met by a quality of obstinate

and resourceful resistance calculated finally to baffle the greatest power. Not only every military but every industrial device would be resorted to and maintained.

The Dutch are conscious of being in no sense inferior to any of us except in mere brute force and size. In civil and religious liberty, in probity of public life, Holland stands by the side of England. But it would be truer to say that she conferred these upon us with the Revolution of 1688 than that she had learnt them from us. In the field of art even France cannot boast a longer period of fine painters; Rembrandt is unique and universal as Shakespeare and Beethoven are unique and universal. In science and criticism she rivals England and France in originality, Germany in laborious and painstaking research. Indeed, she combines the best culture of England, France, and Germany in a degree hardly credible. Her children learn to read and speak all three languages, and frequently study Latin and Greek too. It is little wonder that they pay for this in a certain loss of childish liberty and gaiety. And it is possible that the burden of foreign languages to be learnt has prevented their own literature from rising to the level of their painting. This would account for the fact that Holland to-day hardly takes the place in the conscious thought of Europe to which her moral and intellectual powers entitle her.

In Switzerland one finds oneself again in the continental zone, with its characteristic ideals and outlook: efficiency, obedience, smoothness, faith in the army and in military method—characteristics which prove to be consonant with a free, democratic, and federal state. A conversation I had with a shop-girl in Berne admirably summarizes the national sentiment as I found it.

The German Swiss, she told me, were principally, but not all, in favour of Germany; "except those who had been to England, and they, of course, were for England!" The French Swiss were all for France, but they (the German Swiss) had no fear of their being disloyal to Switzerland, and if they occasionally became more demonstrative than was felt prudent or acceptable to the German Swiss, they were not to be taken too seriously, "because we know that they are more excitable than we are." As for Belgium, Yes, everyone was sorry for Belgium, and everyone took it for granted that she would be restored and compensated after the war. "But it seems to us rather strange," she said, "that they were not more prepared. Of course, I suppose they were relying on England, but we know why the Germans did not march through our country—because we have five hundred thousand men always ready at six hours' notice to take the field. Everyone has his gun in his house, and knows where to go as soon as he is wanted." The moral of

which appears to be that mountains and a gun in your house are more solid realities than scraps of paper. One might search Holland wide and long for a corresponding judgment on the case of Belgium.

This typical conversation is the more interesting from the fact that no people is more earnestly humanitarian than the Swiss. Granted that the right of a nation to survive lies in virtue of its strong right arm, even so our common humanity transcends all national rights. The original Red Cross was born in Switzerland, and it was my privilege in Lausanne to see the immense "Prisoners' Information Bureau" whereby news of hundreds of thousands of prisoners is conveyed to their anxious families, and *vice versâ*. It was humiliating to contrast this smooth-running organization with one extemporized since the war, in London—the offices of our Belgian Refugees Committee in Aldwych. Never have I seen so vast and complex a work performed with so much efficiency and so little circumstance as in those three cellar-rooms at Lausanne. Never have I seen one conducted with so much circumstance and so little efficiency as at Aldwych. After all, the continentals can often make our insular institutions look foolish in the extreme.

My particular purpose did not, unfortunately, call me to Italy at that time, but I cannot forbear to quote from the letter of a young Italian a sentiment particularly germane to my subject. Addressing his English father-in-law, he writes words to this effect:—"As I leave for the front I wish you to remember two things. In the first place, that I would ask no better fate than to die for my country, and for the recovery of the Trentino. And, in the second place, that you will talk none of that French sentimentality or English hypocrisy about dying in the cause of international morality." This frankly "Prussian" sentiment, of course, by no means completely represents the movement which brought Italy into the war on our side. But it seems to indicate that Italy is deeply influenced by the philosophy of the power she so long allied herself with, and it is not impossible that—nearly sea-girt though she is, she inherits something of the psychology of Rome, whose utmost land frontier traversed three continents, and whose military organization has left so strong an impress upon all the Latin countries.

No country is harder to characterize than France. Her psychology seems to many to have undergone a radical change since the declaration of war. Everywhere one hears surprise, amounting to something like awe, at the "silence of France." But France has always had two souls. On the one hand, she shares to the full the characteristics of the nations of the Atlantic sea-board.

Like the rest of us, she is adventurous, individualistic, democratic, and independent; more than any of us she is full of fiery audacity and originality. But she is also logical, rigid, exacting, bureaucratic and centralized—the most imperial, the most Roman, power of all.

A trivial and personal but typical little incident occurred as I crossed the French frontier into Switzerland. It was at the Customs examination, early one cold April morning. After the examination of our luggage we had to pass the more exacting examination of passports, and the officials were sharply on the lookout for Germans with false papers. When at last I reached the barrier I passed the first official to show my papers to one I saw was disengaged. I was called sharply back, a summons which of course I obeyed promptly but not apologetically. A fair French smile struggled with the official scowl as my examiner muttered in French, "You're an Englishman all right."

In certain ways the Englishman and Frenchman are so unlike one another, both institutionally and psychologically, that it seems to have been necessary for us to pass together through a life-and-death struggle in order to get to know and understand one another. Yet even this could not have brought it about but for the generosity of the spirit of France. "It is easier," says William Blake, "to forgive an enemy than to forgive a friend." Yet, from the highest officials downwards, there appeared to be a quiet unquestioning confidence in the good understanding between the two nations. Anyone who looks forward to a closer fellowship between the civilized peoples of the world cannot be too grateful for this fact. It might so easily have been otherwise. For my own part, I find it hard to say where the finer quality of chivalry lies, in our ungrudging bestowal of help, or in France's ungrudging acceptance of it.

IV.

But indeed, all the Atlantic nations are something more than friendly to us to-day, and this despite the acute diplomatic difficulties which the practical blockade of Germany has provoked. For we have all earned a living on the sea, and have drunk deeply of the ideals which the sea has fostered in us. If France has remained the most military of us, she has proved that it is from no wish of her own. She recently attempted to establish a reduction of her term of service; she has always supported efforts to enlarge the scope of the Hague Tribunal; and she was obviously unprepared for aggression when this fatal war broke in upon her land. The sea, which is no man's territory, has brought us all together, and it is from the sea there will sooner or later inevitably rise a world-order from which no power can stand aside. I cannot think from what I see in Europe and the world that our long supremacy on the

sea has been seriously abused, or that it has done anything but prepare the way for a consenting federation of the earth. Norway, before joining the Scandinavian pact for a common foreign policy, made it plain that, whatever Denmark and Sweden might do, she stood by us. Over the whole world, she said, England had opened trade routes, established security, buoyed dangerous channels, and given these advantages without grudge to every mercantile marine of the world. Portugal, recognizing the temptations we have sometimes resisted to appropriate her unprotected colonial possessions, has come to trust us implicitly, and to regard herself as our ally. Denmark and Holland, though both having long sea frontiers and jealously treasuring their distant and exposed possessions, have, so far as sea-power is concerned, practically disarmed. France, as is well known, recently removed her navy to the Mediterranean. And a widespread attitude in America is aptly expressed in the amusing story of the German who objected to the American' proposal for universal disarmament. "But some provision would have to be made for policing the world," said the German. "There would always be the British Navy," replied the American.

The centuries of warfare in which we fought Spain and Portugal, Holland, Denmark, France and America, ended in our holding a paramount position on the sea for a hundred years. And it is in that hundred years that our sometime foes have gradually come to form with us a genuine fellowship of nations, in which international law was fast becoming as binding as national law and a universal tribunal the recognized court of appeal. This fellowship has an inevitable tendency to grow wherever the approach to a country is by sea. Japan would never have fought her recent war with Russia had it not been for the new land approach of the Siberian railway. She is now helping England with an enthusiasm scarcely recognized. The South American States are in the main silently with us, and if the United States is politically neutral to-day, it is certain that in the unhappy event of a renewal of the struggle in some future generation, America will come to our aid as inevitably as we came to the aid of France.

It is our unique position in the Atlantic fellowship that affords the only true sense in which we are the champion of the smaller nations. Compared with Germany, America and Russia, we are ourselves a small people, entirely unable to protect all the weaker races of the earth. But in the Atlantic area the sanctity of local patriotism which is the inspiration of our own Empire has gradually asserted itself, and here our power is an effective bulwark of the smaller nations. It was when Germany, who had reaped a rich harvest from the benefits of this Atlantic fellowship, transgressed its spirit by attacking France and overwhelming Belgium, that she

challenged us to its defence. And its triumph in the victory of England and France is the great hope for the establishment of a genuine world polity.

V.

Behind the westward-facing powers of the coast of Europe one enters, as has been said, a zone where a different psychology exists. In Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and even Sweden, a relatively high importance is attached to routine efficiency and diligent investigation, as compared with adventurous enterprise and resource. Italy, on the one hand, and France on the other, are not so easily classified; but, generally speaking, the sea peoples have versatility where the continentals have painstaking thoroughness, outlook where the others have concentration, great individual initiative where the others have highly departmental organization. Whether or not connected with this, either as cause or as effect, it is also true that among the sea peoples a nation's independent character tends to be regarded as something founded on language, race, or national consciousness, and amongst the continentals as founded upon its organized military resources. No doubt both points of view are generally accepted as relative to the question, and it is difficult to draw a true generalization. But the striking difference in *emphasis*, even in small countries like Denmark and Holland, as against Sweden and Switzerland, is significant of a real psychological divergence.

Now it has frequently been alleged that the "armament" psychology of continental Europe is due to the menace of Russia from the East. This, it was said, compelled the Central Powers to maintain immense armies for protection, with the result that they drove their western neighbours into the armament race. The view seems so logical, and derives so much support from the horror felt by the advanced political nations for Russia's repressive internal policy, that it has been accepted uncritically by many of us. It ought, however, to have received fresh consideration after the attempt and failure of the Tsar's proposal for the Hague scheme of general disarmament. If Russia had been the prime difficulty in the way, this step ought to have led to some more definite result in the direction proposed. Even more striking to us was the fact of our repeated endeavours, and our repeated failure, to come to an agreement with Germany for naval reductions. It is evident that the difficulty was not in the East, but in the centre; for, however large our navy, it could never be the menace to Germany that the Russian armies might be; and it became obvious that the German navy had grown beyond the requirements of defence against France and Russia.

Nevertheless, the fact remained that Germany, situated between

France and Russia, had long been in a state of nervous tension. France had a permanent grievance against her, and if it was true that Russia, under a cloak of pacifism, was waiting her hour to strike, this would explain the German armies, if not the navy. At all events, it seemed necessary for anyone wishing to gain a first-hand view of the whole situation to visit Russia. Accordingly I set out early in the summer to discover, if I could, whether our alliance with Russia, was a purely military exigency, the alliance of a radically aggressive with a radically pacific civilization, or if she was, as her action in calling the Hague tribunal suggested, a natural ally of our Atlantic fellowship.

In visiting Russia I discovered, what I had so often heard, that an Englishman who went there was destined to leave his heart behind with the Russian people. This makes the question all the more insistent, How can so lovable a people possess a form of government in certain ways so hateful? And the answer given in Russia is that for centuries Russia has been dominated by Teutonic influences that have poisoned her life at the core. Peter the Great was obliged to draw upon German efficiency and knowledge for means to further his westernising of Russia. He preferred England and Holland, but the proximity of Germany made the Teuton the readier resource. Unfortunately, the psychology of these two races is deeply opposed, and the attempt at amalgamation has proved injurious to both.

Taking the Prussian at his best, I suppose one may say that his watchword is duty, his paramount duty being to the state. But there can be no doubt that the thing that moves the Slav is his affection, and he is incapable of recognizing a duty to anything that does not command his devotion. He has great talent for organization, and the communal life is as natural to him as the family affections; but a bureaucratic hierarchy is something alien and incomprehensible to him, and a government machine, demanding for its efficient administration a cold impersonal sense of duty, had no appeal to the Russian temperament. The officials became corrupt and negligent of the machine, or enforced it upon an unreceptive people by ruthless penalties and repression. It is a piteous tale, and the great hope of this war is that, the machine having to some extent broken down, the local and truly indigenous organization of the country will succeed in maintaining the very important position which it has won during the crisis. Russia has at last had a chance to learn to recognize her own national genius, and it is already a great gain for her to have publicly labelled all her worst offences "German." Even if this is only partly just, it makes it hard for her to return to her vomit.

The view that her crimes are due to some kind of indigestion of an alien element gains support from the fine influences always

clearly at work in the Russian government during the past hundred years. Few countries, if any, can boast a better record of chivalrous action abroad, or of great reforms at home. The present eradication of her national vice of drunkenness is typical. The reform is largely voluntary, as it is not impossible to obtain small quantities of certain spirituous liquors, but it has been estimated that ninety-eight per cent. of the population is now absolutely teetotal, and this is certainly not too high an estimate so far as my observations went. Largely as a result, no doubt, of this, I found a Russian crowd the most delightful company in the world. One never tired of watching the very English-looking children playing their vigorous games in the Petrograd public gardens. The picturesque streets and fine parks of Moscow, the terraces overlooking the Volga at Yaroslav, and Nijni, are full of people so like ourselves that even the very unfamiliar language does not disturb one's sense of being at home; and there are scenes at wayside stations, where the crowds gathered to send off parties to the front, that must always bind one to this cheerful, tender, dauntless people.

Russia may have armies greater than any nation in the world, but the Russians can never be a militarist people. She may have longer to struggle for her popular liberties than any of us, but in the end she will get them. The position of her railways may be dictated by her military needs, but meanwhile they circulate industry, ideas, and education, which will make her future sure. Rome built roads for her armies, but Britain created railways for her commerce, and the railway is the ship come ashore. The vast plains of Siberia and European Russia, like those of Canada and the United States, are rapidly opening their wealth to this new vehicle of commerce, which sprang from our sea-civilization. In countries where the current of political thought was already set, it may have failed to reverse the trend, but it will yet turn the still green civilization of Russia to the type of the Atlantic powers.

And the same will happen in Germany, too, when, and only when, she admits the miscarriage of her military ambitions. Europe and the earth will be grouped into larger corporations as the centuries succeed one another. This is a process which has never been permanently arrested since the dawn of history. The question at issue to-day is as to which type these larger groupings shall follow. Are they to be founded upon a military organization, irresistibly imposing its authority, or are the bonds to be those of spontaneous association in which every land preserves its own historical characteristics, its own patriotic sentiment, and contributes its own genius to the common tasks of civilization? We are fighting to decide whether human corporations are to be of the type that is bound from without, or by something springing from within. It is

impossible for this latter type to be absorbed by the former without destruction. The Atlantic group can never become part of a Germanic polity. On the other hand, if the Atlantic civilization prevails the continental powers will still contribute all that is great in them to the common stock; their massive sense of the corporate life and of the finality of scientific method are all important correctives to so much that is slovenly and unsocial in the British, French, and American civilization.

Even Germany, in the end, will find, like the rest of us, that the scope of her genius is enlarged by the reversal of her military organization. No friend of the world, or even of Germany herself, ought to wish her to come out triumphant from this struggle. A young Russian officer, at a moment of many Russian disasters, said to me as he left for the front, with that light in his eyes we have learnt to know at home, "Yes, this is a blessed war for Russia." The ordeal Russia has passed through will leave her a permanently nobler land. And it will be a blessed war for Germany, if and when she is obliged to realize her military failure. It is our unsuccessful crimes that teach us to understand the sordid nature of crime. Let Germany fail, and she will then look at Belgium and France and Poland and Serbia and Armenia, at the Atlantic, at Austria, and at her own desolated land, and she will have to endure the fierce purgatory of *seeing* what she has *done*. No nation has ever had to expect a more terrible awakening, but if she wakes, posterity may yet look upon this war and say, "Yes, that was a blessed war for Europe."

JOSEPH WICKSTEED.

Westminster: an Interpretative Survey.

I.

Method: the Non-National Unit.

II.

The Mediæval City: its Survivals and Tendencies.

I.

Method: the Non-National Unit.

Though we are about to introduce to the reader what is probably for him a somewhat novel mode of presenting history and using historic analysis for the interpretation of current events, our purpose happily does not necessitate any deep or extensive discussion of method. We need only address ourselves to two simple issues. The first is to indicate the traditional lines of study and research which we seek to continue and develop. The second is to outline the general framework within which we propose to present each historic scene of our interpretative series.

An "interpretative survey" has, we conceive, its purpose and justification in the "outline of policy" which it yields and which is really its extension into the world of practice. On this ground alone it should be evident that our survey of Westminster in no way competes with, and still less makes pretension to supersede, such standard ones as that of Booth on the economic side or of Besant on the historical. On the contrary, we assume both these works as starting points of our own somewhat different endeavour. We not only utilize their data, selecting from their inexhaustible treasuries what is relevant to our purpose, but we even endorse and adopt their methods as far as they can be made to serve our ends.

Besant's vision of Westminster was a drama of romantic personalities; or when not rising to the dramatic level, it was at least a pageant of the picturesque past.[1] The essential characteristic of his aspiration to recreate the scenes of the past in lifelike pictures is expressed in the circumstance that he prepared himself—as it were—to write his chapter on the mediæval Abbey by a visit to the contemporary Benedictine Abbot of Downside.

Charles Booth, on the other hand, in looking at Westminster (as in looking at any other region of London), sees the contemporary city of daily life and toil. For him Westminster is a group of families needing for maintenance definite quantities of food, clothing and shelter, and most of them continuously struggling to rise above the poverty line, or to save themselves from falling below it. And the institutions of the city—more especially its churches and chapels, its schools and taverns—he sees as mainly noteworthy in that they advance or retard the family's daily struggle for survival.

Up to a point the methods of both investigators are the same. The ideal exploitation of each method would involve a house to

1. In his Survey of Westminster he follows this method more closely than in his Survey of London.

house visitation. But while Besant asks: "Of what historic romance has this house been the scene? what notability, maybe, lived here and bequeathed to the place an atmosphere of sentiment? what part did he or she play in the history of the nation, what contribute to its roll of glory?"—Booth, on the other hand, asks about each house, "Who lives here to-day? what income does the family receive? how earned, how spent, and with what result on domestic wellbeing? what neighbouring institutions relate the members of the family to the social life around them, and with what result on the family and the neighbourhood?" The many-sided Besant was, to be sure, an observer and a lover of contemporary no less than historical romance; but he searched for it in mansion and cottage, in mine and counting house, on the seas and the mountains, even (as was the fashion in those days) in the slums—anywhere in short rather than in the daily life of that plain citizen's household which fills the foreground of Booth's canvas.

These two contrasted standpoints—one personal, dramatic and historic, the other social, economic, institutional—we have tried to keep in view throughout our survey, and it has been our effort to combine the data gleaned from each into a single composition.

But we have endeavoured also to continue and develop a third traditional approach to the understanding of the present. The concept of the Future as open to exploration through an investigation of the Present, which again is intelligible in terms of the Past, is a product of those studies which in the eighteenth century flourished under the title Philosophy of History. Two seventeenth century precursors of this line of research well expressed its fundamental affirmations in memorable phrases. "The present," said Leibnitz, "is charged with the past and big with the future." Again, the continuity of past, present and future was tersely put in the saying of Pascal (usually attributed to Lessing, who elaborated it in an essay) that the more perfect and ordered the record of tradition, the more the human race becomes as one man, always living, always learning.

During the past two or three generations the "philosophy of history" has fallen into discredit, and practically ceased as a serious occupation for historians. Subjugated by the German ideal of exhaustive research—generally research into the documentary minutiæ of a restricted and more or less arbitrary "period"—our professors of history have not only neglected, but even poured contempt upon the search for unified vistas.[1] Yet the quest of unification, in which the philosophers of history were so deeply concerned, was formerly a main impulse to historic inquiry in its

1. The present state of these studies in our universities may be inferred from the following facts. "The Cambridge Modern History," designed to embody the highest results of English historical scholarship, was intended

accepted modern form, so that the want of respect for the wider pre-occupation implies either some want of memory or of gratitude. And it is even a question whether the prevailing academic disrespect for an ideal and a quest which postulated the rationality of world history and stressed the unity of mankind is not chargeable with a large share in producing—or in giving intellectual sanction and expression to—the present fissure of western civilization into an affair of internecine rivalries of nationalities and states.

But let us not be misunderstood. We plead for no abandonment of minute factual research, nor even for its diminution; but only for its subordination to synthetic ideals, and its emplacement in a larger orientation of studies and purposes. We plead also for a broader interpretation of the concept "document," and to that end would generalize the example of Besant, who (as we have seen) affirmed in the most practical way his belief that for a study of the Benedictine Order, a live Benedictine abbot was a primary and indispensable "document." This is by the way. What we desire to affirm is our belief that a renewal and development of the "Philosophy of History" is urgently needed and that not only for its own sake but also because it should prove an active solvent

to wind up with a survey and examination of philosophies of history. In the opinion of Lord Acton, projector and architect of the work (and its editor throughout, had he lived) there was one man only in Great Britain capable of presenting that culminating study—and he was a Scottish theologian with a leaning to the French systematic tradition. To Professor Flint, accordingly, Lord Acton appealed in a letter in which he said: "That we may conclude well and with effect I have proposed that the last chapter should be on operative philosophies of history, on condition of course that you consent to write it *there will be no such chapter if you should inauspiciously decline.*" The italics are ours, and further comment is perhaps superfluous. Yet the sequel is worth noting. (1) Flint being unable to comply, the History appeared without the needed philosophical survey which should have completed and indeed crowned it. (2) Acton died before the first volume was published; and in the hands of his successors and their collaborators the great work projected by this illustrious Liberal (in no partisan sense of that term) has become in effect—without advertisement, without intention, and largely without its being perceived—the chief literary monument of the anti-idealist and anti-democratic Reaction which has prevailed so exceedingly during the past half generation, and perhaps nowhere more completely than among academic and scholastic professionals of England. (3) Prof. Flint died more recently; and the fact was noted by "The Athenæum," if we remember aright, in a line or two of its Literary Gossip, where it announces also the special contents of forthcoming popular magazines. Yet to many that death seemed the passing of the last of the Europeans: in the sense in which the great thinkers and scholars of the Middle Age and the early Renaissance were Europeans—not only in audience and reputation but in the habitual view and abode of their mind.

of national animosities and so would make for the recovery of European sanity. For the needed re-orientation of traditional studies many changes, alike of form and substance, are pre-requisite. One of the most vital pre-requisites, it seems to us, is that students of historical synthesis should agree upon some *non-national* unit of investigation, and that it should be a unit which, like the "species" of naturalists, is unquestionably adapted to those concrete collective methods of research which, in the long run, ensure some measure of definite progress in the established sciences. That such a concrete unit is afforded by the "city" is an assumption running throughout the present endeavour to interpret Westminster—Past, Present and Incipient—by the aid of concepts derived in considerable measure from various traditional schools of the philosophy of history.

Thus, in so far as our method has novelty, the novelty resides in an attempt to present the history of a representative city in terms of personal drama, and simultaneously also in terms of economic and social institutions and the general movement of civilisation. In other words, we seek to combine (in principle) the historic or dramatic method of Besant with the observational or scientific method of Booth and the generalised method of philosophy. But these methods are rather two than three, since the observations and classifications of science, whether of things past or present, have their natural and proper fruit in the generalizations of philosophy. For this two-fold enterprise a special notation has to be contrived, and it should be one that has the qualities of symbolism at its best, *i.e.*, at once pictorial and diagrammatic. Such a desideratum means, of course, a large initial difficulty. But the difficulty, which is at first an obstacle, should act also as a stimulus when we remind ourselves that progress in the arts and the sciences alike is intimately associated with the development of notation. The scheme of notation here offered (though the product of many years' experimentation by the present investigators, and of at least two generations of predecessors) is, of course, to be regarded only as a provisional solution—a first approximation towards the more perfect system that would grow out of a more extended research and more enlightened endeavour.

The scheme exhibits the element of personal drama in 84 sketches which compose into the larger groupings of a developing series of social situations. All of these, again, may be read not in terms of personality but of types inheriting and transmitting a given tradition; acted on by a given milieu and, in turn, reacting on it. When so read the history of the city, previously observed as a drama of personalities, appears in the impersonal guise of social evolution. By a little effort the notation may be read both ways simultaneously, just as a pianist reads at the same time bass and

treble of the musical score. And, as the bi-manual efforts of the musician are rewarded by the revelation of higher harmonies, so the civic student discovers in the end that this two methods are really one, for he comes to see the process of social evolution as itself a higher kind of drama: nothing less poignant than the drama of the human Prometheus in ceaseless contest for the mastery of his fate. And is it not true that in this continuing labour of the Titans the city is incomparably the most efficient instrument of mastery and likewise its highest reward, doubly therefore symbol of victory? And if so, then it follows that each citizen, in the measure that he identifies his own life with that of his city, becomes participant in this the supreme drama of life—a drama in which the historic cities are assuredly the most abiding players, for is not their influence undying? Our notational scheme, then, is devised to show the life of the citizen intertwining with that of his city, and both together playing a rôle of increasing clearness, purpose and achievement in the sæcular drama of Humanity, of which the whole world is the stage.

For illustration of the method let us turn to Plate I. (between pp. 267 and 268)—"Mediæval Westminster"—and consider its framework and the placing of the twelve drawings therein. Recalling that the distinction between State and Church, now of secondary import, was in mediæval times primary and vital and in the daily consciousness of all alike, high and low, we describe that elemental bifurcation in the more general form of contrasted but co-ordinated Temporal and Spiritual Powers. The drawings on the left hand page show three successive phases of the Temporal Power; the drawings on the right hand page show the corresponding phases of the Spiritual Power.

As representing the Temporal Power the king with his barons occupy the first square and the serfs—later becoming townsmen—the second square. These two aspects or hemispheres of the Temporal Power are shown in three successive phases as they change from time to time. On the opposite page are shown in a parallel series of views the corresponding Spiritual Power as represented by the Secular Clergy with their flock in the first square, and the Regular Clergy in the second.

Here, then, in Plate I., we present a picture of mediæval Westminster as a typical city of its era. The bottom line of four drawings read horizontally across the double page shows what might be technically called the "social situation" characterizing the origins of mediæval Westminster; the second line shows the "social situation" at the climax of the era, and the third or top line that of its decline. The twelve sketches taken altogether are designed as a *time section* of the middle age in its growth, maturity and decline. Each of the three horizontal sets taken by itself is

designed to serve as a working model of the mediæval system at a given phase of its development.

Now the transition from the middle ages is, as it were, the hinge of modern history. Of the many transformations which turn on that hinge one of the most significant is the change in thought from the controlling idea of social fixity to that of social development. The very notion of a social science emerged, in point of historical fact, at the moment when Comte detected in the vital components of the mediæval system *general types*, and proclaimed them as the formative elements of all social mutations. In that moment of insight into the social process the science of sociology was born. It is therefore in direct continuity with the main line of sociological tradition that we should take our analysis of the mediæval city and make it the pattern of our general framework. In other words, by re-naming its parts in general terms, the framework is made to serve also for other periods.

Hence, for the analysis and description of subsequent eras, use is made of Comte's generalization of the mediæval social quartet, Barons, Serfs, Seculars, Regulars, into Chiefs, People, Emotionals, Intellectuals respectively. In each case, the Chiefs and the People, dominantly functional in a given era, are—whatever their precise political or social description may be—termed its Temporal Power; similarly the Emotionals and Intellectuals, then dominantly functional, are termed its Spiritual Power—again adopting Comte's conception of history as the interplay of Temporal and Spiritual Powers.


In defence (if defence seems called for) of this somewhat apparitional and unexpected classification of social types as Chiefs, People, Emotionals and Intellectuals, it may be remarked that though introduced by Comte in this form into modern sociology, it outcrops in one form or another, with more or less clearness, in the writings of reflective observers from Plato and Aristotle to H. G. Wells and Arnold Bennett. Plato's Guardians, Artisans, Poets and Philosophers are manifestly chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals. Even such also are Aristotle's Citizens, Labourers, Teachers and Philosophers. Amongst Mr. Wells' "Modern Utopians" the normal types were classed as Kinetics and Poietics, each of which again exhibited two main varieties, the more active and the more passive—that is, there were plus kinetics and minus kinetics or chiefs and people; and plus poietics and minus poietics or emotionals and intellectuals. A verification wanting neither in directness nor actuality may be found in the fact that Mr. Arnold Bennett, with his keen naturalistic eye, found, in a recent visit to the Clyde, men in that complex situation sorting themselves out into Organisers, Workers, Energisers, Initiators—a nomenclature

that goes straight to the root of the matter. Again, if a symbolism is wanted for the four types, one may be found ready made in the tradition that gives us our playing cards. "Spades" is a misrendering of the Spanish espada, a sword, and obviously stands for the chiefs, while equally do clubs, hearts and diamonds for people, emotionals and intellectuals respectively.

Adopting, then, Comte's two master generalisations, and also his nomenclature both for social types and for social formations (as temporal and spiritual), let us lay out the formula in a way which will show, as it were, the anatomy of the social order. Taking squares of equal magnitude for the four social types, let us bring together the chiefs and the people on the left hand side, with a small intervening space, to indicate their partial and fitful cohesion as a Temporal Power. On the right we similarly indicate the natural separation of emotionals and intellectuals as social types, yet also their tendency to come together and constitute a Spiritual Power. Finally, by bringing all four into a single line and separating the temporal from the spiritual pair by a wider space, we indicate (*a*) that in any given "social situation" all four types tend to emerge and play their respective parts; (*b*) that the four elements of the situation compose into a temporal and a spiritual couple; (*c*) that these couples combine in varying degrees of intimacy and interdependence to organise, to work, to energise and to guide the "movement" that tends to issue from a "social situation," as a stream from its source. As a further convention with a touch of symbolism, an endeavour is made throughout to represent Temporal Powers by Exteriors and Spiritual Powers by Interiors.

It has, of course, to be remembered that in applying such a formula straightway for analysis of a whole city, state, nation, or civilization, we can only expect roughly approximate results. A "social situation" on a large scale has its real elements not so much in individual types as in a graduated set of minor "situations" to each of which in turn the formula should be first applied. Thus for adequate historical research innumerable subsidiary situations have to be analysed methodically, stage by stage, in an ascending series towards a climax which may be civic, national or supranational. Moreover the analysis of its varied temporal and spiritual powers should be made for each successive generation or, better still, each half generation of the period under investigation. Such a propædeutic obviously implies organised research far beyond the present endeavour, which must needs content itself with a modest tentative.

Thus the general scheme here adopted for analysis and presentation of each successive social phase is:—



It is this form we would stress with all emphasis as the KEY PLAN of the notational scheme. To practise the reading of history and to interpret current events in each of the two ways implied by the formula, and to continue the exercise until the mind works automatically in both the consequent methods, is our urgent counsel. Fill in each square with its relevant personalities, and you get the dominant social situation of the day read as drama. Trace the past filiations of these personalities and you get the dramatic reading of history. Interpret the same social situation in terms of temporal and spiritual powers and trace their past filiations, you get a rendering of contemporary life and of social evolution as the interplay of larger forces. Such forces, to be sure, work through individuals, but their efficient instruments are wars and religions, systems of law and philosophy, organized industries and experimental sciences. All of these have their institutional forms, which again integrate into the quasi-personal entities of city, nation, state, empire, etc. It is our contention, as stated above, that the city is the most concrete and continuous of these high protagonists, and consequently is the most suitable unit for naturalistic studies of social evolution. Moreover, by taking the city as our unitary concept in a purposive interpretation of evolving life, do we not the better preserve an ideal of "personality" as the culminating expression and supreme issue of life in evolution? Can the greatest of nations and empires compare with the historic cities in intensity of Personality, if we mean by Personality dynamic power to select and gather together the finest threads of life and out of them create noble and beautiful types of culture? Are not the great historic cities transcendent in this respect; and are they not so determinant in the moulding even of their most creative citizens, that these, as culture-heroes, splendid though they be, yet appear but the by-play of a civic demiourgos?

Departing but slightly from well established convention, we choose the following eras or "periods," through or in which to trace the growth of Westminster city:—

Historic—

1. Mediæval.
2. Renaissance and Reformation.
3. The Civil War and the Restoration.

Recent and Contemporary—

4. The Parliamentary era.
5. The Ministerial era.

Plates I. to V. thus trace the changing phases of Westminster proper (the precincts of the Abbey and of the Houses of Parliament, *i.e.*, the old city and Whitehall) in the above periods. In two final plates an endeavour is made to analyse and pourtray those tendencies which mark incipient Westminster.

The ever growing complexity of the modern order derives from the continuance and interaction of past "social situations" in the present formation. In this civi-complex, the aim of the historic survey is to analyse out with increasing approximation to reality first the simpler surviving "social situations" and next the incipient ones.

Hence a survey of contemporary Westminster resolves itself into (*a*) a study of surviving Temporal and Spiritual Powers, (*b*) a selection of such tendencies as we may observe and judge to be of special significance towards the development of Temporal and Spiritual Powers that are in course of incubation.

In sum our whole presentment is of the life of Westminster, historic and contemporary, as a drama in five acts (Plates I.—V.). That which our method enables us to discover of its continuation into the future is indicated in what might be called the Epilogue of Incipient Westminster (Plates VI. and VII.).

It may serve at once to display the character of our formula and to test its value if we essay an application to a topic of current interest. Consider the "social solidarity" instantly effected in each belligerent country by the outbreak of war. It was relatively easy for (say) Mr. Asquith and Mr. Will Crooks to combine with each other and with (say) the Rev. Dr. Clifford and Mr. Sidney Webb. Because the two former, though they do not have their precise spiritual equivalents in the two latter, yet match them historically, being all four representative respectively of chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals within the Parliamentary Order; all of them would place that institution centrally in their social system, though each might wish to use it differently from the other three. But not only did these four unite into a single quartet; further, they joined in the same orchestra with (say) Lord Derby and his peasant tenants, the Bishop of London and the Oxford professors of Divinity. And that was indeed a feat of harmony, since the latter four—as respectively surviving chief, people, emotionals and intellectuals of the mediæval order—would, under less exigent conditions, have sung to a note of different and

probably discordant pitch from that of the Parliamentarians. The truth is that the parliamentary scale and the mediæval scale are both of such range that at a certain pitch the characteristic note of each is capable of combining with the other into a simple harmonic chord. The rarity of the social combination measures the difficulty of discovering that particular pitch.

Now war is undoubtedly a great awakener, and it is all to the good that the nation should be roused so far towards unity. But when this good has been gained (confessedly at a severe cost) it at once presents to us a new and urgent issue—how not to be arrested there, still less to slide back, but to push on to a deeper and more lasting unity. This can scarcely be effected by war directly; for that, besides being an expensive and fitful way of evoking the simplest kind of national harmony, fails to evoke the more complex harmonies of ideas, perceptions and the goodwill to initiate, that are requisite for high social endeavour, and it has moreover the disadvantage of provoking a corresponding international discord.

William James projected as a countering ideal "the moral equivalent of War." The dangers of the lifeboat, of fire brigade and fever hospital service will always appeal to adventurous youth and are so far moral equivalents of war. But how to devise altruistic exploit on the grand scale that will fire the heart of whole social classes? It would be out of place to attack that problem here, but let it be remarked in passing that we hope to contribute something towards its solution later on in the survey. Here we have merely to claim a relevance for our method of historic notation, since that, we believe, is capable of a certain efficacy in the educational preparation that must be preliminary to the greater task of social unison.

To make this point clear let us again have recourse to the musical metaphor. Suppose, as indeed the metaphor assumes, that the chiefs and people, emotionals and intellectuals, of each order have their characteristic notes, all of the same pitch, and thus spontaneously compose into the distinctive—so to say "specific"—melody of that order. (There will, of course, be found several varieties of that particular melody as one passes under observation, in each separate nation of the same civilization, the surviving examples of the given social order.) Now, the supposition that the pitch of each social note is capable of composing with each and all the others into a chord of harmony depends of course upon our combining them according to the discoverable laws of some general music. That such a general music exists, at least for each nation, the example of the war shows; it also shows how little we know of its laws and their working.

It is our contention that the interpretative survey in its historic application is, as it were, a rough and ready first approximation to

a chromatic scale for the music of western civilization. If the student were diligently practised in its exercise, would not that constitute a sort of mental preparation for the higher social harmony? He would at least learn in turn to play the melody of each surviving historic order, and so might fit himself to take his part in the concert of the whole. And if by a change of habit in the fashion-making classes the pleasing process of musical adaptation by interpretative survey should become a customary educational discipline, we might not have to wait till the next war for another national concert!

In some vital respects the method of presentation outlined above is anticipated and applied to general history by Mr. Gooch in his "Annals of Politics and Culture," the original scheme of which, as the author tells us, was designed by that admirable Crichton of modern historians, Lord Acton. Mr. Gooch's book indeed may be used as a supplementary statement of events and items implicit in the "social situations" indicated in the drawings of our illustrative plates, so far as these, in exhibiting the history of Westminster, resume or reflect the general occidental history of their period.

"No presentation of history," says Mr. Gooch in his preface, "can be adequate which neglects the growth of the religious consciousness, of literature, of the moral and physical sciences, of art, of scholarship, of social life. Numerous handbooks deal with politics alone and a few with what the Germans call 'Kulturgeschichte,' but no systematic attempt has hitherto been made either in English or in other languages to combine them. The plan of the book, which not less than the idea, represents a new departure may be briefly explained. The left hand page deals with Politics, the right hand page, with what I have termed, for the sake of brevity, Culture. The Politics and Culture of each year are as nearly as possible level, in order that the reader may see at a glance what was taking place in the chief departments of thought and action at any given moment."

In his record of "politics," Mr. Gooch interprets that word in a wide sense and includes the main events of economic history. But taking "politics" in its narrower sense, it is roughly the history of the directing classes as they change from age to age. In this sense political history is the history of the "chiefs," and in a similarly restricted sense, economic history is the history of the "people." The politics and the economics of a particular era may be regarded as the two correlated facets of the form into which crystallizes the Temporal Power characteristic of that era. But as every individual action has its corresponding states of feeling and of thought, so the collective action systematized as political and economic has its emotional and intellectual accompaniment in that

grouped similarity of dispositions which prompts many individuals to common action. And when such similarity of disposition becomes sufficiently pervasive to give a distinguishing mark to the age, it takes form in various organisations which together become the dominant and effective spiritual power of that age.

The historical scholarship of the past two or three generations (largely under Germanic influence) has emphasized economic and political history, and has treated religion, art, literature and science as so far subordinate as to be practically negligible in the history of states and their policies, or in the determination of industrial development.[1] The result of this one-sided treatment of history is that no need has disclosed itself in recent writings, for a nomenclature to indicate the correlated two-fold aspect of public life as temporal and spiritual. Thus, when Mr. Gooch introduced the method of narrating "Politics" on one page and "Culture" on the opposite, he made a notable departure in English historical scholarship. It was indeed a bold attempt to return (to be sure, on a higher spiral) to a tradition antecedent to the present vogue, which isolates from the general milieu the State with its immediate scheme of interests, elevating them to that dizzy pinnacle on which they would seem now to be tottering.

Of all the western nations infected by this political erastianism, France, if it did not absorb least of the poison, has yet preserved in more vital activity the necessary corrective tradition. It is on that tradition we have drawn in an endeavour to continue Mr. Gooch's initiative, and to supplement it in our presentation of Westminster by a more systematic analysis of the contents represented by his "Politics" and "Culture." We adopt Comte's formulæ of historic analysis and filiation in amplest recognition of his genius, and of the genius of a nation which in its attempts to keep alight the spiritual torch in a material age has earned the title of "eldest daughter of the Church" in a deep sense, though perhaps not quite that originally intended. But with this acknowledgment of indebtedness must go also a *caveat* against possible misunderstanding. To borrow two analytical formulæ from the treasure house of Comte's innumerable generalizations manifestly

1. It is the misfortune and not the fault of German scholarship that its amplest development and consequent maximum influence on civilization should have coincided with that historic moment when political temporalities were most absolute in the Western world. The origins of that particular type of sovereignty were to be sure general rather than German, while the earliest authoritative theorizings from that point of view were not German but Italian, French and English. It was, nevertheless, the thoroughgoing German scholarship of the nineteenth century that gave system and academic status to the theory of the Absolute State throughout the universities of the world and especially impressed it on British and American professors of history and speculative politics.

implies no formal adherence to his philosophical system and still less to the practical applications of it which its author and his followers have sought to make. One may observe and wonder at the processional spectacle of "Chiefs and People," of "Emotionals and Intellectuals" all playing their parts in the never ending drama of Temporal and Spiritual Powers—a drama of unimagined complexity, for each combination struggles incessantly to maintain itself against rivals, predecessors as well as successors actual and incipient. Without being a Positivist one may thrill to this Pageant of the Past marching full-panoplied into the Future and creating the Present as it moves along—just as without being a Roman Catholic one may enjoy the moral satisfaction of fasting from meat on Fridays.

Truth to tell, the beguilements of political materialism and its twin vice of economic dialectics have little temptation for the student of history who, searching like the naturalist for concrete objects of observation, finds them in a "comparative anatomy" of cities. The reason lies in the very nature of cities. Perambulating the cities of Europe with map and guide-book in hand, and reading their past by the aid of survivals, the naturalist historian watches the rise and multiplication, now of cathedrals and abbeys, again of universities, academies, and museums; now of theatres, picture galleries and concert halls, again of schools, colleges, and all the manifold kinds of cultural and technological institute. These, the infinitely opulent manifestations of spiritual influences, clamour for attention and interpretation, not less but more insistently than do the castles of kings, the palaces of princes, the halls of legislators, or the bureaus of officials. Thus comes salvation from political materialism to the student of history who walks and watches. And to him also comes liberation from the vice of economic abstraction; since the highways and the waterways of commerce, the markets of traders and manufacturers, the exchanges of brokers and bankers, are certainly not less conspicuous to the peripatetic observer than to the sessile student of economic "documents." But it is impossible for the former to overlook and forget the homes and the family life that give meaning and purpose to all the apparatus and processes of trade and industry, for is not every city on first observation and in last analysis but a cluster of homes? It is a cluster of homes provided well or ill with means for continuing the life of the spirit from generation to generation. Through them the city as it develops becomes for good and evil the human and material embodiment of that continuing spiritual life. The generations of citizens in their passage reflect and absorb, create and are created by, the spirit of their city.

II.

The Mediæval City: its Survivals and Tendencies.

As to the origin of Westminster, we adopt the theory—so vividly elaborated by Besant and endorsed by our foremost geographer[1]—which makes it a Ford-Town, as London is a Bridge-Town. Let us therefore begin with the sketch (Plate I, fig. 2) which aims at reconstructing a typical scene at the ford. The era we select is that of the early Anglo-Saxon conversion to Christianity. London Bridge had not been built. Travellers and traffic from the north and the Midlands to the continent crossed the river at Westminster, because it was the first fordable place above the Thames estuary. Here therefore of necessity was the junction of the northern highways with the road to the continent which, passing through Rochester and Canterbury to Dover, ran along the firm ground between the estuary marshes of the Thames and the almost inpenetrable Weald forest.

The highway from the north, known as Watling Street, debouched at this ford and continued on the other side of the river as Dover Street. Later, when London Bridge was built, Watling Street took a bend in the neighbourhood of what is now Oxford Street and ran thence towards London and its bridge. Previous to that, travellers and drovers, packmen and pilgrims, who had traversed Watling Street continued along Park Lane into the Green Park (taking place-names as they are to-day). There they found themselves on the border of the marsh land that has become St. James's Park. This was crossed along a way indicated by stakes. At the further end of this way, and just on the edge of the river, where Westminster Abbey now stands, there was a little neck of firm and rising ground (some three or four feet above high tide mark) called Thorney Island.

Imagine the state of mind of our traveller or drover from the north as he stood on Thorney Isle about to venture on the passage of the great river. He had but just waded through a quarter of a mile of treacherous marsh and swamp before arriving at this exiguous and momentary *terra firma*. Now he must plunge bodily into the river, again committing himself to the sole material guidance and support of stakes, and would have to wade for it, maybe breast high; contending all the way against the force of the current, and nervously mindful of what might befall him at treacherous places in the muddy bed. Given a traveller about to embark on so perilous an adventure, easily conceived is his need of a priest to confess, absolve, and hearten him—to put him *en bon*

1. Mackinder. "Britain and the British Seas." P. 256.

PLATE I.



9. WESTMINSTER PALACE.



10. MARKET PLACE.



11. ST. MARGARET'S.



12. ABBEY SCRIPTORIUM.



3. WESTMINSTER HALL.



6. CRAFTSMEN BUILDING OWN HOUSES



7. PARISH CHURCH (WITH BISHOP).



8. MONK AND NOVICE.



1. KING SITTING AT JUSTICE.

2. THE FORD



3. PRIEST SHRIVING TRAVELLERS.



4. HERMIT.

MEDIAEVAL WESTMINSTER

courage, for the chances of this world and the next—by all the resources of religion. The resulting situation is depicted in fig. 3, where our artist shows a priest shriving travellers. Here then in the performance of such rites are the imaginative beginnings, not of Westminster Abbey and its Regular Clergy, but of its work-a-day complement, the parish church of St. Margaret's with its Secular Clergy. The work of the secular clergy in its broad social purpose was the emotionalizing of the people, by which we mean of course vitalizing, strengthening, calming. In that sense the seculars were the emotionals of the age, and the ceremonial ritual of the parish church must be judged as to its efficiency by these vital standards.

For the doing of justice in the disputes and crimes that would inevitably arise in such a situation as that of an incipient Ford-Town, we must imagine a periodic visitation of the King. Hence the sketch showing the royal judge sitting at justice in his tent with attendant knights (Fig. 1). If it be thought that this simple form of kingship is irreconcilable with present-day notions of royalty, the answer is that originating functions do not of themselves determine contemporary usage any more than good intentions necessarily make good deeds. Ceaseless social education is as needful in the one case as unending self-education is in the other. But if the confirmation of survival be desired, did we not recently learn from the press that King Nicholas of Montenegro numbered amongst his routine of duties the dispensing of justice in his capital from an open air seat under a tree, and that, moreover, he was, in person, his own chief of police?

We come now to the origin of the Abbey itself. Let us suppose that the conventual stage was preceded by that of the hermit. Where may we look for his original seat? There is to-day a block of buildings, known as St. Ermin's Mansions, a few hundred yards to the west of the Abbey, which may give us a clue. For it is so named because it stands on what used to be called Hermit's Hill, a slight eminence which was doubtless relatively higher before the successive building operations and road mendings of several centuries had raised the level of the surrounding soil. For the man of seclusion, a frequent moral type in the ages of religion and faith, this would be a natural site from which to observe the busy drama of the ford and yet remain himself detached from its activities. The opportunity to observe or retire at will into contemplation would supply the stimulus needed for successful pursuance of the meditative life. Such a simplest primitive origin of the cloistered and ordered life of the regular clergy is pictured in fig. 4. This stage has been put in the background for us by the more organized form and enduring memorials of that which succeeded, but it is well to recognise in the hermit the precursor of

the monk as we know him in the West. That general transition, which in early mediæval Europe took place so widely, from solitary hermits to conventual groups, would have its local illustration at the ford of Westminster in the foundation of the Benedictine Abbey which now stands there.

Passing over long centuries of preparatory development, let us come to the higher expression of the Middle Ages. As a social system its working may perhaps be seen at its best in Westminster about the middle of the twelfth century, in the time, say, of Henry II. A town has grown up on the island of Thorney, wherein liberated serfs are settled as craftsmen. A group of them (Plate I, fig. 6) is seen building one of those fine old timbered houses which testify to the artistic skill with which the people build for themselves, in a civilisation that has known how to incorporate them in the culture of the age.

The parish church of this town is shown in fig. 7, and was the round arch predecessor of the present St. Margaret's. The church, it will be seen, is thronged with worshippers, mostly townsmen and their families, but members of all classes are mingled in the devotion of the common faith. Let us assume the presence on this occasion of a neighbouring Bishop, officiating at some notable festival in the parish church. The emergence of the Bishop as a magistral personality, at once a religious and social power in the land, is one of the most significant and characteristic traits of the Middle Ages. The episcopal blessing was no piece of ritualistic punctilio but a real uplifting of the people. The effective sanctity and the far-reaching influence of the mediæval bishop rested on his real power of heartening the people, or at his will putting the fear of death and the torments of hell into the mind of wrongdoers, high as well as low. But the question is how and to what end did he use these unique powers? The cure of souls implied then as it is beginning to imply again the care of bodies, social and civic, as well as personal and domestic. In the social therapeutic of those times, the private and the public life were not divorced, but both were aspects of one single and indivisible life—that of the community. The bishop was therefore above all a designer and a builder of community life, parochial and civic, rural and urban. To concentrate and co-ordinate to this end all the available spiritual resources of the age was, is and must remain, the episcopal ideal.[1]

Turning to the chiefs in this the constructive phase of mediævalism, we observe that the growing organisation of justice from Westminster as a national centre has brought into existence

1. For a detailed study of how the episcopal system worked in the Middle Age through the popular theatre and other arts focussing in the cathedral, see Branford, "Interpretations and Forecasts," ch. v, pp. 204-232 (Duckworth & Co., 1914).

Westminster Hall, with its accompanying housing accommodation for the King and his court. A view of New Palace Yard from the river is shown in fig. 5. It received the epithet "new" when William Rufus added to the old Palace of Edward the Confessor the great Hall which is to-day all that survives above ground of that palace. The King is assisted by a Great Council, which later is to become the Parliament; but the old Palace, with its new hall, is still mainly to be thought of as the King's house in Westminster wherein he and his Council sit as Court of Judicature at certain times in the course of the year. The Court was an itinerant one, holding its sittings periodically for a routine of judicial and other functions at many different cities such as Winchester, Gloucester, Worcester, Lincoln, York, etc. These were the regional capitals which later sank to the status of "provincial towns," as the centralizing city grew—at their cost.

The scene taken as characteristic of the Abbey at this period is a monk instructing a novice in the rule of conventual life (Fig. 8). In this ordered transmission of the spiritual heritage from age and experience to youthful ardour lies largely the secret of monastic persistence and stability. In the intimate contact of King and Abbot by which the thought and wisdom of the latter guided and fortified the judicial and governmental activities of the former lies, we must assume, no small part of the Angevin kings' success in building the foundations of the English constitution. In short the Abbot and his monks served at this stage as the true and functional intellectuals of their social order, just as the secular clergy with the Bishop at their head served as its true and functional emotionals.

The final mediæval phase which we have selected for illustration may be considered as taken at any point in the period from, say, the beginning of the 14th to the end of the 15th century. Feudalism and Catholicism as a social system are declining, though there continue to be built, in great numbers and magnificence, churches, abbeys, and cathedrals. The castles of the nobles, formerly places of strength and simplicity (*i.e.*, fortresses), are beginning to be transformed into mansions and even palaces, increasingly sumptuous. The King's court is no longer an itinerant Court of Justice but stationary in the Palace of Westminster and rapidly becoming a courtier's court. Besant indeed estimated that there were at this time as many as 20,000 people attached in one way or another to the court, counting those housed in Westminster Palace itself and those serving it as workers and tradesmen living in its immediate purlieus. A contemporary view of New Palace Yard is shown in fig. 9. It will be noticed that where the King and a few knights were previously seen, there is now a great retinue of courtiers, and that the simple architecture of the previous buildings has

given place to examples of more ornate intention. The chiefs are ceasing to be chiefs of the people and tending to degenerate into a parasitic caste.

The present Abbey church of the decorated style has been built with funds gathered in all the many ways practised by the Middle Ages, including a continental levy (apt illustration of real European unity). The increased magnificence of the building has been accompanied by a decline of spiritual life. Instead of the aged monk helping the young novice through the stages of initiation, as in the previous sketch, we have now a single scholar immersed in the refinements of the Scriptorium (Fig. 12). On the one hand the court, increasingly forsaking the pursuit of justice for war, sport and the arts of display; and on the other the Abbey, increasingly substituting scholarly and æsthetic interests for the ordered sequence of prayer, praise and meditation—they are each drifting further from the other and suffering the penalties of isolation. The isolation is not only of the court from the abbey, and the abbey from the court, but of both from the people and from the city.

The parish church is the St. Margaret's we know to-day, of ornate perpendicular style. The worshippers are still numerous, but their ardour has decreased as the adornment and enrichment of the building has increased (Fig. 11). The life of the secular clergy is not devoted with the same zeal as formerly to the care and uplift of the people. The ceremonial service has grown more elaborate in ritual, more æsthetic in material equipment, more dramatic in presentation. But the spiritual life of the priest and of the parishioners does not march together with the intimacy of old. The emotionalizing of the people is ceasing to be an absorbing activity of the secular clergy, as the intellectualizing of the chiefs had ceased to be a leading interest of the regulars.

There were, then, elements of disruption arising spontaneously within the city. They were elements characteristic of the mediæval system in general. They are but samples of its many internal tendencies towards decay. Now, our survey of the mediæval period has so far been reduced to briefest limits, partly because the presentation is not made for its own sake, but only by way of an approach to the study of Westminster as it is to-day, and may be to-morrow. Partly, however, also to find room for consideration of certain tendencies which ran counter to the process of decline. Emerging into prominence more especially towards the end of the period, were elements of vitality which gave promise of a new crystallisation around the popular life of the city. Of these significant recommencements some developed into realities, others suffered early arrestment and thereafter exhibited themselves as barely perceptible tendencies. To-day they may be observed as survivals, in fact or in tradition, if not in Westminster yet in other

cities. To-morrow they may be renewed everywhere as initiatives.

Our concluding sketch therefore shows (Fig. 10, Plate I) the market place of Westminster as focus of that popular life which contained the seeds of re-birth. The people are here presented in a reconstruction which is not wholly imaginary. Though not indicated with any precision in the earliest plans of the city, the old mediæval market-place is nevertheless marked incidentally on a plan of the seventeenth century, which, by a fortunate exception, happens to be drawn to scale. By means of Sandford's map of James II's coronation procession we can therefore locate the old market-place with exact precision on the contemporary town-plan. Its centre was roughly at a point made by the intersection of two lines, one drawn from, say, the north end of Westminster Hall to the Horse Guards entrance, and another drawn at right angles to it from the main entrance to the Local Government Board in Parliament Street. It was a small market-place, between 40 and 50 yards square, and had (in Sandford's plan) a permanent structure of covered booths or stalls in the centre, probably of the kind indicated in our artist's sketch.

The market and all its memories have so completely vanished that even the laborious archæologist would seem never to have felt the call to go in search of its traces. Oblivion so complete may be interpreted as a comprehensive and definitive token of the profound transformation that differentiates modern from mediæval Westminster. It may also be interpreted as indicating certain points of exceptional difference that mark off mediæval Westminster from more typical cities of its period. For, unlike other regional or national capitals of its time, the business life of the city never came to focus under the consecrating shadow of a cathedral spire, that fit and lasting emblem of the mediæval endeavour to subordinate economic to ethical ends. Nor yet in its later growth did Westminster, like some of its continental compeers, develop that unique pair of temporal and spiritual institutions, the Town Hall and the University; institutions which elsewhere in adequate working correlation each with the other, gave a city not only intensest efficiency, but also afforded noble expression to its dignity, pride and independence. But another civic product of mediæval inventiveness Westminster did have—a great and imposing Bell-House. In beauty of workmanship, richness of adornment and exquisiteness of design, it was in no way comparable to the famous belfries of Flemish cities. But still a remarkable structure, with a peal of bells which enjoyed a European reputation, as we learn from no local chronicler, but from Matthew of Paris and at least one other continental traveller and narrator. Let us pause for a moment to consider the character, use and significance of this belfry, and its rôle in the life of the people. Its history we must also briefly

recount, for the incidents of its origin, maturity, decline and extinction make an instructive commentary on the half millennium which has mainly bequeathed our effective social heritage to-day.

Built simultaneously with the present Abbey-church in mid-thirteenth century, the Westminster Bell-house had definite civic purpose in the well ordered planning of those luminous and large-minded times. Doubtless intended to link the life of the Abbey and the Palace in close intimacy with that of the city, it was appropriately placed at the fourth angle of an irregular quadrilateral, of which the other three corners contained respectively the market-place, the great hall of the palace and the Abbey church. To carry its peal of four, or perhaps five bells (one of them said to be the largest in the world) a tower of cyclopean masonry rose to a height of 60 feet and was surmounted by a lead-covered spire. The base of the tower was 75 feet square, so that its mere magnitude precluded the market-place as its site, even had there been no larger civic purpose determining its erection elsewhere. With its spire the belfry certainly overtopped by a long way the tower of St. Margaret's, and in all probability all other buildings also, for the present western towers of the Abbey church were not then built.[1] It rose above the city, we may well suppose, like a watchful sentinel aspiring to a unity which, if never fully realized, was yet assumed as a social ideal, affirmed in the religious scheme, planned in architectural design, and in a measure achieved in the actual life of the city. In the synoptic vision of the bird's-eye-view, the belfry and its spire would replace the parish church as symbol of mediæval Westminster's emotional life, for St. Margaret's tower was left unfinished till recent times. Thus a variant of our formula of chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals emerges as follows:—

PALACE. MARKET PLACE. BELFRY. ABBEY.

To give æsthetic expression to our survey of the mediæval city as a whole and to put an accent on the above fourfold aspect, is the purpose of the imaginative reconstruction which has been drawn for frontispiece.

A lay Guild was charged with the care and due functioning of the belfry. And for many generations—certainly for more than two centuries—did the brethren of the Guild make known through the pealing music of its bells the great happenings of the day. In the mediæval scheme of things the bells of the parish church literally played their part of sustaining the corporate emotions of the citizens. They chimed each birth and marriage, they tolled

1. In his imaginative sketch to show the belfry as it probably was in the thirteenth century, Mr. Lethaby ("Westminster Abbey and the King's Craftsmen," p. 58) makes tower, spire and apical cross rise to a height of nearly 200 feet, which far exceeded the highest point of the Abbey before the addition of Wren's western towers.

each death and funeral, and thus every parishioner shared, in a measure, the joys and the sorrows of all the families of the parish, in ages when the sense of community was stronger and richer than most of us now can even conceive by an effort of the imagination. Similarly were the several parishes knit into the wider community of the city by the more sonorous music that issued from the great belfry, for this enabled every individual of the body civic to participate instantly in the larger issues of life and death. War, fire and pestilence, peace and pageantry, the coming and the passing of successive abbots, the birth and death of princes, royal weddings, coronations, and exalted visitings—all were announced from the belfry. The mysterious power of arousing and communicating emotion which belongs to great bells pealing from lofty towers was deliberately used to large social purposes. Every one, without distinction of sex or age, wealth or status, was united by the music of the bells, for therein they thrilled to common ecstasy or throbbed to a common grief. And moreover, be it remembered that the music of the bells beyond giving a collective relief to agonies in the life cycle, and a collective enhancement to its ecstasies, had also a further civic function. It voiced the message and intensified the visual appeal of that spectacular life which as pageant, play and procession, emanated from church and guild, from cloister and from court, like the spreading odour of an aromatic plant.[1] It may fairly be argued that between that vital pair—City and Citizen—there was achieved a depth and continuity of unison such as can hardly be grasped by their pallid successors

1. "The shops were shut; and the Bishop ordered a great and devout company of priests and friars in a solemn procession accompanied by the nine aldermen and by all the officials of the Commune and all the people; and all the more worthy were ranged in order near the said picture with lighted candles in their hands; and then behind them were the women and children very devout. And they accompanied the said picture as far as the cathedral, making the procession around the close after the usual manner, *ringing all the joy-bells* for devotion to so noble a picture." This is a scene from the mediæval chronicle of an Italian city; but the occasion of it—Duccio's painting, or rather a portion of it—is now in Westminster, as another portion is in Berlin. Both pieces must at one time or another have been stolen from a Siennese altar. In their present habitat they are a standing accusal of metropolitan cities given rather to the gathering of foreign loot than to the glorifying of their own artist-craftsmen. Naturally therefore metropolitan cities of to-day have military processions and other cities have none of any kind. We may further note as surviving evidence, that church bells expressed the very spirit of community, the notion that only those born within the sound of Bow Bells were true Londoners. Bow Church stood opposite the Guildhall in the open centre of the mediæval city's forum. It is now all but closed up with shops; and therefore awaits clearance and renewal for the restoration of spiritual life to the modern "city" of full shops and empty churches.

to-day, the Individual and the State; whose habitual means of intercommunication are the tax-gatherer, with his inquisitorial "schedules," and the journalist, whose metier under existing conditions almost compels him to alternate between the distributing of chill "news" and the industrious daily kindling of the stubble-fires of brief "sensation."

From its origin in the thirteenth century till its catastrophe in the sixteenth, the Belfry of Westminster is in the happy position of having no recorded history. Then its great bell, and even its smaller bells, were taken down and robbed by Henry VIII towards supplies for furnishing a military expedition against his personal rival the French king. The care and functioning of the belfry had before this been removed from its proper Guild, and transferred to St. Stephen's, the private chapel of the palace: sure sign and stigma of the monarch's declining interest in the life of the city and the people. It was doubtless advanced by Henry's legal counsellors as one of the reasons for the subsequent spoliation of the particular Guild, which formerly had charge of the belfry, that its main public function was no longer being performed!

By the time of Elizabeth the citizens had so far progressed in the new dispensation as to have actually forgotten the original use and meaning of the belfry. Even the learned and conscientious Stow records as fact, the contemporary legend that it had been built by Edward III as a belfry for St. Stephen's chapel—a legend which, besides ignoring the original purpose of the belfry, post-dates its erection by no less than a century.

Incidentally this anecdote of sixteenth century ignorance and distortion of thirteenth century life (by scholar and populace alike) is worth noting for another reason. It gives a clue to much contemporary misunderstanding about the Middle Ages. For it is from survivals continuing into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, debased by renaissance misuse and misinterpretation, often aggravated further by eighteenth century myopia, that are derived most of the notions current to-day as to what "mediævalism" means. A further example of defamatory superstition about the Westminster belfry found in many modern books asserted as historical fact is the legend that its bells were only rung for coronations and funerals of kings. There is probably about as much truth in that as an account of thirteenth century custom, as in another Elizabethan legend that the ringing of the great bell turned all the beer in the cellars sour!

During the seventeenth century the belfry, having already lost its soul, could offer no resistance to any who would despoil its body. It is not surprising therefore that the lead covering of its spire was removed—as likely as not to make bullets for Oliver's soldiers. The spire of wood doubtless soon decayed, but the solid masonry

of the tower which had carried the great bells resisted equally the disintegrative powers of nature and the spoliative passions of humanity.

Even more lasting than the solidest of masonry are the channels of emotion. It was therefore only to be expected that in the eighteenth century the material shell of the old belfry should again revert to its original use of housing the stuff of emotional arousal. It became the cellar of an adjacent tavern. One of the ever recurrent penalties of civic disorganisation is the resulting reversion of emotional life to that primitive habit which seeks the mystic state by an alcoholic short-cut. And this is true alike for chiefs and for people. Promptly, at the outset of the renaissance, the despoiled "people" began to domicile their spiritual life in the taverns that everywhere throughout Western Europe proliferated in the disintegrating cities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While as for the chiefs, they also, after their first flush of æsthetic and intellectualist aspiration had subsided, followed the people to the same spiritual goal. Anecdotes illustrating the attraction with which Westminster taverns appealed to our legislators in the eighteenth century are too well known to need recall. Thus it came about in the fulness of time that a common stream of emotion, literally flowing from the old belfry, again united high and low among the citizens of Westminster.

The power of that stream to sweep aside any obstacle seeking to hinder, divert or diminish its habitual and secular flow has received in our own day a manifestation which will rank among the memorable incidents of the Great War. For it is an open secret that what chiefly stood in the way of the success of King George's call to the nation to forego the social and private use of alcohol in every form while the war lasted—and what rendered in effect nugatory the thoroughgoing and sportsmanlike example which he himself set in the matter—was just the impossibility of reconciling such a self-denying ordinance with a certain Parliamentary tradition and its accretion of sinister influences and perversive interests. "Freedom and Whisky gang thegither," says the Scottish poet, and fitly enough the House of our Liberties enshrines the most illustrious and not the least frequented "private bar" in Christendom. It is not the only instance known to archæology of a stately edifice being built around a sacred wellhead or source of magical waters. Recalling here the Dionysiac connexion with oratory, and consequently recognizing the symbolic character as well as the historic continuity of the House of Commons bar, we perceive also that there was a kind of religious sanction for the aspiration of the noble legislator who wished rather to see England drunk and free than sober and enslaved.

But to return. The intellectuals also in the eighteenth century

gave restored attention to what remained of the robbed and mutilated structure of the belfry. It became an interesting ruin. It was measured, sketched, described, and theories were propounded as to its origin. Learned men scoffed—the authority of Stow notwithstanding—at the lingering tradition, kept faintly alive by the people, that it had once been a belfry. That it had been a belfry with civic functions would, had the idea been mooted, have seemed still more unrelated to historical fact, and inherently absurd! There was no consensus amongst the scholarly investigators as to its original character. But of three favourite hypotheses one identified the ruin with a fourteenth century church of the Holy Innocents; another, made it a Nonconformist chapel of the seventeenth century, while the third affirmed that it was a kind of fortress built as an asylum for those who fled into the sanctuary of the Abbey! The third hypothesis gained strength with age till, towards the end of the nineteenth century, its momentum of tradition carried away even the well-stored mind and vigorous commonsense of Sir Walter Besant.

During the age of the Industrial Revolution the belfry suffered the same fate as had overtaken the market-place. Mediæval Westminster, as a city, became all but submerged in the tide of new bricks and old cupidity set aflowing when the "energy" of the machine era applied itself in that quarter of the world. The last remnants of the ancient belfry completely disappeared from sight. What may have been left of local tradition was too feeble—and what is worse, too lowly and of the people—to find expression even in considerable histories of the city. And so, when it came to Besant's time, we find that he does not even mention the market-place and makes an extravagant mistake about the belfry. Nevertheless its foundations of indestructible masonry remained below ground, waiting the opportunity to testify of themselves and the vanished social world to whose higher life they had ministered. The opportunity came and in a fortunate hour. For it was during Mr. Lethaby's architectural wardship of the Abbey that they were exposed in the course of neighbouring building operations. The discovery was viewed by him—most civic and architectonic of his guild—and the significance of the remnants was at once perceived and socially and historically interpreted. Hence to the details of its long and chequered story, accumulated by loving care and punctilious scholarship, there have now been added data for the exact location of the old belfry. The detailed information on hand is even sufficient for its imaginative reconstruction, as of extinct animals by the naturalists. It remains for a coming generation to utilize all this store of recovered and verified knowledge. Not for any archaistic idolatry of mere rebuilding, but for fit and effective renewal, at once material and spiritual, of the usages to which the belfry at its best was put.

The belfry at its best stood for the enrichment and unison of emotional life in the mediæval city. But the spiritual life, to be adequate, must be intellectualized as well as emotionalized. The brain of the citizen must be disciplined and informed, as well as his heart charged and attuned. He must be instructed and educated, and at the same time stimulated and guided towards noble activities. The monasteries more and more failed to do this intellectual work for the community, in the surging times of the later middle age, so that a new type of educational institution was manifestly called for. It appeared as the University. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries universities grew like mushrooms in the cities of Italy and southern France. The cities of the north were relatively barren in this respect, though the three most famous and efficient of all universities had for their birthplaces Paris, Louvain and Oxford.

As to Westminster, the too close intimacy of palace and abbey and the prolonged tutelage of the city to both, have been pointed to in explanation of the fact that the city produced neither Town Hall nor effective guild system, neither cathedral nor university. Even the belfry was a royal gift: and the abbot nominated the chief burgess to office. It is an historical truism to say that the presence of a monarch's court is not conducive to intellectual activity. It is a simple moral inference to affirm that the mitred abbot was a figure of too overpowering prestige to admit the permanent abode of a bishop in his vicinity. All these were real reasons for the arrestment of civic life in Westminster; yet they are local and special. There still remains for discovery the common factors relating the local circumstance with the general movement. Here we must be content to say that the failure of Westminster to produce a university was but sample of a general infertility of northern cities. No doubt the surviving civic tradition of ancient Rome accounted for something of the higher cultural potential of southern cities. But this is too general a factor to be of use as an interpretative clue, bearing in mind what deep foundations had been laid for the permanence of that tradition in every region of Europe and beyond it. What we need is something more definitive and specific.

The universities even more than the cathedrals owed their parentage to the cities. In its beginning, the university was just one among the crop of guilds that attested the exuberant vitality of cities in the later middle age, the high individuation and strong communal sense of the citizens. It was only when success had declared the permanence of the university movement that lawyers discovered that the new institutions needed "constitutions," and popes and kings hastened to "grant" them charters and to plant out colleges of their own making. Where then the guild tradition

was most endemic (as surely it was in southern cities), we should look for the earliest springtide and most exuberant flowering of the university movement. But the whole question is obscure, and awaits further investigation. What we are here concerned with, however, is not the historic origin of universities, but their functional relation to civic life.

Observe therefore how the coming of the university, by completing the social outfit of the city, had a peculiar and definitive spiritual significance. Given Town Hall for its chiefs, Guilds for its people, Cathedral or Belfry for its emotionals, and University for its intellectuals, a city was, in itself, endowed with the full complement of temporal and spiritual institutions. Let us set out the rectified situation in terms of our fundamental formula :—

Town Hall.	Guild.	Cathedral and (or) Belfry	University.

Here then was a new phase, a veritable re-birth, of the mediæval system, emerging as the older and more characteristic phase was lapsing to decay. The old phase had been more aristocratic and rural, in a word feudal. The new one was more democratic and urban, in a word civic. The former was characterised by a preponderance of castles and abbeys. The latter sought to redress the balance with its guilds, its belfries and its universities. As to the cathedral, that occupied a midway position. It was essentially a civic institution; yet the bishop's diocese was a Regional unit, and so gave wide room for an episcopal reconciliation of feudal and civic interests. But the bishop was handicapped by the aristocratic bias of his "intellectual" ally the abbot. The men and the minds of the cloister (an institution which has many disguises, one of them being the Club) inherently lean that way, and the tendency was too often reinforced by the motives of simony, not only in the convent but in the episcopal see also. All the greater need on the civic side for the creation of universities, if a working adjustment and equipoise was to be made among the conflicting social forces. The early university was the guild of teachers or scholars, and happily sometimes of teachers *and* scholars. And the academic, like other guilds, when it desired authentication sought it from the local bishop, because he stood nearest to the city as its spiritual overseer and protector of the people. He, if his policy were dictated by diocesan interest, would naturally desire to see established not only a civic but a Regional university—the intellectual counterpart of his cathedral, though not necessarily in the same city.

From whatever cause, the early development of universities does, in point of fact, show observable tendency to focus at regional

centres. What produced the first mushroom crop would seem to have been a fashion that sped through southern cities for each to have its own university; and even (running to extremes, as is the way of fashion) two in the same city. Of that first crop a good many withered as rapidly as they grew, others again were removed from less to more suitable cities. The early or pre-patronage phase of the university movement was thus characterised by a natural sorting and shifting on a basis of regional selection.

Meantime, the contrast of the feudal and the civic order was being widened by the tendency of the chiefs on both sides to break with, and to drift away from, their associated spiritual powers. As the respect of feudal chiefs for the Church declined, their appetite for its property grew. By indirect and devious means there had been an extensive and growing diversion of ecclesiastical wealth to private use, long antecedent to the organised pillage of the Reformation. The consequent increase of luxury was significantly expressed in the popular saying that it took a priory to feed a noble family and an abbey to clothe them. The reaction of the new standards of aristocratic life on ambitious burghers, enriched by the growing profits of foreign trade, would naturally be to seduce them from allegiance to the civic order, and to convert them into plutocratic variants of the feudal chiefs. Increasingly leaderless and forsaken by their proper intellectuals, who tend too much, as we have said, to attach themselves to the chiefs, the people of the cities became the victims of exploitation and parasitism on every side. Handicapped by these temporal and spiritual dead-weights they gradually sunk to that level of depression and impoverishment which finally, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, made them the hungry and facile "hands" of the new and not less ruthless order of chiefs brought to the surface by the Industrial Revolution. But from this telescoping of a half millennium of social history we must return to the later middle age.

The coming of the Friars expressed the final and supreme effort of the old spiritual order to harmonize things all round, and renew the mediæval system for a fresh advance on a higher and more civic level. That stirring upheaval affected Westminster only indirectly. By the immense impetus it gave to Oxford, it confirmed what had apparently been already determined by natural selection—that neither Canterbury nor Rochester, neither London, Westminster nor Reading should provide the Regional University. But the regional university though not, as far as we know its dim beginnings, a civic institution in the sense here taken, yet arose in no secluded spot, but in "one of the first municipalities of England," as J. R. Green tells us. Certainly its early tendencies could not be called aristocratic in the great days when many, perhaps most, of its students slept on straw in garrets, unless they preferred rushes on a kitchen floor.

By changing its concerns and curriculum from a regional and European to a national outlook, and from a democratic to an aristocratic culture, Oxford participated in the general movement of transition from mediæval to modern times; and thereby adapted itself intimately to the changing character of Westminster. With the renaissance, the two cities entered on a correlative development as the spiritual and temporal hemispheres of a single civic unit; or say rather, as twin cities specializing respectively on the theory and the practice of Government, and the congruent views of life. That a highly perfected adjustment between Oxford and Westminster became fixed at the renaissance, and that the co-partnership has continued to work efficiently up to these days, will not be seriously questioned.

This concurrent development of the civic dyad Westminster-Oxford is of course a special case of the larger tempero-spiritual drama, which occupies the background of our canvas, and affords at each successive stage of the survey the needed clue to its interpretation. Let us conclude our mediæval survey by returning to Westminster for a local observation of survival, which is charged with renewal and at the same time is typical of the general background which we have been considering.

In the public garden which embanks the river by the House of Lords there has quite recently been erected, under the very shadow of the Victoria Tower, a statue. It is Rodin's group, "The Burghers of Calais." The oft-told tale is told again, in bronze, by the master-sculptor of the age. All of them emaciated, in rags, haggard, some bent and broken, others proud and erect, the six burghers of Calais stand debating the English king's offer to save the city at the price of their own lives and their dignity—for they were commanded to bring the keys of the city with halters round their own necks. The symbolic intensity of the piece is in its representative character. These assuredly are the true "representatives of the Commons," rather than the frock-coated and silk-hatted gentlemen who occupy cushioned benches a few yards away on the other side of the House of Lords.

Consider the issue of the age-prolonged struggle between the feudal and the civic order. On the one hand, a patriciate continuously recruited and expanded by the incorporation of the new rich of each passing generation, magnificently housed, splendidly furnished, sumptuously fed, beautifully apparelled. On the other, the degradation of cities, deepening from the close of the middle ages till the civic revival in the nineteenth century. Of that revival perhaps the most hopeful element was and is the resumption of the middle-age movement for civic universities. By its arrestment, or diversion to aristocratic purpose and the social uses of the inillustrious rich, the cities of Western Europe in general, and

especially those of England, had for centuries been deprived of their most vital organ of spiritual power. And a peculiar bitterness is added to the wrong when we remember that it was an organ created not only *for* cities but *by* them.

If a dramatic date be wanted for the close of the middle age in its civic phase, it is not difficult to find one similar to that of the sack of Constantinople, which scholars take as the conventional beginning of the Renaissance. About midway in the sixteenth century there occurred an event which academic historians usually dismiss with curt notice. They tell it ostensibly as simple fact, but in reality they convey an insinuated interpretation. The Oxford specialist, who records the life of Charles V in the current issue of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, reserves from eleven columns of biography half a dozen lines for the chronicle of this event. His version is that "Charles in person punished the rebellion of the city of Ghent (1540)." That is how the ruthless and complete destruction, once for all, of the independence of the city of the Van Arteveldes presents itself when viewed from the feudal end of the telescope.[1] From the civic end it looks like the final disaster, the symbolic culmination of a long-drawn tragedy. The life of the Middle Ages expired in that catastrophe.

Of innumerable minor tragedies, misinterpreted or unrecorded, in the more far-flung, sporadic drama of civic degradation, the Rodin statue at Westminster stands as survival and symbol. Happily it stands also for renewing associations, both within and without the nation. Almost at the moment of the unveiling of the statue a British army was defending Calais against feudal War Lords who, to the old renaissance game of plundering the Flemish cities, add the new "scientific" refinement of burning their universities. And in the defending army, it is well known, the sons of the English aristocracy are not only bearing their full share of sacrifice and responsibility with a splendour of cheerfulness and absolute devotion, but are also coming to know the qualities and the life of the "people" by an unprecedented intimacy of comradeship. But why should not something of the moral élan and generosity, the goodwill and the good humour of war be maintained and carried forward into the subsequent peace? If that could be brought about, the Burghers of Calais would have come among us to good purpose. Their presence in that unlikely *milieu*, with the reminders, at once heroic and shameful, which it

1. The completeness of the break in the life of the city is faithfully reflected in the face of its Town Hall, and to this day gives it the appearance of monstrosity. The Gothic and the Palladian portions, built respectively before and after the extinction of civic liberties, the confiscation of civic property, and the judicial massacre of elect citizens, are as though a man's profile were Caucasian on one side and Mongolian on the other.

must ever renew, would become an evocatory appeal for the "sacred union" of chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals here at home. And abroad (assuming there as here the needed redemption by internal transformation and civic conversion) of states, of nations and—why not?—of empires. Then indeed would these representatives of the Commons hold their place beside the Temple of Peerage no longer like ghosts of the injured and outraged, come to claim vengeance for the past, but as the bringers of a supreme gratitude and as the heralds of a call to the enlarging ideals of communty, which would quench the sense of all ancient wrongs and light a new star in the heavens for their nation and ours to steer by—in sympathetic courses friends for ever!

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APPENDIX A.

Government of Secondary Group.

The peoples to whom the numbers in the text, p. 52, refer are :—

Lower Hunters :—Group I : Yerwaka and Yantrawanta, Powell's Creek, ? Kulin, ? Yuin, Miwok. Group II : Gourneditchmara,. Group III : Dieri. Group V : ? N. Queensland, ? Mycoolon, Euahlayi, N. Australians.

Higher Hunters :—Group I : Seri, Montagnais (33), Unalashka Aleuts, Lillooet, Halokmelen, Lkungen, Haida, Kwawiutl, Kootenay, Klamaths, Yurok, Yokuts, Aucas, Puelches. Group II : Blackfeet, Kiowa (27), Similkameem, Italmen, Tehuelches. Group III : Tsimshian, Nootka, Shastika. Group V : Bellacoola.

Dependent Hunters :—Group I : Bataks of Palawan (36), Yanadi. Group III : Korwa. Group V ; Bhuiyar, Chenchu (34).

Agricul. I :—Group I : Mohave, Delaware (29). Group II : Lushai (41), Mantra. Group III : Iroquois (28), Huron, Ojibways. Group IV : Santals.

Pastoral I :—Group I : Beni Amer, Wambugu, Kurds of Eriwan, Aeneze. Group II : Dinka, Shasewenses (37). Group II : Ovaherero, Batauana, Colonial Hottentots, Khoi Khoin.

Agricul. II :—Group I : Kandhs, Kaupui Nagas (some), ? Lendu, Banaka and Bapuku, Fang, Niam Niam, Mayombe, Bageshu, Bakongo, Creeks (30), Pawnees, Illinois, Marshall Bennett Islands, ? Ambrym, ? Mowat, other Caroline Islands, Rotumians. Group II : Chakma, Kolya Nagas, Bororo, Chiriguano, Yoncs and Boni, Bali, Azande, Adio, Azimba, Maravis, Angoni, Latuka, Monbuttu, Mangbetu, Waheiei, Wadoe, Natchez, Koita, Wagap, New Caledonia, Maoris, Tongans, Rarotongans, Hawaians, Tahitians, Fijians. Group III : Land Dyaks, Khonds, Bangala, Bayanzi, Gallinas, Warega, Wyandots, Gilbert Islands, Samoans. Group IV : Wambugwe Group V : Kharwar, Majhwar, ? Torres Group.

Pastoral II :—Group I : Watuturu, Bogos, Kazak Kirghiz (42). Group II : Danakil, Bahima, Makololo, Baquerewe, Altaian Kalmucks, other Kalmucks. Group III : Somal. Group IV : Bechuana, Ama Xosa, Gallas (some).

Agricul. III :—Group I : Ossetes (formerly), Nias, Alfures, Achinese and Pedirese, Javans, Pima, Kuku (46), Wakikuyu, Bahuana (formerly), Basonge, Ababua, Jekris, Marea. Group II : Kasias, Suanes, Battas, Maguindanaos, Khiva, Apalachites, Zapotheks (formerly), Marutse, Ondonga, Banyoro, Bukoba, Nandi, Wasinja, Washambala, Basoga Batamba, Wafipa, Bihenos, Cazembe, Bayaka, Bushongo, Waniamwesi Bamsalala, Baganda, Lunda, Kimbunda, Baronga, Ewe (49), Tshi, Yoruba, Geges and Nagos, Diakité Saracolays, Warundi, Bambara, Foolah, Segoo, Benin Natives, Nossi Bé. Group III : Some Kayans, Kenyahs, Passumahians, Malays of Padang, Pueblos of New Mexico (51), Akamba, Wapare, Bawenda, Flote, Amahlubi, Guatemala. Group IV : Kayans of Mendalam, Kayans of Mahakam, Badagas, Balinese, Basutos, Alur, Wachagga, Yao, Wagogo, Calabar. Group V : Padam Abor, Singkel (dep.). Mbengas.

APPENDIX B.

Tables indicating Methods of Maintaining Order and Redressing Wrongs in the Simpler Societies of each Economic Grade.

LOWER HUNTERS.	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crimelaw	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
(8) Swan River	+							
(15) N.W.C. Queensland	+		+				+	
(7) Bungyarlee	+							
(10) Dieri	+		+					
(9) Bangarang	+		E +					
(22) Narrinjerri	+							
(2) Kaiabara	+					+		
(2) Maryborough	+ ? E					+		
N.S. Wales (Some)	+					+		
(20) Kamilaroi	+		+					
(5) Geawegal								+
(6) Euahlayi	E							
(19) Rose Bay	+		+					
(Namoi R.)	+		+					
Powell's Creek	E							
(3) Port Lincoln	+					+		
(16) Port Darwin	+		+					
(14) Tongaranka	+							
(2) Turrbal	+					+		
(12) W. Victoria	+		+					
(13) Kurnai	+		+					
(24) Waimbio	+							
(2) Wiradjuri	+							
(8) Perth & W. Australia	+		+			+		
(2) Wotjobaluk	+							
Yarra Yarra								
(2) Wurunjeri	+							
Wudthaurung	+					+		

NOTE.—The headings are fully explained in the text, pp. 54 to 61.

Crimes actionable	Public punishments tribal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Expiatory combat
	+							+	+				+
	+	?			+				Formal				
				+									+
	+	+							+				+
													+
	+	+						+					+
	+	?		+									+
	+								Formal				Private
	? Cere												+
													+
	+												+
													+
													+
	+												
													+
	+	+							+				+
													+
	+												Private
	+												
													+
													+
	+												
													Private

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vindictive	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice satisfied
(2) Yuin	+							
Gringai	+							
Chepare								
(11) C. Australians	+							
(11) N. Australians	+							
Ngeumba	E+		+					
(17) Kabi and Waaka						+		
(18) Herbert River	+					+		
Tasmanians						+		
(1) Adelaide	+							
(23) Buntamurra	+							
Watchandee	E +		E +					
Ngurla								
Newcastle Tribes	E							
Whayook								
Ballardong	E							
Koynup and Etecup								
Yerkla Mining						E+		
Warburton River	E							
Milya Uppa								
(21) Belyando River	+					+		
N. Queensland	+						+	
(4) Riverina	+							
(4) Some Murray R.	+					+		
(8) King George's Sound	+			+				
Shoshones	+							
Lower Californians	+							
Patwin	+							

Crimes punishable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Expiatory combat
	+	+						+					+
	+		+										+
	+												
	+												
	+												
	+		+										
													+
													+
													Private
													Private
													Private
	+							+	+				+
		+							+				
	+	+											
				+									
			+										

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Criminal	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Miwok	? +							
Botocudos	+					+		
Fuegians	+							
Batua	+							
Bushmen	+							
Kubu (Wild)				Family Group		? +		
(44) Semang				Do.				
(44) Sakai				Do.				
Andamanese	+			+				
(39) Negritos of Alabat				Family Group				
(39) Negritos of Angat				Do.				
Bumagat Negritos	+			Do.				
Punans	E		? —	Family Group	?			
Veddas				Do.				
HIGHER HUNTERS.								
Topanaz	+		+					
Guaycurus						+		
Charrua	+							
Tehuelches	+							
Pampas	+	+	+					
Puelches	?	?	?					
Abipones	+							
S. Chaco	+							
Zaparos	+ ? E							
Kedah Semang								
Perak Sakai		+						+
Manobos	+		+					

Crimes punishable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
					+ ?			?+					
					+								
					+		+ ?	+					
						•							
						•							
+							+						
							+						

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Ghiliaks						+		
Tuski				+	?			
(38) Italmen	+							+
Ostyak								
Halokmelen								
(27) Similkameen	+	+						
Klamaths S.W.Oregon	+							
Karok	+	+						
Hupa	+	+	+					
Blackfeet		+						+
Etechemins	+	+						
Montagnais	+	+						
Micmacs	+	+						
Assiniboins	+	+						
Seri								
Comanche	+	+						
Apache	+							
Kiowa	+							
Omaha	+	+	+				+	
Luisenos				+				
S. Californians	+							
(26) Carriers	+							
Kelta		+						
Petawet		?						
Yuki	+							
Pomo							?	
Shastika	+	+						+
Nishinan	+							

Crimes attonable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offenses	Public punishments some private offenses	Unsanated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Primary group: Regular	Primary group: With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
					+							
					+			+				
					+							
			?									
											+	
					+							
	+											
					+							
					+							
					+							
	+						+					
	+											
	+					?						
				+	+							
				?	+							
	—				+							
	+	?										
	+											

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice violated
Yokut								
Makh el Chel								
Gallinomero		+					+	+
Western Eskimo						+		
Behring Straits Do.	+							
Central Eskimo	+	+				+		
Greenland Eskimo	+					+		
E. Labrador Eskimo	+							
(33) Oonalashka Aleuts								
(33) Atkha Aleuts	+		+					
Koniaga				+				
Chepewayans	+					+		
(25) Loucheux	+		+					
(25) Kutchin	+							
Kenay	+							
(26) Tsekhene	+							
(26) Chilcotin	+							
(26) E. Nahane	+							
(26) W. Nahane	+							
Thlinkeet	+	+	+					
Lillooet	+	+						
Tsimshian	+	+						
E. Shushwap	+							
W. Shushwap	+							
Bellacoola			+					
Lkungen	+	+						
Kootenay	+	+						
Kwakiutl	+							

Crimes alienable	Public punishments tribal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
	+												
	+												
				+									
				+									
				+									
							+		+				
					+								
					+	•							
	+												
	+												
	+												
	+												

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Nootka	+	+						
Haida	+	+						
Thompson River	+							
Yurok	+	+						
Kauralaig (Torres Straits)	+							
DEPENDENT HUNTERS.								
Bhinyar								
Beriya								
Korwa								
(34) Atkwar Chenchu								
Nundail Chenchu	?							
Nicobarese	+	+						
Bonthuks								
Korumbus								+
(36) Bataks of Palawan	+	+					+	+
AGRICULTURE INCIPIENT.								
Yanadi								
Dakota	+	+						
Hidatsa	+							
Iowa	+	+						
Algonquins of Quebec	+	+	+					
Huron	+	+	+					
(28) Iroquois	+	+	+					
(29) Delaware	+	+	+					
Abnaqui								
Ojibway	+	+	+					+
Lengua					?			
Yuracares						+		
Mattacco	+							

Crimes actionable	Public punishments tribal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Uncertain	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
	+												
	+												
				+	+								
		M											
		+											
		M											
							+						
				+									
		+			+							+	
						•				+			
			+										
				+									
	+												
	+												
	?	+											
	+	+							+				
							?						

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice regulated
Ipurina	+							
British Guiana	+		+					
Paravilhana								
Mataguayos	+							
Karayaki	+							+
Paumaris					+			
Western Torres Strts.	+							
(41) Lushai	+						+	
(35) Negritos of Zambales		+						
Bheels	+	+	+					
Manobos of Agusan	+		+					
Zambales or Tinos	E	+	+					
Bygas								
(44) Jakun								
Paniyans								
Arunese		+						
Mantra								
Orang Bukit		+						
Ainu								
Lepchas								
Santals (Some)								
(44) Kedah Semang								
(44) Perak Sakai		+						+
(44) Central Sakai								
Candios		+		+				
Veddahs				Family Group				
Pastoral: Kurds of Eriwan	+	+						

Crimes tenable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Primary group: Regular	Primary group: With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
		?					?					
					+							
				+	+							
		+										
					+							
							+					
		M			+	•						
							+					
					+							
					+						+	
							+	+			+	
	-	M			+							
	+	+ ?						+				
+							+					
							+					
					+						+	
				+	+							

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
(37) Shahsewenses	E	+						
Aeneze	+	+	+					+
Ostyak								
Chewssures	+	+	+					
Bilochs	+	+	+					
Navaho				?				
Ova Herero	+		+					
Batauana								
Dinka	+	+	+					+
Beni Amer	+	+						
(49) Masai	+	+						
Colonial Hottentots	?							
Khoi Khoin	?							
Wambugu		+						+
Mundombe		+						
AGRICULTURE								
Maoris	+	+	+					
Rotumians		+						
Tongans								
Raratongans								
Hawaians	+							
Tahiti	+							
Fiji	+							
Samoa	+	+					+	+
Marquesas				+				
Savage Islands	+							
Florida								
Saa								

Crimes punishable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							+						
						−						+	
					+								
					+								
							+						
							+	+					
					+								+
				?									
				?									
							+						
							+		+		+		
					+								
							+			+			
							+						
							+						
							+					+	
	+			+									
							+						
				+									
		+								+	+		
					+							+	

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Roro								+
Koita	+	+						
Wagawaga & Tubetube	+	+						
Bartle Bay	+	+						
Trobriand Islands	+							
New Caledonia								
Torres Group	+							
Gazelle Penin. (N.E.)	+	+						
Gazelle Peninsular	+	+						
Sulka (New Pomm.)	+	+						
Moanu (Admiralty Islands)	+							
Motu (New Guinea)	+							
Mowat	E							
Bogadjim	E							
Mafulu	+	+						
Jabim	+							
E. Torres Straits	+							
Marshall Islands (Nauru)	+	+	+					
Pelew Islands	+	+						
Gilbert Islands								
Bangala	+	+	+					+
Bali Tribes	E							
(45) Mundombe		+						
Azande	+	+						+

Crimes actionable	Public punishments tribal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Primary group: Regular	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
					+							
					+							
		+										
					÷							
						•						
					?		?					
				÷								
	÷	+										
					+							
	+											
+							?					
					+			+			+	
							+					
							+				+	

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice regulated
Adio	+	+	+					
Tuchilange								
Baquiri	+	+						
Mandja	+	+						
Bondei		+	+					
Azimba		+						
Wawira		+						
Maravis	+	+						
Angoni								
Latuka								
Wafiomi	+	+						
Quissama	+							
Kunama and Barea	+	+	+					
Bayanzi	+	+	+					
Banaka and Bapuku	+		+					+
Yaunde	+	+	+					+
Fang	E	+	+					
Gallinas								
Mayombe								
Mangbetu		+						
Wambugwe	+							
Waheiei	+	+					+	
Bageshu	E	+	+					
Warega	+	+						
Wadoe								
Baluba								
Bakongo								
(49) Massai	+	+						

Crimes punishable	Public punishments tribal and moral offenses	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							+		+	+		+	
+							+					+	
							+		+			+	
							+					+	
												+	
							+		+			+	
							+	+		+	+		
							+					+	
							+					+	
							+			+	+	+	
					+								
					+				+				+
							+			+			+
					+							+	
					+								
					+								
							+					+	
							+					+	
	+	+									+		
							+						
							+					+	
		+							+			+	
+							+			+	+		
							+						
			c									+	
				?									

	Retaliation and self-help	Compositon	Collective or vi arious	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Wyandot	+	+					+	+
(30) Creek	+		+				+	
Pawnee								
Illinois				?				
Carib	+							
(32) Tarahumare *								
(32) Tepehuanes *								
(32) Huicols*								
Papago	+							
Sambioa	+							+
Uaupe	+							
Chiquito	+							
Chiriguano								
Miranda	+							
Campas	+							
Ges								
Youca and Boni								
Tapuyas					+			
Chakma								
Paharias	E							
Kandhs	+	+				+		
Tagals			+					
Subanos	+							
Kharwars								
Kols								
Majhwar								
Dhimals								
Nicobarese	+	+						

Crimes atonable	Public punishments trial and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Consensual	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
	+	+					+	Private					
	+												
							+						
							+						
							+						
					+								
	+												
				+									
							?						
							+						
+	+	M					+				+	+	
		+			+							+	+
+	+				+								
+							+						
		M	+										
		M											
		M											
		+											
	+			+									

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Enganese								+
Arunese								
Flores								?
Bajdus				+	+			
Boksas (Dep.)								
Calingas	+	+						
Kachari (Bodo)								
Limbus & Karantes								
Pani-Kocch								+
N. Aracan Group	+	+	+					
Tharu								
Tharu of Bengal								
Land Dyaks								
Khonds	+	+	+					
Kolya Nagas	+							
Dodonga					+			
Sea Dyaks	+	+						
Pathan	+							
Kei	+	+						
Muruts	+	+						
Bontoc								
Kaupui Nagas	+	+						
Kiangans	+		+					
PASTORAL +								
Somal	+	+						
Danakil								
(48) Beduan		+						
Bahima								

Crimes atonable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Un-stated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
+							+			+			
+							?						
					+								
	+												
	+												
		M											
												+	
					+							+	+
					+								
							+						
		+			+	•						+	+
							?					+	
						•	?+						
							+					+	
			+										
							+		+			+	
							+						
				+									
							+					+	

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Makololo								
Bechuana								
Ama Xosa		+						
Wataturu		+						
Bogos	+	+	+					
Gallas	+	+	+				+	+
Baqerewe	+							
Midhi	+							
(42) Kazak Kirghiz	+	+					+	+
(40) Yakut	+	+						
Altaian Kalmucks								
Turcomans	+	+						
Kalmucks								
Araucanians	Formerly	+	+					
AGRICULTURE +								
Kasias								
Kayans	?	+						
Kayans of Mendalem	+	+	+ E					
Kayans of Mahakam	+	+	+ E					
Kenyahs	?	+						
Ossetes	+	+	+					
Miris				?				
Suanes (Free)	+							
Suanes	+							
Bagobos	E	+						
Garos	+		+					
Igorottes	E	+	+					
Angani Nagas	+							

Crimes stonable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offenses	Public punishments some private offences	Unstaked	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							?						
+							+			+	+		
							+						
							+			+	+		
					+				+				+
					+				+			+	
							+		+	+	+		+
							+		+				
					+								
							+		+	+		+	+
							+		+				
							+					+	
						+	+			+	+		
						−	+			+	+	+	+
						−	+			+	+	+	+
						+	+			+	+		
							+	+					
					+								
							+		+				
												+	
		+											

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice abetted
Sonthals								
Badagas								
Battas of Sumatra		+	+				+	+
Tjumba					+			
Makassares		+	+					
Bugis		+	+					
Padam Abor								
Maguindanaos								
Singpho	+	+	+					
Singkel								
Nias	+	+	+					
Passumahians	+	+	+					
Khiva								
Balinese						+		
Daians								
Malays of Padang	+	+				+		
Java	+					+		
Tinguianes		+						
Adighe or Tscherkasses	+	+						
Munda Kols								
Timorese	+	+	+					
Hopi				+				
Pima	+							
Sia								
Zuni								
Zapotecs								
Guatemala			+					

Crimes atonable	Public punishments trifal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
		+			+								
							+				+		+
									+				
+						−	+						
+							+						
				+	+							+	
+							+						
							+		+	+	+	+	+
					+				+				
							+						
							+		+				
												+	
							+			+	+		
							+		+				
		+									+		
	+	M										+	
				+									
	+						?						
							+						
							+						
							+						

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crimeless	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice settled
Apalachites								
(31) Pueblo or New Mexico								
Marutse								
Ondonga	+	+						
Banyoro	+	+						
Bukoba Natives	+							
Basutos		+						+
Alur								
Takue	+	+						
(50) Nandi	+	+	+					
A-Kamba		+						
Warangi	+	+	+					
(46) Kuku	+	+	+					+
Wasinja								
Waschambala	E	+	+					
Wakikuyu	+	+	+					+
Wapare		+						
Duallas	+							
Marea	+	+	+					+
Amahlubi			+					
Wafipa								
Sereres					?			
Fanti			+					+
Mbenga								
Wachagga	+	+						
Bihenos								
Indikki		+						

Crimes amenable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unorganized	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							+						
							+						
							+		+			+	
							+		+	+			
	+	+									+		
							+				+		
					+		?+						
+							+			+	+		
													+
	+											+	
							+					+	
												+	
					+								
						•	+						
							+		+	+	+		+
							?						
							+			+	+	+	
						•	+		+	+	+	+	
									+				
							+			+	+		
							+						
					+								
+										+	+		
									+	+			
							+			+	+	+	
							+			+			
		+										+	

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Crime-less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice settled
Cazembe								
Kilwa		+						
Basonge		+						+
Ababua	+	+						
Ba-Yaka	+							
Bushongo								
Ba-Huana			+					
Bambala		+						
Yao	+	+	+					
Basonge Meno	+	+						
Wapokomo	+	+	+					
Waniamwesi	+	+						
Wasiba	+		+					
Anyanza		+	+					
Bamsalala	+	+	+					
Wagogo	Formerly	+	+					
Baganda	+							
Kimbunda			+					+
Baronga								
Bawenda			+					
(47) Ewe Peoples	+	+	+					+
Tshi Peoples	+	+	+					+
Yoruba								
Geges & Nagos								
Jekris		+						
Diakite Saracolays	+	+	+				+	+
Warundi	+	+						+
Fiotes								

Crimes payable	Public punishments tribal and moral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							?						
							+						
					+				+			+	
							+					+	
+							+						
							+		+				
+							+			+	+	+	
+					+		+	+				+	
+							+					+	
		+								+	+	+	
							+		+	+	+	+	
							+					+	
+							+			+	+		
							+						
				+								+	
							+		+			+	
+							+						
							+				+	+	
							+		+			+	
	+											+	
	+											+	
							+					+	
							+					+	
									+				+
									+				
+													

	Retaliation and self-help	Composition	Collective or vicarious	No law	Grimes less	Regulated fight	Private justice controlled	Private justice assisted
Foulah - - -								
Segoo - - -								
Calabar - - -								
Benin Natives - -			+					
Nossi-be & Mayotte -	+		+					
Bambaras - -								
Noerforesen - -	?	+						

Nexus enable	Public punishments tribal and sacral offences	Public punishments some private offences	Unstated	Occasional	Arbitration	Executive	Regular	Primary group	With trial	Fine to aggrieved party	Fine to the Court	Ordeals	Oaths
							+						
							+						
							+					+	
							+					+	
+							+			+		+	+
							+						
	+				+							+	

APPENDIX C.

Detailed Classification of Socities in Respect to Methods of Justice.

In order to draw up the Lists on which our Tables of Justice in the text (pp. 68-9 and 72-3) are based it was necessary to consider the Lower Hunters, and particularly the Australians in some detail. Their classification presents great difficulties, statements being often very vague and ambiguous in interpretation. In many instances we have general references to self-redress which do not make it clear whether it would be exercised upon (*a*) members of the same group, (*b*) of the same tribe but another group, (*c*) only on those of another tribe. Then, again, self-redress may be mentioned in reference to particular offences, such as abduction, but we do not feel justified in regarding it as a regular institution, particularly as homicide, in the form of killing an adult male, seems often to be treated as a public matter, whereas others are private. Then, again, regulated fights and expiatory combats may involve more or less of public interference. We have therefore distinguished cases :—

(*a*) Where self-redress is alleged in general terms.

(*b*) Where it is alleged of certain offences, but homicide not being mentioned, it may be that the most important are not included.

(*c*) Where homicide, at least of an adult male, within the group is definitely stated to be "publicly" punished.

(*d*) Where there is revenge or self-redress as between groups of the same tribe.

(*e*) Where revenge is mentioned without any differentiation in the account as between fellow-tribesmen and others.

(*f*) Where the only vengeance mentioned is outside "the tribe."

(*g*) Where an expiatory combat occurs. Under this head we have where possible distinguished instances in which submission is said to be definitely enforced, and those in which it is merely said to be the "custom." The former we have regarded as cases of public assistance, the latter not.

Having considered these points we draw up lists for Justice within the group, excluding from our first column cases in which it is not clear that the retaliation described by our authorities is exercised on members of the same group, but taking any form of self-help and retaliation as between individuals or kinsfolk as a ground of inclusion, and regarding regulated fights as a restricted form of retaliation. Any collective interference beyond the regula-

tion of a fight overrules the general practice of retaliation and places the tribe in the second column.[1]

We thus arrive at the following provisional list for justice within the group:—

JUSTICE WITHIN THE GROUP.[2]

(Australia.)

Col. I.	Col. II.
Herbert River (2).	Yuin (3 ?).
Wakelbura (2).	N. Queensland (3).
Port Lincoln (2).	N.W.C. Queensland (3).
Swan River (1).	Dieri (2).
Bangerang (2).	Some Murray River Tribes (3).
King George's Sound (1).	Narrinyeri (3).
Perth and W. Australia (2).	N.S. Wales tribes (2).
Tongaranka (1).	W. Victoria (?3).
Kurnai (2).	Riverina (2).
Kabi (2).	Rose Bay (2).
Turrbal (2).	Geawegal (3).
Adelaide (2).	Kamilaroi (2).
	?Wotjobaluk (2).
	? Yerkla Mining.
	? Watchandee.
12	13½

(1) (2) (3) The number in brackets after any name gives the column to which it belongs in Classification B. (Text, p. 71). The Watchandee and Yerkla Mining are omitted from Classification B. because the references do not enable us to distinguish retaliation proper from "External Retaliation."

1. There are two or three cases in which the only sign that we have of any such interference is that all the men of the camp join in the pursuit of an eloping couple. Here the abductor may be and most probably is some one from another group, and those in the camp are not necessarily the whole local group, but the friends and relatives who are living together. These cases are queried under col. ii.

2. In drawing up this table we have omitted 3 N.S. Wales tribes from Col. i. The specific accounts of them suggest retaliation and self-help alone, but it is possible that Fraser's general account of New South Wales, which asserts some public assistance within the group, might apply to them. For the same reason the Wudthaurung are omitted, as covered by Dawson's description of West Victoria. Two possible additions to Column ii½ are the Kaiabara and the Narrangi. Of the former Howitt, (p. 353), says that if two men quarrel about a woman the tribe does not interfere if they are of the same class, but if they are of different classes it does so. This might be to keep the peace between the classes, or it may mean merely that one class has a superior right by the marriage laws of his tribe, but it has nothing to do with the redress of wrongs, nor is there evidence of any sort of judicial proceeding. (It should be noted that J.

The list, reduced as it is, includes doubtful cases on each side. The twelve tribes in column 1 include all cases in which self-help is alleged and no public interference is alleged. But in some of these cases homicide is not mentioned, and homicide in many groups is what is publicly punished. Now, we have numerous accounts of revenge for homicide, but unfortunately few make it quite clear whether it would be exercised on a member of the same group or tribe. In a few instances, however, it is explicitly stated that revenge is a purely personal or party matter, and in others this is the only reasonable interpretation of our authorities. We therefore make a second list, in which column 1 is confined to these cases, all more doubtful ones being discarded. At the same time, we exclude cases of doubtful reference from column 2, viz. (1) The three instances in which the pursuit of eloping lovers is the only public interference alleged. (2) Rose Bay, in which the nature of the ordeal and the means of its enforcement are not free from ambiguity.[1] (3) "Some Murray River" tribes and Riverina, which are of doubtful interpretation.[2] This leaves us the following table:

Column I.	Column II.
Wakelbura.	Yuin.
Port Lincoln.	N. Queensland.
Swan River.	N.W.C. Queensland.
Bangerang.	Dieri.
King George's Sound.	Narrinyeri.
Perth and other W. Australia.	Kamilaroi.
Kurnai.	Other N.S. Wales tribes.
Adelaide.	W. Victoria.
	Geawegal.
8	9

1. From Collins' account (*Hist. N.S. Wales*) it is clear that there was in fact a great deal of indiscriminate murder, and spear-throwing appears partly as a ritual and partly as an escape from serious vengeance rather than as punishment.

2. See note at end of chapter.

Mathew describes the Kaiabara as no more than a family group.) The Narrangi are described by Huhn (in *Woods*) under the name of the Turra, and he says that the "class" punished adultery with death. But it is impossible to make out what his class really was, as his account of classes is incompatible with that of Howitt, who also assigns a perfectly different basis for the law of marriage, and makes no mention of the punishment of adultery. (Pp. 67, 258, etc.) For murder, trials in the form of the usual spear-throwing ordeal are mentioned among the Euahlayi by Mrs. Parker (p. 92), but the account refers only to cases of magic.

For considerations bearing on other tribes see notes at end of Appendix.

Turning now to Justice within the wider society, we still have considerable difficulty in many individual cases. But fortunately we can be sure of enough instances to determine what is the preponderant system. The first point is to decide on the value to be attached to Regulated Fights or Expiatory Exposures of a member of one group to spear-throwing by another. Now, regarded as an affair between groups, the latter institution rests on vengeance, and is a party matter. It is either for the man himself or his group to decide whether he shall stand the ordeal, and the ceremonial combat is, in fact, always in danger of expanding into a fight between the parties. A concrete case among the Mukjarawaint branch of the Wotjo people will illustrate most of these points.

"When a serious offence occurred and the offender belonged to some one of the other local divisions, the custom was to send a messenger (Wirri-gir) to call on him to come forward and undergo punishment. In such a case, if he were a man of consequence, or if the affair caused much feeling among the people, all the totemites of each of the men assembled under their respective Headmen at the place agreed on.

Such a case occurred at the Mukjarawaint tribe, and was reported to me by a man of the Garchuka totem, whose brother and maternal grandfather had for some matter of personal offence killed a man of the black snake (Wulernunt) totem. They speared him at night, when sleeping in his camp, and escaped, but were seen and recognised by his wife. The relatives of the deceased sent a Wirri-gir to the offenders, telling them to look out for themselves and be prepared for revenge. A messenger was sent in reply saying that they should come with their friends, and that they would be prepared to stand out and have spears thrown at them. There was then a great meeting of the respective totems, the Garchuka being that of the offenders and the Wulernunt that of the avengers.

Having met as arranged, at the time and place fixed, with their respective kindreds, the Garchuka Headman stood out between the opposed totemites and made a speech, calling upon his men not to take any unfair advantage in the encounter. Then he appointed a spot near at hand where the expiatory encounter should take place that afternoon, it being agreed that so soon as the offenders had been struck by a spear the combat should cease. Then the offenders stood out, armed with shields, and received the spears thrown at them by the dead man's kindred, until at length one of them was wounded. The Headman of the Garchukas then threw a lighted piece of bark, which he held, into the air, and the fight ceased. If it had been continued there would have been a general fight between the two totems."[1]

Now, such cases differ in detail from tribe to tribe. We may well suppose that the challenged group may bring pressure on its accused members, and so far they assist punishment. But as between the groups it is a party affair unless and until the groups take combined action or the whole tribe intervenes. We find a transition to this stage among the Narrinyeri, and perhaps in West Victoria. Other-

1. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, p. 334 seq.

wise there is in these proceedings nothing really comparable to the submission of an offender's case to an impartial authority. Yet processes clearly of the same kind are sometimes spoken of as "trials."[1] A further difficulty is to determine whether vengeance for death is exercised on other groups within the tribe. Owing to the vagueness of the use of the term we have had to leave out of account many cases where there is probably no limitation intended. We include cases where relation between groups is specifically mentioned, or is exercised on those with whom intermarriage or other social relations are habitual.

On this basis we draw up the following list :—

Column I.	Column II.
Adelaide.	Narrinyeri.
Bungyarlee	W. Victoria.
Bangerang.	Geawegal.
Wotjobaluk.	Dieri.
Tongaranka.	N. Queensland.
Maryborough	
Kamilaroi.	
Wiradjuri	
Port Lincoln.	
Kurnai.	
King George's Sound.	
Swan River.	
Perth and other W. Australians.	
Wurunjerri	
Yuin.	
Wakelbura.	
Turrbal.	
N.W.C. Queensland.	
18	4

These lists, it will be seen, can only be taken as rough approximations. It is practically impossible to draw up a list of Australian tribes to which the nomenclature of different writers can be accurately and systematically applied. Nor is it possible in all cases to interpret with certainty the meaning of their accounts,

1. There is nothing to show that the "trials" described by Beveridge among the Riverina peoples, or punishments mentioned by Le Souëf among some Murray River tribes, really differed from this type.

particularly when they speak of trials. The evidence on which we include a case under column 1 is necessarily negative and inconclusive. It is possible that in every case there would be some collective action by the old men. On the other hand, it is possible that in many of the cases in our column 2 such collective action was only of the sort that we have called "occasional." What is clear about the Australian is (1) that for many purposes retaliation was general, both within the group and between groups and tribes, in the two latter cases abductions and accusations of magic murder being the most frequent causes of disputes.

(2) That within the group the older men, and possibly a headman, generally punished breaches of the marriage prohibitions and other "tribal" offences, while in certain instances they seem also to have dealt with adultery, or murder, or some other "private" offences.

(3) As between groups, vengeance and a consequent feud was frequently avoided by a regulated fight or by the submission of the offender to the spear-throwing ordeal. In this case there might be negotiations between groups. It would be for the offender's group to decide whether they should expose him or fight it out, and we can imagine these discussions dealing more or less with the merits of the case, and so developing into the rudiments of a trial. But at bottom it is a question of vengeance or averting it.

With this understanding our lists may remain as an approximate measure of the two forms of justice. With regard to the tribe, we may be confident that the number of cases of true systematic, collective intervention in private matters is very small.

The Lower Hunters in Asia are also very difficult to assign to any group in Table I. They live in "enlarged families," with very little organic relation between different groups, so that we have no hesitation in entering them under "No Law" for the purpose of our second table. But as to internal relations information is very vague. We decide to exclude the Kubus altogether, as their internal relations in the wild state appear from Hagen to be really matter of mere conjecture. Nor are the internal relations of the Negritos of Angat, the Veddas, or the Punan sufficiently definite. Of the latter, Hose and McDougall state that the petty chief, or family head, administers no substantial punishment, and if there is a quarrel the offended family leave; but when left to themselves the people seem almost crimeless. We retain (1) the Negritos of Alabat, who are described in a way that suggests some exercise of authority, and we enter them with a query under "Public Justice," of course in the technical sense here given to the term; (2) the Semang and Sakai, among whom Martin speaks of fights about women if the elders could not settle differences. We query these

two cases under our Group I.; (3) the Negritos of Bumagat and the Andamanese, where self-redress seems to be clear. We also add to our Australian list a query for the Tasmanians, whose institutions are insufficiently known, but, as far as known, fulfil the requirements.[1]

We thus get the following numbers for the Lower Hunters:—

JUSTICE WITHIN THE PRIMARY GROUP.

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
Australians	12½	13½	0
N. America	3½	0	0
S. America	2	0	0
Africa	2	0	0
Asia	3	0	½
Totals	23	13½	½
Each column as fraction of all the cases	·62	·36	·01

Reducing the number of Australians by eliminating the more doubtful cases we get:—

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
	19	9	½
As fraction of all the cases	·67	·30	·02

We may now consider the Lower Hunters, taking the wider view of the social unit. Among the Australians, we have 18 cases, and the probable instance of the Tasmanians. On the other side we have 4 cases. To make the total of the Lower Hunters we have now to add to it the nine Asiatic cases, in which whatever law there is is within the primary group, together with the North (3½), the South Americans (2), and the Africans (2). The result is:—

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
Lower Hunters	35	4	0

We now enumerate peoples of the remaining cultures in three columns, bringing under Columns II or III, as the case may be, cases where justice is found only within the primary group. The figure after each name gives the column to which it belongs in Classification B.

1. In Classification B. the Tasmanians and Botocudos are in Col II. as having regulated fights. In the Asian groups the assignment can only be on balance of probability. The Andamanese are placed in Col. II., and, with queries, the Semang and Sakai. The Negritos of Alabat are in Col. IV. Other Lower Hunters are in Col. I.

HIGHER HUNTERS.

I.		II.		III.	
? Similkameen	(2)	Blackfeet	(3)	Aleuts	
Klamath	(1)	Omaha	(2)	Kedah Semang	
Karok	(1)	Shastika	(2)	Perak Sakai	
Hupa	(2)	Gallino Mero	(3)		
Etechemins	(2)	Italmen	(2)		
Montagnais	(2)				
Micmac	(2)				
Assiniboins	(1)				
Comanche	(1)				
Apache	(1)				
Kiowa	(1)				
Luisenos	(1)				
S. Californians	(2)				
Carriers	(2)				
Yuki	(1)				
Nishinan	(1)				
W. Eskimo	(2)				
Behring St.	(1)				
C. Eskimo	(2)				
Greenland Eskimo	(2)				
Labrador Eskimo	(1)				
Atkha Aleuts	(1)				
Koniaga	(1)				
Nootka	(1)				
Haida	1				
Thompson River	(1)				
Chepewayans	(2)				
Loucheux	(1)				
Kutchin	(1)				
Kenai	(1)				
Tsekhene	(1)				
Chilcotin	(2)				
E. Nahane	(1)				
W. Nahane	(2)				
Thlinkeet	(1)				
Lillooet	(1)				
Tsimshian	(1)				
Shushwap	(1)				
Lkungen	(1)				
Kootenay	(1)				
Kwakiutl	(1)				
Yurok	(1)				
Topanaz	(1)				
Guaycuru	(2)				
Charrua	(1)				
Tehuelches	(1)				
Aucas	(1)				
? Puelches	(1)				
Abipones	(1)				
S. Chaco	(1)				
Manobos	(1)				
Ghiliaks	(2)				
Tuski	(1)				
Kauralaig	(2)				

DEPENDENT HUNTERS.

? Nundail	(1)	Bhuiyar	(3)	Atkwa Chenchu
Nicobarese	(2)	Beriya	(3)	
		Korwa	(3)	
		Bonthuk	(3)	
		Korumbas	(3)	
		Bataks of Palawan	(2)	
		Yanadi ?	(3)	

AGRICULTURE.[1]

Bheels	(2)	Lushai	(2)	Jakun
Manobos of Agusan	(1)	Paniyans	(3)	Arunese
Candios	(1)	Lepcha	(3)	Ainu
Dakota	(1)	? Santals	(3)	Kedah Semang
Hidatsa	(1)	Abnaqui	(3)	Perak Sakai
Iowa	(1)	Ojibway	(2)	? Lengua
Algonquins of Quebec	(1)	? Paravilhana	(3)	? Paravilhana
Huron	(1)	Karayaki	(2)	
Iroquois	(1)			
Delaware	(1)			
W. Torres St.	(2)			
Yuracares	(2)			
Mataco	(1)			
Ipurina	(1)			
British Guiana	(1)			
Mataguayo	(1)			
	16		7	6

PASTORAL.[1]

Beni Amer	(1)	Ovaherero	(3)	Batauana
Massai	(1)	Dinka	(2)	Shasewenses
Kurds of Eriwan	(2)	? Colonial Hottentots	(3)	? Col. Hottentots
? Navaho	(1)	? Khoi Khoin	(3)	? Khoi Khoin
Chewssures	(2)	Wambugu	(3)	
Biloch	(1)	Aeneze	(2)	
	5½		5	3

AGRICULTURE.[2]

Nicobarese	(1)	Kandhs	(2)	Chakma	
Calingas	(1)	Subanos	(3)	Arunese	
N. Araccan	(1)	Kharwar	(3)	? Flores	
Kolya Nagas	(1)	Kols	(3)	Land Dyaks	
Pathan	(1)	Majhwar	(3)	Bontoc	
Muruts	(1)	Dhimals	(3)	? Bogadjim	
? Kaupui Nagas	(1)	Enganese	(3)	? Gilbert Islands	
Kiangans	(1)	? Flores	(3)	Rotuma	
Koita	(1)	Panikocch	(3)	Tongans	
Waga Waga	(1)	Khonds	(2)	Rarotongans	
Bartle Bay	(1)	? Sea Dyaks	(3)	Bali	
Trobriands	(2)	? Kei	(3)	Tuchilange	
Torres Group	(1)	Florida	(3)	Azimba	
Gazelle Penin.	(2)	Roro	(3)	Wawira	
N. E. Gazelle	(1)	New Caledonians	(3)	Angoni	
Sulka	(1)	E. Torres Sts.	(2)	Latuka	
Moanu	(1)	Hawaii	(3)	Mayombe	
Motu	(1)	Fiji	(3)	Mangbetu	
Mafulu	(1)	Samoa	(2)	Bageshu	
Jabim	(1)	Bangala	(2)	Wadoe	
Marshall Islands	(2)	Azande	(3)	Baluba	
Pelew Islands	(1)	Adio	(3)	Wyandot	
Maoris	(1)	Baquiri	(3)	? Tarahumara	
Tahiti	(1)	Mandja	(3)	? Tepehuanes	
Marquesas	(1)	Maravis	(3)	? Huicols	
Savage Island	(1)	Banaka & Bapuku	(3)	? Ges	
Wafiomi	(2)	Yaunde	(2)	Yonca & Boni	
Quissama	(1)	Wambugwe	(2)		
Barea & Kumana	(2)	Waheiei	(3)		
Ba Yanzi	(1)	Warega	(2)		
Massai	(1)	Creeks	(2)		
Caribs	(1)	Sambioa	(2)		
Papago	(1)				
Uaupe	(1)				
Chiquito	(1)				
Miranda	(1)				
Campas	(1)				
	36½		30½		23½

PASTORAL.[3]

Midhi	(1)	Kazak Kirghiz	(3)	Kalmucks	
Yakut	(1)	Somali	(3)	Altaian Kalmucks	
Turcomans	(2)	Gallas	(2)	Danakil	
Bogos	(2)			Bahima	
Baquerewe	(1)			? Makololo	
				Bechuana	
				Ama Xosa	
				Watatura	
	5		3		7½

AGRICULTURE.[3]

Hopi	(1)	Sonthals	(3)	? Sia	
Pima	(1)	? Kayans	(3)	Zuñi	
Suanes (free)	(2)	Kayans of Menda-		Zapothecs	
Garo	(1)	lam	(3)	Guatemala	
Singpho	(2)	Kayans of Maha-		Apalachites	
Passumahians	(2)	kam	(3)	Pueblos	
Timorese	(1)	Angami Nagas	(2)	Kasias	
Takue	(1)	? Kenya	(3)	Badaga	
Nandi	(1)	Ossetes	(3)	Padam Abors	
Warangi	(1)	Suanes	(3)	Maguindanaos	
Wapokomo	(1)	Battas	(3)	Singkel	
Wagogo	(2)	Nias	(3)	Khiva	
Araucanians (for-		Balinese	(3)	Marutse	
merly)	(1)	Malays of Padang	(3)	Basutos	
? Noeforesen	(2)	Basonge Meno	(2)	Alur	
		Java	(3)	A-Kamba	
		Adighe	(2)	Wasinja	
		Munda Kols	(3)	Waschambala	
		Ondonga	(3)	Wapare	
		Banyoro	(2)	Amahlubi	
		Bukoba	(3)	Wafipa	
		Kuku	(2)	Bihenos	
		Wakikuyu	(3)	? Cazembe	
		Duallas	(3)	Kilwa	
		Marea	(2)	Bahuana	
		Fanti	(3)	Bushongo	
		Wadshagga	(3)	Bambala	
		Indikki	(3)	Anyanja	
		Basonge	(3)	Kimbunda	
		Ababua	(3)	Baronga	
		Bayaka	(3)	Bawenda	
		Yao	(3)	Yoruba	
		Waniamwesi	(3)	Geges & Nagos	
		Wasiba	(3)	Fulah	
		Bamsalala	(3)	Segoo	
		Baganda	(3)	Calabar	
		Ewe	(2)	Benin	
		Tshi	(2)	Bambara	
		Diakité	(2)	Araucanians	
		Warundi	(2)		
		Nossi bé	(3)		
13½		36		37½	

In Classification B the totals for justice within the group are derived from the above list, the figure following each name indicating the column to which it belongs.

To obtain the corresponding figures for justice beyond this group we transfer from a higher to a lower column cases in which

the elements of public justice are found within the group alone. On this account we enter all the Asiatic Lower Hunters in Col. I. Among the Australians we transfer from Col. III. to Col. II. the Yuin, N.W. Central Queensland, the Narrinyeri, and W. Victoria.[1] We add the Kaiabara, Maryborough, Wiradjuri, Wurunjerri, and Bungyarlee, who fall clearly into this column for inter-group relations,[2] and the Koynup, Whyook, and Milya Uppa, who practise regulated fights, and may safely be placed here for relations beyond the group. This gives for the Australians 26 and for the Lower Hunters a total of 27 for Col. II.

Above the Lower Hunters alterations are few. In Asia (A^1) the Santals pass from Col. III. to Col. I., and the Ossetes (A^3) likewise. In Africa (P^1) the Batauana and the Wawira (A^2) are omitted from Col. IV., but not placed elsewhere for lack of specific information, while the Bambala (A^3) are moved from Col. IV to Col. II. Finally, in North America (A^2) the Wyandots pass from Col. IV. to Col. II.

1. We omit the Riverina and Murray R. tribes (see note following this Appendix). We also omit "other N.S. Wales tribes" from col. ii because numerous members of this group are included individually.

2. See notes following this Appendix.

NOTES TO APPENDIX C.

AUSTRALIAN TRIBES.

The sources from which the lists in the text have been compiled may be very briefly indicated :—

1. *Adelaide* :—Eyre asserts private vengeance and denies knowledge of any stated punishments, except spearing in expiation of death, which, as he describes it, was a private matter. Though his statement is negative in form his account is very clear and concise, and the only doubt is whether it should not be extended further. He knew large tracts of S. Australia, and he applies this statement in particular to the Murray River natives as well. We omit them however because the reference is vague, and in some parts of that river show punishments did exist, so that the limits to which Eyre's statement holds could not be ascertained.

2. *Kaiabara, Maryborough, Wiradjuri, Turrbal, Wotjobaluk, Wurrunjerri, Yuin* :—These form a set of tribes described by Howitt in which ceremonial or expiatory encounters occur between groups. The details given vary from case to case, but we may fairly refer to the same general type in the Makjarawarib instance quoted from Howitt in the text. There is no hint of any impartial body to which the two groups appeal, and we take it that the object of the ceremonial combat or exposure is on the part of the group to avoid a feud and on that of the offender to avoid private vengeance or the alternative of being surrendered by his group.

Occasional traces of higher intervention appear, as among the Kaiabara if two men of different clans quarrelled about a woman. They are omitted from both columns.

The case of the Gringai (Howitt, p. 343) is probably the same, though the description is less precise. Several of these tribes who fought out some disputes within the group, but the Yuin would seem to have controlled vengeance there. Among the Turrbal individual quarrels were settled by a fight. (Howitt.)

3. *Port Lincoln* :—A similar system (spoken of in one place as a "trial") is described by Wilhelmi (*apud* Brough Smyth) and Scharman (*apud* Woods), who also describes irregular vengeance, in terms which we take as meaning that it was a purely personal or party affair.

4. *Riverina and Murray River* :—According to Beveridge (*Aborigines of Victoria*) among the Riverina tribes no offence was criminal except murder. Then the "whole tribe" sat in judgment. The criminal generally acknowledged his offence and was exposed to spear throwing (which was rarely fatal), and after it was received again as quite innocent. Perhaps every 5th man had killed his man. We do not know what Beveridge means by a tribe. In all probability it is another case of expiation in lieu of vengeance as between groups. This view is confirmed by the fact that the Riverina was largely occupied by the Wiradjuri. Among these Howitt, who knew the tribe personally, speaks of fights between sections, if a man is not given up. Beveridge's "Murder trials" would then be the ordinary ceremonial exposure as between district groups. We have entered the Riverina in our provisional list for group justice but

omitted it from the 2nd list and from "tribal justice." Le Souëf, writing in Brough Smyth in reference to the Murray River and Goulburn River tribes, speaks of enquiring into any theft or breach of tribal usage and describes the exposure of an offender to a blow from the injured party. This is subject to the same doubts, and, further, the reference is very vague. We have entered this tribe on our first list under justice within the group (p. 121), but have omitted them from our second as of doubtful interpretation. Under tribal justice we do not enter them at all. Le Souëf in fact asserts the occurrence of fights on murder charges at the corroborees. These would be like the ordinary inter-group combats, the tribe as a whole taking a part which is not clearly defined.

It should be noted that G. S. Lang (*The Aborigines of Australia*), writing of the Murray River basin generally, treats the justice done by the council as nominal, and says of the spear throwing that "if applied it is only to persons of little influence, or to avoid a war with some neighbouring tribe, for which they would sacrifice any one. A man bold and formidable with his weapons can do anything with impunity." This nearly coincides with the view that the ordeal is essentially a substitute for a feud, while beyond this it would come under what we mean by "occasional" intervention.

5. *Geawegal*:—This tribe had the ordeal, spears being thrown by the relatives, but as Rusden says that obedience would have been enforced if necessary by the assembled tribes it is possible that here we have something more than the fear of feud. It is therefore entered under public assistance. (Rusden writes in *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, App. F, and is quoted in Howitt.)

6. *Euahlayi*:—Mrs. Parker mentions prolonged tribal feuds arising from accusations of "pointing the bone." They are probably waged between groups of allied totems, but this is not properly clear, and the tribe is therefore omitted from our list. There are also traces of public justice (1) in connection with allegations of magic murder, when men of "all the kins" throw spears at the accused, (2) in the punishment of an extremely wanton woman, who may be bound and tossed by members of any of the clans and is abandoned by her relations to their pleasure. This would be one of our "occasional" cases. The Euahlayi therefore are not entered on either side.

7. *Bungyarlee and Parkinji*:—Vengeance for alleged magic by the relatives is described by Bonney (*J.A.I.*, xiii). The victim may apparently belong either to the same camp or to another, and this account implies that the two parties may normally be friends.

8. *Swan River, King George's Sound, Perth, and other W. Australians*:—According to Gray, the Matrilineal families are united for defence and revenge. The sorcerer points out the man who has caused death by magic and the relatives start to avenge the death. In case of wilful murder they slay the murderer and any of his friends. In case of accident the practice differs, *e.g.*, if in ordeal spear-throwing one shall accidentally kill the culprit he must be speared through both sides. All relatives are liable, if the culprit escapes his own relatives often assist in finding him, for until he is punished "the whole of his connexions are in danger." Wife stealing, adultery and incest are generally punished with death, but any other crime is compoundable by ordeal of spear-throwing, which often gives rise to further duels.

In addition to Gray we have statements from John Forest about the C. and W. Australians pointing in the same directions though less explicit, from Ph. Chauncy and Oldfield, both of whom describe retaliation mainly as between different tribes. Gray's one exposition covered N.W. as well as W. Australia.

Further we have Jones' statement in *Dr. Petermann's Mittheilungen* as to King George's Sound, which alleges not only feuds between local groups, but lawlessness and violence generally, Mrs. Bates' account of tribes within a radius of 200 miles of Perth describing fights between families generally appeased by spearing of the offender, and Salvados' account of the Swan River tribes in the interior. In all this district it would seem that justice is a private matter.

How to group the tribe over this large area is a question. We have made those divisions, King George's Sound as described by Jones, Swan R. as described by Salvados, Perth and other West Australians as described by Gray and Mrs. Bates.

9. *Bangerang*:—The Bangerang group described fully by Curr, who shows that there is nothing amounting to public justice in private matters. In the first place the Father was absolute in the family. Secondly, offences against custom sometimes had a "foreign" aspect, bringing about wars with other tribes. Within the tribe they were generally of the nature of a wrong to some individual who would make complaints in the camp. The accused also stated his case, and then anyone who liked would proclaim his views and the offender ought to make a customary reparation. If he did not he would probably be murdered by the injured party and no one would avenge his death. In cases of women disputes custom often compelled the offender to submit to spear-throwing ordeal. Sections of the tribe did not practise witchcraft against one another so that blood feuds were against other tribes with which however they intermarried. We take the Bangerang as a case where justice was private because the force behind custom, apart from opinion, is that of the avenger.

10. *Dieri*:—While theft and wrongful accusations gave rise to fights, magic murders were punished according to Gason (*ap.* Brough Smyth) by the Pinga or avenging party sent out by the Council. Accidental death in a fight would be avenged by the Pinga on the slayer's elder brother or father. This looks as though the Pinga must be privately organised, for while it is intelligible that one kindred should demand the elder brother's life as inflicting a greater loss on his offending group, it is not easy to see the way the council should take this view. Mr. Howitt (p. 821) adds murder as well as death by witchcraft to the offences dealt with by the council. Gason, who is Howitt's authority, speaks in another place (Woods, p. 259 seq.) of supposed murderer of any man with numerous relatives being slain by the Pinga, which looks as though its intervention apart from several matters were rather a matter of personal influence than anything else. If so it would correspond to our "occasional" justice. The tribe however is, in deference to Howitt's description, entered in the "public" side.

11. *Central and North Central Australians*:—Spencer and Gillen describe feuds between local groups arising out of magic murders. They also, particularly in the North, assign to the tribal council the function of dealing with offences, specifying in one place (*C. Austr.*, p. 15) breaches of the marriage laws and in another (*N. Austr.*, p. 25) these and magic

murders. Possibly these councils may have dealt with other offences as well but we do not observe instances. Very probably they would come under our " occasional " justice.

Schulze describes family vendettas on the Fink R. But on the whole we feel the evidence insufficient for the classification of these peoples.

12. *West Victoria* :—According to Dawson (*Tribes of W. Vict.*, and citations in Howitt, p. 335, etc.) the blood feud is recognised, but if the avenger escapes being killed in his turn he is summoned to the ordeal which takes place before the assembled " tribes." Dawson's " tribes " probably correspond to our local groups, so that the assembly of them is equivalent to a tribal meeting. As this meeting is said to enforce attendance we have a beginning of tribal justice proper. But in them from Dawson the group might elect to defend its man and bear the feud. From certain statements, *e.g.*, that a man would ask his dearest friend to avenge a brother's death, we suppose that vengeance may be just personal and among intimates, probably between the groups.

13. *Kurnai* :—From Howitt's *Kamilaroi and Kurnai* we learn that the clan division protects its members and exercises the blood feud. An ordeal may be substituted and the drawing of blood satisfies the relations. Bulmer (*ap.* Brough Smyth) says that among the Lake Tyers people there are no stated punishments, but that a man who is obnoxious to certain members of the tribe may be killed or called to the ordeal. We have entered them under private justice both in the group and in the tribe.

14. *Tongaranka* :—Offences against marriage law punished by the tribe. Individual offences, *e.g.*, theft, left to the sufferer to spear. (Howitt.)

15. *N.W. Central Queensland* :—Quarrels frequently lead to fights. At the close of which the old men hold an inquiry. If the victor is found to have been in the wrong he undergoes a similar injury to that which he inflicted with a similar weapon and if he had killed his man would be put to death. Quarrels are liable to spread to the whole camp. Hence the determined efforts to stop them. The man who kills his wife would have to deliver up one of his sisters to his wife's friends for death. If a man is murdered by one of another tribe, his tribe is visited in force and he is given up to stand the spear-throwing ordeal and a second life may be demanded in addition. Death is inflicted by the Council for violation of blood-relation, a group cester, or uninitiated girl. The blood brother of the culprit is responsible for his appearance and may suffer vicariously. Ordinary elopements are punished with an ordeal of knife-backing, but death is avoided owing to fear of vengeance by the victim's brothers, but if the parties are of forbidden groups both are put to death with the tacit consent of the blood-relations. It is clear that there is publicly assisted justice within the camp and group retaliation beyond it. The question is whether the camp corresponds to the local group or the tribe. Roth describes them as " messmates " possessing in common trade routes, markets, hunting grounds, being intermarriageable and making common cause in war against an enemy. This is clearly within our definition of one society. For N. Queensland Roth gives no details, but his general expressions are the same. For safety's sake we query this case under tribal justice.

16. *Port Darwin* :—Murder, according to Foelsche (*J.A.I.*, xxiv), is punished with spearing if murderer is a fellow tribesman, if otherwise with

death. Serious quarrels and sometimes fights are, he says, the natural result. Presumably therefore the punishment is inflicted by the aggrieved friends. Unfortunately Foelsche makes no definite statement nor do other authorities make clear that vengeance would be exercised within the tribe. It is therefore not entered.

17. *Kabi* :—Quarrels were settled by a duel of endurance (Curr, iv, 131), and according to Mathew (Two representative tribes) fights in the camp were frequent. Elopement also led to fights (Howitt). But we do not hear of homicide, and enter them only upon the more doubtful list.

18. *Herbert R.* :—Lumholtz (*Among Cannibals*) describes duels for theft, etc., but indicates that homicide would be differently treated. How it is dealt with he does not explicitly say, but speaks of tribal wars in revenge for witchcraft as well as for cannibal purposes, and witchcraft can, he says, be exercised upon a fellow tribesman. He denies all organisation beyond the "family tribe" so that for the purpose of tribal justice we might be justified in regarding this as a case of "no law." We have not however added it.

19. *Rose Bay* :—Collins, at end of 19th century, describes complicated series of acts of vengeance mingled with ceremonial exposures. It may be noted that in one case after the murderer had stood the ordeal he was killed by one of those who had taken part in it.

20. *Kamilaroi* :—According to Ridley (*J.A.I.*) murder was avenged by a man's totem class. A note in Howitt says that if serious complaints were made of a man's conduct a council of the headmen (? of the tribe or of the division in which there might be several) might desire his death. This we call "occasional" justice, and we therefore enter the Kamilaroi under col. i for tribal justice. Within the group there was promiscuous prostitution for adultery, so that it falls within col. ii.

We do not enter Ridley's other tribes separately under group i.

21. *Wakelbura* :—Howitt's account (esp. p. 223) indicates that homicide in fair fight or in a quarrel among comrades would be unpunished. On the Belyando R. generally, according to Curr's informants (*Austr. Races*, iii, 26) vengeance for alleged magic murders is exercised by the priests and, it would seem, on members of the same group. Further Howitt could hear of no headmen among the Wakelbura (p. 303). There is quasi-exhortive punishment of unlawful marriages, but for other matters there seems no regular restraint even within the group.

22. *Narrinjeri* :—Along with private vengeance there existed, according to Taplin (*ap.* Woods), a system of punishments by the council of the clan division. In case of murder of members of one clan by one of another the aggrieved party might invite the others to a combined council to "try" the case, and the murderer might then be handed over to his own clan for execution. This is an incipient judicial process, though we must suppose that the matter still really depended on the consent of the murderer's clan.

23. *Buntamara* :—All offences are punished by the tribe. The relations of the injured man fight and thrash the offender (Howitt, p. 333). We should take this second sentence to be explanatory of the first, Kirkham (Mr. Howitt's informant) probably meaning by the first sentence that the people generally dealt with offences, but on the whole the statement is too vague for entry.

24. *Waimbaio* :—Bulmer describes fights between relations arising out of elopements and the ravishing of the girl if unprotected. (K. and K. App. i.) Not sufficient for entry.

OTHER TRIBES.

25. *Loucheux* and *Kutchin* :—Bancroft, and Hardisty and Strachan Jones in *Smithsonian Reports* for 1886. These people live in bands headed by a chief or a medicine man. There is some discrepancy as between Hardisty and Strachan, and as there are said to be 22 tribes variously called Loucheux and Kutchin, either may be true of different peoples. (Bancroft, p. 146, treats the Loucheux as one tribe of the Kutchin.) There is however no mention in either account of any public justice. Hardisty states that among the Loucheux theft, lying and murder by shamanism are heinous crimes (pp. 319-20), but he does not say by whom they are punished. Killing an enemy in fair fight is honourable (*ibid.*). Strachan Jones says of the Kutchin that there is little or no punishment for theft, and he makes all redress definitely a private affair (p. 325). According to Hardisty mourners may "in a fit of revenge against fate kill some poor friendless person" (p. 317), and this is tabled for its ethical significance—though in other respects not quite appropriately—as a case of vicarious revenge.

26. *Western Dené* :—The Tsekenne (or Sekanse) including the Beavers and the Suanes, the East and West Nahane, the Carriers and the Chilcotin. There is much confusion in the nomenclature of these peoples—the best authority is Father Morice (*Trans. Canadian Institute*, 1893, etc., also *Proceedings*, 1888-9), but even in his statements it is not always clear whether the reference is to the whole group or only to certain tribes. The Tsekenne and E. Nahane are very primitive and have apparently no law or government (*Trs.*, p. 28, cf. *Proc.*, 143), but in regard to the latter the author's reference is not perfectly clear. They are omitted from the table. The other three are more advanced, presenting a distinction of class between nobles and commoners. The former collectively constitute the authority in the village, but except as to territorial rights they have no definite power. They pacify belligerents and settle disputes, but rather by persuasion than by other means. Instances are however related in which notables have shot dead disobedient villagers without having to answer "tooth for tooth." (*Proc.*, 142-3, cf. *Trs.* 28.) In the tables authority in relation to disputes being devoid of regular powers of coercion is entered under the head of arbitration. In a disconnected passage Morice mentions public flagellation among the Chilcotin but without saying by whom administered or for what offences. (*Proc.*, p. 164.)

27. *Semilkameen* :—Mrs. Allison (*J.A.I.*, xxi, p. 317) states that chiefs formerly had the power of life and death, but for what offences is not stated. She mentions summary vengeance or blood money for murder.

28. *Iroquois* :—The accounts of the Jesuits and of Loskiel (*Hist.* p. 16, etc.) show that in the 17th and 18th centuries there was no law but that based on retaliation. Morgan states that the council punished witchcraft with death and the adulteress by whipping. The second at least must be of later date, probably due to missionary influence. It is precisely what missionaries would have noted if they had found it in existence.

29. *Delawares* :—We follow mainly Loskiel, who is clearer than Heckewälder, though in general agreement.

30. *Creeks (Muskogees)* :—Accounts differ according to period.

31. *Pueblos of Mexico and Arizona* :—The pueblo is taken as a unit equivalent to the tribe rather than the primary social group among peoples of lower organisation. Bancroft speaks of organised government, but has little to say about justice except that the council supervises matrimony and forces young people in case of incontinence to marry under penalty of corporal punishment. This is probably due to missionary influence at some period. But Miss Marreco writes that in the New Mexican pueblos generally the council up to a recent period usually settled all disputes and inflicted penalties such as beating and compulsory work for "what might be called criminal cases." As to general administration the civil and religious functionaries are distinct and the war chief, whose functions are now small, is in some way intermediary. The system, Miss Marreco writes, is loaded with Spanish 18th century ideas.

Among the Tewar and Kopis of Arizona, on the other hand, Miss Marreco writes that there is really no one now charged with the administration of justice and of affairs generally (see her letter).

32. *Tarahumara, Tepehuane* and *Huicols* :—All previously under strong missionary influence, on which account they are only reckoned as queried cases in our additions. Floggings lavishly used for many offences, particularly unchastity. Very little Christianity remains. The governors hold authority from the Mexican Government. (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, vol. v, ch. vii, p. 140; ch. xxiii, p. 463; vol. ii, p. 247.)

33. *Aleuts* :—The account of the Atkha Aleuts is due to Father Yakoff, that of the Oonalashka is translated by Dr. Petroff in United States 10th Census from Veniaminov, but is given by him as a tradition only, the system having entirely disappeared under Russian rule.

34. *Chenzuas* :—In the account of these two peoples given in a report by Captain Newbolt (*J.R.A.S.*, vol. viii, p. 271 seq.) the author named 8 heads of clans, and stated that in case of murder they assembled and killed the murderer. In robbery, restitution; and if the thief had no property nothing was done. For petty offences, beating and reprimand by the head. The death penalty was executed in same manner and with same weapon as the murder: a clear case of the public authority taking over the function of retaliation (p. 275).

The Nundail, of whom there are 31 tribes, could not give the name any chief (p. 274) and say that in case of murder the perpetrators are put death in return (p. 273), while for theft and assault punishment corresponded with that of the Akwar. For both cases we have the statement that civil cases were disposed of by the heads, who had the parties before them and examined witnesses. As the Nundail could mention no heads it will be seen that with them justice was a matter of Retaliation—life for life in case of murder and restitution for theft.

35. *Negritos of Zambales, A* 1 :—The Negritos of this district are settled in rancherias within the jurisdiction of two Philippine small groups. (Reed, p. 30.) Murder is punishable with death but is almost unknown (p. 13), theft said to be punishable with death, but the thief is given time to pay a fine, or someone else pays it, in which case he becomes a slave (p. 13.) Adultery is also punishable with death, but com-

position is generally accepted (p. 64). Unfortunately our authority does not state by whom these punishments are inflicted. Martens says that in case of adultery it is the husband who executes the sentence, though he is usually satisfied if he recovers what he has paid for his wife. In the case of a daughter the father exacts payment. They are therefore not tabled except as allowing composition.

All the Negritos appear to live in very small groups, or "enlarged families," numbering 20 to 30, or at the outside 50, and to recognise a certain chieftainship in some elder of capacity, who settles disputes between the constituent families whose heads otherwise appear to have autocratic power.

36. *Bataks of Palawan* :—They have apparently taken to agriculture only within the last 20 or 30 years, but they previously traded with Christians or Tagbanuas. (Venturillo, *J.A.I.*, 28, p. 138.) Their institutions appear to be in a similarly transitional state. Statements as to their mode of government are conflicting. According to Venturillo the settlement is governed by a capitan chosen either by the chiefs of the provinces or by the local chiefs of the Barria, but authority is in the hands of an old man chosen for his superior merit, who dispenses justice with aid of the old men of the tribe. (P. 141.) According to Miller (p. 182), the old man is said to take cases to the chief of the tribe. He also quotes Venturillo as saying that in some districts there are no tribal chiefs (p. 185).

Alike in cases of murder, theft and adultery, the relatives may exercise vengeance on the spot, but if the matter is reported there is intervention by old men (p. 142). Murder may be compounded for a fine determined by them. Theft is punishable by a flogging, and adultery and abduction by fine. Rape if neither party is married is not an offence, but an effort will be made to secure marriage (p. 142).

37. *Schakswenses* :—The whole system of government and justice is overlaid by the Persian suzerainty. Disentangling the original system from this as far as possible, we find the blood feud at least as between different tribes, and retaliation in case of theft, subject to conciliation or to composition. (Radde, p. 423-5.)

The Italmen :—"The basis of justice is retaliation, but the statement ... he detected thief could not resist seems to imply a certain public intenance of the avenger. (Steller, p. 356.)

39. *Negritos of Alabat and Angat* :—These are typical apparently of the wilder Negritos of the Philippines but there is some difference in the description of them. Both live in very small groups of the enlarged family type. Among those of Angat all power is attributed to elders of families. Among those of Alabat we hear of punishment for crime which may possibly be taken as exercised by the elders on behalf of the group and so be deemed a sort of public punishment within the little kindred. We express this in the table by entering them under "No Law" but querying public justice within the group. (Meyer, *König. Ethn. Mus. Public*, 9, p. 33.)

40. *The Yakuts* :—The statement seems to refer to the time when they were not subject to Russian influence.

41. *Lushai (Kukis)* :—Dalton, Lewin and Shakespear differ widely in accounts of the Kuki, partly because there are many Kuki tribes, and partly perhaps because they are considering different periods, before or after the British occupation. We take only the Lushai, among whom the chief's

power over the criminal consisted apparently in offering him sanctuary. Personal injuries were punished by the sufferer or his relatives. But we have public justice as covering some private offences because some cases of theft at least were dealt with by fines. (Shakespear, *J.A.I.*, xxxix, p. 374.) The Kookies were a warlike predatory people, hardly to be graded adequately by their agriculture.

42. *The Kasak Kirghiz* :—Accounts of these people are not wholly consistent, but as they are estimated at 2,000,000 there is room for considerable difference. Some appear to be semi-civilised and have tanning, weaving and metallic industries, and agriculture. (Radlov, p. 469.) They appear to have had great khans and to one of them legislation on the basis of retaliation is attributed. (Levschin, p. 399.) The practice of retaliation is said to persist nevertheless.

43. *The Ainu of Japan* :—Public justice now prevails. Batchelor (p. 138) notes an earlier stage in which the power of the Father over wife and family was absolute as contrasted with the present time when he can do little or nothing without consulting his companions.

44. *Semang Sakai and Jakun* :—We have a great variety of statements as to particular groups of Semang Sakai and allied races which are not easy to reconcile. Bringing the statements of Martin, Skeat, Wilkinson and others together, we first distinguish the wholly wild groups which apparently live in small kindreds or possibly in groups including one or two different families but seldom having more than two or three huts. Whatever government there may be must be of purely patriarchal character, and while disputes are rare, according to Martin they do occur in relation to women, and if not settled by elders result in bloodshed. The groups seem to be as nearly as possible anarchical, and are tabled as having no law.

Coming to those exposed to the influence of Malay or Indo-Nesian culture, we have first the Central Sakai described by Wilkinson, who have chiefs who maintain some sort of order and use ordeals in the settlement of disputes, but have apparently no means of punishment. Then we have several other groups distinguished as the Kedah and Perak Semang and Sakai, the Sakai of Kuala Kernan, as well as the Mantras, the Jakun, the Basisi, or the Sakai of Salangor. Of these the Basisi and the Salangor, who have an elaborate government based apparently on Malay influences, are not tabled, the former because they appear to be mixed with the rest of the population without independent means of subsistence, the latter because their economic status is not clear. The former have systems of government and public justice of varying grades which, if we follow Martin may be ascribed mainly to the influence of the more cultivated peoples with whom they are in contact.

45. *Mundombe* :—Our only information about justice refers to adultery, which is compounded. The death of a wife will from whatever cause entail the payment of bloodmoney to her relatives by the husband. This appears sufficient evidence of the prevalence of the idea of compensation. (Magyar, p. 23.)

46. *Kuku* :—This is a complicated system in which the execution of justice differs a good deal according to the relation of the parties. People form clans with no chiefs and the clans form tribes which recognise a *chef de l'eau*, while there is also a landowner who is sometimes invoked in judicial matters.

Within the clan in the case of murder the kin go to the *chef de l'eau*, who forces the guilty party to pay compensation. In the case of rape the ravisher caught red-handed may be killed, otherwise the kin obtain compensation through the *chef de l'eau*, who is also appealed to in case of adultery should the landowner fail to induce the guilty to indemnify. In case of theft, if the thief will not pay an equivalent appeal is made to the *de l'eau*.

As between the clans or tribes, in case of murder the clan of the victim claim the murderer or a relation. In case of refusal a feud ensues. In case of rape husband and kin claim compensation. In theft and adultery appeal is made to the *chef de l'eau*.

Further, if collective action fail, individual vengeance may occur and even develop into an endless feud. Presumably much depends on the personality of the *chef de l'eau*. (*Varden Plas*, pp. 355-361.)

47. *Ewe speaking peoples*:—The government of these peoples is monarchy controlled by an aristocracy who form a Council, except in Dahomi where the king was absolute. (Ellis, p. 162.) Accounts as to administration of justice are not altogether in agreement, but retaliation is certainly recognised and responsibility is collective and vicarious. There are some differences depending on the rank of the parties. If the injured party is poor the family will usually accept compensation. Ellis states explicitly that among the Tshi, Ga and Ewe peoples the State, *i.e.*, the tribal or village chief takes no cognisance of offences unless they are such as concern the whole community, *e.g.*, treason and witchcraft. In cases of homicide, theft, rape, assault, injury, etc., the family alone exacts satisfaction from the other family, and only if no agreement is arrived at is the case brought before the chief, who until called upon cannot act. (*Yoruba speaking peoples*, pp. 299-300.)

48. *Beduans*:—The account is not very clear. It denies knowledge of genuine criminal justice. It says offences are generally settled in patriarchal fashion. It also speaks of accusation before the Pasha and of punishment by exile, but the Pasha acts very arbitrarily and interferes but little. The Pasha has superseded a native chief, and the conditions are probably transitional. (Munzinger, p. 156.)

49. *Massai*:—Our authority speaks of revenge and composition if there are no judges, but who the judges would be or what power they would have does not tell us. (Hollis, p. 311.)

50. *Nandi*:—Administration of public justice is not clearly stated but trials are mentioned. There is a clear distinction between murder inside the clan and outside the clan. In the former case the offender is looked on as unclean until he kills 2 outsiders; in the latter there is vengeance and composition. (Hollis, p. 73-4.) They were formerly hunters (p. 17) and their institutions are perhaps transitional.

കേരള സാഹിത്യ
അക്കാദമി

